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SECOND SERIES, NO. XIX. WHOLE NO. LI.

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ARTICLE I.

PUNISHMENT, ITS NATURE AND DESIGN.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

THE subsequent article, from one who is familiar with the origin, history and operation of law, will commend itself to the thoughtful and philanthropic portion of the community. In our estimation, exhibiting as it does our own views, it is worth its weight in gold. We hope every reader of the Repository will be deeply imbued with its principles, and we commend it to the attention of editors of weekly papers for extracts, in order that through their more extended influence, the public mind may be called to consider this all-important subject.—What is to become of us as a people; what are to be the consequences to our children, if the perpetrator of crime shall so awaken the sympathies of mankind, that in the morbid tenderness of their feelings for him, they shall forget altogether how much the general weal of society depends on the prompt infliction of proper penalties on the violators of wholesome law? ED.

THE most important concern of the State, is its Criminal Jurisprudence. Peace and order, the security of person and property, life and its incidents, in great measure, depend upon it. We sleep in safety through its guardianship; we go abroad without peril through its protection; multitudes feel no other

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restraint. The abandoned and the brutal acting out their wills, inflicting death, outraging person, robbing property, invading the dead hour of night and making its darkness and repose the facility of wickedness and means of terror, our houses ceasing to be our protection, in the power of burglars with us and all our comforts at their mercy, some suffering, all alarmed, are instances of the criminal law having failed of its first and most valuable office, the prevention of crime; are proofs of the inadequacy of its sanctions. To these may be added a long and foul list of forgeries, cheats and embezzlements, carrying ruin to the unsuspecting, and filching from widows and orphans, from the aged and dependent, bread.

But important as Criminal Jurisprudence is in this view, in another aspect it is of more weighty consideration. It affords the instruction under which the estimate of crime is made, and forms the common mind upon the subject. How shall a particular act be regarded? Is it criminal? Is it flagitious or venial? Is it scandalous or creditable? Is the commission of it imputed with infamy to the malefactor, branding its perpetrator with that character, or is it set down as the excusable failing or positive trait of a man of honor, not diminishing his respectability? To these questions the answers of the community will be in accordance with the criminal law and its administration.

There are, then, two objects of criminal jurisprudence;—the first is, to secure the community from injury by deterring the unprincipled and wicked from the commission of crime through dread of its punishment:—the second, to produce a just moral estimate, connecting crime and infamy, so that the unprincipled with any remains of self-respect or love of character, will not hazard the ignominy, and those yet untainted, and especially the youth in their training, shall receive proper impression, and be imbued with right sentiment with respect to acts of moral obliquity; making the thought of guilt revolting, and the mind to shudder and shrink at a suggestion of it.

The events of the time are sorrowful evidence, that there is relaxation of criminal law in efficacy both for restraining crime, and for instilling moral sentiments rendering the mind incapable of base purposes. It is deplorable to see the extent and extremity of suffering produced by crime, but more deplorable to notice the persons who are the criminals. The daily press, presentations of grand juries, the conversation of all neighborhoods, have for their common topics, want and woe spread through

society by the flagitious conduct of men who still more pitiable, have carried infamy into circles where we should expect nothing but unsullied purity, and where a good name should be of priceless value. Foul deeds, from ruffian violence upon life, through the black catalogue of arson, rape, burglary, theft, and swindling of every degree and contrivance, are common occurrences; and while from the halls of justice a voice proclaiming the fearful increase of crime, is sounding in our ears, the executive informs us, that there is a morbid sympathy with offenders interposing between crime and punishment. It is time for the community to take this subject into their serious consideration: we say *their* serious consideration; that the MEMBERS of the community shall investigate this subject so as to form positive opinions upon it as a practical matter most nearly concerning them. There are some men whose observation and judgment give intrinsic value to their conclusions, who say, that this subject of criminal jurisprudence has been wholly under the direction of notionists in philanthropy; that these notionists coming forward with gratuitous service, in organized and imposing forms, have arrested and played upon the superficial ear with sentimental refinement, and with the assent of the public always pleased to be relieved from duty, taking this subject under their own management, in effect have provided a substitute for punishment, which neither deters from guilt nor makes it abhorrent, and have schooled the common mind into aversion not to the commission of crime but to the condemnation of it. When has there been a murder with more aggravating circumstances than that of Adams by Colt? Yet the periodical, highest in political standing and probably most powerful in our country, represents Colt as the sufferer of vindictive vengeance, and arraigns all before whom his cause came in legal proceeding as its guilty inflictors. The law and its tribunals are condemned: the murderer justified. How much is there of this!—the law prostrated before the malefactor: the tide of sympathy sustaining the offender; justice down-trodden. In one paper we read the presentment of a grand jury, solemnly protesting, that pardons are so readily granted, that the administration of criminal law is a useless expense; in another, we have the message of the governor, the liberal dispenser of these pardons, deploring the relaxation of criminal justice, and complaining, that the court and jury convicting and sentencing one day, recommend to mercy and remission the next.

That there is fault somewhere in relation to this subject, all assert. The prevailing delinquency is shocking. It comes too near us. Where we have been best satisfied of integrity and religion, where the circle of family and friends has been of unstained honor, we are amazed with the astounding intelligence of deep and shameful guilt, involving the victims in ruin and distress, the perpetrators in wretchedness and infamy, all taking place where there was the fullest confidence of prosperity and honor. If property only were affected, if the only consequences were the rich made poor, the affluent reduced to beggary, and widows and orphans, the aged and dependent deprived of the support anxiously provided by the self-denying and frugal foresight of husbands and fathers, or their own stinted savings, it might be endured; but the wreck of innocence, of character, of moral worth is startling: it is a state of things not to be endured: the order of society will be reversed, and the profligate and abandoned form the public morals, direct the legislation, and control the administration and execution of the laws.

There is fault somewhere:—fault of no trifling nature, but debauching the common morals, and jeoparding the common safety.

Where is this fault? Certainly not in the severity of the laws. The advocates of clemency have been left to institute and perfect their own systems according to their own projects. They differ concerning the merit of these systems, and say hard things. The feature common to their systems is confinement to labor; but some require this confinement to be solitary, while others allow the convicts to do their prescribed work in company, but in silence. More clemency is not suggested except by a class of philosophers, who assert, that the word "punishment" is a brutal, savage expression irreconcilable with humanity, and insist, that the idea and the term ought to be expunged from thought and language. They argue, that crime is the result of diseased or perverted mind; that it can no more be charged upon any one than sickness or insanity; that where there is blame, it rests upon society for suffering the infection that corrupts innocence; and that the least that can be done is to provide hospitals to receive those who transgress the laws, and cure them of this malady. This doctrine has been expounded and enforced by a distinguished and popular lecturer, and received with no inconsiderable approbation. There is plausible reason for holding it to be the carrying out to its just

results of the principle of the prevailing systems ; an advanced position in the line in which these systems are the first stage. At present, however, the public mind is not prepared for this advance ; and it will not be pretended, that the relaxation of criminal justice, is chargeable to the severity of the laws. The only corporal punishment retained in our prevailing codes is that of death for wilful murder. The argument for this has been, that the law should make ruthless violence upon human life dreadful, and put forth its highest sanction to restrain vindictive malice and raging passion from gratifying their thirst of blood. But even this corporal punishment retained in this extreme case for this high purpose, is giving way before the principle which has rejected all others.

May we not then be allowed to inquire, whether the fault is not in the lenity of the laws ? The mere suggestion of such an inquiry raises the cry, "brutal," "savage;" but the times call for it, and no nervous sensitiveness to harsh epithets should hinder or prevent it. Mercy is a noble and exalted virtue : pity and commiseration may be weaknesses : when apparently amiable and seeming to proceed from pious feeling, they are not unfrequently immoral weaknesses, the workings of an artificial and morbid sentimentality. Sympathy with the convict in his guilt is both weak and wicked ; the most merciful of beings is the most inflexibly just. But upon the sight of a malefactor enduring bodily suffering for crime, no matter how ruffian or base, the energy of virtue through infirmity of depraved nature dissolves in sympathy ; and we absurdly misconstrue this failure of virtue, into virtue itself. In this way our laws have been framed, with the eye upon the suffering of the convict undergoing sentence, kindling into indignation because looking upon the punishment only, and seeking for the amelioration of it. In consequence, the laws are destitute of the truth and sternness requisite to exhibit crime and moral obliquity in their true character, and associate them with their just retributions. The natural result is the relaxation of moral principle ; the conscience becomes torpid ; there is a want of sensibility to personal guilt, settling into indifference. Every person of observation who will examine this subject experimentally or speculatively, by the common experiences of life or the true principles of philosophy, without affectation, will come to this conclusion. In the experience of the writer of this article, in cases of great criminality, astonishing when we consider the



standing of the offenders, it has not been practicable to produce in them any proper sense of their guilt; their minds will not receive the impression of the heinousness of their conduct; but they are impervious to the truth. We believe, there is the same reason, why such persons apparently with so little hesitation deeply implicate themselves in crime, and why they cannot be made sensible of the flagitiousness of their guilt.

The criminal law is the highest and most authoritative instruction upon the subject of crime. Moral philosophy is theory; it is reading, very good reading, and that is its principal use: "plays round the head, but comes not near the heart." The criminal law is practical; it comes home to all that is susceptible about us. The penalties it annexes are the standard of guilt. This law is learned in the operations and converse of society; it is a part of the moral light, received as readily as the light of day. Men become familiar with it without perceiving how: it enters with the first rudiments of knowledge, is incorporated with the first opinions and sentiments, and makes a part of the intellectual structure. According to the representation of crime in the criminal law of a community, and the standard of its guilt in the penalty prescribed for it, will be the opinions, sentiments and principles in that community: in their estimation such is the character of crime, and the degree of its guilt. This is not merely just reasoning; it is confirmed by experience. Many years ago the law, in a certain region of our country, prescribed for adultery corporal punishment, of which a part was to sit on the gallows an hour with a rope round the neck. A citizen in that region, of superior ability, wealth, popularity, and prospects, of general upright deportment, was detected in adultery. He was ruined; denounced by unanimous opinion, he fled his state. In another region, about that time, a citizen, to explain facts tending to raise a suspicion against him of a particular offence, publicly confessed to the fact of adultery. The writer then resident in the former region, well recollects his own amazement, and that of all with whom he was conversant, at a man's voluntarily acknowledging such guilt. It was deemed of far deeper turpitude, than that involved in the suspicion. Subsequently in another region, where the penalty for adultery was one hundred dollars to be recovered in an action of debt, the writer learned how little was to be apprehended from the imputation of it. Yet the writer has no doubt, that the actual suffering because of adultery in the first

mentioned region, great as it was in the single case, was far less than in the last mentioned, where the law throwing no restraint, the evils of indulgence were more frequently experienced, producing no small amount of sorrow and ruin.

Upon what principle has our criminal law been framed, and the vital part of it, the punishments, determined? We have before mentioned, what all observers of events must have remarked, that the community, to be freed from the burden of this subject, have suffered it to pass into the hands of philanthropists, who have undertaken it gratuitously for the sake of making their improvements. The subject is perplexing and painful; and society seems willing to enter upon any experiment to avoid what is man's, as well as God's, strange work—punishing man. The principle of the improvement introduced, looks to the malefactor as the prominent object, and requires as the main end to be answered, his reformation. As results of this, he must not be pained by bodily suffering; for this is "brutal," "savage": nor must he be marked with ignominy; for this would destroy his self-respect essential to reformation. In the outset, however, these philanthropists fall into the error of judging of the feelings of the culprit by their own, and of supposing that the same things will affect him and them in the same manner. This is a common error: the refined and sensitive shudder at the thought of inflictions which the hardened criminal would scarcely feel, and are well nigh convulsed in agony with imagining infamy to which he would be utterly indifferent. Such is the process of vice through which he passes to conviction of crime, so depraving are the influences to which he subjects himself, so conversant is his life with hardship and wickedness, that he is callous and obdurate. It has been found in the experience of penitentiaries, in cases of release by pardon, that convicts can feign penitent feeling, tender affection and good resolution so as to gain full credit, with so little change of principle, that their first step of liberty is into their former course of wickedness, proving themselves, under all their specious demeanor, radically corrupt. We by no means assert, that there is no reformation in penitentiaries. We have rejoiced over one prominent case. But that case is not an argument against capital punishment, and does not properly belong to the view we are now taking. There may be, we presume there are, other cases; but we are confident that all who have reflected upon this matter, or who will turn their attention to the candid

examination of it, will sustain us in saying that they who have been disposed to make the most of this part of the subject, have used a great many more words than they have adduced facts to frame their argument.

This philanthropy is not only mistaken in investing the culprit with the refinement and sensibility of its advocates, who would be more deeply affected by an unkind word, than he with the pillory; but it is in greater error in becoming so absorbed with his reformation as to lose sight entirely of the proper means to preserve the innocent from guilt. There is obviously something else to be cared for besides the criminal and his comfort, some other concern than merely to contrive how light we can make the penalty of his transgression. He has cast behind his back every consideration that forbade the flagitious purpose of his lawless will: he has trampled, with entire disregard of social duty, upon the comforts, rights and safety of others: it seems inequitable, in providing punishment for his offence, to act upon this same disregard of what is due to the worthy part of society, and look only for what will be lenient to him. We recur then to the proper objects of criminal jurisprudence, and take the position, that instead of the criminal's comfort and reformation being the first concern, they are the last: the first being to produce such an estimate and consequent sentiment of abhorrence of crime in the common mind, that the thought of it shall be loathsome, infamy inseparable from its image: the second, to make such sensible impression of pain and ignominy upon the wicked and unprincipled as to deter them from hazarding the consequence of crime: and the last, so far as consistent with most effectually securing these results, the comfort and reformation of the offender. We disclaim all cruelty; we reject sanguinary laws as defeating their own purpose; but we do not take either our standard or our definition of cruelty or sanguinary laws from persons who have trained themselves to be shocked, and cry "brutal," "savage," at a punishment which the wisest of men, by the pen of inspiration, prescribes for a child (Prov. 19: 18; 23: 13, 14; 13: 24). Crime is brutal, is infamous. The office of law is to make it appear what it is, by punishment stamped with its own character. We do not allow to the men who, under the name of mitigating punishment, frustrate this its proper end, their claim to peculiar benevolence. Is it benevolence so to frame the criminal law, that it is lenient in its restraints upon those

who, regardless alike of mercy and justice, exercise cruelty upon the defenceless, robbery upon the unprotected, knavery upon the confiding, and spoliation upon property, notwithstanding all the precaution that can be used for its security? Especially is it benevolent, so to frame this law, as to make no adequate impression upon those whose minds are forming under its influence of the heinousness of crime, of the sternness of justice, but on the contrary, to imbue them with moral principles so loose that they fall before common temptations into the grossest delinquencies, and then plead, in unfeigned simplicity, that they have done nothing very wrong? Who would not desire to have the salutary impression of punishment, marked with suffering and infamy, upon the mind of his child to deter him from guilt, rather than the influence of this alleviated system which, pervaded with sympathy for criminals, makes easy the descent to crime and impairs the sense of its degradation, but nevertheless, in a manner suited to the taste of speculative refinement equally effects the ruin of its victim? In the first case the parent might enjoy a child worthy and honorable: in the last a malefactor leniently treated by law. We have no taste for this lenity, and no esteem for the benevolence that exercises it. We do not deny, we fully admit, that men of the purest benevolence and most exalted worth, have been, and are zealously engaged in projects for mitigating punishment of crime. What we say is, that what they have done or are doing, may not be benevolent in an enlarged and just view of the subject; for we do not dispute the benevolence of particular cases of mitigation. But we further say, that many who have been zealous in this system of alleviation, and are now zealous in it, are mere notionists in benevolence. The man of energy, who to prevent crime, prescribes law to make it painful and infamous, has tenfold more true sympathy with his race. The energy of his character arises from strong feeling. Refined sentimentality, the great element of much benevolence, often consists of mere description; told in words, represented in picture, exhibiting its own contrast in matter of fact. Sterne, if not the father, the successful fosterer, of this sentimentality, was cruel even in the tenderest relations of man. Robespierre distinguished himself by a treatise against capital punishment; we next see him the bloodiest butcher of the French revolution. Lebon, the commissioner of the National Convention at Arras in the reign of terror, was constrained to pass a capital sentence by the threat



of a dungeon : he rioted in carnage : he was tried, condemned and beheaded for his indiscriminate and inhuman massacre of men, women and children. But for this accidental drawing out of character Robespierre and Lebon would have had their distinguished place among the benevolent mitigators of criminal law.

We may then take the position, that those who advocate lenient retribution for crime, have no just claim to exclusive refinement and mercy. Indiscriminate and sensitive leniency may consist with personal cruelty of disposition as manifested in the men referred to, and unless tempered by practical intelligence and wisdom, instead of being excited by morbid sentimentality, will issue in calamity to the community. What can be more calamitous, than that person and property should be unsafe, our houses insecure, our careful investments for the weak and dependent in jeopardy, through lawless and unrestrained violence, plundering, and embezzlement, unless it be the exposure of our children and friends to be corrupted in principle so as to have no sensitiveness against crime, and be liable in the common courses of life to involve themselves in its turpitude and ruin ?

Observation of the criminal jurisprudence of other countries, their execution of criminal justice learned in the pages of their history, and the reflections naturally arising strengthened by treatises written and efforts made in those countries for reforming this branch of their polity, are productive of much error upon this subject in its relation to this country. In the old world the criminal law is indeed cruel and sanguinary. In England, a few years ago, one hundred and sixty offences were felonies of death without benefit of clergy. With regard to their punishment, Blackstone remarks : "Disgusting as this catalogue may seem, it will afford pleasure to an English reader and honor to the English law, to compare it with the shocking apparatus of death and torment to be met with in the criminal codes of almost every nation of Europe." It is no wonder, therefore, that in those countries complaint is made of cruel punishments ; and that the kindly properties of our nature are appealed to, to interpose for their amelioration. Besides, these punishments are aggravated often by being vindictive, the dictate of personal malice, for political offences not unfrequently acts of pure patriotism, and the sufferers the noble, the worthy, the accomplished, the beautiful—Sidney, Russel, Jane Grey,

Mary of Scotland. Views of this subject in other countries, have no application to these United States. But our philanthropy must have food; and our philanthropists must be indulged in the same luxury of sentiment and the same fervency of eloquence: and taking our criminal codes for their subject, they have well-nigh divested crime of every thing infamous and dreadful, making it to be pitied as misfortune rather than frowned upon as wickedness. We should consider, that what is just opinion with respect to the criminal codes of other nations, is prejudice in our favored land. We have most sparingly provided capital punishment: only for most atrocious offences, and now rarely allowed except for the highest of all, murder. In our states, punishment can fall only upon determined, wilful violators of law. The jury-trial, public sympathy, the all powerful voice of public opinion, are the safeguard of all others. We know no political offences; we merely see how carefully they are defined on our statute-books, and how fully our people are protected with respect to them. We have no high dignitaries who can imbue the laws or their administration with their malevolence. In our dispensing of penal justice, nothing weighs against the accused but the public consideration; the weights that unbalance justice, are all on his side.

There is another view of this subject which ought to be taken, with great deliberation, in this country. Russia, the first of nations to abolish capital punishment, is a severe and cruel government. It is the kind and circumstances of punishment in the particular case, that constitute cruelty. The persons who are the subjects, their number and condition; the crimes for which it is inflicted, freedom of thought, hasty or misconstrued expressions; the dreary desolation to which they are consigned, from affluence, ease, noble station, family endearments, to hopeless banishment in regions of ice and famine, without a comfort, to endure the pains of personal wretchedness, and the anguish of the wretchedness of all they love. Such is the extolled mercy of this iron power. In Russia, where government is strong, and the principles of its strength inherent, a despotism, it is the course of wisdom as well as mercy to labor to mitigate its rigors, relieve from its hard bearings, and lighten its oppressions; but in these United States, where government being the common voice, having no power but that spontaneously conferred for common safety dependent upon the variable humors of public sentiment, is necessarily weak, the

same course, which in Russia is as useful as it is humanizing, is public cruelty, enervating what is already too relaxed, and breaking down the defences, at best too difficult to be kept up, of social order and personal security. Our whole system of polity is so constructed as to require the aid of public sentiment, and in nothing more than in the administration and execution of criminal law. In our system this law, if it be such as not to impart energy and sternness to public sentiment with respect to crime and its punishment, but to relax and depress it, must subvert itself, and lie a dead letter in the statute-book, annulled by its own moral influence. The sight or the idea of the pale, trembling, convicted murderer, may produce two very different trains of sentiment; and what this train shall be in the particular person, depends upon the manner in which his mind has been formed to regard crime and punishment. In one of these trains, pity of the convict, sympathy with his sufferings, desire to avert his awful doom, and the superficial inquiry, who can be hurt by sparing him? will follow each other, conducting to the conclusion, that the punishment is malicious and vindictive, and the convict the murdered not the murderer. Such are the sentiments and reasoning in the periodical before referred to, in Colt's case. In the other of these trains of sentiment, the feelings are absorbed in the consolation, that the rights of society are vindicated, that justice visits outrage with equal-handed retribution, that in the most solemn sanctions of law, its majesty is revered and its voice obeyed, and that no private considerations avail to divert public duty from its faithful guardianship of the community. Such a view, while it gives a general sense of security, from assurance that the law is vigilant and energetic, rests with a feeling of dread upon the evil-minded from the conviction that there is no escape for guilt, and at the same time it gives firmness and vigor to virtue by manifesting the practice of justice, and the rebuke of iniquity to be alike its attributes, and that it is equally inconsistent with it to justify the wicked, as to condemn the righteous. Under the first train of sentiment, the determination will be to spare the malefactor; under the last, to protect the community, to warn the profligate, and to fortify the innocent by inseparably connecting in their minds crime and infamy.

The course of criminal jurisprudence in this country has been directed by the first described train of sentiment, and as a consequence has extended and fostered it. The profession has

been, not to annul punishment, but to form and graduate it according to the requirements of humanity in the advanced civilization of the age ; indeed to change punishment from "brutal" and "savage," to human and civilized : characterizing by "brutal" and "savage" the punishments provided by the pilgrim fathers, Penn and his counsellors, and those patriots and sages, who conducted our nation through the revolution, in their system of civil polity under which the people were imbued with such love of order, fixedness of principle and intelligence of subordination, that (what every other people who have tried the experiment have utterly failed in) they sat down in well-regulated government constituted by themselves, in the full possession of civil and religious liberty. It should be added, that the epithets, "brutal"—"savage," applied to punishments determined by laws enacted before and directly after the Revolution, in the original States of this Union, by men as distinguished by conscientiousness and humanity as by practical wisdom and consummate ability, whose memory is cherished as ornaments of our race, are defined by the delicate feelings and refined taste of those who in pity to the convict have interposed for his relief. The result has been, that in nearly every state the criminal code has been changed, rejecting what had been deemed an essential element of punishment, for a substitute of an entirely new principle.

A prominent reason for this change has been the greater certainty of punishment. It has been argued, that the efficacy of punishment consists in its certainty : that if it is an established thing, that the law will be executed without fail, so that the offender, if detected, must suffer the penalty it prescribes, greater leniency may be indulged ; for men will not risk small penalties, when they see little chance of escape : that it is this hope of escape, that leads to crime : that when punishment is severe juries will not convict, or upon conviction governors will pardon : and that these considerations are familiar to those who direct their minds toward the commission of crime, and form important items in their calculation of the probability of eluding punishment. These arguments seem to have been allowed for the purpose of demonstrating the fallacy of human reasoning on this subject. For never was human reasoning more conclusively confuted by experiment. The difficulty of conviction has been more than doubled ; and the facility of obtaining pardon increased at least tenfold. With respect to conviction, a

man prosecuting an extensive and prosperous business has shot dead his own daughter, of deliberate purpose and with direct preparation, and has been acquitted of all guilt. Another man has literally hacked to death his own father, and been cleared of wilful murder. A post-master has been convicted of stealing money from the mail by breaking open letters passing through his hands as post-master, a most deliberate, base and dangerous crime, and has been recommended by the jury in their verdict finding his guilt, to mercy. It is deemed a victory, when a verdict is obtained against a notorious swindler with the fruits of his iniquity in his hands; and this victory cannot always be achieved. It is not necessary to pursue this point; all conversant with courts of justice have been convinced by their own observation. With respect to pardons, we have before us a notice of a pardon in December 1842, from the President of the United States, of a sentence passed in April 1840 for fifteen years imprisonment for aiding to abstract money from letters in a post-office: not quite three years of the term suffered, more than twelve remitted. In New York, a statute prepared with peculiar care and solicitude, to prevent the distressing crime of duelling, so fraught with calamity, has been deliberately violated; the violation has been boastfully acknowledged in the very teeth of justice; and it has been pardoned; forming a precedent that sanctions the crime, and prostrates the law. Every kind of crime, the sentence upon which is sufficiently inconvenient to justify the trouble of applying for pardon, is pardoned. Where the law appoints an imprisonment of a few years, the greater portion of the term is reprieved. In Pennsylvania, as we have seen, the public press throws its complaints in relation to this matter upon the governor, and he throws them back upon the courts and juries. In New-York the advocates of the abolition of capital punishment, agreeing that there must be some protection of life, and that imprisonment for life of the wilful murderer was as little security as could be required, admitted, that to effect such a sanction of law; it was necessary to change the constitution so as to take from the governor the power of pardon in this particular: it being found upon investigation, that sentences for life had generally been put an end to by pardon within four or five years: the term which these sentences for the most atrocious crimes had been allowed to run under the pardoning power, not being equal to what the legislature had prescribed for

minor offences. There is no special cause of complaint against courts, juries and governors with respect to these matters; the influence of the laws allowing nothing painful and degrading in punishment, has not only concealed or glossed all that is infamous and flagitious in crime, but in the spirit of the laws producing the same spirit of carefulness of the malefactor lest he should be treated with severity, has formed the common sentiment into aversion to the infliction of any suffering even of imprisonment with abundant comforts, so that the moment it begins, there is a tide of sympathy for the convict, and of indignation against all who have contributed to bring him to justice, no matter how much he has injured them by his criminality. A man noted in the community for practical wisdom, just thinking, sound judgment, in a time of general alarm through the frequency of crimes, was heard to express doubt, whether society had strength adequate to its own protection; whether our system of government by laws could repress crime so far as required for common safety: and that same man within a few months afterward, signed a petition and was active in exertion for reprieve of a burglar. The writer has seen a man with his flesh appearing to creep upon hearing it said, that a hardened felon, old and bold in violation of the peace of society, ought to be whipped; while he listened with entire composure to the relation of the exploits of a midnight robber, breaking into houses in the defenceless hour of sleep, carrying peril wherever he went.

That there is evil, is attested by the common voice. But what remedy can be proposed? We shall not attempt to answer the inquiry. The public mind, if it will make itself master of this subject, will find a remedy. The common sagacity, brought into exercise, is adequate to the exigencies of the community. The fault lies, and the mischief arises, when there is an unpleasant and difficult work to be performed by the body politic, in their consenting for the sake of ease, that those who will take it off their hands may do it in their own way. The discussion of this subject heretofore has been all on one side. Had not the philosophers of leniency insisted upon the total expunging of capital punishment from the criminal code, probably they would have been permitted to retain undisturbed possession of all the rest of the field. As that is a corporal punishment, and depends upon the same reason as other corporal punishments; its being absolutely enjoined by the supreme Lawgiver,

may lead to the investigation, whether all previous time comprehending the wisdom of legislation in all places and ages, has been so very wrong in prescribing this mode of punishment.

We have seen that, in determining punishment, the attention may be directed to society, inquiring what is wise and expedient for its protection and well-being, or to the offender to see how he will be affected by the infliction. In the last case the motive that will be excited, will be commiseration. We may, without hesitation, take the position, that this undistinguishing but powerful principle ought not to be allowed to influence the making or administering of criminal law. It is too much to require, that the only concern shall be for the malefactor. In forming our judgments in this matter, we should be careful to survey the whole ground. Ours is a government of laws. The laws are not vindictive: they inflict pain, not that the wrongdoer may feel, but that the community may learn the character of crime, and be preserved from its baneful evils; that the profligate may be terrified, and the innocent instructed and warned. We have no need to guard against personal vengeance; there is no cause for apprehension that punishment will ever be aggravated from this source; but how can we expect to fortify youth against temptation, to preserve them from allurements to indolence and indulgence, leading them to become plunderers of their fellow men instead of pursuing the toil-worn course of patient, painstaking industry, unless by powerful safeguards? And can we have these safeguards in the completeness requisite for their efficiency, without the co-operation of the criminal code visiting crime as base and rendering it odious? It is very certain, that the form of law which takes the part of the offender, to make his crime sit as lightly as possible, conjuring up the spirit of compassion to show its winning aspect and seek its gratification in the opportunity afforded by the convict's condition, as a case of suffering humanity, will do nothing available for this end. But there is a powerful principle of our nature, which we can call to our aid by judicious legislation, and produce by it most salutary moral effects in this relation. The mind may be trained to connect specific things with such revolting associations, that it cannot endure the thought of them. Upon this principle it has been experienced of the worst of men, that, all abandoned as they are, there are things of which they cannot be prevailed upon to harbor the design. It is a most useful purpose of punishment to produce such associations, to save

men from crime by making it repulsive to their feelings. It is the direct and sure effect of this system of leniency to defeat this purpose, of all others the most efficacious for fortifying innocence and elevating the morals of society. The objection to punishment, that it is degrading, is mistaken: the object is to hold up the culprit as degraded, to manifest that crime does degrade the perpetrator. It is no just objection to punishment as brutal and barbarous, that it subjects the convict to pillory and stripes: because the law in this way holds up the desert of crime, the infamy to which it leads, and the abhorrence with which it should be regarded. Punishment should not be excessive nor disproportionate; but, in its very nature, for infamous crimes it must be painful and ignominious. Take away these attributes and it ceases to be punishment, and crime ceases to be infamous. Whatever may be the self-complacence of the philanthropy that has succeeded in infusing kindness into retributions of justice until there is nothing discernible in them, to which the term "infliction" is applicable, there is no benefit even to the convict, certainly none to society. There can be no benefit from glossing crime. Although the law be ever so refined and delicate in its sentence, the criminal is ruined: his principles are corrupted: he has destroyed his self-respect: he is conscious of baseness; and he must drag out life under the slow torture of self-contempt, unless indeed he be incapable of such feeling, and then he will be the wretched slave of his vices and wickedness. The law raises no sufficient beacon to warn against ruin because of delicacy and kindness toward the guilty; and thus widens the way for the increase of their number, and leaves them to the unseen but bitter fruits proceeding from want of strictness of integrity, and defect of cautiousness with regard to deviation from rectitude.

Those who have devised confinement to labor as a substitute for corporal punishment, have given to it a coloring, the pure figment of their own imagination. There is no essential element of punishment in it. In the mass of cases it produces no suffering: it makes no impression upon the public of abhorrence or dread of crime: it shows the convict in the power and under the treatment of the kind and benevolent, whose business it is to perform toward him the offices of humanity, and by good usage and painstaking expedients school him into virtue: restoring him to society a reformed and worthy member. Whether this is the course of wisdom to deter from crime, either the



abandoned who look to it as a means of profit or gratification, or the innocent allured by temptation, no one who has read, with any advantage human nature or the word of God, can have a doubt. The soldier for the defence of the country, or the sailor in the ordinary pursuits of commerce, is very nearly as much abridged of freedom, and undergoes much harder service than the convict of atrocious crime. Poverty, even in this favored land, makes severer exactions than our criminal codes. In the majority of cases the convict's condition in the penitentiary is greatly preferable to what his own exertions in unrestrained liberty would procure for him: the labor less, the accommodation better. A German gentleman visiting the Philadelphia prison in 1798, and seeing the prisoners at dinner, remarked, "I declare, if the convicts in our country were treated as these men are, people would commit crime to enjoy their fare." The stigma of the penitentiary is obviously wearing out: most of its inmates never had the cultivated sensibility requisite for feeling it. The operation of the penitentiary process is to remove the convict out of sight, the thing most expedient for his comfort, pleasant to his feelings, and judicious for covering his guilt with oblivion, keep him from observation until he is forgotten, and at last restore him to society with the advantage of being unknown, to put in successful practice new schemes of wickedness. There is no impression upon the public mind making crime dreadful or abhorrent; and for hardship and suffering, it would be far severer upon the convict to discharge him from the bar with his guilt made certain and notorious, to return into the community to meet its frowns, and support himself by his own exertions under its indignation and watchfulness. It is about a century, since the English poet wrote

"Her poor to palaces Britannia sends:"

we may say in plain prose, we send our convicts to palaces. The influence of the POOR LAWS in England has been calamitous in the extreme, and in every relation it is deeply deplored. If analogous consequences shall proceed from our Penal Codes, the calamity will be greater and more truly deplorable.

One of the most zealous of the original advocates of that system in Philadelphia, where the Penitentiary system was conceived, produced, fostered, and reared, as is said, to perfection; after trial of it for more than thirty years under most favorable circumstances, says, "The reformation of the Penal Code of

Pennsylvania in the year 1790, was considered by many friends to humanity, as an epoch in the history of the State, and great credit has been given to it by writers and statesmen in Europe, for the wisdom of substituting confinement and hard labor, in place of the disgusting and demoralizing public punishments to which, by the former code, criminals were subjected. The most signal good consequences were expected to flow from the system by reforming the morals of those condemned to submit to it, and by preventing crimes. No one was more sanguine on this subject than the writer of these observations, who heard and read every sentence of praise on the system with great satisfaction. They raised his native state, in the public estimation; they reflected honor upon the man with whom he was connected by strong affection, (Dr. Rush,) and to whose ardent zeal in the cause of humanity the United States are indebted for the promulgation of the plan, and for his steady and able support of it, for several years previous to its adoption, in opposition to the confederated influence and talents of the bench, the bar, many ministers of the gospel, and other individuals of weight in society. Above all, the writer was led to believe from almost daily conversation with him on the subject, for some time after it went into operation, that it would in a few years work an entire reformation among the lower order of mankind. He did not even think it an utopian idea, that crimes would scarcely be known in Pennsylvania after the new system had been a few years tried. We all know, and some of us have felt, that such have not been the effects of it; the records of the prisons and the presentments of grand juries, show that crimes have greatly multiplied, and the fear of hard labor and confinement lost its influence, if it ever had any, upon the vicious, nay upon those who have been repeatedly subjected to them. It may, therefore, be useful to inquire into the causes to which the failure of the system is to be attributed, since, until these are known, the proper remedies cannot be applied; nor can any means be suggested, which would be likely to check the alarming and annual increase of crimes." [Extract from *American Edition of Edinburgh Encyclopedia*, published in 1832.]

The position that there is an increase of crime, is denied by the advocates of the new system. In the last annual report of the Prison Discipline Society, p. 26, is a chapter entitled "DIMINUTION OF CRIME," stating the proof and cause of the alleged diminution. The writer of this article was once an advocate,

and with great sincerity and confidence, of this new system, under full conviction of its efficiency and practical effect to diminish crime, and its supplying the most judicious and effectual means of executing penal justice. He entertains the highest respect for the Prison Discipline Society, and cordial esteem for the very worthy persons connected with it, with some of whom it is his privilege to have a slight acquaintance; but he cannot consider, that a society organized to carry out a particular project, or its agents or members, are well qualified judges to determine the usefulness or success of their chosen measure. The mind becomes engrossed with its favorite subject; its admiration is constantly growing through its continued attention; whatever comes in conflict with its prepossessions appears unreasonable and wicked, and its investigations, perceptions and conclusions must be partial. Can we suppose, that what we have read constantly in the periodical press, in the presentments of grand juries, in governors' messages, heard in uniform conversation on this subject wherever introduced, and felt in the distresses around us, has no foundation? and what ground can there be for this, unless there has been an increase, we may say more, an alarming increase of crime! We have no doubt, that Temperance Societies have produced much effect in diminishing the number of crimes. Assaults and batteries, and the ordinary outbreaks of violent passion under excitement, occasioning at one time the greater number of criminal prosecutions, in most districts have become very rare, and in some have nearly ceased. These societies have also elevated particular portions of the community above other crimes. But must we not confess that, in other classes of society, and other crimes of far more fearful grade and corrupting influence, there have been most deplorable accessions to the number of malefactors. In the statistics of crimes and misdemeanors in Massachusetts the past year, it appears there have been seven hundred and seventy-seven convictions of crimes; that there have been seventeen hundred and sixty-four examinations before the prosecuting officers; that there have been eighty-three sentences to the penitentiary; that there have been two hundred and seventeen trials for offences against person, five hundred and twelve trials for offences against property, and nine hundred and thirty-eight for misdemeanors. The increase in crime is stated as two hundred and forty-seven. The defalcations of men in public trust in New-York city in the year 1842 are set down in the public newspapers of the highest character

as 670,000 dollars. We see, that there is a vast amount of crime, that does not consign to the state prison. The two hundred and seventeen offences in Massachusetts the past year against the person, are of higher grade than assault and battery, which is in the number of misdemeanors. One effect of the new system has been to depress the grade of crime. Stealing in Pennsylvania is punished with short confinement in the common jail: such has been the sentence in all the cases noticed. We can well remember when the crime of stealing was deemed of far higher grade, than that of burglary is now. In New-York a crime of basest turpitude, considering the standing of the culprit, involving large amount, of most pernicious example, has received sentence of like lenity. We will further remark, that the improved state of society tends to the diminution of crime; and that the increase of it, the deplorable statistics of it in Massachusetts, where, according to the state of society there ought to be very few crimes, is proof of great mistake in criminal jurisprudence.

We propose nothing. We doubt, whether the community ought to rest satisfied with the present state of criminal jurisprudence. In order to any change, there ought to be an investigation of principle. Our sole object is, to bring this subject before the public mind for examination, and to suggest some points on which, we believe, there is radical error. The question how crime should be punished so as effectually and properly to fulfil the purpose of punishment, is of vital importance and most difficult solution. We have seen, that punishment has even a higher aim than the protecting of property or person, in contributing to elevate the common morals and fortify innocence against contamination by imbuing the public mind with a just sentiment of the turpitude of guilt. We think, that the body of the community are convinced, that there have been serious practical mistakes in this matter; and that benevolence in pursuing its metaphysics of clemency, has not only impaired the defences of social order and security, but enervated moral principle. There is not a proper quickness and keenness of sensibility to the baseness of crime. It is very manifest, that our knowledge of man, and our philosophizing upon his susceptibility of good impression, and the aptness and adequacy of prescribed motives to produce anticipated effects, do not enable us to treat successfully human depravity. We need instruction; and we have in our power means of instruction worthy of implicit reliance. But the mere

mention of the Bible raises the cry of sectarian, UNION OF CHURCH AND STATE. The Bible is regarded as the book of the church: the church is deemed, and truly, sectarian; for in this country where we have no established denomination, every church consists of a religious sect, and the inference is therefore drawn, that the Bible is sectarian; discarding it from all use but in the church, or in religious concerns, so that to search the Bible for instruction or wisdom in civil affairs, is considered a positive impropriety. The church, by claiming to be the only accredited expositor of the Bible, and paying no deference to any use or construction of it, in any of its bearings, except by its own functionaries, countenances and justifies this view of it. But it is a most hurtful prejudice. We are not Mohammedans nor Budhists: this will be at once conceded; but what is no less true, is practically denied—we have not cast away all religion; we are not an Atheistic or an Infidel nation. We do not, as a nation, reject religion: we are a Christian nation; as a nation we acknowledge God, we acknowledge his attributes, and government as declared in his word, and we receive the Bible as his revealed word. We do not allow the church to interfere in our civil government; but we do not, therefore, disown the Bible to be the word of God, nor disclaim his authority or our duty. We adore his perfect wisdom; and who dares take the ground of directly opposing or deviating from his instructions in any matter to which they are properly applicable? The ground upon which the principle of our Institutions places us in relation to this matter, is, that we admit no infallible expositor of the Bible; but that it is the right and the duty of every man, by the honest and diligent application of his own mind, to understand it, and conduct himself in all his relations, as well public as private, in as out of office, according to this understanding, so far as it affords him a principle of judgment and action; he, and no one else, being responsible. Upon the ground of our civil and religious polity, harmony must result from reciprocal deference of the different parts of society to each other in matters within their appropriate spheres, the church not interfering in matters belonging to the civil government nor the civil government in matters belonging to the church. The notion that the Bible is sectarian, appropriate to the church, and not the instructor of every man, is an essential part of that corruption which built the papal hierarchy; consigning every thing of a spiritual nature to the church exclusively—as a consequence making that

infallible, and destroying all freedom of opinion. The issue has been that, in the establishment of rational liberty, men have left in the church all that had been appropriated to it, and thus through blind prejudice have deprived themselves of the very best help which they could have for the wise use and improvement of their high privileges—the word of God.

What, then, is the instruction of the word of God in relation to this exceedingly difficult matter, determining the punishment of crime? With respect to the crime of murder we can have no doubt. Immediately after the flood, while our Preserver was accepting with special favor the spared remnant of mankind, uttering in the accents of abounding mercy the covenant, that the ground should not be cursed any more for man's sake, but that while earth remaineth seed time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, and day and night should not cease. He ordained the law—"Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man." This is the primal law of our race rescued from destruction, to replenish again the earth, given upon the inception of the new condition they were entering upon, as the rule for all succeeding generations. It stands unrepealed as the law of God to man. Its principle differs essentially from that which is relied upon to sustain the alleged improvement of our penal codes; it justifies the element in punishment, to which the terms "brutal," "savage," have been so liberally applied in the advocacy of this improvement. This same principle is manifest in all punishment prescribed by our Maker. We have nowhere warrant from him to fritter away penalty of crime through sympathy for the criminal. He visits transgression with uncompromising retribution. He did not spare even his own Son. At the same time he is the most merciful of beings; and this his unyielding course with respect to crime, is in mercy's cause and for mercy's sake; that men may know the character and desert of crime, and through this knowledge be fortified with principle to withstand its allurements, to guard against its temptations:—"that they may hear and fear, and commit no more any such crime."

The law which we have cited was no part of the law of Moses. It was given to all mankind, and is the law of all men who admit the right of their Maker to govern them. It imposes as a duty on mankind to punish murder with death: our Maker, our sovereign lawgiver, solemnly enjoins an imperative

duty upon man to protect, by requiring blood for blood, the life of man, because made in the image of God. It recognizes also, and justifies the principle of punishment by corporal infliction; it further shows, that our creator is not indifferent to our social state; but that he holds the members of society responsible for the public evil of allowed criminality, and exacts of them to institute and make effectual sufficient safeguards to protect and preserve from the defilement of guilt. It is true, that the Mosaic law was given to the nation of Israel specially; and that it is not obligatory as law upon any other people; but it is as true, that these laws do manifest the principle of unerring wisdom in respect to punishment. We say the principle with respect to punishment: not that the particular punishments should be prescribed for the particular offences, or that the punishment of death, for the specified offences, should be transferred into any other code; but when our Maker has prescribed for punishment stripes and corporal inflictions, it is presumption indeed for us to deny that punishment can properly be of such a nature, and worse than presumption to characterize such punishments as brutal and savage. Whom do we brand with savageness and brutality by this charge?

To the argument deduced from the principle involved in the punishments prescribed by the ALL-WISE in the laws ordained by HIM for his own people, the common answer has been, that they were at the time in a state of barbarism, a horde of barbarians, incapable of refined impressions, or of being operated upon except by the grossest means: these gross or brutal punishments were, therefore, adapted to the condition of those for whom they were provided: but that the progress of civilization, elevating to refinement, requires a correspondent change. We have heard this position in relation to that people, very thoughtlessly asserted, and asserted by persons who ought at least to have examined the subject before pronouncing an opinion. We ask the proof of the barbarism of that people when receiving their law. The law itself implies nothing of the kind, but the contrary. "Thou shalt neither vex a stranger nor oppress him." "Thou shalt not afflict any widow or fatherless child." "Thou shalt not revile the judges, nor curse the ruler of thy people." "Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling-block before the blind." "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart: thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer sin upon him." Such laws as these, we might add the

laws against incest and others, are not laws of barbarians. We then refer to the history of the people in the wilderness, and aver, that they will compare advantageously with any nation of the present time. It is true, that they were great sinners against their God, and he visited them with sore judgments. But if our history were written by the pen of inspiration, or our sins were dealt with immediately under the direction of God taking cognizance upon the spot, what would be said, or become of us? What would be the effect now, of such a judgment as punished the enviousness and thirst of office of Korah, Dathan and Abiram? Besides, the laws given to them, were ordained for permanent laws, to organize and govern the state as God's chosen people in the land of his promise. There never was a suggestion of the change of these laws while that nation remained. Thou "gavest them right judgments and true laws, good statutes and commandments," is the just character of these laws given by inspired truth. The objection brings itself to the point, that we are wiser than our Maker, and understanding man better than he, can devise a better system of criminal jurisprudence.

Others, to obviate this principle deduced from the laws ordained by God, reply that the New Testament has superseded the Old. But what is there in the New Testament for mitigating punishment? It may be remitted altogether, but only through the death of the cross. The suffering of the highest possible punishment, the amazing infliction of punishment, is the only way of mercy in the New Testament. "If thine eye offend thee pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire: where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched:"—"and shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth:" "and in hell he lifted up his eyes being in torment:" "and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever:" "and they gnawed their tongues for pain." There is certainly nothing in the letter or spirit of the New Testament requiring or justifying the disconnection of pain from crime, corporal suffering from guilt; nothing to mitigate the penalty of iniquity. Nor can we suppose, that the Old Testament has transmitted to us the mind of the infinitely wise God for no purpose. No part of it has been placed on record, and preserved as his word without design. "Now these things were our examples to the intent we



should not lust after evil things as they also lusted." "For whatsoever things were written aforetime, were written for our learning." "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." If we do not approve the principle which enters into punishment as God prescribes it, it is not because his law was made for barbarians, and what he has preserved in his word as the teachings of his wisdom, is savage and fit only for savages, not adapted to improved society; but because we do not regard crime as he regards it, nor know how, as he knows, to deal with the depravity of our nature. We believe, that some of the worst evils of the great apostacy, are cherished by the churches. One of these we have alluded to, the consigning of the Bible to the church as its special deposit for its peculiar edification, and thus depriving society in its secular concerns, the administration of its legislative, executive and judiciary departments, of the benefit of the knowledge, wisdom and just moral sentiment that would arise from its proper estimate and consequent careful, general study. In this relation people of intelligence do not hesitate to lay down absurdity for practical doctrine. It is taken as a clear proposition, that on morals, and moral questions, the church owes no deference to the law of the land, but decides by its special paramount authority; and that only in things indifferent will it be influenced by the consideration of what the constitution of society makes the rule of every member, and the instruction of inspiration makes obligatory on the conscience. What is morality but conformity to law? and it begs the question, to say that the church ought not to observe the civil law when it sanctions sin. What is sin? Whence does the church derive its infallible authority to determine this point, so as to set aside the adjudication of the civil power in cases within its legitimate cognizance? We have no doubt, that laws may be resisted on the ground of their oppression and wickedness. So may the church: and its history shows more just causes for this extreme resort, than that of the civil power. But let it be considered, that these are exceptions not to be discussed, dangerous to be contemplated. The result of such a condition in the relations of the church and civil power, is mutual aversion, so that appealing to the word of God in matters of highest concern of a civil nature, although it is directly applicable, is repelled by the civil power as inadmissible. There is action and reaction:

the church absolves itself from all duty to respect civil legislation, as utterly incompetent; and civil legislators interdict all reference to religion and its associations as inconsistent with rational liberty and enlightened government.

We should be glad to discuss more largely than our remaining space allows, the incident of reformation. We are aware, that the reformation of a criminal, who has proceeded to the point of conviction, must be difficult under any regimen. We believe, however, that shutting him out from intercourse with men, and in a condition where nothing of interest to him depends upon his exertions, whether in solitary confinement, or under any other prison discipline, is not the way of reformation. Social influence, and the value of character, and the need of character, and the necessity of procuring livelihood, afford motives for amendment, and may lead to it. But repentance is the only principle of reformation: without this, no change for the better contains in itself any promise. To repentance, a just sense of the turpitude of the crime, is essential. Punishment that does not break the spirit, provokes it. To deal leniently with fault or crime, is the direct course to produce irritation; leading to the conclusion that the guilt is venial, and the infliction undeserved. There is neither wisdom nor mercy in daubing with untempered mortar. To repent, a man must have a just sense of the baseness of crime, and of his own baseness as criminal, for an abiding sentiment; the punishment that produces this effect is the punishment of reformation. Nothing is more unphilosophical and unscriptural, than to disallow a punishment because it tends to produce the consciousness of vileness and degradation; for it is the very state of mind that repentance requires. "If they accept the punishment of their iniquity," "thou hast punished us less than our iniquities deserve," are given as indications of this state of mind; it never arises until a man is forced to see and feel the true desert of guilt. Treat a man as unfortunate, let him feel the regrets and condolence of humanity, in his wickedness, and pride and indignation will be the natural fruits: he will not admit the infamy of his crime unless the abjectness of his condition fastens upon him the revolting truth.

[Since this article went to press, another alarming illustration of the truth of some of its statements, has been afforded in the acquittal of Mercer, charged with the murder of He-

berton. The provocation was, indeed, aggravated, but could never justify the perpetration of murder. Men must not be permitted, on any account, to take vengeance into their own hands. The majesty and sacredness of law must be maintained, and the violator of it be made to feel the keen edge of its severest penalty, or we must revert to a state of barbarism, in which each man shall be obliged to wear his own weapon of defence.

The ground of acquittal in this case was insanity. But who believes in the fact of Mercer's insanity? It is a miserable plea: and wo to us when every murderer, who shall perpetrate the awful act under the excitement of passion, amounting indeed to madness, shall be able successfully to urge this now every-day plea. The only safe ground to take on this point is, that no one shall be entitled to the plea of insanity, who is not an unquestionable subject for the insane asylum: and let the mad-house be the future home of every one acquitted on that plea. Friends, also, who claim acquittal on this ground, ought to be, by law, liable to punishment for allowing the insane person to walk abroad in society, to the detriment of its peace.

It is, in the present case, especially to be regretted that, on the return to Philadelphia of the lawyers who plead for Mercer's acquittal, they were welcomed by the shouts of the multitude, and the waving kerchiefs of some of the softer sex, and escorted to their lodgings. Among these were wise and eloquent men, who know the value of law to this republic, and one who has held the high office of governor of New Jersey, bowing deference to the shouting crowd, and, with bare heads, most respectfully expressing their sympathy with those indecent expressions of joy at the result. Better, far better had the ex-governor and his associates decidedly manifested their disapprobation of such proceedings, and gone to their closets to weep over the growing disregard of law and morbid feeling of compassion for the guilty. We are apt to forget that the murdered one has friends, as well as the murderer, and that the former are, at least, much as entitled to our sympathy as the latter.]—ED.

## ARTICLE II.

## THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE, CONFIRMED BY THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ABORIGINES.

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IN styling the native American race, *Aborigines*, we would be distinctly understood not to regard them as indigenous, as the term in its strict acceptation implies, but merely that the era of their isolation goes back beyond the reach of history. As Americans, no part of Anthropology or the Natural History of Man, can be more interesting to us than that of our Aborigines. From time immemorial, the vast theatre of the western hemisphere has been thronged by numberless inhabitants. While many tribes of these people have lived and died without leaving a trace of their sojourn on the face of the earth; others, as in tropical America, at the period of its Spanish discovery, were a polished and cultivated race, living in large and flourishing cities. There is a third class of Aborigines, still more ancient and more civilized, known only by their monumental antiquities, scattered over the United States, South America, and the intermediate region; but even these, no doubt, belonged to the same great family of the human race. The recent investigations of Stephens, Norman, and others, among the ruined cities of the southern states of North America, (the first having closely examined and studied forty-four sites in the peninsula of Yucatan alone, exhibiting the vestiges of *ancient American civilization*,) have revealed the monuments of a people, who constitute now, perhaps, the most interesting enigma in the history of the world. The eastern continent has been called the *Old World*; but here, in the *New*, are stupendous ruins, which, perchance, may have flourished in their most palmy day, yea, some of them may even have been antiquities, when the seven hills which subsequently sustained the great city of the Cæsars, knew no other habitation than that of the shepherd's hut of Faustulus. When Solomon was laying the foundation of the first temple ever raised by man to the honor and glory of the true God, here may have existed the *ruins* of temples—those vast pyramids which distinguish the primitive history of man in regions the most remote, and apparently the

most widely separated. We do not, however, possess any precise data by which to determine the remoteness of the earliest American civilization; and we are not among those, as will be seen in the sequel, who incline to the opinion of the *extreme* antiquity of some of the now existing ruins. Unlike the decayed and ruined institutions of the Old World, as, for instance, those of Thebes, Babylon, Palmyra, and Petræa, which have left upon the institutions of posterity their sign, thus transmitting their greatness and glory; those of America, on the other hand, have left us nought save the memorials of their existence impressed upon the surface of the earth. It matters not that, in the deserted halls which once blazed with the glory of mighty kings, the wild Arab with his camels should now lie down at night; for the important principles which those nations, in the progress of man's civilization, were destined to evolve, have been, notwithstanding the dissolution of their own social and political institutions, bequeathed to the world.

What we propose to demonstrate in the investigation of this subject, is, that Revelation and Science are both beams of light emitted from the same Sun of Eternal Truth. As truth can never be in opposition to truth, so it has been found that many investigations into the laws of natural science, which were thought at first to conflict with Holy Writ, have been discovered in the end, as will be shown in this inquiry into the *unity of the human family*, to afford confirmation and elucidation of its divine truths. The question now before us is one, the decision of which is not a matter of indifference either to religion or humanity. As the testimony of the Sacred Scriptures is received with implicit and reverential assent by the readers of the Repository, the belief that all mankind are the offspring of common parents, constitutes, of course, a part of their creed; but it is our intention, in the following pages, to establish the same conclusions independent of the Mosaic records, thus showing that the Author of nature speaks the same language as the Author of revelation. This is the more necessary, as there have not been wanting writers who maintain that the declaration, that the Creator made of one blood all the nations of the earth, does not comprehend the uncivilized inhabitants of remote regions; thus excluding the Negroes, Hottentots, Esquimaux, etc., as inferior in their original endowments to those which are now known as the Caucasian variety of the human family, and thus attempting to justify the institu-

tion of perpetual servitude; and hence it becomes requisite, both to meet these skeptical theorists on their own ground, and also to investigate this question upon the strict rules of modern inductive reasoning, to abstract our minds from all extrinsic evidence not bearing directly as matters of fact upon the subject. Voltaire was one of the first to observe that "none but a blind man can doubt that the whites, negroes, Albinos, Hottentots, Laplanders, Chinese, and Americans, are entirely distinct races." Those *μυθοῦρα*, half-men, half-brutes, as the ruder tribes are designated by M. Bory de Saint-Vincent, are excluded in his classification from the "Race Adamique."

The authors whose writings we have carefully studied in reference to this subject are the following: Blumenbach—" *De Generis Humani Varietate Nativa*," and his *Collectio Craniorum Diversarum Gentium*; Prichard's " *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind*," and his recent work, entitled, " *The Natural History of Man*;" Morton's " *Crania Americana, or a Comparative View of the Skulls of various Aboriginal Nations of North and South America*;" and " *An Inquiry into the Distinctive Characteristics of the Aboriginal Race of America*;" Lawrence's " *Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man*;" Smith's (Samuel Stanhope) " *Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species*;" Lyell's " *Principles of Geology*;" Wiseman's " *Twelve Lectures on the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion*, delivered in Rome;" Smith (Rev. John Pye) " *On the Relation between the Holy Scriptures and some parts of Geological Science*;" as well as Humboldt, Bradford, Stephens, etc., on *American Antiquities*." To James Cowles Prichard, however, we acknowledge our deepest obligations; for to him we stand more indebted for knowledge upon the subjects treated by him than to all the rest combined.

Before considering the physical, moral, and intellectual characteristics of the American Aborigines, we shall here introduce the known facts relative to the *geographical distribution of the human family*, in order to show that there is nothing in the relative position of America that forbids the supposition of an exotic origin of its native inhabitants. The geographical distribution of man is, indeed, one of the most interesting problems in history; and history, if we exclude the Mosaic account, affords no data for determining the great problem of man's origin. Any one who allows himself to speculate upon this

subject, will at first view be inclined to adopt the opinion that every part of the world had originally its indigenous inhabitants—*autochthones*,—adapted to its physical circumstances. By this hypothesis, a ready solution is afforded of some of the most difficult questions presented in the investigation of the physical history of mankind; for instance, the remarkable diversity in figure and complexion observed among different nations—their difference of moral and intellectual character—and their peculiarity of language, and even dialectic differences, observed as far back in antiquity as the days of Jacob and Laban. We might thus explain the fact that the oldest records, ever since Cain went to the land of Nod, seldom allude to an uninhabited country; or the no less surprising fact, that in many parts of the world, as for instance Central America, or even the very soil now pressed beneath our feet, we discover vestiges of a primeval population, who, having dwelt there for ages and brought the civil arts to a comparatively high degree of cultivation, were swept away before the dawn of history. But many of these obscurities will be made to disappear before the light of science, like mist before the morning sun, thus reconciling in many points science and revelation. It will even be seen, as the result of modern ethnographic science, that the four hundred dialects of America,—a multiplicity of languages which was at first deemed incompatible with the Scripture narrative,—all have the most extraordinary analogies; and still further, that *all the languages of men are to be regarded as dialects of an original one now lost!*

But to return to the *geographical distribution of man*. The probable birth-place of mankind—the centre from which the tide of migration originally proceeded—has always been, on the assumption that the whole human race has descended from a single pair, a matter of speculation with many. History points to the East as the earliest or original seat of our species, as well as of our domesticated animals and of our principal food. That this birth-place was situated in a region characterized by the reign of perpetual summer, and the consequent spontaneous production, throughout the year, of vegetable aliment adapted to the wants of man, has always been a favorite conjecture. From this point, with the progress of human population, men would naturally diffuse themselves over the adjacent regions of the temperate zone; and in proportion as new difficulties were thus encountered, the spirit of invention was gradually called

into successful action. In the early stage of society—the hunter period—mankind from necessity spreads with the greatest rapidity; for 800 acres of hunting ground, it has been calculated, do not produce more food than half an acre of arable land. Thus, even at a very early period, the least fertile parts of the earth may have become inhabited; and when, upon the partial exhaustion of game, the state of pasturage succeeded, mankind, already scattered in hunter tribes, may soon have multiplied to the extent compatible with the pastoral condition. In this manner may a continuous continent, in a comparatively short period, have become peopled; but even the smallest islands, however remote from continents, have, with very few exceptions, as for instance St. Helena, been invariably found inhabited by man,—a phenomenon susceptible of satisfactory explanation.

The oft-observed circumstance of the *drifting of canoes to vast distances* affords, without doubt, an adequate explanation of the fact, (on the supposition that the human family has had one common source,) that of the multitudes of islets of coral and volcanic origin, in the vast Pacific, capable of sustaining a few families of men, very few have been found untenanted. As navigators have often picked up frail boats in the ocean, containing people who had been driven 500, 1000, and even 1500 miles from their home, there is nothing in the relative position of America that forbids the supposition of a trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific origin of its Aborigines. A number of such instances are related by Lyell, on the authority of Cook, Forster, Kotzebue, and Beechy. A Japanese junk, even so late as the year 1833, was wrecked on the northwest coast of America, at Cape Flattery, and several of the crew reached the shore safely. Numberless instances of this kind might be cited. In 1799, a small boat, containing three men, which was driven out to sea by stress of weather from St. Helena, reached the coast of South America in a month, one of the men having perished on the voyage. In 1797, twelve negroes escaping from a slave ship on the coast of Africa, who took to a boat, were drifted, after having been the sport of wind and wave for five weeks, ashore at Barbadoes. Three natives of Ulea reached one of the coral isles of Rodack, having been driven, during a boisterous voyage of eight months, the amazing distance of 1500 miles. The native missionaries travelling among the different Pacific insular groups, frequently meet with their countrymen, who have been drifted in like manner.



"The space traversed in some instances," says Lyell, "was so great, that similar accidents might suffice to transport canoes from various parts of Africa to the shores of South America, or from Spain to the Azores, and thence to North America; so that man, even in a rude state of society, is liable to be scattered involuntarily by the winds and waves over the globe, in a manner singularly analogous to that in which many plants and animals are diffused. We ought not, then, to wonder that, during the ages required for some tribes of the human race to attain that advanced stage of civilization which empowers the navigator to cross the ocean in all directions with security, the whole earth should have become the abode of rude tribes of hunters and fishers. Were the whole of mankind now cut off, with the exception of one family, inhabiting the old or new continent, or Australia, or even some coral islet of the Pacific, we might expect their descendants, though they should never become more enlightened than the South Sea Islanders, or the Esquimaux, to spread, in the course of ages, over the whole earth, diffused partly by the tendency of population to increase, in a limited district, beyond the means of subsistence, and partly by the accidental drifting of canoes by tides and currents to distant shores."

Thus has the earth been widely peopled in the earliest periods of society; and in later times, as some nations became maritime, important discoveries were made by accident. In the year 862, Iceland was discovered by some mariners bound for the Feroe Islands, who had been thrown out of their course by tempests. The discovery of America by the Northmen was accidental; and so was the discovery of Brazil, in the year 1500, by a Portuguese fleet, which, in its route to the East Indies, departed so far from the African coast, in order to avoid certain winds, as to encounter the western continent.

In our researches into the origin of the varieties of mankind, it is necessary to dismiss all argument *a priori*. Let us repudiate that speciousness of argumentation which maintains that it is much more consonant with the wisdom of the Deity that each region of the earth should teem *ab initio* with vegetable and animal productions adapted to its physical circumstances, than that immense tracts, while a single species is slowly extending its kind, should remain for ages an unoccupied waste. The question as here viewed, belongs to the domain of natural history, and especially to physiology and psychology, as based upon the observation of facts. Hence, too, it is obviously im-

proper to set out, as most writers on the subject have done, with a distribution of the human family into certain races, as this is in fact a premature anticipation of the result. It is only by proceeding in the analytical method, surveying the ethnography\* of various countries, and deducing conclusions from the phenomena collected, that the subject can be legitimately investigated.

Preliminary to the consideration of the distinctive characteristics of our Aborigines, more especially as it is important to have, in every scientific inquiry, a clear idea of all the terms employed, it may be well to state that by the term *species*, in natural history, is understood a collection of individuals, whether plants or animals, which so resemble one another that all the differences among them may find an explanation in the known operation of physical causes; but if two races are distinguished by some characteristic peculiarity of organization not explicable on the ground that it was lost by the one or acquired by the other through any known operation of physical causes, we are warranted in the belief that they have not descended from the same original stock. Hence *varieties*, in natural history, are distinguished from *species* by the circumstance of mere deviation from the characters of the parent stock; but to determine whether tribes characterized by certain diversities, constitute in reality distinct species, or merely varieties of the same species, is often a question involving much doubt,—a doubt which can, however, be generally removed by a comprehensive survey of the great laws of organization.

Species is defined by Buffon—"A succession of similar individuals which re-produce each other." By Cuvier—"The union of individuals descended from each other, or from common parents, and of those who resemble them as much as they resemble each other." He adds—"The apparent difference of the races of our domestic species are stronger than those of any species of the same genus. \* \* \* The fact of the *succession*, therefore, and of the *constant succession*, constitutes alone the *unity of the species*."

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\* The term *Ethnography*, derived from *ἔθνος*, nation, and *γραφω*, I write, is generally restricted to mean the classification of nations from the comparative study of languages; or, in other words, it is comparative philology. But, throughout this article, we use it in a more extended sense. We shall speak not only of *philological* but *physiognomical* Ethnography.

As regards the physical characteristics of the American Aborigines, Dr. Morton arrives at the following conclusions:

"Thus it is that the American Indian, from the southern extremity of the continent to the northern limit of his range, is the same exterior man. With somewhat variable stature and complexion, his distinctive features, though variously modified, are never effaced; and he stands isolated from the rest of mankind, identified at a glance in every locality, and under every variety of circumstances; and even his desiccated remains, which have withstood the destroying hand of time, preserve the primeval type of his race, excepting only when art has interposed to prevent it."

From this and other considerations, all of which will be noticed in detail, Dr. M. arrives at the final conclusion, "*that there are no direct or obvious links between the people of the old world and the new.*" But notwithstanding the high authority of Dr. Morton upon this subject, we shall attempt to show, and as we conceive successfully, the utter fallacy of this inference.

In surveying the globe in reference to the different appearances of mankind, the most extraordinary diversities are, indeed, apparent to the most superficial observer. The Patagonian and Caffre, compared with the Laplander and Esquimaux, are real giants, the stature of the latter being generally two feet less than that of the former. What a striking contrast does the coarse skin and greasy blackness of the African, present to the delicate cuticle and the exquisite rose and lily that beautify the face of the Georgian! Compare the head of the Caucasian, having those proportions which we so much admire in Grecian sculpture, with the flat skull of the Carib or that of the Negro with its low retreating forehead and advancing jaws! Or behold in one the full development of intellectual power, as displayed in arts, science, and literature, and in the other a mere instinctive existence! Hence arises the question:—*Have all these diverse races descended from a single stock?* Or, on the other hand: *Have the different races of mankind, from the beginning of their existence, differed from one another in their physical, moral, and intellectual nature?* This inquiry opens to our view a wide and interesting field of investigation; and although the extreme diversities of mankind just adverted to, would seem, at first view, to forbid the supposition of a common origin, yet we find them all running into one another by such nice and imperceptible gradations, not only in contiguous countries but among the same people, as to render it often impracticable,

independent of the individual's locality, to determine to what family of the human race he belongs. Hence we surely do not despair of disproving Dr. Morton's deduction, that our Indian "*stands isolated from the rest of mankind.*"

In order to present a more general view of the subject, we shall now endeavour to point out the most important diversities by which the human family is distinguished, as we find them separated into different races; and to determine in connection with the main object of this inquiry and as tending to elucidate it, whether these races are merely varieties of one or constitute distinct species.

In the general classification of mankind, we find that nearly every author has some peculiar views. Thus, while Cuvier makes the distinction of three races, Malte-Brun has no less than sixteen. As the division of Blumenbach, consisting of five varieties, viz., the Caucasian, Mongolian, American, Ethiopian, and Malay, is the one most generally adopted, it may be well to present here their general distinguishing characters. Among the principal characteristics, those of the skull are most striking and distinguishing. It is on the configuration of the bones of the head that the peculiarity of the countenance chiefly depends. Although as previously remarked, the various families of man run into each other by imperceptible gradations; yet, in the typical examples of these five primary divisions, a very marked difference is observable.

(1.) In the *Caucasian* race, the head is more globular than in the other varieties, and the forehead is more expanded. The face has an oval shape nearly on a plane with the forehead and cheek-bones, which last project neither latterly nor forwards as in other races; nor does the upper jaw-bone, which has a perpendicular direction, to which the lower jaw corresponds, give a projecting position to the front teeth, as in the other varieties. The chin is full and rounded. This variety is *typically* characterized by a white skin, but we will show that it is susceptible of every tint, and that it is in some nations almost black; and the eyes and hair are variable, the former being mostly blue, and the latter, yellow or brown and flowing. It is the nations with this cranial formation that have attained the highest degree of civilization, and have generally ruled over the others; or rather, as we would show more fully did space allow, it is among these nations that the progress of civilization and the development of the anterior portion of the brain, each exercising on the other a mutual influence, have gone hand in hand. Of this variety of

the human race, the chief families are the Caucasians proper, the Germanic branch, the Celtic, the Arabian, the Lybian, the Nilotic, and the Hindostanic.

(2.) In the *Mongolian* variety, the head, instead of being globular, is nearly square. The cheek-bones project from under the middle of the orbit of the eye, and turn backward in a remarkable outward projection of the zygoma. The orbits are large and deep, the eyes oblique, and the upper part of the face exceedingly flat; the nose, the nasal bones, and even the space intermediate to the eye-brows, being nearly on the same plane with the cheek-bones. The color of this variety is olive or yellowish brown, and the hair is blackish and scanty. This variety of the human family has formed vast empires in China and Japan, but its civilization has been long stationary. It has spread over the whole of central and northern Asia, being lost among the American polar race, the Esquimaux, on the one hand, and the Caucasian Tartars on the other. Extending to the Eastern Ocean, it comprehends the Japanese, the Coreans, and a large portion of the Siberians. On the south, its limits seem to be bounded by the Ganges; while in the Eastern Peninsula, it is only in the lower casts that the Mongolian features predominate over the Indo-Caucasian.

(3.) The *Ethiopian* variety, which recedes the farthest from the Caucasian, presents a narrow and elongated skull, the temporal muscles, which are very large and powerful, rising very high on the parietal bones, thus giving the idea of lateral compression. The forehead is low and retreating. The cheek-bones and the upper jaw project forwards, and the alveolar ridge and the teeth take a similar position. The nose is thick, being almost blended with the cheeks; the mouth is prominent and the lips thick; and the chin is narrow and retracted. The color varies from a deep tawny to a perfect jet; and the hair is black, frizzled, and woolly. In disposition, the negro is joyous, flexible, and indolent. The whole of the African continent, with the exception of the parts north and east of the Great Desert, is overspread by the different branches of this type. Besides which, they are found in New Holland, New Guinea, the Moluccas, and other islands. It is not true as is remarked by M. Cuvier and others, that the people comprising this race have always remained in a state of barbarism. On the contrary, numerous facts might be adduced, showing that many Negro tribes have made considerable advances in civilization, and that

in proportion to this improvement, do they approximate to the physical characters of the Caucasian. For instance, in the ancient kingdom of Bambarra, of which Timbuctoo is the capital, civilization was comparatively far advanced at a time when the Britons, as described by Julius Cæsar, were smeared over with paint and clothed in the skins of wild beasts.

These three varieties constitute the leading types of mankind, the Malay and American being no more than mere intervening shades.

(4.) In the *Malayan* variety, the forehead is more expanded than in the African, the jaws are less prominent, and the nose more distinct. The color is blackish brown or mahogany; the hair is long, coarse, and curly; and the eye-lids are drawn obliquely upwards at the outer angles. Active and ingenious, this variety possesses all the habits of a migratory, predacious, and maritime people. They are found in Malacca, Sumatra, the innumerable islands of the Indian Archipelago and the great Pacific Ocean, from Madagascar to Easter Island.

(5.) The *American* variety, which, as it constitutes the special object of this paper, we have reserved to the last. This variety, like the Malayan in reference to the Caucasian and Ethiopian, may be said to hold a similar relation to the Caucasian and Mongolian. The head, though similar to the Mongolian, is yet less square and the face less flattened. The forehead is low, the eyes black and deep set, and the nose large and aquiline. The skin is dark and more or less red; the hair is black, straight, and long, and the beard deficient. They are slow in acquiring knowledge, and averse to mental cultivation. Restless and revengeful, they always evince a fondness for war; but as regards the spirit of maritime adventure, they are wholly destitute. As exhibiting the highest point of attainable civilization, the ancient empires of Peru, Mexico, and Central America generally, may be considered analogous to those of China and India, which have been for ages stationary.

This race was, when first discovered by Europeans, spread over nearly the whole of the Americas south of the sixtieth degree of north latitude. From this point towards the Arctic Circle, our Indian, it is generally believed, belongs to the Mongolian variety, notwithstanding the analogy of language would warrant an opposite inference. From Greenland we trace apparently the same family of men to the north of Europe, comprising the Finland and Lapland coasts; and thence to the

Polar races of Asia, which are part of the Mongolian tribes, covering the immense region extending from the line of the Ural and Himmaleh mountains to Behring's Straits.

But before proceeding to a consideration of the characteristics of the American Aborigines, as connected with the question of the *unity* of the human family, let us first treat of the *phenomena of hybridity*, which have a close relation with the determination of species. An identity of species between two animals, notwithstanding a striking difference in some particulars, has been inferred, as a general rule, if their offspring has been found capable of procreating. Although this doctrine has been generally maintained by our most distinguished naturalists, yet some have rejected it as a hasty generalization. The production of hybrids is a phenomenon observed not only among mammifers, but among birds, fishes, the insect tribes, and the vegetable kingdom; and when we survey the numerous facts opposed to the generally admitted law of nature that all hybrid productions are sterile, there would seem to be some ground for doubting the soundness of the general conclusion. Thus the dog and the wolf, and the dog and the fox, will breed together, and the mixed offspring is capable of procreating. And that mules are not always barren, is a fact not unknown even to Aristotle. But as hybrid productions are almost unknown among animals in their wild and unrestrained condition, it would seem that there is a mutual repugnance between those of different species; and thus nature guards against a universal confusion of the different departments of organized creation. Notwithstanding the occasional exceptions to the general fact of the sterility of hybrid productions, it has never been observed that an offspring similar to themselves has proceeded from hybrids of an opposite sex. The offspring of these animals is capable of being continued in successive generations only by returning towards one of the parent tribes. It is thus apparent that the *vis procreatrix* between different species, both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, is very defective, and that the law of nature which maintains the diversity of tribes in the organized world, is not really infringed by the isolated phenomena observed in reference to hybrid productions. That animals generally have the same form and endowments now as at the remotest period of our acquaintance with them, is an opinion confirmed by the oldest historical records, as well as by the works of art and the actual relics found in Egyptian tombs.

The zoological descriptions of Aristotle, composed twenty-two centuries ago, are still faithful to nature in every particular. Hence it would appear that insurmountable barriers to the intermixture of species, at least among wild animals, have been provided by nature, in the instinctive aversion to union with other species, in the sterility of hybrid productions, and in the law of the reproduction of the corporeal and psychical characters of the parent in the offspring.

These facts have an important bearing upon the doctrine that mankind constitutes a single species. It is well known to horticulturists and those engaged in breeding domesticated animals, that, by crossing and intermixing varieties, a mixed breed superior in almost every physical quality to the parent races is often produced; and it has also been observed that the intermixture of different races of the human family has produced one physically superior, generally speaking, to either ancestral race. Now, as it is a law, according to the high authority of Buffon and Hunter, that those animals of opposite sexes, notwithstanding some striking differences in appearance, whose offspring is equally prolific with themselves, belong to one and the same species, it follows that these facts afford a strong confirmation of the conclusion deduced from many others, viz., that *there is but one human species*, for, as just remarked, while the offspring of distinct species, (real hybrids,) are so little prolific that their stock soon becomes extinct, it is found that the mixed offspring of different varieties of the same species generally exceeds the parent races in corporeal vigor and in the tendency to multiplication. This law, however, does not apply to the moral and intellectual endowments; for we find these deteriorated in the European by the mixture of any other race, and, on the other hand, an infusion of Caucasian blood tends in an equal degree to ennoble these qualities in the other varieties of the human family. It is, indeed, an undisputed fact, that all the races and varieties of mankind are equally capable of propagating their offspring by intermarriage; and that such connexions when contracted between individuals of the most dissimilar varieties, as for instance the Negro and the European, prove, if there is any difference, even more prolific. This tendency to a rapid increase is especially obvious among the so-termed Mulattoes of the West Indies. Upon this point the philosophic Prichard arrives at the following conclusion:—

“It appears to me unquestionable that intermediate races of



men exist and are propagated, and that no impediment whatever exists to the perpetuation of mankind when the most dissimilar varieties are blended together. We hence derive a conclusive proof, unless there be in the instance of human races an exception to the universally prevalent law of organized nature, that all the tribes of men are of one family."

It is well remarked by Prichard, that perhaps the solution of the problem of the unity of the human family, might be safely left on this issue, or considered as obtained by this argument. The same law, as is well known, applies to our Aborigines. As we spent upwards of two years, when serving in the Medical Staff of the Army, among the Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees, we saw, especially in Florida, the most remarkable inter-mixtures between the Indian and the Negro, as regards the physiognomy of the individual. Instead of an apparent new being like the Mulatto, the mixed offspring would often exhibit the decided characteristics of the two races, without any obvious blending. Thus, one would have the crisp and curly hair, united with a reddish copper-colored skin and all the other Indian features: and another would present the straight, long, and coarse hair of the Indian upon a true Negro skull; as the low and retreating forehead, the projecting jaws, the thick nose, the narrow and retracted chin, and the jet black complexion.

We shall also here bring under notice what may be designated as *accidental* or *congenital* varieties, these phenomena having a close relation with the diversities exhibited among the various tribes of mankind. Among all organized productions, we find variety of form and structure in the same species, and even in the offspring of the same parents; and what is equally remarkable, we discover a tendency to perpetuate in their offspring all individual peculiarities. This constitutes, in some degree, an exception to the general law that animals produce their like,—an exception by which it were easy to explain the present existence of diversified races, originating from the same primitive species, did not a new difficulty arise in the question, having reference to the extent of deviation of structure that may take place without breaking in upon the characteristic type of the species. There are many instances on record in which these accidental varieties have been perpetuated by hereditary transmission. One of the most extraordinary is the recent origination of a new variety of sheep in the state of Massachusetts, called the "*ancon* or *otter-breed*," in consequence of the shortness of

the limbs and the greater proportionate length of the body, the fore-legs being also crooked.

Among instances of variety of structure originating in the race of man, which are in like manner propagated through many generations, may be mentioned the oft-observed fact of supernumerary toes or fingers, and corresponding deficiencies. Hence the names of Varus and Plautus among the ancient Romans. Likewise, those peculiar features by which the individuals of some families are characterized; as, for instance, the singular thickness of the upper lip in the imperial house of Austria, which was introduced, three centuries ago, by intermarriage. These organic peculiarities are often transmitted to children, even when one of the parents is of the ordinary form, for three or four generations. Hence there is reason to believe that if persons of this organic peculiarity were to intermarry exclusively, we might have a permanent race characterized by six toes or fingers. We have a similar fact in the history of the English family of "porcupine men," in whom the greater part of the body was covered with hard excrescences of a horny nature, which were transmitted hereditarily. These remarks apply equally to those peculiarities of organization which predispose to many diseases, as well as to the transmission of mental and moral qualities, all of which are truly hereditary. It is thus seen that varieties of structure are not always transmitted from first parents, and that when they have once arisen, they become, under favorable circumstances, permanent in the stock.

We are now prepared to consider the *characteristics of our aboriginal race*, by which, in the language of Morton, they "*stand isolated from the rest of mankind.*" We shall speak first of *diversities of form or configuration*, the most important of which is doubtless the shape of the head as connected with the development of the brain. The classification of skulls under five general forms already given, is of course entirely arbitrary; and as in every other corporeal diversity, so we find in regard to crania an imperceptible gradation among the nations of the earth, filling up the interval between the two extremes of the most perfect Caucasian model and the most exaggerated Negro specimen. Hence we must conclude that the diversities of skulls among mankind, and consequently in a much less degree the peculiarity of our Indian, do not afford sufficient ground for a specific difference—an inference confirmed, as will be seen, by the variations which occur in animals of the same species

We might show, as we think, conclusively, did space allow, that there is a connection between the leading physical characters of human races, (and especially as regards cranial formation,) and the agencies of climate and their habits of existence. This is very apparent in the configuration found in our Aborigines, and equally so in all other races in the nomadic and hunter conditions, consisting of the greater development of the jaws and zygomatic (cheek) bones; in a word, of the bones of the face altogether, as compared with the size of the brain. That the development of the organs of taste and smell, is in an inverse ratio to that of the brain, and consequently to the degree of intelligence, is considered by Bichat as almost a rule in our organization. By this principle, as an index to those exalted prerogatives which elevate man above the brute, was the Grecian sculptor guided. Although, upon this point, the facial angle of Camper is not an exact test, yet it may be remarked that in the human race, it varies from  $65^{\circ}$  to  $85^{\circ}$ , the former being a near approach to the monkey species. Among the remains of Grecian art, we find this angle extended to  $90^{\circ}$  in the representation of poets, sages, legislators, etc., thus showing that the relation here referred to was not unknown to them; while, at the same time, the mouth, nose, jaws, and tongue, were contracted in size, as indicative of a noble and generous nature. In the statues of their gods and heroes, the Greeks gave a still greater exaggeration to the latter, and reduction to the former characteristics, thus extending the forehead over the face, so as to make a facial angle of  $100^{\circ}$ . It is this that gives to their statuary its high character of sublime beauty. Even among the vulgar, we find the idea of stupidity associated with an elongation of the snout.

As regards man's average stature, the size and proportions of his trunk and limbs, and the relations of different parts, it has been inferred by some that these varieties, in connection with other diversities, constitute distinctive characters sufficient to class the human family under several separate species. It has been asserted, for instance, that in the Negro the length of the forearm is so much greater than in the European, as to form a real approximation to the character of the ape. This difference, however, is so very slight, compared with the relative length of the arms of the orang and the chimpanzee, that we are not even warranted in the inference that races long civilized have less of the animal in this respect in their physical conformation than

those in the savage state. No peculiarity of this kind pertains to our Aborigines; but that uncivilized races have less muscular power than civilized men, is a fact that has been often observed, and one that we can confirm from extensive personal knowledge relative to the Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees. The experiments of the voyager, Peron, with the *dynamometer*, showed that Frenchmen and Englishmen have a physical superiority compared with the natives of the southern hemisphere. But these diversities are not specific, being merely variations arising from the operation of particular causes; as, for instance, the Hindoos, who live on a vegetable aliment exclusively, are less muscular and have arms and legs longer in proportion than Europeans; and hence, too, the miserable savages, who are never well fed, but are frequently depressed by absolute want, cannot be expected to equal, in physical strength, the industrious and well-fed middle classes of a civilized community. That none of these deviations amount to specific distinctions is apparent from two arguments, as laid down by Prichard:—"First, that none of the differences in question exceed the limits of individual variety, or are greater than the diversities found within the circle of one nation or family; secondly, the varieties of form in human races are by no means so considerable, in many points of view, as the instances of variation which are known to occur in different tribes of animals belonging to the same stock, there being scarcely one domesticated species which does not display much more considerable deviations from the typical character of the tribe."

Among the physical characteristics of our Indian, we shall now consider that of *color* or *complexion*, the usual designation of which is *copper-colored*; but this is considered by Dr. McCulloch as wholly inapplicable to the Americans as a race, having himself proposed the term "*cinnamon-colored*." Dr. Morton thinks that, taken collectively, they would be most correctly designated as the "*brown-race*." He adds—"Although the Americans possess a pervading and characteristic complexion, there are occasional and very remarkable deviations, including all the tints from a decided white to an unequivocally black skin."

In order to show that the complexion, as well as the color and texture of the hair, belonging to the American Aboriginal, are not *distinctive* but merely *typical* characteristics, it will be necessary to take a general survey of mankind. It will be found

that these characteristics become so modified, altered, and evanescent, that to draw an absolute line of demarcation among five, or any other number of varieties of the human family, is totally impossible. The Negro and the European are the two extremes, which, as in every other particular in which the various tribes of human kind differ, pass into each other by insensible gradations. The terms, white and black races, can be used only in the general sense of Caucasian and Ethiopian varieties. The complexion implies no distinction of species; for it can be readily shown that, in this respect, the African tribes vary much, that the American aboriginals exhibit the extremes of white and black, and that even the Caucasians, generally characterized as white, present nations decidedly black. In the frontispiece to the third volume of Prichard's "*Researches into the Physical History of Man*," we have a striking specimen of a black Caucasian, being a portrait of Rahomun Roy—"a Brahmin of undoubtedly pure race." Among the Arabs, according to the country they inhabit, we discover the extremes of complexion. "The general complexion of the Shegya Arabs," says Mr. Waddington, "is a jet black." He adds—"The Shegya, as I have already mentioned, are black—a clear, glossy, jet black, which appeared to my then unprejudiced eyes to be the finest color that could be selected for a human being. They are distinguished in every respect from the Negroes by the brightness of their color; by their hair and the regularity of their features; by the mild and dewy lustre of their eyes; and by the softness of their touch, in which last respect they yield not to Europeans." As the Arabs on the Nile do not intermarry with the natives, as appears by the accounts given by Burckhardt and Ruppell, the blackness of their complexion can be ascribed to climate alone. In more northern, and particularly in more elevated regions, the hue of the Arab's skin is not less fair than that of the European. "The Arab women," says Bruce, "are not black; there are even some exceedingly fair." Among the Otaheitans, who have been long celebrated for their personal beauty, the skin of the lower orders has a brown tint, which becomes so gradually lost in those of a superior caste, that the complexion in the higher ranks is nearly white, or at least but slightly tinged with brown. On the cheek of the women, a blush may be readily observed. The usual color of the hair is black, but it is of a fine texture, and not unfrequently brown, flaxen, and even red. Of the natives of the

Marquesas, it has been said that "in form they are, perhaps, the finest in the world," and that their skin is naturally "very fair;" while in the color of their hair, all the various shades found in the different tribes of the Caucasian race, are exhibited.

Even among the American tribes, known the world over as the "*red-man*," the most remarkable diversities of complexion are presented, varying from a decided white to an unequivocally black skin. Of so deep a hue are the Californians, that La Perouse compares them to the Negroes in the West Indies. "The complexion of the Californians," he says, "very nearly resembles that of those Negroes whose hair is not woolly." In contrast to these black Californians, we have, on our northwest-coast, tribes with skins as white as the complexion of the natives of southern Europe. Captain Dixon describes a female whose "countenance had all the cheerful glow of an English milk-maid, and the healthy red which flushed her cheek, was even beautifully contrasted with the whiteness of her neck; her forehead was so remarkably clear that the translucent veins were seen meandering even in the minutest branches."

So far, then, we can discover no distinctive characteristics, by which the American Aboriginal "*stands isolated from the rest of mankind*." But as difference of color is the most obvious diversity of human organization that meets the popular eye, we will present to our readers the conclusion of the learned Prichard on the same point.

"That the different complexions of mankind," he says, "are not permanent characters, may be sufficiently proved by numerous facts collected from the physical history of particular races of men. It is hardly necessary, in this instance, to appeal to the infinite number of phenomena which are to be found, precisely analogous in all the circumstances of their origin and subsequent propagation and permanence in entire breeds, in the various tribes of animals, there being scarcely any tribe of warm-blooded creatures which are not subject to become thus diversified. The reader will find in the following outline of the history of particular tribes of the human family, instances of this variation of color,—of a change from white to black, and from black to white, or of both complexions actually subsisting in the undoubted progeny of the same stock; and these instances so multiplied and so well authenticated, as to leave no doubt as to the conclusion which we are obliged to draw in this part,

at least, of the investigation before us, as to the great question of the unity or diversity of the human species."

The hair of our Indian presents so little diversity from the rest of mankind, as to require no special notice; but as much stress has always been laid upon the national differences of the human hair, by those who hold that the Negro is of a distinct species from our own, a few general observations will not be deemed out of place. As regards the *hair, beard, and color of the iris*, we observe, indeed, strongly marked varieties, all these having a relation with the color of the skin. While the head of the Caucasian race is adorned with an ample growth of fine locks, and his face with a copious beard, the Negro's head presents short woolly knots, and that of the American or Mongolian, coarse and straight hair, all having nearly beardless faces; and with this diminution of the beard is combined a general smoothness of the whole body. That the coloring principle in the skin and hair is of a common nature, is evident from the fact, that among the white races every gradation from the fair to the dark is accompanied by a corresponding alteration in the tint of the hair. This remark applies equally to the colored varieties of men, for all these have black hair; but among the spotted Africans, according to Blunnenbach, the hairs growing out of a white patch on the head are white. These facts in connection with others observed among inferior animals, as the dog, sheep, and goat, prove sufficiently that a distinction of species cannot be established on the mere difference in the hair. Upon this point, Prichard very happily remarks:—

"That if this cuticular excrescence of the Negro were really not hair, but a fine wool,—if it were precisely analogous to the finest wool,—still this would by no means prove the Negro to be of a peculiar and separate stock, since we know that some tribes of animals bear wool, while others of the same species are covered with hair. It is true that in some instances this peculiarity depends immediately on climate, and is subject to vary when the climate is changed; but in others, it is deeply fixed in the breed, and almost amounts to a permanent variety."

But the so-called *woolly* hair of the Negro is not wool in fact, but merely a curled and twisted hair. This has been proved by microscopic observation, upon the well-known law, that the character which distinguishes wool from hair consists in the serrated nature of its external surface, giving to it its felting property.

That the physical characters of nations have certain relations to climate, is an opinion warranted by facts, the erudite arguments of Lawrence to the contrary notwithstanding. Our remarks here, however, will be restricted mostly to the single question relative to the human complexion. The limits of Negroland, properly so called, seem to be confined to the inter-tropical regions of Africa. Now, if we proceed southward of Central Africa, we find the hue of the negro grow less black, as in the Caffres and Hottentots; and, on the other hand, we discover the same law north of the tropic of Cancer. Although some of the tribes in the Oases of the Great Desert are said to be black, yet they are generally brown or almost white; and when we reach the second system of highlands, which has a temperate climate, the inhabitants present the flowing hair and complexion of the southern Europeans. This general law, if the comparison is extended to Europe, is confirmed. On comparing the three elevated tracts bounding and containing between them the Mediterranean and the Great Sahara, we find that the intermediate region, (Mount Atlas,) differs much less from the northern (the Alps and Pyrenees) than from the southern chain, (the Lunar Mountains.) The same law is evident in each, as respects vegetation and the physical characters of the human races. While the mountains of Central Africa are inhabited by negroes, the Berbers of Mount Atlas show but little difference of physical characters when compared with the Spaniards and Piedmontese. For the purpose of more extended comparison, Prichard divides Europe and Africa into eight zones, through which he traces a gradation in the physical characters of the human race. Within the tropics, as just observed, the inhabitants, if we confine ourselves to the low and plain countries, are universally black. South of this region are the red people of Caffreland; and, next to these, are the yellowish-brown Hottentots. North of Negroland, are the "*gentes subfusci coloris*?" of Leo,—tribes of a brownish hue, but varying from this shade to a perfect black. The next zone is the region of the Mediterranean, including Spaniards, Moors, Greeks, Italians, &c., among whom we find black hair, dark eyes, and a brownish-white complexion, predominant features. In the zone north of the Pyreno-Alpine line, the color of the hair is generally chestnut-brown, to which that of the skin and eyes bears a certain relation. Next come the races characterized by yellow hair, blue eyes, and a florid complexion, such as those of England,



Denmark, Finland, the northern parts of Germany, and a great portion of Russia. And north of these are the Swedes and Norwegians, distinguished by white hair and light gray eyes.

It were desirable that Prichard had proceeded still farther north, and told us why the Laplanders, Greenlanders, Esquimaux, Samoiedes, etc., have a very dark complexion. This fact has always been a stumbling-block in the way of the advocates of a connection between climate and the human complexion. By them it has been referred to their food, consisting of fish and rancid oil, to the grease and paint with which they besmear the body, aided by the clouds of smoke in which they sit constantly involved in their wretched cabins. The agency of these causes is strongly advocated by Dr. Samuel Stanhope Smith, who also refers to Blumenbach, Fourcroy, and J. F. Meckel, who concur in the opinion that, from the affinity of the bile with the fat or oil of the animal body, nations that subsist chiefly on food consisting of animal oil, not only smell of it, but acquire a very dark complexion. But these northern tribes have the olive complexion, the broad large face and flat nose, and the other features which characterize the Mongolian variety. Hence Lawrence maintains that the distinguishing characters of the German and French, or the Esquimaux or more southern Indians, find no explanation in climate influences. On the contrary, he ascribes the peculiarities of these northern pigmies to the same cause that makes the Briton and German of this day resemble the portraits of their ancestors, drawn by Cæsar and Tacitus. The French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italians, belong, he says, to the Celtic race, whose black hair and browner complexion are distinguished from the blue eyes and fair skin of the German tribes, which include the Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, English, modern Germans, etc.

That climate exercises an influence in causing diversity of color, is an opinion likewise strengthened by the analogy of inferior animals. As we approach the poles, we find every thing progressively assume a whiter livery, as bears, foxes, hares, falcons, crows, and blackbirds; while some animals, as the ermine, weasel, squirrel, reindeer, and snow-bunting, change their color to gray or white, even in the same country, as the winter season advances.

We thus discover a marked relation between the physical characters of nations and climate as expressed by latitude,—a law that obtains equally in the modification of climate induced

by elevation. Thus the sandy or brown hair of the Swiss, contrasts strongly with the black hair and eyes of those that dwell below on the plains of Lombardy. Among the natives of the more elevated parts of the Biscayan country, the black hair and swarthy complexion of the Castilians give place to light blue eyes, flaxen hair, and a fair complexion. In the northern parts of Africa, we observe the same law as regards the Berbers of the plains and the Shulah mountaineers. And even in the intertropical region of Africa, several examples are adduced by Prichard. We surely cannot regard as a mere coincidence the fact, that the intertropical countries all around the globe have black inhabitants; tropical America, from its great elevation, constituting only an apparent exception, and thus illustrating the law that an exception may prove the rule.

Hence it is obvious, that in no point of view can the facts presented in reference to the complexion and the hair, be reconciled with the hypothesis that the Negro constitutes a distinct species, and in a much less degree the American, inasmuch as we do not find in any department of nature, that separate species of organization ever pass into each other by insensible degrees. We will add a few facts in regard to the so-called woolly hair, which, it has been seen, is not wool in fact. Although the shape of the head, among the South African tribes, differs in a degree corresponding to the extent of their civilization, yet it would seem that the crisp and woolly state of the hair, notwithstanding the complexion is considerably lighter than among the tribes of Central Africa, experiences no modification. The Caffres, for example, who have black and woolly hair, with a deep brown skin, have the high forehead and prominent nose of the Europeans, with projecting cheek-bones and thickish lips. This tribe, as well as the Iolofs near the Senegal, scarcely differ from Europeans, with the exception of the complexion and woolly hair. Other tribes, as for instance the darkest of the Abyssinians, approximate the Europeans still more, in the circumstance that the hair, though often crisp and frizzled, is never woolly. Again, some of the tribes near the Zambesi, according to Prichard, have hair in rather long and flowing ringlets, notwithstanding the complexion is black, and the features have the negro type. The civilized Mandingos, on the other hand, have a cranial organization differing much from that of their degraded neighbors, yet in respect to the hair, there is no change.

A similar observation applies to the natives of the islands in the great Southern Ocean.

This peculiarity of hair would be regarded by Prichard as a *permanent* variety, which "differs from species," he says, "in this circumstance, that the peculiarities in question are not coeval with the tribe, but sprang up in it since the commencement of its existence, and constitute a deviation from its original character." The so-termed woolly hair of the negro, may perhaps be, with good reason, classed among the *accidental* or *congenital* diversities of mankind, which are transmitted from the parent to the offspring. This would certainly not be more extraordinary than the phenomenon of the *otter-breed* of sheep, which occurred in New England. Such peculiarities in an individual, at a remote and unknown period, may have readily become the characteristics of a whole nation; for then mankind, few in numbers, were dispersing themselves in detached bodies over the face of the earth; and we can easily comprehend how, in the event of the occurrence of any peculiarity of color, form, or structure, it would naturally, as society multiplied in these detached bodies, become the characteristics of an entire people. Under existing circumstances, however, or indeed ever since the population of the world has been comparatively large, these peculiarities of organization can extend very little beyond the individuals in whom they first appear, being soon entirely lost in the general mass.

It will be observed that we dwell particularly upon the characteristics of the Negro; and to this we are led for the reason that as they constitute much greater deviations from the Caucasian type than those of the American variety, it follows that the reconciliation of the former with the Mosaic account of the unity of the human family, will the more completely disprove the conclusion of Morton, that "there are no direct or obvious links between the people of the old world and the new." He adds—"Once for all, I repeat my conviction that the study of physical conformation alone excludes every branch of the Caucasian race from any obvious participation in the peopling of this continent." Now, if the principles developed in this essay are founded in nature; such as, the origination of the diversities of man from congenital causes, and the doctrine that there is an intimate connection between physical feature and moral and intellectual character, both being influenced by local causes, then does this

last conclusion likewise prove a mere postulate. That there is a remarkable coincidence between the natural talents and dispositions of nations and the development of their brains, cannot be denied. This is illustrated in the intellectual superiority of the Caucasian race, taken in connection with the development of the anterior portion of the brain. Time was, no doubt, when the present distinction of races did not exist; and hence, at the period when man, in his gradual diffusion, reached America, the Caucasian race may scarcely have been known as a distinct variety.

"This idea [the American race being essentially separate and peculiar] may, at first view," says Morton, "seem incompatible with the history of man, as recorded in the Sacred Writings. Such, however, is not the fact. Where others can see nothing but chance, we can perceive a wise and obvious design displayed in the original adaptation of the several races of men to those varied circumstances of climate and locality, which, while congenial to the one, are destructive to the other." As difficulties, regarded by some as insuperable, have been encountered in tracing back the diverse varieties of mankind to the same single pair, Morton, like others before him, has cut this imaginary Gordian knot by calling in the aid of supernatural agency. He thinks it "consistent with the known government of the universe to suppose that the same Omnipotence that created man, would adapt him at once to the physical as well as to the moral circumstances in which he was to dwell upon the earth." Now this supposed miracle did not, of course, occur until the dispersion of Babel; and, inasmuch as man is endowed with a pliability of functions, by which he is rendered a cosmopolite,—a faculty possessed in the highest degree by the inhabitants of the middle latitudes,—there is not the slightest ground for the belief that it ever did occur, simply because no such special adaptation was demanded. The *chief* characteristics which distinguish the several varieties of man, viz., the comparative development of the moral feelings and intellectual powers, require no particular adaptation to external causes. Least of all, could the American race, regarded by Morton as the same exterior man "*in every locality and under every variety of circumstances,*" have been endowed with an "*original adaptation*" "*to the varied circumstances of climate and locality,*" inasmuch as the region inhabited by them, embraces every zone of the earth, through a distance of one hundred and fifty degrees of

latitude! Is not this an absolute confutation of his own theory?

But for this boasted power of accommodating himself to all climates, man is less indebted to the pliability of his body than to the ingenuity of his mind; for, although naturally more defenceless against external agents than inferior animals, yet, by the exercise of his mental endowments, he can interpose a thousand barriers against the deleterious effects of climate. That man thus modifies the agencies of the elements upon himself, is sufficiently obvious; but there arises the converse question, already noticed—Do not these agencies likewise modify him, thus fitting him to possess and occupy the whole earth? Are we not to attribute to these physical causes, in connection with moral conditions, the very different organization presented in different regions by the same human family? Hence arises the question constituting the leading object of this paper,—*Have all these diverse races descended from a single stock?* Or, on the other hand,—*Have the different races of mankind, from the beginning of their existence, differed from one another in their physical, moral, and intellectual nature?* The labors of naturalists in recent years have demonstrated an admirable conformity between the organic capabilities of each region of the earth and the surrounding physical circumstances. This peculiar adaptation of organic structure to local conditions, is apparent in the camel of the sandy deserts in which he is placed, as his stomach has cells for holding water; and also in the circumstance, that the hoofed animals of South America are suited to the precipitous Cordilleras, while the solidungular quadrupeds of Southern Africa are equally adapted to its vast sandy plains. And we may add that a most remarkable instance of similar adaptation has recently come to light, in the fact that there have been discovered, in the Mammoth Cave of Kentucky, fish *without eyes*,—a specimen of which is now in the New-York Lyceum of Natural History.

The natural history of man in regard to his diversities may also receive valuable elucidation from comparative physiology, as well as the laws of the distribution and migration of plants and inferior animals. So similar is the physical organization of man and the brute creation,—so identical are the laws whereby their species are preserved,—and so analogous is their subjection to the operation of natural causes, to the laws of morbid influences, and to the agency of those artificial combinations

resulting from domestication and civilization,—that we have, says Wiseman, “almost a right to argue from one’s actual to the other’s possible modifications.” The geographic distribution of inferior animals as connected with that of man, is deemed of importance, on the presumption that the great diversity and the dispersion of the human race are regulated by some general plan, analogous to that which is apparent in the distribution of the former.

But as regards the *dispersion of animals*, we are unwillingly obliged wholly to forego its discussion; and as respects the *phenomena of variation among plants and animals*, which are most remarkably displayed in the cultivated tribes of the former, and the domesticated races of the latter, we are only permitted to take a glance. The best authenticated examples of the effects produced upon animals by a change of external circumstances, are afforded by the modifications developed in certain breeds transported to the new world. As our space will not allow us to present any details, we cannot do better than give the inferences deduced by Prichard upon this subject.

“1. That tribes of animals which have been domesticated by man and carried into regions where the climates are different from those of their native abodes, undergo, partly from the agency of climate, and in part from the change of external circumstances connected with the state of domesticity, great variations.

“2. That these variations extend to considerable modifications in external properties, color, the nature of the integument, and of its covering, whether hair or wool; the structure of limbs, and the proportional size of parts; that they likewise involve certain physiological changes or variations as to the laws of the animal economy; and lastly, certain psychological alterations or changes in the instincts, habits, and powers of perception and intellect.

“3. That these last changes are in some cases brought about by training, and that the progeny acquires an aptitude to certain habits which the parents have been taught; that psychical characters, such as new instincts, are developed in breeds by cultivation.

“4. That these varieties are sometimes permanently fixed in the breed so long as it remains unmixed.

“5. That all such variations are possible only to a limited extent, and always with the preservation of a particular type, which is that of the species. Each species has a definite or definable

character, comprising certain undeviating phenomena of external structure, and likewise constant and unchangeable characteristics in the laws of its animal economy and in its physiological nature. It is only within these limits that deviations are produced by external circumstances."

Admitting, then, that these phenomena of variation are analogous to the diversities which distinguish the various races of the human family, it follows that the latter should present still greater differences; for, while each species of animals inferior to man is mostly confined to a limited region and to a mode of existence that is simple and uniform, the human races are scattered over the whole face of the earth, under every variety of physical circumstances, in addition to the influences arising from a moral and intellectual nature. It was long ago remarked by Blumenbach, that the difference between the skull of our swine and that of the primitive wild boar, is quite equal to that observed between the crania of the Negro and of the European. That swine were unknown in America until carried hither from Europe, is a conceded point; and, notwithstanding the comparatively short period that has intervened, there now exist many breeds, exhibiting the most striking peculiarities as compared with one another or with the original stock. The pigs carried in 1509 from Spain to Cuba degenerated, according to Herera, into a monstrous race, with toes half a span long. They here became more than twice as large as their European progenitors. Again, we find the breed of domestic swine in France, with a high convex spine and hanging head, just the reverse of that of England, with a straight back and pendulous belly. In Hungary and Sweden, we meet with a solidungular race. It is also observed by Blumenbach, "that there is less difference in the form of the skull in the most dissimilar of mankind, than between the elongated head of the Neapolitan horse and the skull of the Hungarian breed, which is remarkable for its shortness and the extent of the lower jaw."

Returning to the characteristics of the American Aboriginal, we find, as regards physiological laws, no deviation from the rest of mankind. As respects the *duration of human life*, it is evident that there exists no well marked difference among the different families of men. As all nations have the tendency to exist for a given time,—the three-score-and-ten of the Hebrew being also allotted to our Indian,—they appear thus also as *one* species. The duration of human life, however, varies from the

influence of external causes in different climates upon the animal economy; but, at the same time, individuals removed to a new climate acquire in successive generations a gradual physical adaptation to its local conditions. Thus the natives of the western coast of Africa and of the West Indies, notwithstanding the destructiveness of these climates to Europeans, sustain comparatively little inconvenience. As the cells of the camel's stomach, as already remarked, show a wonderful adaptation of organic structure to local conditions, without being referred to climatic agency, so the system of the Negro, as his skin is a much more active organ of depuration than that of the white man, is better adapted, let the remote cause be what it may, to the warm, moist, and miasmial climates of the tropics.

If the comparison as regards the duration of human life, however, is extended to the simiæ, notwithstanding their very close approximation to man in physical structure, the contrast is very great. As the greatest longevity of the troglodyte is no more than thirty years, we thus perceive, more especially when also we consider that all the monkey tribes, in their natural state, are confined almost wholly to the intertropical zone, the close relation of what are generally regarded as extreme diversities among the human races. As we discover no difference in this respect among the three races of the European, our Indian, and the Negro, there is little ground for introducing, as was done by Linnaeus, Buffon, Helvetius, and Monboddo, the ourang-outang into the human family. Moreover, we find as attributes common to the three races just mentioned, the erect attitude, the two hands, the slow development of the body, and the exercise of reason. On the other hand, the whole structure of the monkey, who is four-handed, proves that to him the erect attitude is not natural. The striking characteristics of the predominance of the fore arm over the upper arm, and the great length of the upper and the shortness of the lower limbs, are peculiarly adapted to his climbing habits. How beautifully is the majestic attitude of man, which announces to all the other inhabitants of the globe his superiority, described in the words of Ovid:

Pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram,  
Os homini sublime dedit; cælumque tueri  
Jussit; et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.

And while all other creatures to the dust  
Bend their low look, to man a front sublime  
He gave, and bade him ever scan the skies,  
And to the stars lift up his lofty gaze.



As regards the progress of *physical development and the periodical changes of the constitution*, such as the frequency of the pulse, the period appointed by nature for marriage, or any other of the vital functions, it appears that mankind, whether aboriginal to the old or the new world, present little diversity; and this little is of course attributable to difference of climate.

The *pathological history* of the different races constitutes as much a part of their physical description, as any feature in their anatomical structure; for there are certain diseases peculiar to man, a list of which has been made out by Blumenbach. From a survey of the facts connected with this question, it appears that the whole human family, making due allowance for endemic influences, are equally subject to those ills which "flesh is heir to," thus confirming the doctrine that a common nature pertains to all human kind.

But there are other facts on the ground of physical characteristics tending to show that the American Aboriginal does not stand "isolated." The affinity of the Americans with the people of Eastern Asia, notwithstanding the very remote period at which man, in his gradual diffusion, reached our continent, is confirmed by a striking physiognomical resemblance, as well as by many customs, arts, and religious observances. As regards a resemblance in physical characteristics, the evidence of many travellers, who were competent judges, might be introduced with much point. "The American race," says Humboldt, "has a striking resemblance to the Mongol nations, which include those formerly called Huns, Kulans, and Kalmucks."—"We observed," says Barrow, speaking of the Brazilian Indians, "the Tartar or Chinese features, *particularly the eye*, strongly marked in the countenance of these Indians." Of the Chiriguano, a Peruvian tribe, Mr. Temple speaks thus:—"Had I seen them in Europe, I should have supposed them to be Chinese, so closely do they resemble those people in their features." The testimony of many others equally decisive might be presented, but it will suffice to adduce one more, viz., Mr. Ledyard, who speaks from extensive personal knowledge. Writing from Siberia to Mr. Jefferson, he says—"I shall never be able without seeing you in person, and perhaps not then, to inform you how universally and circumstantially the *Tartars resemble the Aborigines of America*. They are the same people—the most ancient and the most numerous of any other; and had not a small sea divided them, they would all have been still known by the same name." Among the numerous facts that

might be adduced in illustration of the same affinity, on the score of customs, a single one must suffice. The Scythians, like our Indians, were in the habit of *scalping* their enemies slain in battle, both regarding these scalps as their proudest trophies. This is related by Herodotus, (Melpomene, LXIV.,) who also describes the mode of stripping the skin from the head. Besides, the Thracians are described by Homer as having their hair only on the crown of the head; and this custom, as among our Indians, prevails generally among the Mongol nations, the head being shaved, and only a tuft or tress of hair left on the crown. The Caucasian nations, on the other hand, have, in all ages, cherished an abundant growth of hair.

Let us now consider the *mental endowments* of the American Aborigines. As regards their *moral traits*, Dr. Morton thinks the characteristics quite distinctive; and of these, the following may be considered the strongest. "One nation," he says, "is in almost perpetual hostility with another, tribe against tribe, man against man; and with this ruling passion are linked a merciless revenge and an unsparing destructiveness." But these characteristics can be considered merely as the extreme of passions common to all mankind, not only in the savage state, but, under certain circumstances, in the condition of the highest civilization. Without referring to the barbarous excesses of nations equally uncivilized, behold Rome, even in her most palmy day, when she was wont to drag in chains her barbarian captives from the remotest frontier, to swell the triumphal pomp of a successful general! Britain and Thrace thus yielded up their noblest spirits, that spurned the yoke in vain, to die for the amusement of Roman ladies! Compelled to enter the amphitheatre of wild beasts and the arena of the gladiator, the captives were—

"Butchered to make a Roman holiday."

Behold next the historic page of not only *civilized*, but *Christianized* man. But we would not bring to the light of day the deeds of a nation belonging to our own enlightened age,—a people who, pretending to wisdom and philosophy, established a "reign of terror,"—cannibals who drank the blood and ate the hearts of their victims! These moral convulsions which tear up the elements of society, throw a fearful light on the ferocity of human nature, hidden under the arts and pleasures of civilized nations. They are like the convulsions of

physical nature, which disclose volcanic fires beneath fertile and flowery fields.

It is thus seen that the *cruelty* of our Indian is not without a parallel,—a remark that applies equally to his *love of vengeance*. A Scotch Highlander, wronged by an individual of another clan, for example, retaliated on the first of the same tribe that fell into his power. The feuds of the Corsicans become hereditary: vengeance is taken by one family upon another, the actors in which may have been unborn at the period of the original quarrel.

As regards the *intellectual faculties* of our aboriginal race, Morton is of opinion that they “are decidedly inferior to the Mongolian stock; \* \* and as to their social condition, they are, probably, in most respects the same as at the primitive epoch of their existence.” The general inaptitude of Indian character to conform to new laws and customs, it has been shown by experience, presents, however, no insuperable barrier to their gradual civilization. The Choctaws and Cherokees, and the Creeks to a considerable extent, abandoning the venatic life, have become an agricultural people. Advancing in the useful arts, the acquisition of knowledge and property has gone hand in hand; and in proportion as mental cultivation has taught them the value of salutary and uniform laws, they have become capable of enjoying the blessings of free government. The Cherokees live under written laws, one feature of which is the trial by jury. The Choctaws are rapidly advancing in civilization. In an agricultural point of view, their country resembles the new frontier of white settlements. They understand the value of money, and possess the comforts of domestic life, such as the common luxuries of tea, coffee, and sugar. They cultivate Indian corn and cotton, have large stocks of cattle, and have cotton-gins and mills of different kinds, as well as mechanical shops. In these three tribes, likewise, the rising generation have the advantage of schools, a portion of the annuity received from our government being appropriated to that purpose.\*

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\* It has been recently stated in the Natchitoches Herald that the Choctaws, who number 17,000 souls, have raised \$40,000 to build a College for the education of their youth; and that they have a press which last year printed more than three million pages of books and pamphlets. Do these people belong to a race unsusceptible of civilization?

That the American Aboriginal is susceptible of civilization is proved by the single fact, that three contemporary centres of civilization, each independent of the other, existed in tropical America, viz., the Mexicans in the north, the Peruvians in the south, and the Muyscas of Bogota intermediate. Nor did these three civilized states stand isolated from their barbarous neighbors; but, on the contrary, the two extremes gradually merge into each other, some nations in this gradation holding a place so completely intermediate as to render it difficult to classify them with either division. In this relation stood the Araucanians to the Peruvians; the Aztec rulers of Mexico, at the period of the Spanish invasion, to the less fierce Toltecas, whose arts they had usurped; and still later, the Natchez tribes of the Mississippi exhibited, even among many of the rudest traits of savage life, some traces of the refinement of their Mexican progenitors. To what degree of civilization the Mexicans and Peruvians would have attained, had America remained unknown to Europe, it is of course impossible to determine; but even had Mexico and Peru undergone intellectual degradation and gradual extinction from intrinsic causes, there would not be wanting analogous events in the history of the old world. Look upon the present state of Italy and Greece, and contrast them with the people who gave glory to the age of Augustus and Pericles! This state of things did in reality exist in America at the period of its discovery, as is proved by the three great groups of monumental antiquities in the United States, New Spain, and South America. Many of the ancient and cultivated nations had become extinct, or subjugated by the inroads of barbarous or semi-civilized tribes; and even in Mexico and Peru, the civilization of earlier ages seems to have sunk into a state of decadence.

Of all parts of America, the tropical portions are best adapted for awakening the savage man to a sense of his intellectual powers. That the civilization of countries is greatly influenced by climate and physical features, is evident in the fact that the cradles or nurseries of the first nations of which we have any historical records—the people in which the intellectual faculties were first awakened from the brutal sloth of savage life—appear to have been extensive plains or valleys, irrigated by fertilizing streams, and blessed with a mild climate. As the means of sustenance are in such localities easily obtained, the human mind, if man in this primitive state will reflect at all, is

most apt to receive that impulse which leads to the cultivation and development of his nature. It is in such regions that we discover the most ancient centres of population; as, for example, the simple habits of wandering shepherds were exchanged by the Semitic nations for the splendor and luxury of Nineveh and Babylon; and in the fertile valley watered by the Nile, we also find the first foundation of cities, and the earliest establishment of political institutions; and here, too, were invented hieroglyphic literature and those arts which embellish human life. Thus has it, likewise, been in America; for the elevated lands within the tropics afford a delightful climate, the heats of summer and the rigors of winter being alike moderated; and here the earth yields its fruits almost spontaneously. Hence it was in this region that the American Aboriginal first received the impulse of social improvement; here were laid the first foundation of cities; and here, too, as was just remarked of Egypt, was invented hieroglyphic literature.

As the most ancient cities of which we have any record, as Babylon, Nineveh, and Thebes, were founded in the midst of *alluvial* soils, deposited by the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the Nile, this agency would appear to have been the means employed, in the economy of nature, to prepare the world for the residence of social and civilized man. Geology would, indeed, seem to demonstrate, that the formation of soils for the support of animal and vegetable life, is one of the numerous evidences of design, by which the external world has, through successive physical revolutions, ultimately become so admirably adapted to the moral, intellectual, and physical condition of man.

From the recent extensive researches relative to American antiquities, we seem fairly warranted in the following conclusions. The first seats of civilization were in tropical America, whence it was gradually diffused north and south. In the history of the civilized tribes, two distinct epochs are observable, the first and most ancient having existed in unbroken tranquillity for a long and indeterminate period; the second being characterized by national changes brought about chiefly by the inroads of barbarous or semi-civilized tribes. The style and character peculiar to the monumental antiquities of the New World, prove that all have proceeded from branches of the same human family.

The relics and monuments found in the United States, which point for their origin toward Mexico, show that the ancient in-

habitants had arrived at a considerable degree of civilization,—that they were an agricultural people, lived in extensive cities, and under regular forms of government,—that they possessed a knowledge of the use of many metals, were skilled in the art of fortification, and were not unacquainted with astronomy and geometry; the last two, as well as a decided system of religion, being in the hands of the priesthood. At the period of the discovery of America, these ancient and cultivated nations had become extinct within the present limits of the United States, with the exception of the Natchez tribes of the Mississippi, who still retained some traces of the civilization of their Mexican progenitors. These extinct tribes were no doubt coeval, if they did not precede them, with the ancient Egyptians and Phenicians. With the ancient inhabitants of that portion of North America lying south of the United States, we are better acquainted. Unlike the latter region, in which the prior existence of civilized communities became a question of inquiry to the antiquary, the former affords the most decisive evidence of having been occupied for many ages by civilized nations. Mexico, Guatemala, and Yucatan, were found by the Spanish invaders occupied by populous nations, distributed in regularly organized states, partaking of the monarchical, aristocratical, and republican forms of government. Here were immense cities, rivalling in the magnificence of their temples and edifices those of the Old World,—a remark equally applicable to roads, aqueducts, and other public works. It has been well said that, as regards civilization, those people were decidedly superior to the Spaniards themselves on their first intercourse with the Phenicians, or that of the Gauls when first known to the Greeks, or that of the Germans and Britons in their earliest communication with the Romans. Indeed, in the knowledge of some of the sciences, these aboriginal Americans equalled, if they did not surpass, their conquerors. They seem to have had a mental constitution adapted to scientific investigation. Their knowledge of arithmetic and astronomy was both extensive and accurate. In architecture and sculpture they had made great advances. The remains of aqueducts and canals for irrigation yet exist. They knew how to extract metals from ores; how to form images of gold and silver hollow within; how to cut the hardest precious stones with the greatest nicety; how to dye cotton and wool, and to manufacture them into figured stuffs. Herrera, in his account of the markets at the Mexican

city of Tlascala, says—"There were goldsmiths, feather-men, barbers, baths, and as good earthenware as in Spain."

A description of the ancient cities and other ruins of the southern regions of North America, would of itself fill volumes. Clavigero, who has collected much important testimony upon this subject, asserts, upon the authority of Cortez, that not only were their cities numerous, but that some of them contained from thirty to sixty thousand houses; and so populous were they in the vicinity of these towns, that "not a foot of the soil was left uncultivated." As regards the present appearances of these monumental remains or vestiges of ancient population, it will suffice to refer the reader to the well-known works of Stephens, illustrated by Catherwood.

The stupendous pyramids, constituting the temples of our aboriginal race, are perhaps their most extraordinary monuments. The number of these in the Mexican empire, according to the estimate of Torquemada is forty thousand; but Clavigero thinks the number was far greater. The ruins of the celebrated pyramid, sacred to Quetzalcoatl, the "God of the Air," supposed to have been the largest in all Mexico, still stand to the east of the holy city of Cholula. The area covered by its base is twice as great as that of the Egyptian pyramid of Cheops, having a length of 1423 feet, and its altitude, which is 170 feet, is ten feet greater than that of the pyramid of Mycerinus.

Notwithstanding all these ruins are completely deserted, it is noway probable that they are the relics of a people now extinct. By the Spanish conquerors, the temples were found still devoted to their original sacred uses, and the magnificent palaces were not without their princes. The finest temple of the city of Mexico was erected but a short period before the landing of Cortez; and the great "Teocalli," we are told, was constructed after the model of the pyramids built by the Toltecs,—a people who preceded those found by the Spaniards, and to whom were ascribed by the Mexicans themselves all edifices of great antiquity. When the Europeans first arrived, it is very probable that many cities, in consequence of the revolutions to which every government is subject, had already been deserted, perhaps for centuries. It is, however, true beyond doubt that the ancestors of the present Indians occupying that region, were the authors of many of the existing antiquities indicative of a comparatively high state of civilization. In view of these facts, the relics and monuments scattered over the United States, in

connection with the uncivilized condition of its inhabitants when first discovered by Europeans, will the less excite our surprise. Like the "middle ages" of the old world, the new has had its still darker ones.

We are pleased to add, that in these conclusions we are confirmed by those of Stephens, whose opinions, on the score of extensive observation, are entitled to much credit. From his "*Incidents of Travel in Yucatan*," we make the following extracts:

"It is my belief that within this region, cities like those we have seen in ruins were kept up and occupied for a long time, perhaps one or two centuries, after the conquest, and that, down to a comparatively late period, Indians were living in them, the same as before the discovery of America. In fact, I conceive it to be not impossible that within this secluded region may exist at this day, unknown to white men, a living aboriginal city, occupied by relics of the ancient race, who still worship in the temples of their fathers."

On another occasion, our traveller remarks:—"Who were the builders of these American cities? My opinion on this question has been fully and freely expressed, [alluding to his former work,] *that they are not the works of a people who have passed away, and whose history is lost, but of the same races who inhabited the country at the time of the Spanish conquest, or of some not very distant progenitors.* Some were probably in ruins, but in general I believe that they were occupied by the Indians at the time of the Spanish invasion. The grounds of this belief are interspersed throughout these pages."

And in the following opinion we likewise fully concur:—"Degraded as the Indians are now," says Stephens, "they are not lower in the scale of intellect than the serfs of Russia, while it is a well known fact that the greatest architect in that country, the builder of the Cazan Church, at St. Petersburg, was taken from that abject class, and by education became what he is. In my opinion, teaching might again lift up the Indian, might impart to him the skill to sculpture stone and carve wood; and if restored to freedom and the unshackled powers of his mind, there might again appear a capacity to originate and construct, equal to that exhibited in the ruined monuments of his ancestors."

It is not true, as is generally supposed, that the chronicles of the conquest are quite deficient in descriptions of the great buildings then existing in Mexico and Yucatan. On the contrary, there is probably no historical question, upon which the



evidence is more specific and abundant. The testimony of Herrera, perhaps the most credible of the Spanish historians, is alone sufficient to establish beyond all controversy, the then existence of an immense number of great buildings, occupied as temples by the natives, and frequently made use of as military quarters by the invaders. "The whole country," says Herrera, "is divided into eighteen districts, and in all of them were so many and such stately stone buildings that it was amazing, and the greatest wonder is, that, having no use of any metal, they were able to raise such structures, which seem to have been temples, for their houses were always of timber, and thatched. In those edifices were carved the figures of naked men with earrings, after the Indian manner, idols of all sorts, lions, pots or jars, etc."

To the ancient monuments of South America, we can do no more than merely advert. These also indicate a high degree of civilization, which was not wholly confined to Peru. The tombs containing the preserved bodies of the ancient Peruvians of the upper provinces, we are told by Mr. Pentland, "are monuments of a grand species of design and architecture, resembling Cyclopean remains, and not unworthy of the arts of ancient Greece or Rome." By this people and some of the neighboring nations, cultivation of the soil was carried to a high state of perfection. Even the sides of the steepest mountains were converted, by the aid of stone walls and canals of irrigation, into productive fields. "Upon the sides of some of the mountains," says Mr. Temple, "were the remains of walls built in regular stages round them, from their base to their summits, forming terraces on which, or between which, the Indians, in days of yore, cultivated their crops." In many places, both in Peru and Chili, are still to be seen aqueducts often of great magnificence, constructed of earth and stone, and carried along the most precipitous mountains, with great labor and ingenuity, frequently to the distance of fifteen or twenty leagues—aqueducts that rival the boasted water-works of our own city of New-York. A striking resemblance to the aqueducts of Mexico is apparent in the circumstance that they consisted of two conduits running parallel, the larger being for general use, and the smaller to supply, while the other was being cleansed, the actual wants of the inhabitants. Many of these aqueducts were subterranean, there being at Lanasca a fountain supplied by such conduits, the source of which has never been traced. The very magnificence of some

of these great works, the pipes being made of gold, was the cause of their destruction by the Spaniards, whose avaricious cupidity was thus excited. Many public works were constructed for the encouragement of agriculture. In the vicinity of Santiago, in Chili, for example, an artificial aqueduct, in order to irrigate the soil of the lower plain, was formed so as to draw off a portion of the waters of the river Mapocho. "They cut channels," says Graham in his "Chile," "through the granite rock from the Mapocho to the edge of the precipice, and made use of the natural fall of the ground to throw a considerable stream from the river into the vale below. This is divided into numerous channels, as is required, and the land so watered is some of the most productive in the neighborhood of the city." But many of these lands, thus maintained fertile and productive, are now sandy and arid wastes, scarcely capable of supporting the most scanty population.

Much might be said in regard to the ruins of ancient cities, fortresses, and edifices in South America, as well as the remains of baths and works of sculpture; but we must content ourselves with one or two extracts in reference to their great public roads, which, by no means confined to Peru, still reveal their vestiges in remote regions far beyond the domain of the Inca power. "We were surprised," says Humboldt, in his journey across the plains of Assuary, "to find in this place, and at heights which greatly surpass the top of the peak of Teneriffe, the magnificent remains of a road constructed by the Incas of Peru. This causeway, lined with freestone, may be compared to the finest Roman roads I have seen in Italy, France, or Spain. It is perfectly straight, and keeps the same direction for six or eight thousand metres. We observed the continuation of this road near Caxamarca, one hundred and twenty leagues to the south of Assuary, and it is believed in the country that it led as far as the city of Cuzco." Another writer, (*Long, Polynesian Nation*, p. 78,) remarks, that "at a time when a public highway was either a relic of Roman greatness, or a sort of nonentity in England, there were roads fifteen hundred miles in length in the empire of Peru. The feudal system was as firmly established in these transatlantic kingdoms as in France. The Peruvians were ignorant of the art of forming an arch, but they had constructed suspension bridges over frightful ravines; they had no implements of iron, but their forefathers could move blocks of stone as huge as the Sphinxes and Memnons of Egypt."

In this region, as in Mexico, the ancient monuments indicate two epochs of the arts, one of remote antiquity, and the other of a more modern period. The sacred lake of Titicaca constitutes probably the most ancient locality of South American civilization; but to suppose that all the civilized tribes were comprised within the limits of the Peruvian empire, were an error of no small magnitude. The enterprise and ingenuity of the Peruvian sovereigns, when they established their extensive empire, were always ready to adopt, and reproduce on an enlarged scale, the inventions they found existing; as, for instance, the ancient structures of Tiahuanaco, which were, according to their own admission, the models of those erected by them in their own dominions.

From the foregoing facts, it would seem to follow conclusively that the American Aboriginal is susceptible of civilization. Whether the ancient Mexicans or Peruvians possessed the knowledge of hieroglyphic writing, was formerly a disputed point; but this question, as regards the advancement of their mental powers, is no longer of much importance; for even within the present age, in a tribe recently the most uncultivated, a second Cadmus has arisen in the person of an uneducated Cherokee, ignorant of every language but his own. The name of this Indian who invented a system of "talking Cherokee upon paper," is Se-qua-yah, or George Guess; and as we had the pleasure, during the removal of that tribe west of the Mississippi, in 1838, to become acquainted with a son of this Cadmus the Second, who was in the public service as a "*lingster*" or interpreter, we are enabled to state the circumstances which gave rise to this important discovery, as repeatedly related to us by the son. The thoughts of Guess were first directed into this channel by observing his nephew, who had just returned from a distant school, spelling some words, whereupon he immediately exclaimed that he could effect the same in his vernacular tongue. Building a hut in a retired spot, and thus secluding himself in a great measure from his people, he devoted himself exclusively to this great labor. His fellow countrymen, superstitious by education, grew suspicious of his object, as they viewed him in his solitary study surrounded by his cabalistic figures. Believing that he was engaged in the art of conjuration, peradventure in concocting some diabolical plan to blow up the nation, the populace succeeded in drawing him from his hermitage, when they burned up the cabin, hieroglyphics and

all. But our *second* Cadmus returned to his supposed black art; and he was soon fortunate enough to exhibit to his people one of the greatest wonders of modern times. Thus having, after two years' labor, completed his system, and instructed his daughter in the signification of the characters used, he invited his old friends, the head men and warriors of the nation, to assemble at his house to witness the result. Having explained to them the principles of his system, he then wrote down whatever was suggested by any of the visitors; and now calling in his daughter, she read it off unhesitatingly to the wonder-stricken assembly. His old friends, after repeating this several times to guard against imposition, were seized with mingled feelings of terror and amazement. One called him "*Skiagusta*" (God, or a very great man); another, "*Unantaha*" (God Almighty); and a third, "*Agagheha*" (Jesus Christ).

Like Pallas from the brain of Jove, the system sprang at once before the world complete in all its parts. A newspaper in the Cherokee language was soon published, and the greater portion of the New Testament and Watts' Hymns was translated and printed; and had not the Georgians, in a spirit of Vandalism, destroyed their printing establishment, the whole Bible might for years past have been read in the Cherokee tongue.

The elements of this written language consist of eighty-five characters, six of which represent vowels and the rest syllables. The language is not, like the ancient Egyptian, *ideographic*, that is, conveying ideas to the mind by pictures and resemblances, or metaphorical figures; nor is it, like the Chinese, *lexigraphic*, that is, representing the words of the language; but it consists of vowels and syllables, the various combinations of which have been found to embrace every word in the tongue. For a native to learn to read requires no longer a period, than the time requisite to become acquainted with the characters. The word Cherokee, for example, pronounced by the natives *Tseloge*, is represented by three characters, equivalent to *tse*, *lo*, and *ge*. This may be considered a *syllabic* alphabet, being intermediate to the European and Chinese languages, the characters of the former expressing elementary sounds, and those of the latter designating elementary objects, that is, expressing those ideas required in the infancy of knowledge, a combination of these forming additional words.

George Guess now resides with his nation west of the Mississippi, little distinguished above his neighbors for acuteness of

intellect. His mind at least was not, in the language of Dr. Morton, "incapable of a continued process of reasoning on abstract subjects, nor did it reject whatever requires investigation or analysis." Although a stranger to the honors of the world, the name of George Guess is destined to immortality.

Although we have thus considered at some length the *mental endowments* of our Aborigines, yet it will not be without interest and profit, to take a general view of *psychology*,—a term which comprehends not only the history of the mental faculties, but also an account of those faculties in inferior animals, which most nearly resemble the mental endowments of man. Here, again, we must call to aid our favorite author, Dr. Prichard. As it is an admitted law, that the instincts of no two separate species bear an exact resemblance to each other, that is, they do not precisely resemble each other in those internal principles, of which their actions and habits are the outward signs and manifestations,—it follows, that should it appear, on inquiry, that the whole human family are characterized by one common mind or psychical nature, a strong argument, on the ground of analogy, for their community of species and origin, would be afforded. On a first view of this question—when the mind's eye surveys, on the one hand, a Newton in his study or a Davy in his laboratory, and on the other hand, a Bushman or a native American in a state the most savage and morally degraded,—or let the *coup d'œil* take in, at the same time, the brilliant spectacle of the coronation of a European monarch, and that of the dancing and barbarous music known to the Aborigines of America or of Nègroland,—under the contrasted view of these circumstances, we say, that most persons would be disposed at once to adopt the negative side of this inquiry; but when we come to trace the history of man from ancient times, we first become aware what changes time and circumstances have effected in his moral and intellectual nature. In this, in truth, lies the grand distinction between man and inferior animals; the latter being characterized by a uniformity of habits in successive generations, and the latter by variations in the same, either tending to improvement, or to alternate periods of improvement, with reverses and retrograde changes. "The Numidian lion and the satyr of the desert, the monarchies of bees and the republics of African termites," says Prichard, "are precisely to-day, what they were in the age of Æsop, and in the kingdom of Juba; while the descendants of the tribe

who are described by Tacitus, as living in squalid misery in solitary dens, amid the morasses of the Vistula, have built St. Petersburg, and Moscow; and the posterity of cannibals and phthirophagi, now feed on pillaus and wheaten bread."

There are in truth fixed principles of human action, which may be regarded as typical of the whole human family. The universal employment of conventional speech among men—the aboriginals of Africa and of America equally with those of Caucasian blood—contrasted with its total absence among inferior animals, is one of the most remarkable characteristics of humanity; and this difference serves to distinguish the two in an eminent degree, implying that mankind, who possess it universally as well as exclusively, are endowed with a common nature and origin. To the same category of exclusive characteristics belong the use of fire and of artificial clothing, and the arts in general; but the use of conventional language, as well as all the arts and sciences which ennoble and dignify human nature, are only certain outward manifestations of that internal agency which constitutes its distinctive attribute. It is in the characteristic phenomena of this principle, as compared with the psychological nature of the lower animals, that we must seek the line of distinction.

This difference is well expressed by Dr. Prichard in the following extract:—"The changeless uniformity which prevails in the habits of one class of beings, contrasted with the variation, equally remarkable when one generation is compared with another, in the higher class, is a more really characteristic difference between the life of instinctive and that of rational agents. This is the distinction most obvious, and the only one that is obvious, to a superficial and casual observer. But those who look more closely into the nature of actions, and into the more recondite history of feelings and sentiments, which are the prime movers and secret springs of actions, are enabled to discover a more important distinction, and this is to be found in the very different scope toward which the active energies of instinct and of reason are directed. The energies of all the lower animals, the whole sum of their activities, excited into action by the stimulus of desire or aversion, according to different laws impressed on each species, are directed toward the present safety and immediate well-being of the individual or of his tribe. But if we survey the whole sphere of human actions, in the

vast field of observation which the entire history of mankind presents, we shall find that the same remark can here be applied, but in a very limited degree. On the contrary, there is nothing more remarkable in the habitudes of mankind, and in their manner of existence in various parts of the world, than a reference, which is everywhere more or less distinctly perceptible, to a state of existence to which they feel themselves to be destined after the termination of their visible career, and to the influence which both civilized and barbarous men believe to be exercised over their condition, present and future, by unseen agents, differing in attributes according to the sentiments of different nations, but everywhere acknowledged to exist, and regarded with sentiments of awe and apprehension."

Amongst the psychological phenomena peculiar to human beings, these are certainly the most remarkable; and they serve, in a corresponding degree, to distinguish man, in his inward nature, from the whole life of the lower orders of creation. Dr. Prichard devotes much attention to these psychological phenomena, believing that they express principles which are common to all human races. He attempts to illustrate the psychological history of the most widely separated races of men; and he attains this end, by bringing under view, in the first place, the most striking and characteristic features relating to the moral and intellectual state, the original superstitions and religious dogmas, of uncultivated nations, prior to their acquaintance with the common acquirements of the civilized and Christianized world; and by showing, in the next place, the extent to which these tribes, when civilization and Christianity were brought within their reach, have been found capable of receiving and appropriating their blessings. To effect this purpose, he finds it sufficient to survey two or three of the most diversified races, viz., the nations of the New World and the woolly-haired races of Africa; and these he compares with the nations of Europe and Asia, by way of testing the truth of his theory.

Without following Dr. Prichard in these researches, the reader must be content with mere conclusions, which rest upon abundant historical testimony. We thus contemplate, in surveying the diversified tribes of the human family, the same general internal feelings, propensities, and aversions, as well as the same natural sentiments of subjection to invisible powers, and of accountableness, in a greater or less degree, to unseen agents

of retributive justice, from whose dread tribunal even the gates of Death are far from promising escape. In the words of the Roman Poet—

Vengeance divine to punish sin moves slow;  
The slower is its pace, the surer is its blow.

As respects the institutions of religion and of civilized life, we also find that nations the most barbarous and sensual are susceptible, some more slowly than others, of becoming moulded to them, through those endowments of our mental nature which are universally recognized. We can, indeed, confirm this from our own knowledge relative to the Cherokees, many of whom we have known, as we believed, to be thoroughly imbued with the principles and sentiments of the Christian religion. When we consider that, in all ages of mankind, there have been orders of the sacerdotal and consecrated class, who have made themselves to be respected as the interpreters of destiny and as mediators between gods and men;—when we consider that these vicegerents of the Deity, call them, if you will, pontiffs, have alike exercised unlimited sway in the Vatican of the Tiber and in the temples of the Pagan world,—in the magnificent pyramids of Egypt and of the central regions of ancient America; when we consider that thousands of many nations, Christian and Pagan, white and black, have performed, every year, through long successive ages, the most toilsome pilgrimages, with the view of seeking at the tombs of prophets and saints, atonement for guilt;—when we consider that through zeal for some metaphysical dogma, which the multitude were incapable of comprehending, empires have been desolated by sacred wars; when we consider all these, and many other psychological phenomena of a similar nature that might be enumerated as belonging to the history of all the nations of the earth, barbarous and civilized, it follows as an irresistible conclusion, (more especially when it is borne in mind that every species of animal organization is characterized by specific instincts and separate psychical endowments,) that *all human races are of one species and one family*: and in addition to this deduction, who does not spontaneously feel, from a survey of these facts, the solemn conviction that *there is a God*!

To the five varieties of the human family, according to the classification of Blumenbach, and frequently to three of them,



excluding the American and Malay, it has been customary to refer all the ramifications of the human family. Taking the country of the Georgians and Circassians as the radiating point of the Caucasian race, we may trace out its principal branches by the analogies of language. The Armenian or Syrian division, directing its course to the south, gave birth to the Assyrians, Chaldeans, and untamable Arabs, with their various subdivisions. In this branch, science and literature have occasionally flourished, but always under fantastic forms. Another division embraced the Indian, German, and Pelasgic branch, in whose four principal languages we recognize a striking resemblance. The first is the Sanscrit, now the sacred language of the Hindoos ; the second is the Pelasgic, the common mother of the Greek and Latin, and of almost every language now spoken in the south of Europe ; thirdly, the Gothic or Teutonic, from which arose the German, Dutch, English, Danish, and Swedish languages and their dialects ; and fourthly, the Sclavonian, from which are derived the Russian, Polish, Bohemian, etc. This division is the most respectable branch of the Caucasian variety ; for among them have philosophy, the arts, and sciences, been carried to a degree of perfection unknown to any other race.

This ethnographic inquiry has been of late years followed up with much industry, tracing out the analogies of languages into their most minute ramifications. Much credit is due to Prichard for his indefatigable researches in this respect in regard to Europe, Asia, and Africa ; but it too often happens that the affinities of languages in the last two are not sufficiently known to lead to undoubted results. Prichard thinks, however, that languages, of all peculiar endowments, are the most permanently retained, and that it can be shown that they have often survived even very considerable changes in physical and moral characters. "*Glottology*, or the history of languages," he says, "founded on an accurate analysis of their relations, is almost a new field of inquiry. It has been explored with great success of late, and new discoveries are every day being made in it. Our contemporaries are becoming more and more convinced that the history of nations, termed ethnology, must be mainly founded on the relations of their languages. The ultimate object of this investigation is not to trace the history of languages, but of the tribes of men whose affinity they tend to illustrate. We must at the same time keep in view the great physical dis-

inctions pointed out in the preceding sections, and particularly the threefold divisions of the forms of the human skull."

One thing, however, is certain, namely, that the researches of modern ethnographers have rendered in the highest degree probable, what all of our readers of course already believe—that *the languages of man were originally one*. "Instead of being perplexed with a multiplicity of languages," says Wiseman, "we have now reduced them to certain very large groups, each comprising a very great variety of languages formerly thought to be unconnected, and thus representing, as it were, only one human family originally possessing a single idiom. Now every succeeding step has clearly added to this advantage, and diminished still further any apparent hostility between the number of languages and the history of the dispersion." We cannot of course do more than give a glance at this subject upon which has been written volume upon volume. Even in Africa, according to Wiseman, "the dialects whereof have been comparatively but little studied, every new research displays connections between tribes extended over vast tracts, and often separated by intermediate nations; in the north, between the languages spoken by the Berbers and Tuariks, from the Canaries to the Oasis of Siwa; in Central Africa, between the dialects of the Felatahs and Foulas, who occupy nearly the whole interior; in the south, among the tribes across the whole continent, from Caffraria and Mozambique to the Atlantic ocean."

More recent researches confirm the same conclusion, as appears by the last No. of Silliman's Journal, in which is presented a condensed view of the results of our Exploring Expedition; and these results, it is said, when published, will equal, in amount and interest, those of any preceding expedition. It has been shown, for instance, that the investigation of the languages of the vast island or continent of New Holland, which had been supposed to be entirely distinct, has resulted in proving such a clear and intimate resemblance, that there is the strongest reason for believing that the inhabitants of this widely extended region, are *one people*, speaking languages derived from a common origin.

Let us now turn to the special object of our researches,—the *American* race, among whose languages, as they are as innumerable as the tribes, (some 400,) it was long believed to be impracticable to establish any analogies, or with those of the Eastern continent. Baron Humboldt's assertion respecting the

multiplicity of American languages was at first doubted by many in Europe, because the fact was deemed incompatible with the Scripture narrative; "for we cannot suppose," says Wiseman, "each of these tribes, speaking a language totally unintelligible to its neighbors, to be lineally descended from one formed at the dispersion, without allowing the strange anomaly, that, of the human families then formed, such countless yet such insignificant tribes should have wandered to that distance." Of the fact of this multiplicity of tongues among our Aborigines, we became acquainted with a striking instance in a camp of friendly Creeks serving in Florida against the Seminoles. An intelligent and educated Creek, named Paddy Carr, commanded a force numbering less than one hundred men, which he had gathered from several neighboring villages in the Creek country; and amongst these, three, if not four, dialects were spoken, each peculiar perhaps to one or two villages and their dependencies; and as regards one of these tongues, (the Uchee, we think,) the commanding officer, Major Paddy Carr, was obliged to keep up his communications through an interpreter.

But the philosophic Alexander von Humboldt, to whom the world is so much indebted in respect to the languages and monuments of our country, early discovered certain relations among them. "However insulated," he says, "certain languages may at first appear, however singular their caprices and their idioms, all have an analogy among them, and their numerous relations will be more perceived, in proportion as the philosophical history of nations, and the study of languages, shall be brought to perfection." It is now, however, known that they all present the most remarkable resemblances,—an analogy which consists mostly in peculiar conjugational modes of modifying the verbs by the insertion of syllables. This peculiarity of the American languages was termed *agglutination*, as a family name, by the late W. von Humboldt. "This wonderful uniformity," says Malte-Brun, "in the peculiar manner of forming the conjugation of verbs from one extremity of America to the other, favors in a singular manner the supposition of a primitive people, which formed the common stock of the American indigenous nations." The existence of some American words common with the vocabularies of the old world, has been proved; and these analogies, however scanty, look towards Asia as the point of migration of our Aborigines. "In eighty-three American languages examined by Messrs. Barton and Vater,"

says Humboldt, "one hundred and seventy words have been found, the roots of which appear to be the same; and it is easy to perceive that this analogy is not accidental, since it does not rest merely upon imitative harmony, or on that conformity of organs which produces almost a perfect identity in the first sounds articulated by children." As regards the affinities between these languages and those of Eastern Asia, Malte-Brun advanced a step farther, in his endeavor to establish between them what he calls a "geographical connection;" and this resemblance between the languages of the two continents, was also regarded by Balbi, as too marked to be the result of accident. By Mr. Gallatin, who has bestowed great learning and research upon the Indian languages, the inference that our aboriginal race dates back to the earliest ages of mankind, was long since drawn. "Whilst the unity of structure and grammatical forms," he says, "proves a common origin, it may be inferred from this, combined with the great diversity and entire difference in the words of the several languages of America, that this continent received its first inhabitants at a very remote period, probably not much posterior to that of the dispersion of mankind."

The decision of the Academy of St. Petersburg upon the general question, was, after a long research, that *all languages are to be regarded as dialects of one now lost*. By M. Balbi, the industrious and learned author of the "*Atlas Ethnographique du Globe*,"—a work consisting of charts classifying languages according to Ethnographic kingdoms, as he styles them, followed by comparative tables of elementary words in every known language,—the following has been recorded as the result of a whole life spent in these and kindred investigations: "The books of Moses, no monument either historical or astronomical, has yet been able to prove false; but with them, on the contrary, agree in the most remarkable manner, the results obtained by the most learned philologists, and the profoundest geometers."

In view of the preceding facts, it is obvious that all our Aborigines, with the exception perhaps of the Esquimaux, have the same descent and origin. The monumental antiquities, extending from Canada to the southern part of Chili, present, in their style and character, indications of having proceeded from branches of the same primitive family. This conclusion is also confirmed by the uniformity of their mental, moral, and physical charac-

teristics, under every variety of circumstances, and from universal analogies in their language, religion, methods of interring the dead, and certain other arbitrary customs. The emigration of the Esquimaux tribes from Asia, is of a comparatively recent date, as is evinced by their Mongolian features, while the period of the arrival of what are considered our aboriginal race, dates back to the earliest ages of mankind.

A primitive branch of the human family, the American Aboriginal race, cannot be said to be derived from any nation, or variety of mankind, *now existing*; but they are assimilated by so many analogies to the most ancient types of civilization in the Eastern Hemisphere, that the character of their civilization cannot be regarded as wholly indigenous. This uniformity is apparent in the monuments of these nations, whose temples were pyramids, and whose traditions are interwoven with cosmogonical fables, retaining the relics of primitive history. It thus appears that the same arts, customs, religion, and social institutions, carried in the earliest ages of man's diffusion into various parts of the globe, as for instance, Egypt, China, Hindostan, and America, were subsequently so modified in each under the influence of causes the most diverse, that we can now discover only an approximation in their general features; and to the agency of these same local causes is to be ascribed, in a great degree, the modification of physical features, and of moral and intellectual character, by which the leading varieties of mankind are distinguished.

The civilization of the American nations may be considered as truly indigenous as that of Egypt. The ruined cities of Copan, Uxmal, Palenque, etc., point to an epoch that may be regarded as the primal seat of American civilization; and from this centre, the march of mental culture extended south as far as Chili, and north to the borders of Canada, as indicated by the mounds and mural remains found in the region of the United States. These civilized nations, as already shown, were rich, populous, and agricultural; they were skilled in the arts of pottery, of dying cotton and wool, and manufacturing them into figured stuffs, and in the more refined knowledge of metallurgy and of sculpture. Their constructive talent is conspicuous in their extensive cities and fortifications; in their pyramids and temples, which are not exceeded by those of Egypt; and in their roads and aqueducts, which rival those of the Romans. They had a mental constitution adapted to sci-

entific investigation, as indicated by their extensive and accurate mathematical and astronomical knowledge; and they were associated under regular forms of government, with a national religion under the direction of a priesthood.

Contemplate, for a moment, the great stone *Calendar*, found near the site of the present city of Mexico, in A. D. 1791, in the spot where it was ordered to be buried by Cortez, when he, with his ferocious Spaniards, devastated that country. They invariably broke and destroyed all images of stone, except those that were very large and strong, which they buried in the ground. As the natives had an ardent attachment to these objects, and as their presence counteracted their conversion to the Roman Catholic faith, they were thus carefully hidden from their view. This *Mexican Calendar*, as it is called by Humboldt, is of basalt, having engraved on it, in relief, a great number of hieroglyphics, signifying the divisions of time, the motions of the heavenly bodies, the twelve signs of the Zodiac, with reference to the feasts and sacrifices of the Mexicans. To the description of the similarity of its representations of astrology, astronomy, and the divisions of time, with those of a great many of the Asiatic nations, Humboldt devotes one hundred octavo pages. This stone, which was three feet in thickness and a fraction over twelve feet square, weighed twenty-four tons. As it was discovered more than thirty miles from any quarry of the same kind, we have evidence of the ability of this primitive people to transport, like the ancient Egyptians, stones of vast magnitude. The entire surface of this stone is intensely crowded with representations and hieroglyphics arranged in circles, the outer one being over twenty-seven feet in circumference; the whole, as regards its order, harmony and execution, evincing no inconsiderable knowledge both of art and science.

Although American civilization survived that of ancient Egypt, Phœnicia, and other Semitic nations, as illustrated in the splendor and luxury of Nineveh and Babylon; yet, like them, the day of its glory is no more. As throughout nature the law of change is everywhere apparent, as manifested in the geological history of organic and inorganic creation on the earth's surface,—as we tread in fact upon the wrecks of anterior worlds, proving that every thing that meets our view is either undergoing the process of renovation or decay, waxing or waning like the beautiful orb of night, the impressive emblem of individual as well as of national destiny,—need we be surprised that

nations are subject to the same law—that they have a period of growth, acmé and decay? In this ceaseless mutation, the time would seem to have arrived, when the Aboriginal race of the American soil, like the savages of New Holland, is destined to be supplanted by a different variety of the human family—one which exceeds all others in its aptitude to accommodate itself to the most extraordinary diversity of circumstances. It is melancholy to reflect that, judging from the past, no future event seems more certain than the speedy disappearance of the American Aboriginal race, when these now broken, scattered, and degraded remnants of a primitive and once cultivated branch of the human family, will be scarcely remembered, save in poetry and tradition. Like the grass of his own prairie before the fire of the hunter, so has the red man been swept away before the mildew-blast of the white man's breath! Blighted to the germ, shall the parent stem no more know the spring of renovation, but wither and die upon its indigenous soil? No: Forbid it heaven! Forbid it humanity! We trust that the time is near at hand when the voice of the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Creek, and other tribes on our frontier, members of our national confederacy, shall be heard within the walls of the Capitol; and then will the Indian again acquire "*the skill to sculpture stone and carve wood.*"

In consideration of his high authority on this subject, we have referred particularly to Morton's "*Inquiry into the Distinctive Characteristics of the Aboriginal Race of America.*" We shall now leave the question with the reader. On the one side, he has the conclusions of Dr. Morton, who doubtless reconciles them, in his own mind, with the Scripture narrative, that "*the American race is essentially separate and peculiar, whether we regard it in its physical, its moral, or its intellectual relations*"—that the American Indian "*stands isolated from the rest of mankind*"—and that "*there are no direct or obvious links between the people of the old world and the new.*" And, on the other side, supported by the arguments of this paper, he has the authoritative declaration of Moses that all human kind have descended from a single pair.

## ARTICLE III.

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS EXHIBITED IN THE GRECIAN POETRY ;  
CONSIDERED WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ATTRIBUTE OF  
JUSTICE, AND THE STRONG IMPRESSION LEFT BY THE PRIMITIVE  
BELIEF, UPON THE ANCIENT MIND.

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THE ancient classics should ever be read by the light of the Bible, and with continual reference to their theological bearings. Whatever in other respects may be his critical skill, he who is not familiar with the Holy Scriptures, as a devoted student both of their letter and their spirit, is but poorly prepared to appreciate properly the poetry and philosophy of antiquity. We find this strikingly exemplified in that critical school which was founded by Porson, and which, although it has passed its zenith, is still vigorously maintained by many of his inferior imitators. How barren has it been of all fruit in that higher department of classical literature which is connected with the philosophy of the primitive mind, the truth of a primitive revelation, the elucidation of the Bible, and that most interesting of all inquiries which relates to the early religious sentiments and theology of our race ! The school to which we refer, has been ever occupied with mere verbal criticism, which however valuable as an aid, or as a means to a higher end, becomes useless and worse than useless when made the end itself. More importance has been attached to the discovery of some worthless various reading, or some opportunity to exhibit skill in critical emendations never before proposed by others, than to all the intellectual treasures which were suffered to lie unnoticed in the text. Such scholars linger forever in the vestibule of classic knowledge, without ever entering in and taking possession of that rich domain of thought spread out before their keen yet narrow vision.

And how should it be otherwise ? When instead of an earnest and deep-souled enthusiasm, there is nothing but an insane *cacoethes emendandi* ; when the highest ambition is gratified in expunging forbidden anapaests, in hunting for Cretic endings, in consuming pages to determine the respective claims of a  $\pi\omega$  or a  $\pi\eta$ ,—whilst all this time the lofty discourse of the



mysterious Prometheus, the sublime flow of Plato's poetical philosophy, and even the soul-stirring strains of the harps of Orpheus and Homer are hushed in silence awaiting the momentous decision;—how, when occupied with such pursuits, could we expect the soul to be alive to the high bearings of the classics upon theology, or their connection, by way of opposition or resemblance, with the records of Revelation? What a contrast, in this respect, is presented by Cudworth, Gale, Grotius, Jeremy Taylor and other scholars of past generations! They are declared by the Porsons and Elmsleys of our day, to have been destitute of critical acumen; and yet how vast their acquirements, how extensive their reading! It was not confined to the best known writers who flourished in the golden age of Grecian or Roman literature, but embraced all who made those noble languages the media for the communication of their thoughts,—the critics and grammarians of the Alexandrian school, the writings of the later Platonists, the huge tomes of the Greek and Latin fathers, the voluminous commentators on Aristotle, and the long series of authors who adorned what has been styled the Byzantine period. All this they accomplished because they found no time to bestow on trifles. They had a higher motive than the determination of the exact number of oars in a Grecian galley, or the precise length of the straps on a Grecian sandal. They wrote and studied under the influence of that mighty theological stimulus, which the Reformation had imparted, and which had not yet spent its power. With the Bible in the one hand, and the ancient author in the other, they brought all their reading to bear upon the sacred truths of religion. Classical literature was with them a means to a higher end; and hence they carried it farther, and derived from it much more of real value, than those who profess to have made it their sole object of pursuit.

It is in such a spirit we should open the pages of antiquity; and all who faithfully pursue this end, undiverted by critical trifling, will be astonished at the inexhaustible mine of rich thought contained in the ancient poetry and philosophy, their important bearings upon theology, and the frequent occurrence of sentiments approaching the sublimity and moral purity of the Holy Scriptures. The fact of such coincidences is admitted by all who have made this department the object of their special study. Some have endeavored to account for it by supposing a direct communication between the leading minds of

Greece, and the Scriptures and teaching of the Jewish church. This opinion is defended in a work of great extent and immense erudition, by that learned Puritan, Theophilus Gale. His conclusions however are based upon a mass of arguments and authorities, formidable rather by their accumulation than by their individual strength. Another hypothesis on much stronger grounds maintains, that these coincidences were the lingering remains of the light of a primitive revelation, once common to all mankind in the early Patriarchal ages, and afterwards superseded by a more direct revelation to the Jewish nation embodying the essential truths; whilst the ancient traditional theology was suffered gradually to be eclipsed, although never totally extinguished by the vices and depravity of our race. The Apostle tells us "that the heathen did not like to retain the knowledge of God," thereby clearly intimating that they once possessed it. That this was the fact, no careful student of the Greek classics can for a moment doubt. This primitive knowledge of divine things exhibits its remains in almost every department of ancient literature. We recognize these stray wanderers from a holier home, not only in those wondrous thoughts of Plato, which have ever been the admiration of all studious and contemplative minds, and which he himself ever asserts to have been derived from a traditionary origin; they sometimes strangely make their appearance on the pages of the cold and passionless Aristotle, forming a singular contrast with the dry and technical speculations of his own mind;—as when, for example, in one of his least impassioned arguments, he suddenly introduces a distinction between true happiness or *blessedness* (*εὐδαιμονία*) and mere worldly prosperity, declaring that the former is a "*divine thing*" (*θεῖον τι*), that, as its name imports, it consists in the favor of Heaven, being the special gift of God (*θεόδοτον*) and not derived from Earth.\* They meet us everywhere in the Grecian poets, appearing like the sunbeams struggling through clouds, and often rendered still brighter by contrast with the dark mythology by which they are surrounded. We may find them concealed amid the corruptions of this same mythology, when we have learned to distinguish the more ancient *spiritual* idea from the *physical* hypothesis which was afterwards superinduced upon it. They may be discovered by those who will seek for them, in the Divine names,

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\* Arist. Nuom. Ethic. Lib. I. ch. 9, § 2.

both Greek and Hebrew, or wrapped up in single terms expressive of moral or religious ideas, whose etymological structure points to a purer primitive period, and to a sense far more elevated than that to which in subsequent use they had degenerated. In many cases, among those to which we shall refer, there is undoubtedly conveyed a more sublime and religious sentiment than the writers intended to express, because these purer primitive terms exercised a conservative influence, not only upon their language, but also upon their thoughts. There is a spirit in these old words, which has, perhaps almost unconsciously, carried up the mind of the poet or the philosopher to an elevation above the usual current of his conceptions. It has made him, like the Hebrew prophets, utter sentiments whose full meaning he may have but dimly comprehended, and which we better understand, because we read them by the light of the Bible.

No department of study is more interesting, and at the same time more truly profitable, than that which leads us to contemplate the gradual moral deterioration which language, like every thing else which is human, suffers from the depravity of man ;—becoming, it is true, improved for the purposes of commerce and the ordinary concerns of life, yet, in its moral, and many of its philosophical terms, ever varying more and more from the piety and clearness of its primitive state. One of the first writers of the age has asserted, that more is often learned from the history of a word than from the history of a campaign. We may go much farther than this, and safely say, that in tracing the course of certain moral terms, more is ascertained of those changes that have taken place in the inner kingdom of the soul, than can be known from all the political or merely external annals of a people. We see in them, how man departs from the simplicity of early morality, as he approaches the refinement of later corruptions ;—how he gradually sinks down from the religious to the atheistical, from that contemplative state which ever forms a marked trait of the primitive life, to what is boastingly styled the practical, and which finally leads, through excess of luxury and its attending vices, to that ultimate savage degradation, which some theorists would place first in their false scale of human progress. This has ever been the case with men, until some new revelation, or some revival of the old, has again shed new life through language, called forth from their graves ancient ideas, awakened ancient associ-

ations of thought, which had long slumbered in the etymological structure of words, and thus again diffused a strange and almost preternatural energy through every department of literature and philosophy.

Without farther preface, we intend at present to illustrate these positions by numerous references to passages from ancient classic authors. As the field however is too vast to be occupied by one article, we propose in this to confine ourselves to those which have a bearing upon some of the most prominent of the Divine attributes, as revealed in the Holy Scriptures, and the expressive appellations by which they are set forth.

The epithets applied by the Greeks to their gods, (especially their supreme deity,) and the sublimity and purity of some of the attributes thereby ascribed to them,—so far beyond their mythological actions,—afford convincing proof, that the former were remnants of traditionary knowledge of the true God, which had come down from a remote antiquity, and surviving the source whence they were derived, formed an incongruous mixture with the fables and corruptions of a later age. No student of antiquity can fail to be struck with this strange feature of the Greek religion. Altars and temples were dedicated to the same god under various names and titles, expressive of different attributes, as though each one had characterized a different divinity. Hence we find Ζεὺς ἐνίστιος or ἐφέστιος, Jupiter who presides over the rites of hospitality and the domestic relations; the same power, although under a different name, in honor of whom the sacred fire was to be kept forever burning,—intimating the never-failing warmth of those hallowed emotions of which he was the special guardian. There was Ζεὺς ξένιος, Jupiter the protector of strangers,—Ζεὺς ὄρνιος, Jupiter the upholder and defender of the sanctity of oaths,—Ζεὺς εὐκταῖος, Jupiter the hearer of prayer,—Ζεὺς ἐρχεῖος, the maintainer of bounds, and the protector of the rights of property,—Ζεὺς φίλιος and ἐταιρεῖος, the patron of friends and friendship,—Ζεὺς ἰκέσιος, the god of the suppliant,—Ζεὺς μελίσσιος, the god of mercy,—Ζεὺς παλαμῆιος, the avenger of crime, especially of murder,—Ζεὺς καθάρσιος, the god who demands expiation for sin, and who will have purity in all who approach to worship him,—Ζεὺς οὐράνιος, the power that rules in the heavens, and Ζεὺς χθόνιος, the same omnipresent deity regarded as appointing and regulating the retributions of the subterranean Hades. Many others might be mentioned, which are found scattered everywhere on

the pages of the Grecian poets. For a full list of them, the reader is referred to the treatise *De Mundo*, ascribed to Aristotle, and generally published among his works (Leip. ed. vol. iv. p. 165.) Thus to the same god, different altars and temples were erected, and a different worship performed, according to the one or the other of these attributes. Could these epithets, we ask, so pure, so sublime, so worthy even of the Jehovah of the Scriptures,—could they have come from the same source, and been coeval with that corrupt mythology, with which we find them afterwards associated, and which ascribes to the gods the worst actions of the worst of men? It is evident that the latter was superinduced upon the former, and that the attributes of the ancient Orphic, or rather Patriarchal Ζεύς (etymologically *the life and the author of life*,) were afterwards ascribed to the Cretan demigod, whose fabled crimes disfigure so many portions of the ancient poetry. This mythology had a far later origin; and it is no fancy to suppose that these sublime names, so strangely associated with it, are traditionary remnants from a primitive religion,—being in fact originally expressive of the different attributes of the one *True God*, of the ancient universally worshipped Deity.

The epithets Ζεύς ἐπίσιος, Ζεύς ξένιος, suggest at once to the diligent student of the Bible and the classics, that attribute of Jehovah so often mentioned in the Old Testament, describing him as the lifter up of those who are bowed down, the avenger of the wronged, the God of the stranger, the widow and the fatherless. In the *Odyssey* we have language which it is not profanity to suppose may have come down from the same source with the Bible, although the dark mind of the heathen poet may have had no conception of the sacred origin of the noble sentiment he had received from ancient tradition.

Ξεῖν' οὐ μοι Θέμις ἔσσι', οὐδ' εἰ κακίων' σέθεν ἔλθοι  
 ξεινον ἀτιμῆσαι;—πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσιν ἅπαντες  
 ξεινοὶ τε πτωχοὶ τε.

I could not harm thee, stranger, nor inquire  
 If crime has brought thee here. Jove's special care  
 Are all the poor and friendless.

*Odyssey*, xiv. 56; also vi. 207.

Compare Deuteronomy 10: 18, 19. *Love ye therefore the stranger; for the Lord loveth the stranger.*

How little did the Greek poets understand of the fulness of

meaning contained in that common epithet, *Ζεὺς ἐγκρατής*, the protector of the domestic *enclosures*, the god of families, the god of our homes, with all their hallowed associations; and how naturally is this associated with those passages of Scripture, in which the Lord expresses his strong displeasure against such as remove their neighbor's landmarks, who violate any of the domestic relations, or who seek to infringe upon any of the sacred rights of property! We cannot meet with the epithet, *Ζεὺς ἐνυκταίος*, without thinking of Him who has styled himself the "Hearer of prayer," and under this precious title invites "all flesh to come before him." That sublime name, *Ζεὺς ὄρκιος*,\* cannot fail to remind us of the Eloah of the Bible, (the God of the oath or covenant,) and of the frequency with which he is described as the avenger of falsehood and perjury—a covenant keeping God of faithfulness and truth. The thoughts suggested by these epithets, we repeat it, belong to a purer age than that of Æschylus or of Homer. They have about them the savor of patriarchal purity, and of those more spiritual views of God, which were the peculiar traits of the primitive ages of the world. Hence surviving as they did, and mingling with a mythology of a later origin and of a lower grade, they arrest the mind not only by their beauty and their purity, but also by their strange want of harmony with other and more degrading views of the Deity, with which they are so strangely associated.

To a thinking and deeply serious mind, there is no stronger internal evidence of the supernatural origin of the Old Testament, than the unshrinking boldness with which it sets forth those Divine attributes, which, to a superficial view, seem directly opposed to each other. Descriptions of God's holy and vindictive justice, clothed in the most terrific language, are found in the same book, in the same chapter, and sometimes closely united in the same passage, with the most soothing declarations of his overflowing loving-kindness and tender mercy.† No human composition could thus have maintained, in all its awful grandeur, the *equilibrium* of the Divine character. The ten-

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\* We find some remains of the ancient idea contained in this epithet (and which is so closely connected with the names Elohim and Eloah) in the designation of the Canaanitish god *בַּעַל בְּרִית* (Baal Berith) *The Lord of the oath or covenant*; *Fœderum Præses*, like the Greek *Ζεὺς ὄρκιος* or Latin *Deus Fidius*.

† Compare Nahum 1: 1—8; also Exod. 34: 6, 7.

dency of the human mind, left to itself, is ever to a partial view,—to an effeminate sentimentalism on the one hand, or to a dark fanaticism on the other,—to an unwarranted trust in the Divine mercy, untempered by any regard to that justice which gives mercy all its value, or to those gloomy apprehensions of wrath, which arise from the sole contemplation of the sterner attributes of the Deity. Both alike destroy that balance, which is ever maintained in the Holy Scriptures. The one tendency forms a peculiar trait of modern rationalism; the other characterizes all the religious views of the world previous to the introduction of Christianity. The God of justice, viewed in the relations of lawgiver and judge, possesses a far more prominent place in those systems, than the God of love. In truth, nature left to its own unbiassed workings, could view him in no other light. A consciousness of sin, without a knowledge of the only way of salvation, must ever present the Deity in all the sterner attributes of his character. Hence the deeper impression, on the ancient mind, of justice than of mercy. Hence the perpetuity and universality of the doctrine of sacrifices, although its origin is undoubtedly owing to an express revelation. Hence the great variety of penances and satisfactions by way of expiation for sin, to which men have in all ages resorted.

*Διὸς γὰρ δυσπαράκλητοι φρένες,\**

*Hard to be appeased is the mind of Jove:* such must ever be the aspect, under which the Divine character appears, not only to the dark soul of the heathen, but also to the impenitent sinner in Christian lands, who is brought to entertain any right views of his relation to his Judge. The believer alone truly knows that God is merciful, but he also knows at what a sacrifice that mercy was obtained. How little do they understand of human nature, either in themselves or others, who would represent repentance as the only ground of forgiveness, or who would treat the universal doctrine of atonement as contrary to the reason, and as having no foundation in the true and natural feelings of the soul!

Suffice it for our present purpose to say, that nowhere does this modern heresy find so complete a refutation as in the Grecian poetry. Not only is it more orthodox, but we also hazard nothing in saying, that there may be found in it more of a re-

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\* Æsch. Prom. Vinc. 34.

ligious Biblical morality, than can be met with in all the sacred melodies and unmeaning sentimentalism of many who are styled Christian poets.

The attribute of justice, as revealed in the Old Testament, and which, as a part of the patriarchal religion, so long continued its impression upon the ancient mind, may be regarded under three aspects, each of them distinguished in the Scriptures by a peculiar appellation. These are, *אל צדיק*,—אל נקם, and אל קנא, the *righteous*, the *avenging*, and the *jealous God*. The first presents the idea of a *lawgiver* the second of a condemning *judge*. The third unites both, and sets forth that holy care, which as the *executive* of the universe, he exercises towards every department of his moral administration, and especially in regard to those right views of himself, which concern the dignity of his government, and the highest good of all his obedient subjects. This threefold aspect may be traced in the numerous allusions to the Divine Justice, which may be met with in Grecian authors. The two last, and especially the third, seem to have made the deepest impression, although the first is frequently exhibited. All however are marred and divested of that pure sublimity, with which they are set forth in the Bible. They frequently appear tinged with the false coloring of human passion, and sometimes degraded to those low forms in which they are exhibited in the depraved human heart. The justice ascribed to the Supreme Deity, is often a mere human justice; the *vengeance* a human *revenge*; and the jealousy only another name for one of the lowest of earthly passions. In general, however, they manifest distinct traces of that old system of truth, whence they were derived. Amid all the darkness and corruption by which they are surrounded, they exhibit something of their former glory, and not unfrequently approach the purity and grandeur of the representations of the Bible.

—Their forms have not yet lost

All their original brightness—

—As when the sun new risen

Looks through the horizontal misty air,

Shorn of his beams,—so darkened still they shine.

The epithet *צדיק*, is more general than *נקם*, and refers to the Deity in all his relations to his intelligent creatures as moral governor. It represents him not only as the enemy of sin, but also as the friend of righteousness—the rewarder of the one, as well as the punisher of the other; in short, as just and impar-



tial, yet rather as the legislator than the judge. The other epithet, אֵל נִקְמָה, is confined to what in theological language may be styled, his vindictive or punitive justice. To that aspect of the Divine character presented by the first, frequent allusions may be found in the Greek poets. To this head may be referred their favorite personifications, of *Nómos* (law,) or *Θέμις*, which have both more reference to general legislation, than the special infliction of vindictive punishment. It is the second, however, which occupies the most prominent place. To any one desirous of tracing the traditionary remains of the primitive belief in this attribute, the Greek furnishes the most striking examples, and in greater abundance, than in reference to any other aspect of the Divine character. This seems to have made the deepest impression on the ancient mind, and longer to have retained its force and purity of meaning. From that early period, when the smoking blood of Abel called from the ground upon this special attribute of Jehovah, it has ever held a prominent place in the fears of men, in all their views of the Deity, and in all their systems of religion. It is exhibited in almost every form of which language is capable, and in every variety of manner,—in the dread personifications of the vindictive and all-seeing *Némeis*, in the decisions of the stern judges of Hades, and in the dark mythology of the avenging Furies.

The radical ideas conveyed by *Nómos* and *Némeis*, have about the same difference as the Hebrew צִדִּיק and נֶקֶם. Both Greek words are from the same root, *μεμα*, to distribute, allot, apportion,—derived from the more ancient pastoral sense, to feed. *Nómos* or Law, however, has regard to the distribution of rights and duties, assigning, in this sense, to each part that duty which arises out of its relation to the whole; *Némeis*, on the other hand, like נֶקֶם, looks to the distribution of the penalty for the violation of law, and is in its very nature vindictive;—that is, it regards the intrinsic demerit of sin, (or rather of the state of soul whence it arises,) irrespective of antecedents and consequences. The one has reference to the legislator, the other to the punishing magistrate. The former pertains rather to the department of the intellect, the other makes its appeal to the moral sense. Both have respect to the same general attribute of justice; the one, however, regards it as contemplative, or in the abstract (*εν θεωρία*), the other, as existing in action, *εν ενεργεια*. Aristotle says, most sublimely of the Deity, that his *οὐσία* is *ενεργεια*. This, it is true, is said in a physical sense, and yet it is

also applicable to the moral aspect of the Divine character. Here, also, and in a much higher sense, may it be held, that his *οὐσία* is *ἐνέργεια*, his *very essence is energy*. \* The attributes presented by צדיק and נקם, or by *Nómos* and *Némeōs*, although logically separable, must exist together in the Divine Nature. The contemplative or the ideal, *must* exhibit itself in action. There can be no mere intellectual disapprobation of sin in the abstract, without, at the same time, an intense hatred of it for its own sake, accompanied by a disposition to punish, (not sin in the abstract, but the sinner,) irrespective of all consequences, or of its mere social and political bearings. Hence, to represent the Deity without passions, (unless we take the word in its old theological sense, and guard it at the same time with great discrimination,) is to divest him, in our minds, of the highest part of his character, and to view him merely as a being of power and intellect. How far, in its practical bearings, this rises above some species of speculative pantheism, or atheism, it would be difficult to show. All moral emotion implies an antithesis. Love for certain objects, cannot exist without hatred of their opposites. If the one is active, or exists *ἐν ἐνέργεια*, so must the other. We may say, with all reverence, that the Divine *ὀργή* is a very different thing from the human passion,—that the holy *Némeōs* is infinitely removed from the earthly feeling that claims kindred with it. A difference, there unquestionably is; but this difference must consist in the former being infinitely more pure, more holy, more just, and above all, in that higher burning intensity, which can only be measured by the infinity of the Divine Nature;† not in that radical distinction, involving a complete separation of idea, and which, when carried out, utterly nullifies what it was designed to exalt. Some of the worst errors in theology may arise from the careless statement of this doctrine, that God is not *really* angry with sin, or that he punishes it merely in view of its consequences as a political or social evil, the contagion of whose

\* Aristotelis Metaph. Lib. XI. (XII.) Chap. 6, p. 246.

† What is gained by applying the term anthropomorphism to such burning expressions as the Hebrew *חַמָּה* and *אֵף* ? Does not the use of such language imply, that the conception differs from the reality only in falling infinitely short of it ? There must certainly be some analogy in kind, if not in degree, between the sign and the thing signified.

example the happiness of the universe requires to be restrained. A true sense of guilt must depart from the heart that harbors this opinion, if there is the consistency to carry it out in all the conclusions to which it leads. The atonement becomes a mere political display, the terms expiation, propitiation, lose all their meaning, and the deepest mystery of the Gospel is made plain to the human understanding, but at the expense of all its value, and stripped of all its essential features. It would not be difficult to show, that even in human government, the punishment of crime must be to a certain extent vindictive; in order that it may have a hold upon the moral sense, and by being thus connected with the Divine, may sustain those lower principles of order and prevention, which are often assumed as the only ends of human law.

In the earliest mythology and poetry of Greece, we find *Δίκη*, or *Θέμις*, *Νόμος*, and *Νέμεσις*, personified and associated, sometimes separately and sometimes together, with the throne of Jupiter. Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and the Grecian dramatists may have been the authors of the poetical drapery with which this is set forth; but the uniformity of manner with which they express it, and its great moral elevation above many other parts of their theology, prove that there must have been some more ancient common source, from whence the ideas themselves were derived. In order to exhibit this in the strongest light, we select some of the most striking passages from the poets. Indeed we can hardly open at random a page of Pindar, Æschylus, Sophocles, or Euripides, without meeting with direct or remote allusions to it. In the Greek tragedies, *Δίκη*, or *Νέμεσις*, is ever on the right hand of *Ζεύς*, and his *ἐκδικον ὄμμα*, is ever upon the actors presented to us. Their *moral* is ever *religious*. All things are constantly referred, not to a physical fate, but to the stern *μοῖρα* or decree of the father of gods and men.

*Τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται;*

*Τι τῶνδ' οὐ θεόκρατόν ἐστιν;*

*Æsch. Agamemnon, 1486.*

Sin, however imperfect may have been their views of its nature, is ever punished, not by the mere working of natural causes, (the favorite doctrine of modern works of fiction and quackish systems of ethical philosophy,) but by the direct interposition and vindictive justice of

*Ζητὸς*

*παναιτίου πανεργάτα—*

*all causing, all doing Jove*,—that stern being, who in some of their representations approaches nearer to the Holy and Jealous God of the Old Testament, than the placable, liberal and indifferent deity of our sentimental rationalists.

We do not intend at this time to enter into a discussion of the entire or partial authenticity of the Orphic hymns. Our opinions on this subject have been elsewhere more fully given. Having become settled in the conclusion, that, although there may be great doubt as to the genuineness and verbal accuracy of many fragments presented to us by the Fathers, these hymns do nevertheless represent an ancient system of theology, which formed the great storehouse of the subsequent poetry and philosophy of Greece,—we quote from them without scruple in defence of our positions. What Plato, Aristotle, and Euripides treated as authentic and genuine in their day, we shall not at this late period wholly call in question; although it may be admitted, that the language and prosody of the works referred to may have been modernized, and that they had suffered much from changes and interpolations. In one of these hymns, this attribute of Jove is thus addressed :

ὦ ΝΕΜΕΣΙ κλήζω σε θεὰ βασίλεια μέγιστη  
πανδερκῆς ἰσορῶσα βίον θνητῶν πολυφύλων·  
Αἰδῖν, πολύσεμνε, μόνῃ χαίρουσα δικάμοις  
ἦν πάντες δεδίασι βροτοί—  
οὐδέ σε λήθει

ψυχὴν ὑπερφρονέουσα—  
Πάντ' ἰσορᾷς, καὶ πάντ' ἐπακόνεις, πάντα βραβένεις·  
Ἐν σοὶ δ' εἰσι δίκαι θνητῶν παννύκταται Δαίμων

“I invoke thee, Nemesis, thou great all-seeing goddess, ever observing the life of men, Eternal, Holy Power, alone rejoicing in righteousness, whom mortals ever fear. The proud transgressing soul never escapes thine eye. All things thou seest—all things thou hearest—all retribution thou dispensest. To thee belong the judgments of mortal men, most High Divinity.”

In a similar manner, the hymn *To Δίκη*, or Justice,

Ὅμμα Δίκης μέλπω πανδερκέος ἀγλαομόρφου,  
ἣ καὶ ΖΗΝΟΣ ΑΝΑΚΤΟΣ ἐπὶ ΘΡΟΝΟΝ ἰσθὸν ἵζει  
οὐρανόθεν καθορῶσα βίον θνητῶν πολυφύλων

“I sing the eye of all-seeing, bright-robed Justice, who sits upon the sacred throne of Jove the king; from heaven survey.

ing the life of mortal men." Compare Psalm 11 : 4 : "The Lord hath his throne in the heavens ; his eyes behold, his eyelids try the ways of the children of men." It has been made an argument against the genuineness of these fragments, that some of their expressions occasionally approach so near the purity and sublimity of the Bible ; and on this account they have been assigned to that common receptacle, (so convenient to a certain class of critics,)—the pious frauds and interpolations of the early Christian Fathers. The argument, however, is divested of all its weight by the fact, that sentiments equally elevated and equally scriptural, may be found in the undoubted writings of those Greek poets, whose existence no German critic has yet dared to call in question. In another one of these hymns, there is a similar address to *Nóμος*, or Law.

Ἀθανάτων καλέω καὶ Θνητῶν ἀγνὸν ἄνακτα  
Οὐράνιον Νόμον—

Φύσεως τὸ βέβαιον  
ἀκλινὲς ἀστασίαστον αἰεὶ τηροῦντα νόμοισιν.  
Ἀυτὸς γὰρ μόνος ζωῆς διηκα κράτύνεις,  
ἀγύγιος

"I invoke thee, Holy King of mortals and immortals, Heavenly Law ! ever preserving without declination or disturbance the firm ordinance of nature ; for thou thyself alone dost rule the helm of life, most ancient Law." One might almost fancy it the language of the Psalmist. "For ever, O Lord, thy law is established in heaven ; all things stand according to thine ordinance."

If such invocations are doubted as being too much in the style of Holy Writ, we meet the argument with unquestioned passages of a similar kind from later Grecian poets. In *Æschylus Supplices*, 667, we have the same sublime personification.

Ζῆνα μέγαν σεβόντων  
τὸν ξένιον Δί' ὑπέρτατον  
ὃς πολὺ νόμῳ αἴσαν ὀρθοῖ—

Great Jove adore,  
The stranger's God, *with ancient hoary Law*,  
All fates on high controlling.

It was an inseparable portion of the most ancient systems of theology and politics, that there was but one source of Law throughout the universe ; or in other words, that all Law was

divine, and that all legitimate government among men derived its sanction from this high and holy origin. Nothing came from nature. Even the dominion of man over the animal creation was the gift of Heaven, existing not as a *natural right*, but as the direct grant of an ancient covenant. Thus the old poet Empedocles as quoted by Aristotle, *Rhetorica* I. 13 :

Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διὰ τ' ἐρρυμένοτος  
Ἀιθέρος ἡρενέως τέταται διὰ τ' ἀπλέτον ἀνγῆς

“The universal institute extends (beyond the earth) through the wide pervading æther, and Heaven’s boundless light.” This, viewed merely as a fragment, might seem to have reference only to physics ; but Aristotle, who knew its connection, quotes it in support of the position he is maintaining, viz., the antiquity of positive moral law. Hence, and in accordance with these more ancient views, are those noble declarations of Cicero, so far beyond even the comprehension of most modern statesmen :—*Orta simul est Lex cum mente divina, De Leg. I. 19—Constituendi vero juris ab illa summa lege capiamus exordium, quæ seculis omnibus ante nata est.* This heavenly origin of Law is most strongly and beautifully expressed in one of the choral odes of Sophocles *Cedipus Tyrannus*, 865.

ἔι μοι ξυνείη φέροντι  
μοῖρα τὰν εὐσεπτον ἀγνείαν λόγων  
ἔργων τε πάντων, ὧν νόμοι πρόκεινται  
ὑπίποδες οὐραγίαν δι' αἰθέρα  
τεκνωθέντες ὧν Ὀλυμπος  
πατήρ μόνος, οὐδὲ νῦν Θνατὰ  
φύσις ἀνέρων ἔτικτεν οὐδὲ  
μήν ποτε λάθᾳ κατακοιμάσει·  
μέγας ἐν τούτοις ΘΕΟΣ  
οὐδὲ γηράσκει

Of which the following is a faithful although not a very poetical translation.

Oh, that it were the portion of my soul,  
To cherish holy purity of thought  
And deed,—observant of those laws  
On high set forth,—of heavenly æther born,—  
Whose father is Olympian Jove alone.  
No offspring they of grovelling earthly minds,  
Nor ever shall forgetful time on them  
Oblivious slumber shed. The mighty God  
Inspires them ever with immortal youth.

Would we be irreverent in comparing this with the ardent language of the Psalmist, breathing forth his devout desires for greater conformity to the Divine law,—“*Oh that my ways were directed to keep thy statutes.*”—“*Thy law is very pure, therefore thy servant loveth it.*” We are far, however, from comparing Sophocles personally with David. The latter spake as he was directly moved by the Holy Ghost. The Heathen poet used language very remotely derived from the same sacred origin. It had come down from the olden time,—*ab omni antiquitate quæ quo proprius aberat ab ortu et Divinâ progenie, hoc melius ea quæ erant vera cernebat*;\* or as Cicero tells us in another place,—*ab antiquissimo tempore quod ergo optimum est, quia Deo proximum*.† The highest import of these remarkable relics of a purer ancient theology was but dimly comprehended even by the poet himself; to whose mind they suggested only confused and mystic thought, instead of imparting those clear and vivid emotions which filled the soul of the Hebrew bard, as he meditated on the statutes and testimonies of the Lord.

With the Orphic address to Δίκη, we may compare the Homeric hymn to Jove, in which we have the same representation of Θέμις, or distributive Justice, seated by the side of Jupiter, and sharing his most secret counsels.

Ζῆνα Θεῶν τὸν ἄριστον αἰέσομαι ἡδὲ μέγιστον  
 Εὐρύοπα κρείοντα τελεσφόρον, ὅστε Θέμιστι  
 ἐγκλιδὸν ἐξομένη πνικινούς ὄαρους ὀαρίζει

The same personification is found in Hesiod, except that Δίκη is there called the daughter of Jove, although still described as sharing his throne.

Ἡ δὲ τε παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη Διὸς ἐγγεγάυια  
 αὐτίκα παρ Διὸς πατρὶ Καθεζομένη Κρονίωνι  
 γηρύετ' ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον—

Works and Days, 239.

To the same effect, a fragment from Pindar, quoted by Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. v. 613. Pott. Compare also Olymp. VIII. 27.

ἐνθα Σώτεια Διὸς ξενίου  
 πάρεδρος ἀσκεῖται Θέμις

\* Cicero Tusc. Disp. I. 26.

† Cicero De Leg. II. 40. ib. 27. Xen. Mem. I. 4. 16.

Passages of a kind similar to those quoted from Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar, may be frequently found interspersed throughout the Grecian dramas. They are unquestionably fragments of that same Orphic theology, which, amid all its misty pantheism, preserved and transmitted so much of the purity of patriarchal thought. Sophocles introduces this same idea of *Δίκη*, or Justice, seated on the throne of Jove, and refers to it as an ancient and well-known tradition.

Τοιγὰρ τὸ σὸν θάκημα καὶ τοὺς σοὺς θρόνους  
κρατοῦσιν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ΠΛΑΛΙΦΑΤΟΣ  
ΔΙΚΗ σύνεδρος Ζητὸς, ΑΡΧΑΙΟΙΣ ΝΟΜΟΙΣ

Œd. Col. 1380.

And therefore to thy throne shall they succeed,  
If JUSTICE, as she's famed in *ancient laws*,  
Sits ever at the hand of Jove.

In another part of the same tragedy, there is a beautiful parallel to this, in a sentiment, which, for reasons already assigned, seldom occurs in the ancient poets. Mercy, or Pity, (*Αἰδώς*,) is also represented as a partner with Justice in the throne of the Heavenly Majesty.

Ἄλλ' ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ Ζητὶ ΣΤΗΘΑΚΟΣ ΘΡΟΝΩΝ  
ἌΙΔΩΣ ἐπὶ ἔργοις πᾶσι, καὶ πρὸς σοὶ πάτερ  
παρασταθήτω· τῶν γὰρ ἡμαρτημένων  
ἄκμῃ μὲν ἐστίν.

Œd. Col. 1267.

For gentle MERCY also sits  
Fast by the throne of Jove, o'er all his works  
Presiding gracious. To thy soul, my sire,  
Let her be present now. Forgiveness is  
The only cure of sin.

In these two passages we have the Mosaic description complete; "the Lord God compassionate and merciful, and yet who will by no means acquit the guilty." Compare also Ps. 89 : 15: *Righteousness and justice are the foundation of thy throne, mercy and truth go before thy face.* The soul of the Greek was too dark to discover that glorious method, by which these two apparently conflicting attributes unite for man's salvation; and hence we so seldom find in the writings of the poets or philosophers any allusion to this milder aspect of the Divine character.

In the *Electra* of Sophocles, we have *Θεμὺς* personified, and



represented after the usual manner, and in the same connection with Jove.

Ἀλλ', οὐ τὰν Διὸς ἀστραπὴν  
καὶ τὰν οὐρανίαν ΘΕΜΙΝ  
δηρὸν οὐκ ἀποίητοι.

Electra, 2065.

No, by the blast of angry Jove  
By *Themis* throned in heaven above,  
Not long unpunished shall such crimes remain.

Compare also Soph. Ajax, 1389.

Τοιγὰρ σφ' Ὀλύμπου τοῦδ' ὁ πρεσβέων πατήρ  
μνήμων τ' Ἐρινός, καὶ τελεσφόρος ΔΙΚΗ  
κακῶς κακὸν φθείρειαν.

In the Hecuba of Euripides, by a strong hyperbole, *Nómos*, or Law, is placed above the gods, (Jupiter probably excepted,) and declared their ruler.

ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς ἴσως  
ἀλλ' οἱ θεοὶ σθένουσι, γὰρ κείνων κρατῶν  
Νόμος.

Hecuba, 790.

We may be weak,  
But yet the gods are strong, and stronger still,  
All-ruling Law.

Plato, in the Gorgias, quotes a fragment from Pindar, in which we have the same sublime sentiment.

ΝΟΜΟΣ ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς  
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων.

Both are evidently derived from the Orphic theology, and are so exactly in accordance with the passage from the hymn already quoted, as to place its genuineness beyond doubt, and to confirm the position we have advanced, that the Orphic poetry was the source from whence all similar expressions in later writers were derived.

In the Medea, 211, we have Ζεὺς and Θέμις associated,

Τὰν Ζητὸς ὀρκίαν Θέμιν.

Jupiter and *Δίκη* associated, Orese 1240.

Σὺ τ' ὦ Ζεῦ πρόγονε καὶ Δίκας σέβας

Also Medea, 170.

Κλίεθ' οἷα λέγει κάπιβοῦται  
 Θέμιν ἐνκταίαν, Ζήνα δ' ὅς ὄρκων  
 θνατοῖς ταμίης νερόμισται

Compare also Homer, *Odyssey* II. 68.

Αἰσσομαι ἡμὲν Ζηρὸς Οὐλυπίου ἡδὲ Θέμιστος ;  
 ἥτ' ἀνδρῶν ἀγορὰς ἡμὲν λύει ἡδὲ καθίζει.

For striking passages of a similar kind, which may be selected from a great variety of others, the reader is referred to Euripides *Electra*, 776; Rhesus, 342, Æschylus *Choephoræ*, 242, 946, *Supplices*, 368; and to the whole tenor and spirit of that most sublime tragedy *The Eumenides*.

We meet with the doctrine of vindictive or retributive Justice, and the manner of its infliction, in a remarkable, although somewhat obscure passage from the *Choephoræ*. We select it as a striking example of the impression this attribute had made upon the ancient mind, and the strong contrast which its scriptural views present to the sentiments of modern semi-Christian rationalists.

Ῥοπή δ' ἐπισκοπῇ δίκας  
 ταχέα, τοῖς μὲν ἐν φάει,  
 τὰ δ' ἐν μεταίχμιᾳ σκότον  
 μένει, χρονίζοντ' ἄγχι βρῦναι.  
 τοὺς δ' ἀκραντος ἔχει νύξ.

Æsch. *Choeph.* 59.

Æschylus, in this place, employs the favorite figure of the balance, so often met with in Homer and the subsequent Grecian poets; and evidently refers to three distinct grades of retribution for crime. The sentiments are in perfect accordance with the whole range of the sacred writings. He alludes first to sudden judgments, when marked and signal punishment follows immediately upon the act committed,—cases in which there is so manifest a connection between the crime and the retribution, that all are compelled to acknowledge the interposition of Heaven, as in the Scriptural examples of Belshazzar and Herod. The reference in the second place, is to protracted evils of life visited upon the offender, following perhaps long after the act committed, and producing a wretched old age. The passage closes with a most striking allusion, in the third place, to the retribution after death of the eternal state. The first are said to come, ἐν φάει, in the open light of day; the second, ἐν μεταίχμιᾳ σκότου, in the dusky twilight of life,—a

highly poetical expression for old age, or the interval between the full light of life and the darkness of the grave: the third are reserved for the everlasting unchanging night, *νύξ ἀκρατος*, the night that is never finished, that long, long night that knows no morning, in which the dreary sufferers "look for the day and it cometh not." Such is evidently the meaning of *νύξ ἀκρατος*, rendered by the scholiast *αἰώνιος θάνατος*, and yet the same class of Christian commentators, who everywhere seek to unspiritualize the Bible, would also divest this passage of all its deep meaning and sublimity, by rendering *νύξ ἀκρατος*, *nox intempesta*, without authority, and in defiance of the whole spirit and poetry of these remarkable verses. The authority of the scholiast is rejected with the usual sneer,—unde liquet eum fuisse Christianum. This is one of those striking passages, (so different from much of the mere verbiage of modern poetry,) in which the meaning is too full for the language, and seems to struggle to burst the envelope in which it is contained. Every word is not only emphatic in itself, but seems to draw after it a crowd of associated thoughts. A free rendering would be as follows: "The swift balance of the scales of vindictive justice (*ῥοπή*) is ever watching (*ἐπισκοπεῖ*) its opportunity to descend. To some it comes in the broad light of day. The retribution of other crimes awaits the dark twilight of life, and by delay (*χρονίζοντα*) are gathering crowds of woes. Others are reserved for the eternal, never accomplished night, viz. the judgment of the world to come."

On the subject of vindictive punishment after death which is so clearly exhibited in this passage, compare also the Eumenides 175.

ὑπὸ τε γᾶν φρυγῶν  
οὐ ποτ' ἐλευθεροῦνται.

How much like the language of the Bible: "There is no place where the workers of iniquity can hide themselves." "If they make their bed in Sheol behold he is there."\* "Though he

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\* Compare Plato's Laws, Lib. X. p. 386: "For you shall never be neglected by it, (viz., the Divine Justice, or Providence.) You cannot so descend into the depths of the earth, nor being raised aloft so fly up into Heaven, but that you shall receive the fitting recompense, whether remaining in this world, or passing into Hades, or being borne to regions still more wild than these."

So also Job 34: 21: "There is no darkness, there is no

flee beneath the earth, says the Heathen poet, he shall never be free from the demands of Justice;" for, as we are told in another terrific passage of this same tragedy,

μέγας γὰρ Ἄιδης ἐστὶν εὐθύνος βροτῶν.  
ἐνεργθε χθονός,  
Δελτογράφω δὲ πάντ' ἐπωπᾶ φρενί.

Eumen. 268.

Beneath the earth  
Great Hades holds his throne, the gloomy judge  
Of sinful men; and in his awful book—  
The soul's accusing conscience—reads their crimes.

We may have amplified in our paraphrase of the word *δελτογράφω*, but how strongly does it suggest that dread record of uncanceled sin, which the Bible reveals as kept for the impenitent?—that *handwriting* which is blotted out only by the blood of Christ. Compare also Æschylus Eumenides, 340.

It is to the poets, and not to the philosophers, we must look for the most striking proof of the ancient universal belief in the doctrine of retribution after death. It is to this popular belief, that even the best reasoners among the latter fall back, when they would supply the defects of their attempts to maintain it by direct argument. Although they might endeavor, in this manner, to prove the *truth* of the doctrine, yet did they derive the *origin* of the opinion, not from the light of nature, but from the authority of ancient tradition. "Hence," says Plato, in his seventh epistle to Dion, "*Thus ought we always to believe those ancient and sacred words (τοῖς παλαιαῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις) which declare to us that the soul is immortal, that judges are appointed, and that they pass the highest sentences of condemnation, when the spirit is separate from the body.*" In a still more striking passage from the Republic, he gives us the most express declaration of the common belief. *For well know, O Socrates, that when one supposes himself near the point of death, there enter into his soul fear and anxieties respecting things before unheeded. For then the old traditions concerning Hades, (μῦθοι λεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅδου,) how those who in this life have been guilty*

*land of the shades of the dead (Tsalmaveth) where the workers of iniquity may hide themselves.*" Amos 9 : 2, "*If they dig down to Sheol (or Hades), from thence shall my hand take them.*"

φυγῆν δὲ πού  
μήπω γενέσθαι φωτός ἀνοσίον βροτῶν

Soph. Œd. Col. 280.

of wrong, must there suffer the penalty of their crimes, torment his soul. He looks back upon his past life, and if he finds in the record many sins, like one starting from a frightful dream, he is terrified, and filled with foreboding fears.\* Compare also with this, the terrific account of the world of wo, contained in the tenth book of the Republic, and of the sufferings of that wretched and incurable class, who, in the emphatic language of the writer, (*ἐκπορευτες εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον οὐποτε, ἐκβαίνουσιν,†*) never come out, but remain to all eternity *πάσχοντες τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον.‡* From such descriptions as these, (as Plutarch tells us,) Plato was charged by Chrysippus, with adhering too closely to the popular traditions, and attempting to frighten mankind with the fears of Hades.§ The first passage referred to, is alone sufficient to refute volumes of Warburton and Whateley. It is not put forth merely as a speculative tenet of the philosopher, but as the sentiment of the common mind in all ages,—exhibiting just the same views of death, and the same apprehensions of future retribution, as now prevail, and ever have prevailed among mankind; a sentiment not derived from philosophy or reason, (however much it may be supported by them,) but handed down by universal tradition, from that ancient period, when Adam hid himself in the garden, and sin revealed in his conscience the penalty of the broken law. The doctrine of a *Hell for the wicked*, is one of the most ancient, and at the same time the most universal, that has ever been believed among mankind. Whence came it? This is the great and difficult problem for those to solve who assert that it is contrary to the Scriptures, the reason, and the feelings. Whence came it then,—we repeat the question—whence came it in opposition to these mighty opposing influences? Men are not fond of what is irrational for its own sake; they certainly do not love their own misery. Whence then came this *τηγέρον μῦθος*, these awful fears of Hades, Tartarus and Gehenna? Why (if the creed of the modern Universalist be true) have men thus cruelly tortured themselves for nought? Why have they indulged in such terrific inventions of fancy? Why have they passed a sentence so unjustly severe on their own depravity?

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\*Republic Lib. I. 10.

† Phædon, Vol. I. p. 191.

‡ Gorgias III. p. 119.

§ Plutarch Moralia De Contradict Stoic. IV. 416.

and above all, why did the meek and merciful Saviour of the world,—coming, as they tell us, to do away the fears of hell, and to preach the glad tidings of universal happiness after death,—why did he so often, and with such solemn emphasis use similar language, but of a still more terrific kind, so directly adapted to render still more intense the same tormenting fears, and which for eighteen hundred years has produced an effect so directly contrary to his alleged benevolent intentions? Let those solve the problem who have given rise to it.

That the fear of future retribution did exert a far more powerful influence upon the ancient mind than Warburton and others have supposed, is proved by the writings of the Epicureans themselves. They were the ancient free-thinkers, whose avowed object it was, to free mankind from those superstitious fears, which had made life so miserable. The very efforts of Lucretius and others of that school, to make light of Hades and Tartarus, show how fearfully these apprehensions had pressed upon the human soul.

Numerous are the references in the Greek dramatic poets to the ancient doctrine of expiation, to the primitive law in regard to the shedding of blood, and to the manner of its atonement. Although this has a close connection with our theme, we can only here refer to some of the more striking passages, deferring comment until an opportunity is presented for a more extended investigation of this most important subject. For some of these the reader is referred to *Æsch. Eumenides*, 423. Compare also *Æsch. Choeph.* 319.

*Καὶ τῷ κταρόντι ποῦ τὸ τέμα τῆς φυγῆς ;  
ὅπου το χαίρειν μηδαμοῦ νομίζεται.*

Oh! where's the boundary of the murderer's flight?  
'Tis in that world where joy can never come.

*τί γάρ λύτερον πεσόντος αἵματος πέδω ;*

What expiation shall be made  
When once the earth hath drunk the flowing blood?

The answer is given in a terrific passage of the same tragedy, 398, in which there is an express reference to an ancient law. In reading the three last lines we might almost fancy that we hear the voice of the blood of Abel calling from the ground.

*Ἀλλὰ νόμος μὲν φονίας σταγόνας  
χυμένας ἐς πέδον ἄλλο προσαιτεῖν*

αἷμα. βοᾷ γὰρ λοιγὸν Ἑριννὺς  
παρὰ τῶν πρότερον φθιμένων ἄταν  
ἐτέραν ἐπάγουσαν ἐπ' αὐτῇ

There is a law, that blood once poured on earth  
By murderous hands, demands that other blood  
Be shed in retribution. From the slain  
Erinnys calls aloud for vengeance still,  
Till death in justice meet, be paid for death.

In another passage, there is a similar reference to a very ancient law or mythus, which the poet styles *τριγέρων*, from its exceeding antiquity.

Ἀντὶ δὲ πληγῆς φονίας φονίαν  
πληγὴν τινέτω· δράσαντι παθεῖν  
ΤΡΙΓΕΡΩΝ ΜΙΘΟΣ τάδε φωνεῖ.

Ib. 310.

For blood let blood be shed. *A law by age*  
*Thrice hallowed*, on the guilty murderer's head  
This righteous doom demands.

Who can doubt that we have in these and many other passages that might be quoted, an echo of that primitive voice which was heard in the law recorded Genesis 9: 5, 6, and which is so offensive to our modern sentimental rationalists?

Without dwelling longer on this branch of our subject, we would simply remark in passing, that there is one most ancient doctrine of the Bible, which nowhere finds so full an illustration as in the Grecian tragedies. We allude to what may be called the *representative feature* in the Divine government, by which the sins of the parent are declared to be visited on the children, even unto the third and fourth generation;—a doctrine which, whatever view we may take of it, is confirmed by the whole course of Divine Providence, from the first fatal transgression of the head of our race, down through all the following periods of the world's history. There is no disputing against facts. The Greeks derived from some primitive source the belief, that in the Divine economy, parents were thus made the representatives of their posterity, and hence we find it boldly set forth without any apprehension of the cavils of philosophy. In fact, it may be said to form the most striking feature of the ancient drama. To this must be assigned many things which, by Archbishop Potter and others, are ascribed to a blind belief in fate or destiny,—a view which we are able to show, had but

little foundation in the religious creed of the ancient world, except so far as by *fate* was meant no physical necessity, but the sovereign decree (*fatum*) of the supreme God. In the Œdipus Tyrannus, Œdipus Coloneus and Antigone of Sophocles, in the Phœnissæ of Euripides, and in the Septem of Æschylus, we have constantly this single moral presented,—that an act of wilful disobedience to the Divine command, involves not only the first guilty individual, but also his offspring to the third generation, together with his kindred and country, in a train of the most calamitous consequences,—that sin ever begets sin, and that nothing can stay the plague, or make atonement, but the direct interposition of Heaven. The degrading views of their deities which we find in connection with this lesson, should not diminish the interest of the truth, nor impair our wonder at the power with which this ancient doctrine of retributive justice had been once impressed on the human soul. The story of the house of Atreus strongly presents the same great truth, as it is powerfully exemplified in the sublime Trilogy of Æschylus, consisting of the Agamemnon, the Choephoræ and the Eumenides. It is however worthy of note in these cases, as in the parallel Scripture histories, that the descendants are not merely unfortunate but criminal.\* The sin is never absent from the house, but descends with the punishment. There is not only *imputed* but also *intrinsic* guilt,—a propagation not only of the calamities, but also of the crimes of their ancestors.

Τὸ γὰρ δυσσεβὲς ἔργον  
μετὰ μὲν πλείονα τίττει  
σφετέρῃ δ' εἰκότα γέννα.

Agam. 737.

Sin still breeds sin,  
And in its image evermore begets  
An offspring like its sire.

We have said that the appellation עֲלֵי נֶפֶשׁ (the God of Vengeance) differs from עֲלֵי אֲבֹתָי, not only as denoting the attribute

\* Vide this subject discussed by Plutarch in his Treatise "concerning such as God is slow to punish," in which he makes the same exception as the Prophet Ezekiel. *A virtuous son (says he) may by repentance escape the punishment which threatens the whole descent as those begotten in sin; but otherwise, as heirs to their father's estate, they must succeed to the punishment of their father's iniquity, and Holy Vengeance prosecutes, still pursuing the likeness of sin.*—Plut. Moralia IV. 175.



of punitive or viadictive, in distinction from legislative justice, but also as expressing, in a more peculiar sense, the attribute of Justice *in action*, (*ἐν ἐνέργεια*.) This idea suggests its etymology. There are many examples in Hebrew of verbs *pe nun* having a close affinity with, and deriving their meaning from verbs *ain uau*; and a comparison of places satisfies us, that *עץ* is not an original Hebrew root, (as it is generally regarded by the lexicographers,) but takes its peculiar sense from *עץ* to *arise*. In punishing sin and avenging wrong, the Lord is said "to arise," to come forth from the "place of the hiding of his power," and manifest himself to the world, as a being of moral emotion, instead of a mere contemplative intellect. For this purpose compare Ps. 10: 12, *קוּמָה יְהוָה, Arise, O Lord, lift up thy hand, forget not the poor.*"—Ps. 12: 5, "From the destruction of the poor, from the groaning of the needy, *now will I arise* (*קוּמָה*), saith the Lord."—Ps. 94: 16, "Who will *arise* for me against the evil doers," &c. It often signifies *surgere adversus aliquem*. Says Gesenius, *sæpe excitantis est, maxime Jehovahm ut auxilium ferat*. The same idea is found in several Greek words of similar import and derivation.

Aristotle in his Ethics makes equality, or *τὸ ἴσον*, the essential idea of Justice; *τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον*. (Ethica Nichom V. 3.) It consists, according to this philosopher, in restoring an equilibrium which has been disturbed, either between individuals, or between individuals and the state; although he does not apply it to the Divine government. The idea is more ancient than Aristotle, as is evident from the fact that it may be traced in the etymologies of most of the ancient tongues. In the earliest Greek, *ἰσότης* and *ἴσον* are used for *δικαιοσύνη* and *δίκαιον*—and with this is evidently connected the Latin *jus* (*I S*) and *justitia*. Another proof is found in that most ancient similitude, such a favorite with the Greeks, by which *Θέμις* or Justice is represented as holding scales in one hand and a sword in the other; a figure which dating from the most remote antiquity is still preserved in the armorial ensign of our own state. We have an allusion to it in the Orphic hymn quoted a few pages back. In Homer, the figure is applied, without any personification of Themis, directly to Jupiter. One of the most striking epithets of Jove in the Iliad and Odyssey is *ὑπὲρβυτος*, literally, *he who weighs on high*,

*Ζεὺς ὑπὲρβυτος ἀντίφα νάων.*

He is represented as standing on the summit of Heaven, and holding the everlasting golden scales in which are weighed the destinies and actions of men. How vividly does this call to mind the Scriptural declarations, "*Jehovah dwelleth on high, his eyes behold and his eyelids try the ways of the children of men. By him actions are weighed. He weigheth the mountains in scales and the hills in a balance. Thou most upright dost weigh the path of the just. The eyes of the Lord are upon the ways of a man and he pondereth all his goings.*" The primary idea here is obscured in the translation, although well expressed by the word "ponder" to a reader who associates with it the original sense of the Latin word. The Hebrew *וַיִּשְׁקָל* literally means *to weigh*, and is so expressed in the parallel passage, Isaiah 26 : 7 : "*Thou dost weigh the path of the just ;*" conveying the idea of a balance nicely poised and representing the most exact and rigorous justice. Compare the Iliad VIII. 68 :

*Ἥμος δ' ἥλιος μέσον οὐρανόν ἀμφιβέβηκει  
καὶ τότε δὴ χρῦσεια πατήρ ἐτίταινε τάλαντα.*

Compare also Daniel 6 : 27 : Thou art weighed in the balances and found wanting. In Homer, Jupiter sometimes holds the scales of providence and destiny, but the main allusion is to the attribute of Justice.

The political systems of the Greeks were imbued throughout with the sacred spirit of religion. Even terms denoting private compacts, in the daily transactions of life, exhibit in their etymology a fundamental idea derived from the same high origin ; striking examples of which we have in the words for *treaty* and *covenant*, *σπονδὴ* and *διαθήκη*. Every thing was religious, and the higher we ascend the stream of time the more pure we find it. All legitimate political power was viewed as a delegation of Divine authority. The early kings were all regarded in the language of Homer and Hesiod, as *διογενεῖς* and *διοτρεφεῖς*, divinely constituted and divinely sustained in the administration of justice.

According to Aristotle, who agrees in this with the ancient records of the Scriptures, King and Priest in the earliest ages were one. This view, it is true, has in modern times been degraded in the extravagant doctrine of the *personal* divine right of princes, yet still the fundamental idea is sound and true, in accordance with the Bible and the purest sentiments of mankind in all ages. It is in fact the *Divine right of Government*,

or of the lawful magistrate, whatever be his title or mode of appointment. It is equally applicable to all regularly established governments whatever may be their external forms. In the subsequent republican systems of Greece, although the people were the instruments of designating the *person* of the magistrate, still they never regarded themselves as the ultimate sources of his *power*. The religious feeling, as connected with the state, viewed as a divine institution, was not wholly lost in the change to a more popular form. The authority of the office itself, aside from the person of him who held it, was ever considered as derived from a higher source than the creative act of the popular will, and as in fact a delegation from the supreme majesty of the king of Earth as well as Heaven. Some may regard this as a pious fiction; whether the opposing modern fiction, that all power is derived from the people, can vie with it on the score of utility, (to say nothing of truth and reality,) is yet to be perhaps most fearfully tested. In proof of this ancient religious feeling, we may refer to the laws of Solon and Numa, and especially to the life of the latter as given us by Plutarch. To no single man did Rome owe so much as to Numa. That religious patriotism,—those high-souled deeds, which so adorn her early annals, and which, to those who do not appreciate their cause, appear only as romantic fables, were the direct results of the spirit he infused into her institutions. Hence Sallust, speaking of his early countrymen, might well style them *religiosis-simi mortales*. Even in *republican* Rome, and so late as the age of Cicero, magistrates of all kinds, bore the appellation *sacro-sancti*. Religious rites and ceremonies of a most peculiar kind were used in their installation. The same took place in their deposition, (when accused of any crime,) in order that they might be divested of the sacred dignity of their office, before they could be made the subjects of punishment. No Biblical student need be informed that in the ceremony of anointing, and in the Hebrew terms מָשִׁיחַ (Messiah) and מְשִׁיחָא, the same primitive idea is prominently set forth. In correspondence with this sentiment, we find in the ancient poetry, the most sacred epithets applied to human princes and magistrates. They were deemed to bear the sword not simply of preventive or utilitarian, but of vindictive justice. They were regarded not as the *humble servants of the people*, but as the representatives, however imperfect, of the awful Justice in the Heavens; as the *punishers* of wickedness, not simply for its pernicious conse-

quences to society, but for its intrinsic demerit. Paul speaks the language of the whole ancient world when he declares, that the magistrate bears not the sword of man but of God. Hence there was also applied to him that same figure of the balance, which was generally regarded as sacred to the Divine Majesty. For examples vide among others Euripides Phœnissæ 74.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπὶ ζυγοῖς  
καθεῖρετ' ἀρχῆς, οὐ μεθίσταται θρόνων.

The primitive idea of justice, given by Aristotle, (τὸ ἕκον,) is found in the Hebrew root צָדַק whose primitive meaning is *straight, rectus*. In a secondary sense it denotes *right, righteous, just, (æquus)*—a preserving the beam of the balance straight, or without inclination. The same idea exists in our own language in the terms *right, rectitude, &c.* Hence, also, in the Hebrew we find preserved the ancient figure of the scales. To be unjust, (not as a private man, but as a magistrate,) is expressed by the frequent phrase צָדִיק וְיָשָׁר to decline or turn the balance in judgment, Prov. 18 : 5, צָדִיק וְיָשָׁר, Isaiah 10 : 2, Amos 5 : 12, &c.

The same ancient idea is presented in the various figures and comparisons by which the awful doctrine of the atonement is illustrated,—when it is compared to the payment of a debt, a *satisfaction* for sin,—and in the other methods by which that mysterious restoration of the equilibrium in the Divine government is represented. When,—to accommodate the most expressive language of Æschylus,—

ῥοπή δ' ἐπεσκόπει δίκας,

Christ, as our *μεσίτης* or mediator, suspended on the cross, balanced the scales of divine retributive justice, which would have otherwise descended with fearful velocity, loaded with the sins of our guilty race. But on this subject all comparisons fail. As sin is something far more than a mere political or consequential evil,—being odious to God, and demanding punishment for itself intrinsically, and independent of its pernicious effects in the universe, considered as a political system; so also its atonement must have been far more than that mere display, held out *in terrorem*, which some theologians are so fond of representing it. Had there been but one sinful subject in God's empire, and no other to be visited by the contagion of his example, or to be profited by witnessing the personal or vicarious

infliction of the penalty, we have reason from Scripture to believe, that the Divine anger would have been no less intense, and an atonement (*καταλλαγή*) to rectify the scales of justice, and to make reconciliation, no less necessary.

That idea of an atonement to which we have alluded, and which regards it as a mere display, is utterly foreign to all those Greek terms which are used to denote propitiation, as well as to the Hebrew words *כִּפּוּר* and *רִצּוֹן*. Whether true or false, we contend that it is wholly modern, and is not to be found radically in either of the languages in which the Bible was written.

## ARTICLE IV.

### ATONEMENT.

By Rev. Alonzo Wheelock, Pastor of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, N. Y. City.

THE Atonement of Christ is the basis upon which the gospel erects the grand scheme of salvation for guilty and condemned sinners. An illustration of this great doctrine is the object of this essay.

In discussing this subject, it will not be attempted by reasoning to construct a mould into which this doctrine must be cast in order to give it a desired form, but we shall allow it to assume that, which a clear scriptural presentation of the subject may require. There will, then, be no occasion for commencing the discussion by instituting the inquiry, "Why was the atonement necessary?" nor to speculate in reference to the design of Christ in assuming the office of Mediator, or any similar abstract proposition. Omitting all discussion of the vicariousness of the atonement, God's justice in it, the necessity of the proper divinity of Christ for its accomplishment, the impossibility of any man's being justified before God without it, the object of this essay will be simply to give a biblical exhibition of the doctrine.

In conducting the examination, the meaning of the word *atonement* will be considered; the characteristics of the typical atonements; the illustrations of atonement derived from the types, and the points of discrepancy between these and the

great antitype. The question, For whom did Christ die? will be examined, the meaning of other scriptural terms employed to express the doctrine of atonement considered, and its practical application shown in obtaining the salvation of condemned sinners.

I. The primitive meaning of the word atonement was to set *at-one* those who had been at variance. It was formerly pronounced at-one-ment, in conformity with its primitive meaning.

The Hebrew word *כָּפַר* translated in our version *atone*, means *to cover, to conceal*. The first passage in which this word occurs in the Hebrew Bible, is in Gen. 6 : 14; and it is there translated *pitch*, but in a connection which indicates its original import: "Make thee an ark of gopher wood: rooms shalt thou make in the ark, and shalt *pitch* [cover] it within and without with pitch." The next passage where the word is found is in Gen. 32 : 21, and translated *appease*. Jacob said concerning his brother Esau, "I will *appease* him with the present that goeth before me, and afterward I will see his face." That is, I will *cover* his wrath with the present. Solomon employs the word in the same sense. "A wise man will *appease* [conceal] the wrath of a king," Prov. 16 : 14. While its primitive meaning is preserved, the particular shade of thought, like that of other words, is modified by the connection in which it is found, and the translation often so varied as to express the different shades of meaning in each given case. Thus in our version the land is said to be *cleansed* [concealed] by sacrifice from the pollution of blood shed in it. The pollution of the altar, and of a disease, is said to be *cleansed* [covered] by an offering. So in a religious sense *pardon*ing a transgression is figuratively *covering* it, *concealing* it, so that the offender is regarded and treated as if he had not sinned. Atonement, then, when applied to transgression, to moral pollution, to wrath, is that which makes amends for sin and secures its pardon, and thus figuratively *covers, conceals* it.

In this way atonement answers as a kind of substitute for obedience, and for the suffering of the penalty of a broken law. A man who breaks the law of God and has an atonement made for him, stands in the same relation to that law as one does who never transgressed it. It was to this the Apostle alluded when he said, "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." By this means, a sinner for whom our Lord Jesus Christ makes atonement, escapes the penalty of

God's law, and is received by God and treated as if he had never sinned. "All his transgressions which he hath committed shall not be mentioned unto him," Ezek. 18 : 22. "The priest shall make atonement for him as concerning his sin, and it shall be forgiven him," Lev. 4 : 26.

So far, then, as the meaning of the term is concerned, the Bible teaches us that he for whom atonement is made, is forgiven, is cleansed, has his sins *covered*, *concealed*, and is received and treated by his God as one who never sinned.

II. This view of the doctrine we shall see developed more clearly, if we examine the characteristics of the typical atonements.

If we seek for *full* and *clear* illustrations of the atonement of Christ, we shall find none, surely, on which we can rely with greater confidence than those furnished by God himself. That the typical atonements were instituted by Jehovah, as illustrations of the Great Atonement, is evident from the testimony of the Scriptures. "Almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood, is no remission. It was therefore necessary that the *patterns* of things in the heavens should be purified with these, but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are *figures* of the true, but into heaven itself, there to appear in the presence of God for us," Heb. 9 : 22—24. "Which are a *shadow* of things to come," said Paul, "but the body is of Christ," Col. 2 : 17. Here we see they are called *patterns* or *figures*, and *shadows*, of the atonements of Christ. Yet some very worthy and venerable theologians, because they cannot make these typical atonements accord with that view of atonement which has been formed by some hypothetical deductions, have concluded that we are not to look for a very exact analogy between the type and the antitype, and then practically set aside almost entirely the instruction God designed we should derive from these typical illustrations of this great doctrine.

It is true, in the types there is often only a general resemblance intended. The minuteness of detail, like many strokes of the pencil in painting, is designed only for ornament, or to give completeness to the representation. While, then, we should guard, on the one hand, against attempting to make the antitype answer to the type in every minute circumstance, where only a general resemblance is designed, we should, on the other hand,

as studiously avoid running into the opposite extreme, by rejecting from the antitype the distinct and main parts of the type. If, in the shadow of a human body, we see distinctly, not only the form of the body and head, but also that of the legs and arms, we hesitate not to decide that these members belong to the body which casts the shadow, or are parts of it. So it is with those shadows formed by Jehovah to represent the atonements of our Lord Jesus Christ. The body of those shadows or types must be allowed to find a counterpart in the antitype. Passing by the less important things pertaining to these types, the following we shall find constitute the main parts of the shadow, and are essential to its existence.

In the typical atonements, it was essential that there should be a *transgressor* in whose behalf they were made—the *immolation of a victim*—the *official act of the priest*.

To obtain a full and clear view of the subject, it will be necessary to understand the requirements and directions of God concerning these three things essential to atonement, and the pledge of Jehovah that it shall be followed by pardon.

1. First, then, let us consider the requirements God made of transgressors. These will be found in the following scriptures: "He shall bring his bullock unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation before the Lord," Lev. 4: 4. "He shall offer it of his own voluntary will," Lev. 1: 3. "He shall lay his hands upon the bullock's head," Lev. 4: 4. "And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things, that he shall confess that he hath sinned in that thing," Lev. 5: 5. "And he shall kill the bullock before the Lord," Lev. 4: 4.

If the congregation had sinned, and the sacrifice was offered by them, then the confession and killing of the victim were to be by the elders or the high priest, as their representatives. "If the whole congregation of Israel sin, then the congregation shall offer a bullock, and the elders shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock before the Lord; and the bullock shall be killed before the Lord," Lev. 4: 13—15. "Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and shall confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat," Lev. 16: 21. "Then shall he [Aaron] kill the goat of the sin-offering that is for the people," Lev. 16: 15.

From these passages we perceive that God requires of trans-



gressors, as essential to their having atonement made for them, these three things, viz. :

The voluntary presentation of a sacrifice unto God—a confession over it of their sins, and the killing of their victim.

There could have been no acceptable atonement unless these requisitions had been complied with. The fulfilment of them, then, on the part of the transgressor, was essential to making atonement for his sins. A deviation from these requirements would have exposed him to death. The declaration of God was, "That man shall be cut off from among the people," Lev. 17 : 3.

2. In the typical atonements, another thing essential was, *a victim to be sacrificed.*

The requirements of God concerning sacrifices were, that they should be selected from among the most gentle and useful of animals, should be of those esteemed clean, and these without blemish. Only animals of the herd and of the flock could, with the goat, the dove, and the pigeon, be used in sacrifice. "If any man of you bring an offering unto the Lord, ye shall bring your offering of the cattle, even of the herd of the flock," Lev. 1 : 2. "If he be not able to bring a lamb, then shall he bring for his trespass which he hath committed, two turtle doves, and two young pigeons unto the Lord," Lev. 5 : 7. "Whatsoever hath a blemish, that shall ye not offer ; for it shall not be acceptable for you," Lev. 22 : 20.

3. A third thing essential to atonement was the *official act of the priest in the place appointed.*

If he were an ordinary priest, a descendant of Aaron, not the first-born, then after the beast had been slain by the transgressor, he was required to take the blood of the victim, which had been received, in a dish, carry it into the first or outer tabernacle, and perform the service of sprinkling the blood, and of cutting in pieces and burning the sacrifice ; part upon the altar in the tabernacle, and part in a place without the camp.

"And the priest that is anointed shall take of the bullock's blood, and bring it to the tabernacle of the congregation.

"And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood seven times before the Lord, before the vail of the sanctuary. And the priest shall put some of the blood upon the horns of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the tabernacle of the congregation ; and shall pour

all the blood of the bullock at the bottom of the altar of the burnt-offering, which is at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation.

“And he shall take off from it all the fat of the bullock for the sin-offering: the fat that covereth the inwards, and all the fat that is upon them, which is by the flanks, and the caul above the liver, with the kidneys, it shall be taken away, as it was taken off from the bullock of the sacrifice of peace-offerings,” Lev. 4: 5-10. “And the skin of the bullock, and all his flesh, with his head, and with his legs, and his inwards, and his dung, even the whole bullock shall he carry forth without the camp unto a clean place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn him on the wood with fire: where the ashes are poured out shall he be burnt,” Lev. 4: 11, 12. “And the priest shall make an atonement for them, and it shall be forgiven them,” Lev. 4: 20.

From these passages we learn that the place appointed for the common priests to make atonement was the first tabernacle, and that it was done subsequently to the death of the sacrifice, by the ceremony performed with the blood, and the dividing and burning of the victim. In later times, we are told, the addition of killing the sacrifice was made to this service. It was added, however, by human, not divine authority. Jahn's Arch. § 365.

When the high priest officiated, atonement was to be made in another place; and the ceremony varied somewhat from that of the common priests. Unlike them, he himself was reckoned among those for whom the atonement was made. Hence, he himself being one of the transgressors, killed the sacrifices, then took the blood of the victims and went with burning incense through the vail into the second, the inner tabernacle, the holiest of holies, where, with the sprinkling of blood, he made atonement for himself, for the congregation, and for the holy place: he then came out into the first or outer tabernacle, where the common priests atoned, and with a like sprinkling of blood he made atonement for the altar of burnt-offering. He then, by the imposition of hands, laid the sins of the people upon the head of the scape-goat, and sent him away into the wilderness. After this he burnt part of the sacrifice, the fat, etc., upon the altar of burnt-offering in the first tabernacle, and the remainder he sent forth by a man selected for the purpose, who burnt it without the camp.

“And Aaron shall bring the bullock of the sin-offering which

is for himself, and for his house, and shall kill the bullock for the sin-offering, which is for himself. And he shall take a censer full of burning coals of fire from off the altar before the Lord, and his hands full of sweet incense beaten small, and bring it within the vail. And he shall put the incense upon the fire before the Lord, that the cloud of the incense may cover the mercy-seat that is upon the testimony, that he die not," Lev. 16 : 11-13.

"And he shall take of the blood of the bullock, and shall sprinkle it with his finger upon the mercy-seat eastward; and before the mercy-seat shall he sprinkle of the blood with his finger seven times," Lev. 16 : 14.

"Then shall he kill the goat of the sin-offering, that is for the people, and bring his blood within the vail, and do with that blood as he did with the blood of the bullock, and sprinkle it upon the mercy-seat, and before the mercy-seat. And he shall make an atonement for the holy place, because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and because of their transgressions and their sins: and so shall he do for the tabernacle of the congregation that remaineth among them in the midst of their uncleanness. And there shall be no man in the tabernacle of the congregation when he goeth in to make an atonement in the holy place, until he come out, and have made an atonement for himself, and for his household, and for all the congregation of Israel," Lev. 16 : 11-17. "But the goat on which the lot fell to be the scape-goat, shall be presented alive before the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scape-goat into the wilderness," Lev. 16 : 10.

"And when he hath made an end of reconciling the holy place, and the tabernacle of the congregation, and the altar, he shall bring the live goat, and Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the sins of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away by the hand of a fit man into the wilderness. And the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities into a land not inhabited: and he shall let go the goat into the wilderness," Lev. 16 : 20-22. "And Aaron shall come into the tabernacle of the congregation, and shall put off the linen garments which he put on when he went into the holy place, and shall leave them there: and he shall wash his flesh with water in the holy place, and put on his garments, and come forth, and offer his

burnt-offering, and the burnt-offering of the people, and make an atonement for himself and for the people. And the fat of the sin-offering shall he burn upon the altar," Lev. 16 : 23-25.

"And the bullock for the sin-offering, and the goat for the sin-offering, whose blood was brought in to make an atonement in the holy place, shall one carry forth without the camp : and they shall burn in the fire their skins, and their flesh, and their dung," Lev. 16 : 27.

This atonement-service of the high priest, naturally divides itself into two parts—that which he performs with the slain sacrifice ; and that which he performs with the living sacrifice.

The service which he performs with the slain sacrifice, we learn from the above quotation, consisted in killing the victim, presenting his blood within the vail, and burning the fat of the sacrifice. The other parts of the sacrifice were burnt, but not by the priest, Lev. 16 : 27, 28, and therefore this was not a part of the *act* of atonement, but only an appendage ; for it is said expressly, that the priest, and not others, shall make the atonement, Lev. 16 : 32. If, then, the *priest* made the atonement, any service performed by others did not constitute any part of the atoning acts. In the most enlarged sense which can possibly be given them, they consisted in these three things—*killing the victim—presenting the blood before the Lord in the holy place—and burning the fat upon the altar.*

In a stricter, and it is believed also, in a more accurate sense, the *atoning act* consisted in presenting *the blood* of the victim within the vail before the Lord, according to divine direction ; for it is said expressly, "*It is the blood that maketh atonement for the soul,*" Lev. 17 : 11. The burning of the sacrifice is subsequent to the making atonement, and therefore cannot be a part of the atoning act. This is clearly expressed in Lev. 16 : 27 : "And the bullock for the sin-offering, and the goat for the sin-offering, *whose blood was brought in to make atonement in the holy place,* shall one carry forth without the camp, and they shall burn in the fire their skins, and their flesh, and their dung."

The reason assigned for giving such importance to this part of the priest's service was, that *the life was in the blood*, and the presentation of *that* was as if the entire sacrifice in all its dying agonies were presented. In cases of reported murder, nothing so strikes us aghast, and fills us with emotion, as the presentation before us of the blood of the murdered victim. the recent trial in this city, for the commission of a fearful mur

der, females, even, sat in the audience and listened to the shocking testimony presented, with apparent composure; but when it was decided to have the mangled and bloody head of the miserable victim exhibited in the court, the ladies and men of weaker nerves left the room. So the blood of the sacrifice that had been writhing in the agonies of death without, when it was brought into the tabernacle and presented before the Lord, would, to human appearance, thrill the mind with emotion, and awaken a lively perception which would discern in *that blood* the dying sufferings of the victim slain. Hence the command to Aaron to come into the holy place with a young bullock for a sin-offering, and a ram for a burnt-offering, (Lev. 16: 3,) was fulfilled when he presented in that place only the blood of those victims: "*For it is the life of all flesh; the blood of it is for the life thereof,*" Lev. 17: 14. "It was manifestly on this account that God forbade the people to eat blood," Lev. 17: 10-12. There is no such prohibition concerning the flesh of the victim. But there was a sacredness attached to the blood, because that was the part of the sacrifice which made the atonement.

In the ordinary atonements the killing of the victims, as we have seen, was no part of the priest's service, and in the annual atonements, the burning of the sacrifice was done by other hands. But the presentation and sprinkling of the blood by the priest alone. Hence we are brought to the conclusion, that, in a strict sense, the service of the priest, which constituted *the act* of atonement, was the presentation and sprinkling of the blood of the victim. Should any maintain that the atoning acts embrace in them the other services also, still, it must be acknowledged this is the one most significant and essential. The burning of incense, which accompanied this presentation of the blood, was evidently that it might not be attended with an offensive but with a sweet-smelling savor.

The second part of the atoning service of the high priest was performed with the live goat. It consisted in confessing the sins of the people and laying them upon the head of the victim, which, being then sent away by a fit man, bore them into the wilderness.

In relation to the typical atonements, then, the Bible brings us to the following conclusions:

The atonement did not consist in the *death* of the sacrifice,

but in the act of the priest with the blood of the victim, after the struggles of death were past.

The principal atoning *act* was the presentation of the blood of the victim, before the Lord, in the place appointed, by the priest.

No atonement could be made for a transgressor until he had confessed his sins.

No atonement was ineffectual, it always procured pardon or cleansing. To this the divine veracity stood pledged. "*It shall be forgiven him,*" Lev. 4 : 20, 26. No instance is on record where an atonement for sin was not followed immediately by a pardon.

III. We shall now consider the illustrations of the Great Atonement derived from the types, and the points of discrepancy between these and the antitype.

1. *In respect to the sacrifices.* They were animals, in their disposition the most mild ; in kind the most valuable ; and in condition without blemish. So with Christ the great sacrifice for sinners. He was meek and lowly in heart, the most estimable of the heavenly world, the well beloved of the Father, sinless and unblamable in life. When offered for us he knew no sin, he was a lamb without blemish.

Every sacrifice was seasoned with salt. As salt is in its nature savory and preservative, unlike the corruptibleness of flesh with which it was combined in sacrifice, so, in the sacrifice of Christ there was combined with human nature, which is corruptible, the Divine nature, which is incorruptible, and which renders his sacrifice so acceptable both to God and the dying sinner.

As the iniquities of the children of Israel were put upon the head of the sacrifices, and of the scape-goat, and it is said, Lev. 16 : 22, "The goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities," so upon Christ the great antitype "the Lord hath laid the iniquity of us all," Isa. 53 : 6. "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree," 1 Pet. 2 : 24. "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust," 1 Pet. 3 : 18.

As the typical sacrifices were slain before the Lord, carried away and burned without the camp, so Christ was tortured in the holy city, and then carried out and crucified and buried without the walls of Jerusalem. "For the bodies of those beasts whose blood was brought into the sanctuary by the high priest for sin, are burned without the camp. Wherefore Jesus also,

that he might sanctify the people with his own blood suffered without the gate," Heb. 13: 11, 12.

2. *In respect to the transgressor.* He was required to bring his offering, voluntarily, to the door of the tabernacle, lay his hands upon the head of his victim, and confess over it his sins. There is no instance recorded where a priest atoned for a transgressor until after a compliance with this requisition. So it is in the gospel. By faith, the sinner is required to appropriate to himself the great sacrifice for sin, confess over it his transgressions, and plead for pardon through his atoning blood. Hence we read, "Repent that your sins may be blotted out." "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved." Sins can be blotted out only by atonement. We are saved only by the blood of Jesus, as the Scripture saith, "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins. Unto him that loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood. The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin."

3. *In respect to the office-work of the priest.* The leading and principal part of this was, to take the blood of the victim after he was slain, and perform the ceremony of sprinkling, etc., in the place appointed. In addition to this he sometimes killed the sacrifice, and sometimes burnt it on the altar. But these acts appear to have been not essential to the official work of the priest, because, as we have seen, they were frequently performed by others. But the presentation and sprinkling of the blood of the sacrifice was appropriately, and exclusively, the official work of the priest, and the principal thing which constituted the act of atoning; "*for the blood maketh the atonement.*"

In the annual atonements made by the high priest, which more fully symbolize the atonements made by Christ our Great High Priest, this service of blood was required to be made in the Holiest of Holies. Hence the numerous references and applications of this symbol to Christ by Paul in his epistle to his Hebrew brethren, to whom the illustrations of this type were familiar. "But into the second [tabernacle] went the high priest alone once every year, not without blood, which he offered for himself, and for the errors of the people. The Holy Ghost this signifying that the way into the holiest of all was not yet manifest. But Christ being come a high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building, neither by the blood

of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained \*[procuring] eternal redemption for us," Heb. 9: 7, 8, 11.

Again, "For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are figures of the true, but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us," Heb. 9: 24. "But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, forever sat down on the right hand of God; from henceforth expecting till his enemies be made his footstool," Heb. 10: 12. "Now of the things which we have spoken, this is the sum. We have such a high priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens; a minister of the sanctuary and of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, and not man," Heb. 8: 1, 2. "But this man, because he continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood: wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them: for such a high priest became us, who is holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners," Heb. 7: 24-26.

In the above passages, Christ is represented as being still invested, subsequently to his death, with the office of a royal high priest; as having entered in this official capacity into the holiest of holies on high with his own blood; as having sat down on the throne of priestly intercession, to remain there forever, exercising the office of his unchangeable priesthood; and as procuring the pardon of all those who come unto God for the remission of their sins through his atoning blood.

These and similar passages prove most clearly, that, as the typical atonements by the high priest were made in the holiest of holies amidst the fragrance of smoking incense, subsequently to the death of the victim, so Christ, after his sufferings were finished, "*was raised again for our justification*," Rom. iv. 25, by officiating in the royal priesthood, and atoning for penitent sinners in the holy place above, into which he has for us entered, amidst their prayers and supplications, which to God are as smoking incense, Rev. 5: 8.

The idea that Christ made atonement on the cross, is one often

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\* The Greek participle, *εὐπάμενος*, translated in our version "*having obtained*," is an Alexandrine form of the 2nd Aorist Middle voice, and here signifies *procuring*. See Stuart's Commentary on the passage.



expressed in the writings of many excellent divines, but this we have not been able to find in the sacred writings. We do not learn from any of the typical illustrations which God has given us in his Word, that the dying sufferings of the victim constitute the atonement; but on the contrary, that the official act of the priest with the blood of the victim in the place appointed, subsequently to the death of the sacrifice, constituted it. That the victim suffered in the room and stead of the transgressor who presented it, and that there was propitiatory merit in those sufferings, is readily admitted. Indeed this sacrificed life seems to be regarded by God as being contained in the blood of the immolated sufferer, and as imparting to it its merit when the priest presents it before the Lord for atonement. This appears to be the reason assigned by God for the fact, that it is the blood which makes the atonement. "For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar, to make an atonement for your souls; *for it is the blood that maketh the atonement for the soul,*" Lev. 17: 11. That the dying of the victim was not regarded as the atonement is evident from the fact, that in the ordinary atonements the priest did not kill the sacrifice, did not perform his official work till after those sufferings were ended; yet it was the act of the priest, in which he presented those dying sufferings in the blood before the Lord, that made the atonement—it was the *priest* that made the atonement, and not the *dying victim*.

In the above extracts from the epistle to the Hebrews we see that the *manner* of making atonement, as illustrated by the types, is applicable to Christ with great particularity. Subsequently to his death he exercises the office of a royal high priest; takes his blood which he had shed in death in his hand, enters with it into the holy place on high, to appear in the presence of God for us. What else can this mean but that he has gone thither to atone for the sins of penitent, confessing transgressors, who come unto God by him? Was not this the appropriate and the distinguishing official work of the Aaronical high priests when they went into the holy place? And why is this symbol applied to Christ with so much particularity? How can he be a high priest in the holy place which he has entered, unless he exercises there the priestly office? If then Jesus executes the office of a high priest within the veil, does he not make atonement there? He ever liveth there, says the apostle, to make *intercession* for us. The Scriptures give no intimation, however, that

the priest ever made intercession in the holy place with *prayer*. It was the intercession of the blood when presented before the Lord. This gave as it were a voice to blood. The blood of Jesus speaketh, and speaketh other and better things than the blood of Abel, for it crieth out, not against the transgressor, but for him. It pleads, saying, "Father, forgive, for I have found a ransom." The context shows that this is the kind of advocacy alluded to by John when he says, "If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. And he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world," 1 John 2: 1, 2. The Jews were in the habit of calling the high priest their *παράκλητος*, translated here *advocate*, on account of the aid he rendered them by his atonements. The intercessions by prayer which accompanied their atonements, were made, not by the priest, but by the people who stood without, praying, Lev. 16: 17, and Luke 1: 10. When Paul speaks of our reconciliation to God by the cross, Eph. 2: 16, and by the death of his Son, Rom. 5: 10, we should interpret the language as the Jews would to whom it was addressed. They would understand it, evidently, in the sense of a sacrificial death on the cross, which would be rendered efficacious only by the subsequent atoning act of the priest with the blood shed in that death, as in the case of the typical sacrifices. Offering the blood of the victim in atonement by the priest was no less essential to the forgiveness of a transgressor than the suffering of death by the victim. So it was equally essential to the justification of sinners that Christ should be raised from the dead, enter the holy place made without hands, and present there his own blood in atonement for their sins, as it was that he should die on the cross. Hence in upbraiding the Corinthians for their denial of the resurrection, Paul declares that "if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins. Then they also who are fallen asleep in Christ are perished," 1 Cor. 15: 16, 17. Hence also the declaration of Paul, in Rom. 4: 25, "Who was delivered for our offences, and raised again for our justification." The influence of the resurrection of Christ in procuring our justification is symbolized by the live goat on which iniquities were laid, and who then bore them away. So, Jesus bears away the sins of the penitent, not in his death, but in his life. When atonement is made for them they remain no longer on the transgressor. As in the types, atonement was immediately fol-

lowed by pardon, so in the gospel, this is everywhere assumed as accompanying the pleadings of the blood of Jesus.

We proceed now to notice some discrepancies between the type and the antitype. These we shall find originate, necessarily, from characteristics belonging to the one, which cannot, in the nature of the case, belong to the other. In other respects we shall find the antitype to correspond with the type. In sketching the discrepancies we shall notice only the things which compose the main body of those shadows of things in the gospel. In these are embraced *the sacrifice, the penitence of the transgressor, and the official work of the priest.*

In the types, many sacrifices were offered; in the antitype but one.

In the types, the priests were furnished with sacrifices by the transgressors; in the antitype, Jesus, our High Priest, furnished his own offering.

In the types, the high priest entered the holy place once every year, when he abode there only long enough to make one atonement; in the antitype, our High Priest having entered once, ever remaineth there.

In the types, the priests made but one atonement with the blood of the same sacrifice; in the antitype, our High Priest with his own blood makes many atonements. It is said he died but once, and that he entered but once into the holy place; but it is nowhere said he makes but one atonement. On the contrary, "This man because he continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood: wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make *intercession* for them," that is, as we have seen, the intercession of blood, which is only another name for atonement.\*

In the types, the confession of the transgressor preceded, not only the act of atonement by the priest, but also the death of the victim. In the antitype this is impossible, because Christ suffered once for all, and his sufferings could not therefore follow the confessions of all those who have sinned. But although the sacrifice was slain previous to the repentance of the trans-

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\* In this essay, the term *atonement* is employed to express the office-work in heaven of our Great High Priest for the purpose of giving it a clearer illustration. Should any prefer the term *intercession* which is employed in the New Testament to express this work, there can be urged against it no valid

gressor, there is no necessity that the atonement be made for him until after he repents, because, having once entered into the holy place, our Priest ever liveth there to make intercession, or atonement, whenever it is applied for by penitent transgressors, and they must repent, that their sins may be thus blotted out.

IV. We come, now, to a consideration of the question so often proposed, "*For whom did Christ die?*"

This question, we apprehend, would never have been one of so much controversy had the representation of the doctrine of atonement, as given in the Bible, been preserved in its simplicity. But divines, who have attained, deservedly, a very high rank among the churches, have raised and discussed, as we have before remarked, certain questions concerning this subject, and then the doctrine of atonement has been made to assume a form which would correspond with the conclusion to which they have arrived. By such means, positions have been taken, and principles adopted, that have perplexed and confused the minds of unbiassed inquirers, and have led to long protracted controversy concerning this great doctrine. In the progress of these things, it has been found necessary to impart to certain scriptural terms a borrowed meaning, and to employ terms to express sentiments concerning the doctrine of atonement unknown in the Bible, and which combine truth and error. Hence we hear of its *general design* and *limited application*, as if God failed to apply what he designed. We hear also of a fresh application of the atonement, as if our Great High Priest could make but one atonement, and therefore were under the necessity of giving it innumerable applications—an idea, the shadow of which, it is believed, no one can find in the Scriptures. So also the death of Christ and the atonement of Christ are often erroneously employed as synonymous terms; whereas, in the Scriptures, the one is represented as the material of which the other is made. "It shall be accepted of him to make *atonement* for him,"

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objections. It should be understood, however, that it is a *priestly intercession*, and of course restricted to penitent sinners who apply to Christ to procure their pardon of the Father, by pleading in their behalf his own blood, and that this intercession of the New Testament is that which answers to atonement in the Old. As the immolated victims of the Old Testament typified the *death* of Christ, so the priestly atonements of the Old Testament typified the *intercessions* of Christ.

Lev. 1: 4, and not that the sacrifice was itself the atonement. The dying victim is nowhere represented as making atonement, but it is made by the priest after the victim is dead. The question then "For whom did Christ die?" may require *one* answer; and the question "For whom is atonement made?" another and different answer.

As to the question, then, "For whom did Christ die?" the Scriptures furnish answers in abundance. Take the following as a specimen. "For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life," John 16: 3. "For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved," John 3: 17. "For the bread of God is he that cometh down from heaven and giveth life to the world. And the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world," John 6: 33, 51. "I am not come to judge the world, but to save the world," John 12: 47. "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world," 1 John 2: 2. "The Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world," John 4: 14. The term *world* is used in the New Testament with reference to the race of Adam seventy-six times. In several of these passages it signifies nothing more than a *multitude of people*, as "the world hath gone after him." Sometimes it is employed to designate the unconverted, as it is now often popularly employed, as, "The world hath not known me;" "The world will hate you." In two passages it denotes Gentiles, and in two the antediluvians. When employed to designate the inhabitants of the world, it embraces *the human race*, unless used in a qualified and restricted sense. The question then arises, How shall we determine in what passages this term is to be taken in its literal, and when in its restricted sense? Not by our fancies, but by the acknowledged laws of language. In all instances where the term is used in a restricted sense, the context, or the application of the term to something which is known cannot embrace the human family, or some other cause, must absolutely demand this restricted sense, since the laws of language require us to give to every word its natural and literal meaning, unless circumstances compel us to depart from that, and give it a qualified signification. In Horne's Introduction, Vol. II. p. 582, the following rules are laid down as our guide:

"The literal meaning of words is to be retained, more in the historical books of Scripture, than in those which are poetical.

"The literal meaning of words is to be given up, if the predicate, being literally taken, be contrary to the subject.

"The literal meaning of words is to be given up, if it be either improper or involve an impossibility.

"When the literal meaning of words is contrary either to common sense, to the context, to parallel passages, or to the scope of a passage, it must be given up."

Now in relation to the term *world* in the above and similar passages, the question arises, Do the laws of language require us to depart from the literal, and employ a restricted signification? It is not sufficient to assert, that there are many passages in which the term is found, where it does not embrace the whole human family. This is readily acknowledged. The above laws of language require the term in many passages to be restricted in its application. But the question returns, Do the above and similar passages require it? Is there any *impropriety or impossibility, any thing contrary to common sense, to the context, to parallel passages, or to the scope of the passage*, that compels us in the above, and similar instances, to restrict the signification of the term *world*? A critical, philological examination of those passages, it is believed, would require the acknowledgment that none of the above reasons can be found. It is not sufficient to affirm that "he died for the sheep," that "he gave himself for the church," because *they* are embraced in the world, and if he died for the world and they are embraced in it, he must of course have died for them. Nor will it suffice to qualify and change the sense of scriptural language, in order to give it an interpretation which shall accord with our creed. By such a practice, *repentance* has been made to signify *penance*, and the terms *hell, everlasting, all, elect*, etc., have been robbed of their appropriate meaning. Allow such a mode of interpretation, and the Scriptures would soon cease to be the standard of divine truth. The Scriptures should be allowed to qualify our creeds, and not our creeds the Scriptures. A proper interpretation of the passages which declare that Christ died for the world, will require us then to take them in their broadest sense, embracing the whole human race.

The same sentiment is expressed in numerous other passages

in different languages. Take the following example : " We thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead," 2 Cor. 5 : 14. " And that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him that died for them and rose again," 2 Cor. 5 : 15. " The righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, is manifested unto all, and is upon all them that believe, for there is no difference, for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God," Rom. 3 : 22, 23. " Who gave himself a ransom for all," 1 Tim. 2 : 6. " For if through the offence of one many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many," Rom. 5 : 15.

In the first of these passages, the reason assigned for Christ's death for all, is that all were dead. But what force is there in this logic, unless he died for all who were dead ? And were not all the human family dead ? None surely will maintain that the elect only were dead. In the other passages, we see the death of Christ is represented as being as extensive in its application as the effects of the fall. Indeed, it is believed, that there are more passages which assert that Christ died for all, than there are which declare that all have sinned. The Scriptures are more replete with testimonies that Christ died for all the world, than with commands that the gospel shall be preached to all the world.

The objection usually urged against this view is, that the death of Christ is represented as having a special application to his people. " He died for the sheep,"—" purchased the church,"—" gave himself for us," the saints. In relation to these expressions we remark :

1. In the above and similar passages, the sacred writers have solely in view the *relations* between *the sheep, the church, the saints*, and their dying Saviour. Consequently they had occasion to speak of the death of Christ simply in its relation to them. In other passages, where the relations of Christ to the world are noticed, he is, as we have seen, represented as dying for the world.

2. The rule adopted by some for the interpretation of the above passages would require us, in its application to other passages, to restrict the death of Christ to one single individual. Paul, speaking of the dying love of Christ, not for the world, nor for the sheep, nor for the church, nor for the saints, but only for *himself*, says, " Who loved *me*, and gave himself for *me*,"

Gal. 2: 20. The argument is that as Christ died for the *sheep*, therefore he did not die for any others. According to this logic, Christ gave himself for Paul, therefore he gave himself for no one else!

But it is objected again, that nothing is gained by maintaining that Christ died for all mankind, since all will not be saved, and that it is derogatory to the character of the Divine Being to suppose that he would allow his Son to die in vain.

To this we reply: If it be an established fact that all will not be saved for whom Christ died, this will not prove that his blood is shed in vain; nor that it has failed or shall fail to accomplish that which God designed should be effected by it. What was this? It was that, "whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have everlasting life;" "that God might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus," Rom. 3: 26. By this means, God's mercy will be gloriously displayed in the salvation of all who believe. His goodness will be gloriously manifested in kindly proffering salvation by dying love to all, though some may wickedly reject it. God will be glorified in Christ's death, then, as well in those who die, as in those that live. God sent Moses to Pharaoh to plead with him that he might let Israel go. He exerted his divine power in working many miracles to enforce obedience, but he declared that he knew well it would all be in vain. Was it therefore useless, and did it detract from the character of God to employ means for the accomplishment of that which he knew they would fail to accomplish? By no means. It resulted in God's getting himself glory by Pharaoh.

So the gospel, which announces to sinners that Christ died for them, will be a sweet-smelling savor unto God, not only in those that are saved but also in them that are lost. No inglorious defeat, then, will be sustained by Jehovah, though many perish for whom Christ died.

Another object gained by this scriptural view of Christ's death is, that it enables us consistently to preach the gospel to every creature. But that which does not include in it the death of Christ is not the gospel. To preach the gospel, then, to every creature, is to preach a dying Saviour to every creature, and to warn the rejecters of it of the dreadful sin of "denying the Lord that bought them," 2 Pet. 2: 1. It also enables us to make the strongest appeal to the sinner's heart, an appeal founded on dying love. Christ has died for you. How can



you slight a dying Saviour? How can you reject bleeding mercy?

This analogy between the type and the great antitype, shows us, finally, that the resemblance is preserved as far as the circumstances of the case will allow. From this analogy we learn:

That the death of Christ on the cross for the world was not the *atonement* of Christ.

That the atonement of Christ consists in his subsequent, official, priestly act in presenting his own blood as our High Priest in that holy place above, into which he has for us entered.

That as his priesthood is an unchangeable one, he ever lives in that holy place, and is ready at all times to make atonement with his blood for every penitent transgressor, who comes to God through him.

That Christ died but once, and entered with his blood into the holy place but once, as our great High Priest, but that he atones for penitent sinners often, and as often as they apply to God through him for pardon.

That Christ has *died* for all sinners, but *atones* for none until they repent.

That as soon as our great High Priest atones for a sinner he is forgiven.

That the doctrine, which teaches that the *death* of Christ is the atonement, in effect, renders his office as our High Priest merely nominal, inasmuch as it takes from him when within the veil, the official work of a high priest, which was to make atonement there.

That the priestly service within the veil is as essential to atonement as the death of the victim.

That to maintain that sinners, whether of the elect or non-elect, are atoned for in a state of impenitence, is contrary to the doctrine of atonement as taught in the Bible.

That the doctrine, which teaches that atonement is made for a sinner, and yet he is not forgiven, is in direct and open hostility to the instruction furnished by the sacred Scriptures.

We shall pass now, to a brief explanation of some other scriptural terms employed to represent the work of Christ in procuring the salvation of sinners.

**Redemption.** This consists of two parts. The first is the payment of a certain price for the release of one in bondage. "This Jesus did when he was delivered for our offences." "Ye

were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish, and without spot," 1 Pet. 1: 18, 19. The second part of redemption consists in the deliverance of the prisoner from his bondage. In the gospel this can be done only on the terms prescribed by the Great Head of the Church. These are, that he repent and believe and be pardoned through the blood of Jesus. "We have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins," Eph. 1: 7. "Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood," Rev. 5: 9. Redemption, then, harmonizes with atonement.

*Ransom.* This is the sum paid for the release of a captive. In the great work of salvation it corresponds to the death of a victim for atonement. Hence it is said of Christ, "Who gave himself a ransom for all," 1 Tim. 2: 6. "The Son of man came to give his life a ransom for many," Matt. 20: 28. The ransom money does not of itself release the prisoner. This is done only on the specified terms of the gospel.

*Price, Purchase.* These terms embrace the sum given for a servant, and correspond in use to the term ransom.

"Ye are *not* your own; ye are bought with a price," 1 Cor. 6: 20.

"Feed the flock of God which he hath purchased with his own blood," Acts 20: 28.

*Reconciliation.* This is making those friends, who, before, were at variance. In the work of salvation (if we except Rom. 5: 10, where the cause is put for the effect, and the term is employed as synonymous with the death of Christ, verse 8) it corresponds to the second part of redemption, and to atonement in distinction from sacrifice, while ransom, price, and purchase, correspond to the first part of redemption, and to the death of the victim in distinction from the atonement made with that death. The elect, as such, are nowhere represented as being reconciled unto God, but this is affirmed of believers, penitent sinners, the saints of God. The wicked are entreated to be reconciled. "We pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God," 2 Cor. 5: 20. But the saints are represented as being already reconciled. "And you that were enemies hath he reconciled," Col. 1: 21. In order to effect reconciliation, it was not only necessary that a sacrifice should be slain, but that atonement should be made by the priest with the blood of that sacrifice. Thus

are these terms employed in perfect harmony with the doctrine of atonement as presented and illustrated in the Scriptures.

In conclusion, let us consider the practical application of this great doctrine in obtaining the salvation of condemned sinners.

In the discussion of this subject, we have seen that Jesus Christ, our adorable Saviour and Redeemer, has given himself in death as a propitiatory sacrifice for all sinners, in order that as many of them as repent and believe may be saved, and that God may be just in pardoning them. Whosoever will, then, let him come and take the water of life freely. We have seen that Christ, after having died for sinners, arose from the dead, assumed the office of a Royal High Priest, ascended into heaven with his blood which he had shed in sacrifice, sat down there on the throne of intercession, where he ever liveth, and is ready at all times to make atonement for every broken-hearted, penitent sinner who casts himself on him, and comes to God for pardon through his blood. We are taught by this glorious doctrine that no sinner, however vile he may be, will apply for pardon thus in vain. God has shown us in the typical illustrations of the doctrine, that all for whom atonement is thus made are instantly forgiven. For this the veracity of God stands solemnly pledged,—“*It shall be forgiven him.*” In the history of atonement, not an instance can be produced from the Scriptures where pardon or cleansing did not immediately follow. If an atonement was made for a house, the altar, the vessels of the sanctuary, or the land, they were immediately and invariably cleansed by that atonement. If made for sins, they were instantly forgiven. So it is with the atonements which Jesus our glorious Mediator makes for poor, condemned, broken-hearted sinners. They are always efficacious. It is said expressly by Jesus, “Father, I know thou hearest me always,” John 11: 42, 43. Whenever he pleads with his blood—for his blood it is that speaketh—saying, “Father, forgive, for I have found a ransom,” at once the sinner is forgiven. God has declared, “it shall be forgiven him.” Hence it is, that the Apostle in exultation exclaims, “Let us therefore come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need,” Heb. 4: 16.

The opinion of many excellent brethren and venerable divines, that on the cross Jesus Christ atoned for all mankind,

whilst they remain still children of wrath, unforgiven, and although many of them will at last fall into perdition, is an opinion at war with the doctrine of atonement as presented in the Bible. Nor does the sentiment of others, that on the cross Christ by his death made a full and complete atonement for the elect, harmonize better with the doctrine of atonement as illustrated in the Scriptures. There, we are taught that the death of the victim is not atonement, but that it is the subsequent presentation of his blood before the Lord, and that atonement is made for no one in any case, where it is not followed by pardon. But no one, of the elect even, is pardoned until he repents; they are children of wrath, even as others. To escape these manifest discrepancies with the Bible doctrine of atonement, some divines have maintained the doctrine of an eternal justification of the elect; and others, in modern times, have asserted that the atonement of itself effects nothing!—a position most dishonorable to the official work of the great Mediator. The pleading of the blood of Christ of itself effects nothing! No, no, precious Jesus. *Thou never pleadest in vain. Thy Father always heareth thee. When thy blood speaketh, it procures pardon. Come, then, to Christ, all ye that are weary and heavy laden, for he will give you rest.*

Let the Christian, then, when his conscience is burdened with guilt, and his soul polluted with sin, go to Jesus. He is his Advocate with the Father. He will make a fresh atonement for his soul, and again will he be pardoned. His blood cleanseth us from all sin. He ever liveth in the holy place to make intercession for us.

If unconverted, reader, go to Christ your great High Priest. Tell him you are a wretch undone, and ask him to atone for your sins, that you may be forgiven. Go in confidence, for he says, "Him that cometh to me, I will in no wise cast out." "Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool."

Are you careless, indifferent to all that Christ has done for you in his agonizing death, and to the blessing he proffers you in his atoning blood? Think, how can you meet it at the judgment of the great day? What base ingratitude to turn away with cold indifference from dying love; dying love followed up with proffered bleeding mercy! Think, how your tender-hearted Saviour, your kind Redeemer, after suffering and dying for you, ascended into heaven, carrying with him the pre-

cious blood he had shed for you, sat down on the throne of intercession, where he will continue till his enemies be made his footstool, till atonement be made for the last sinner, that will be saved,—how he has been waiting and ready to atone for your sins ever since your first transgression. When you have been asleep and when awake; when rejoicing in health, and when terrified in sickness; when careless in sin, and when thoughtful under awakenings; and at all times, by day and by night, at every hour and every moment, he has been ready, and waiting to present his blood in your behalf; the instant you repent and believe, to obtain your pardon, and procure your salvation. If you die in your sins and are lost, how will a review of all this add to your sorrow and sighings in hell, when “thou shalt mourn at the last, when thy flesh and thy body are consumed, and say, How have I hated instruction, and my heart despised reproof; and have not obeyed the voice of my teachers, nor inclined mine ear to them that instructed me,” Prov. 5: 11–13.

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## ARTICLE V.

### REVIEW OF GLIDDON'S EGYPT.

By Rev. A. B. Chapin, New Haven, Connecticut.

*Ancient Egypt; her Monuments, Hieroglyphics, History and Archaeology, and other subjects connected with Hieroglyphical Literature.* By GEORGE R. GLIDDON, late U. S. Consul at Cairo. New-York, 1843.

AMONG all the commemorative symbols of antiquity, the Egyptian Hieroglyphics are the most intensely interesting, and perhaps, the most important. They are records of far by-gone days, reaching back into the shadowy times of primeval ages, containing the history of some of the most extraordinary men, and one of the most extraordinary nations that have ever existed. And they are, too, as it were, the autobiography of those who erected them, containing all their *thoughts of pride*, as well as an account of their actions. But until recently, they have been enigmas for the scholar to pore over, labyrinths for

the antiquarian to explore, and sculptured images for the poet to muse on.<sup>1</sup> Well do we remember the kindling enthusiasm with which we heard of the discovery of a *Key to the Hieroglyphics*. We would fain have hastened to the spot where those mighty monuments were withstanding the shocks of time, and bid the column, the colonnade, and the sculptured temple, speak forth the history of their nation.

With these feelings still glowing in our bosom, we have welcomed every publication on the subject that has issued from the press. And with the same feelings, we hailed the appearance of the work of Mr. Gliddon. *He* had been on the ground,—had walked amid the solitudes of Egypt,—had gazed upon all the remains of that once powerful and mighty nation, and had come home, fraught, as we trusted, with new and important revelations. In this respect, however, we must confess ourselves somewhat disappointed. Not but the work contains much that is new to the *common* reader, though it contains nothing of importance, new, even, to the *American* scholar. But along with what is valuable, whether new or old, it contains so much that is doubtful, or disputed, or false, that it diminishes the value of the book. And many of the facts, though no doubt correct, are so negligently, and carelessly, or extravagantly stated, that the most valuable part of the work, and that which is truly reliable, will suffer much, in the estimation of every scholar. But for many, probably for most of the *facts* stated, Mr. G. is not responsible. Yet for the *manner* in which the facts are stated, and for the *conclusions* drawn, he is responsible; and it is necessary for us to examine them, in order to test the soundness of some of his inferences. It will be our object, therefore, to point out, how far the public may receive the work as a safe guide, and give some reasons why, upon other points, his conclusions must be questioned.

That the *Key* to the interpretation of the hieroglyphic legends of Egypt has been discovered—that an alphabet of hieroglyphs has been formed—that the hierologist is able to decipher all the proper names with accuracy, and the general inscriptions with much probability, we consider as certain.<sup>2</sup> And for

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<sup>1</sup> Wiseman, Lect. IX. p. 209, Am. ed.

<sup>2</sup> This applies to the great proportion of the characters. We believe, however, there are some exceptions, among which we must reckon the last character but one in the Cartouch of Ram-

a *general account* of all this, Mr. Gliddon's book is trustworthy and sufficient. And we refer our readers to the work for an account of these matters. The book, notwithstanding its faults, is worthy a place in our libraries, and no one, curious in "matters of Egypt," will regret its purchase or perusal.

We wish we could stop here, that our language could be altogether free from censure. But this may not be. The tone of the book, in regard to many other subjects, and especially in regard to the antiquity of Egyptian history, and the faults of the Hebrew Chronology, call for a passing notice. And because our author is so confident, and speaks so dogmatically, we are required to examine his arguments more closely, and criticise his conclusions more minutely. It also requires us to perform the more unpleasant part, of inquiring into the manner in which he has executed his task, that we may judge more accurately of his competence to discuss the subjects under consideration. And these are questions, touching, not as our author seems to fancy, the soundness of his orthodoxy, but the accuracy of his scholarship.

We have already remarked, that one thing which detracts very much from the value of the book, and will destroy much of its authority with scholars, is the careless, and often contradictory manner in which our author states his facts. He wrote too much in haste, and did not give himself time to revise and compare his statements. A few examples will show this. On p. 7, he speaks of the labours of Count Robiano in 1829, as "valuable, going to show the Semitic origin of the Coptic language, and thence," he says, "we may infer its Asiatic origin."<sup>1</sup> Again, on p. 19, he says, that Dr. Lepsius, "in 1835 established that the ancient Coptic is no longer placed in lin-

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ses III., given by our author on p. 24, No. 1. Kircher took it for a Nilometer; Dr. Young, for a figure representing the Nile; others consider it a *hammer*; and still others, an *embalming instrument*. Champollion explains it by εδοκιμασεν, in the phrase ου ο Ηραιος εδοκιμασεν, on the tablet of Rosetta, "whom Phtha approves," and he is followed by Rossellini. But Hermapion's translation of the obelisk of Ramses, is ου Ηελιος προεχρειν, "*whom the Sun hath chosen*." See Cullimore on Hieroglyphic Inscript. Trans. R. S. L. pp. 94-96.

<sup>1</sup> Etudes sur l'écriture, les hiéroglyphics et la langue de l'Égypte. Paris, 1834.

guistical solitude; but that it enters into the vast circumference of Semitic and Indo-Germanic languages."<sup>1</sup> How the Coptic could stand in "linguistical solitude," if it was of "Semitic origin," and consequently cognate with the Semitic languages, is more than we can imagine. But we have on p. 19, another account of the matter, when he tells us that the ancient Coptic or Egyptian, was an indigenous tongue, though the people who spoke it, as he himself allows, came from Asia! Again he says, that Quatremère "established the present Coptic language to be the ancient Egyptian itself."<sup>2</sup> Yet, on p. 20 he tells us that the modern Coptic will not always translate the *hieratic*, and *hieroglyphic* mode of writing, because these were the classical, while the present Coptic was the popular dialect of the country. And again, on p. 10, he tells us that Champollion demonstrated, in the first part of his *Egyptian Grammar*, that the Coptic of the hieroglyphics, is not the Coptic as it has been preserved to us. Again, on pp. 14, 15, he ascribes the origin "of writing to primary revelation," and yet on the same page, makes it "indigenous in Egypt," though the Egyptians themselves, as he tells us in numerous places, came from Asia.

Another specimen of his careless and confused statement of facts, is found on p. 10, in what he says of Job. Following Dr. Hales, he places him B. C. 2337, that is, as Dr. Hales supposes, cotemporary with Nahor, the grandfather of Abraham, and in the same paragraph identifies him, as cotemporary with Eliphaz, the son of Esau, the son of Jacob. The events which he thus regards as cotemporaneous, were separated by at least four hundred years, by the shortest chronology. A similar want of consistency is found in other portions of his book, and in reference to other subjects. Thus, on p. 19, he gives what he intends as some of the onomatopoetic words of the Coptic language. The first is "an Ass," called "Yo, from his *bray*." But there is no *y* in the Coptic alphabet.<sup>3</sup> The word is written

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<sup>1</sup> Compar. Names of Numbers in Indo-Germanic, Semitic and Egyptian Languages. 1835.

<sup>2</sup> Recherches sur la langue et la littérature de l'Égypte. Par. 1808.

<sup>3</sup> So on page 9, he translates an inscription, *Judah, Melek*; while there is no *j* in the Coptic. The true orthography would be, *Eoud Hamalek*, the *e* having the force of *y* consonant, which



in Coptic *eeue*, *eeo*, or *ehue*. Next, he mentions the "Lion," called "Mooee from his roar." The Coptic, according to the orthography of that "profound scholar, Dr. Henry Tattam" (p. 10), and rendered into Roman letters from his own alphabet, would be *moovei*, or *moovee*. What resemblance these words have to the "roar of a Lion," we do not perceive.

Another point which will tend to lessen the authority of the work under consideration, in the estimation of all competent judges, is the frequent occurrence of singular errors, in relation to incidental questions. Thus he tells us, that "it has been demonstrated, by a succession of eminent Hebrew scholars, that Genesis is composed of *several* original records" (p. 12). That which he thus denominates "demonstration," is a conjecture of ASTRUC, that it contains "twelve" such documents.<sup>1</sup> A conjecture of EICHORN<sup>2</sup> and LAMB,<sup>3</sup> that there were "two" of them; and of Ilgen that there were "three."<sup>4</sup> But ROSENMULLER denies the possibility of determining the question,<sup>5</sup> and JAHN pronounces all the conjectures unsatisfactory.<sup>6</sup> He confounds the settlement of the time of keeping "Christmas," with that of observing "Easter"<sup>7</sup> (p. 33); adopts the fable of "the

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is nearly related to j. Comp. Wiseman, Lect. IX. p. 305. Greppo. Essay. P. II. c. v. p. 119.

<sup>1</sup> Conjectures sur les Memoires originaux dont il paroît que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le livre de Genese, à Paris, 1753. The same idea had been cautiously advanced by VITRINGA, 1712, Obs. Sac. I. c. iv. § 23, and afterwards by LE CENE, 1741, Bib. Le Cene. Tom. I.

<sup>2</sup> Einleit. A. T. II. Th. §§ 416-427.

<sup>3</sup> Hebrew Characters derived from Hieroglyphics. Lond. 1835.

<sup>4</sup> Urkunden des Jerusalemischen Tempelarchivs. 1798.

<sup>5</sup> Scholia. Tom. I. pp. 40-55.

<sup>6</sup> Intd. O. T. P. II. Sec. I. c. i. § 17.

<sup>7</sup> At least, we suppose this to be so, by his referring to the time of the Council of Nice. He says: "All that can positively be averred is, that Christ was born about autumn." This assertion is entirely without foundation. Clement of Alexandria is the *earliest* writer who mentions the day. He gives the different opinions then prevailing, some of which placed it the 25th of Pachon, and others the 24th or 25th of Pharmuthi. (Strom. I. p. 340.) But does this date refer to the erratic year of the Egyptians, or to the fixed Alexandrian? Pamelius (Not. Tert.

seventy learned" translators of the Septuagint (p. 36); makes Clement of Alexandria a bishop; talks of "the pure, uncorrupted Greek translation of the Old Testament" (p. 36), made from the un mutilated Hebrew (p. 36), but which has since been "altered, curtailed, interpolated and mutilated" (p. 35); places Josephus next in authority to the Septuagint (p. 36), although his chronology is a mass of contradiction, furnishing no less than five different sets of dates; says, that "out of nineteen dates for Solomon's temple, the longest is B. C. 741, the shortest B. C. 479" (p. 33),<sup>1</sup> whereas Usher makes it B. C. 1000, and Hales at B. C. 1020; and finally denominates the Hebrew, a "version of the Bible" (p. 34), and talks of "older, purer, and more orthodox versions" (p. 37). The enumeration of such errors, has no direct bearing upon our author's ability to instruct us in hieroglyphics; but they are important as showing, either his want of ability to discuss questions of chronology, or else his sad neglect in the composition of his book. In either case, he is not a safe guide, for a single step beyond the explanation of a hieroglyphic.

We might, therefore, with perfect propriety, pass by his extravagant claims of antiquity for Egypt, without notice; but as his opinions on this subject, are the opinions of some others, we shall inquire briefly into the evidence they have given in support of their positions, and the probabilities of their accuracy. The character of these claims will be best perceived by taking several points into consideration. The first claim is, that the Chaldeans had astronomical tables which "date back as far as B. C. 2234, or 700 years before Moses" (p. 14), and yet that the Chaldeans "were an Egyptian colony." And again he says (p. 50), that "there is no point ascertained with more precision, than the almost inconceivable remoteness of astrono-

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cont. Jud. c. 8) supposes the former, and makes *Pharmuthi* the same as December; but Basnage (Crit. Baron. p. 216. Bing. Antq. B. XX. c. 4, § 1,) suppose the latter, and make *Pharmuthi* the same as April. But no ancient author ever placed it later than *May*.

<sup>1</sup> We presume he refers to the time supposed to have elapsed between the Exodus and the building of the Temple. If so, he should have added the authority of his favorite Septuagint, which makes it only 440 years. 2 K. 6: 1.

mical calculations and observations among the earliest Egyptians, who appear to have perfected their calendar, for all practical purposes, at a period so distant that even the Deluge epoch of the Septuagint appears irreconcilable with the deductions thereon consequent. Indeed, Champollion declares, what the great mathematician Biot confirms, that the astronomical dates, procured from the tombs of the Kings at Thebes, would carry back the use of the national calendar in Egypt, to the year B. C. 3285."

The second point of evidence is, that there "are positive annals" among the hieroglyphic inscriptions (p. 34), which carry back the Egyptian nation, far beyond the period of the Hebrew Chronology. The third is, that there are a large number of "unplaced kings," that is, names of kings, the time, order (and perhaps place) of whose reigns are unknown. Fourth, that the period necessary for the building of the Pyramids must have been far longer than that of the Hebrew Chronology. And fifth, Menes, the first *King* of Egypt, according to the Egyptian historian Manetho, ascended the throne of Egypt about 2782 years before CHRIST. These are the main points of our author's arguments; or rather of the authors whom he follows, and which we shall briefly examine.

On the supposition that the Chronology of Rossellini, which is followed by our author, is nearly correct, back to the commencement of the reign of the 18th Dynasty, the accession of which he places B. C. 1822 (p. 64), we shall proceed to examine the time anterior to this. He gives us, in his list, the names of six Kings, forming the 17th Dynasty of Theban Kings, cotemporary, as he supposes, with the Hykshos, or Shepherd Kings. This Dynasty is *known* to have reigned 108 years, but *supposed* by our author to have occupied 260 years. Previous to this time, the hierologists have been able to identify only three kings of the 16th Dynasty, occupying 50 years (p. 64), and four others, still earlier, to whom they give 221 years. All these sums amount to 2201 years. The accession of Menes is placed by our author B. C. 2750 (p. 51), giving 549 years, unaccounted for, to be filled up by the "unplaced kings." But even this period our author thinks too short, and would be glad to add "a thousand years" more to it (p. 57). In order to see more distinctly the precise points in question, we give the periods of the two eras under consideration:—

		<i>Deluge.</i>	<i>Exodus.</i>	<i>Interval.</i>
Calmet,	B. C.	2344	1487	857
Usher,	B. C.	2349	1491	858
Hales,	B. C.	3155	1648	1507
Gliddon (about)	B.C. 3200 p. 37 (about)		1500 p. 41.	1700

It is not our intention, at this time, to discuss the probabilities of either the Hebrew or Septuagint Chronology, but simply to inquire whether there has yet been sufficient evidence produced to require us to give up the shorter period between the Deluge and the Exodus, and to follow the long period of our author.—First, we shall consider the *monumental evidence*. This, according to our author, carries us back to B. C. 1822, to which must be added 158 years of the 16th and 17th Dynasties, and 221 years preceding them. This amounts to 2201 years, and reaches within 148 years of the Deluge, according to the Chronology of Archbishop Usher, but falls a thousand years short of it, according to the Chronology of our author. But it should be remarked, that for the 221 years, anterior to the 16th Dynasty, the evidence is not monumental, but historical.<sup>1</sup> It is true, that our author tells us, that there is a long list of “unplaced kings,” who he thinks were anterior to the 16th Dynasty, and who must have occupied a great length of time. This, however, is mere assumption, indeed it is assumption against probability, for we are told both by Manetho and the hierologists, that the Hykshos, who succeeded the 16th Dynasty, “destroyed cities, and overthrew especially all the public monuments and temples of the gods. No edifices built by earlier dynasties were suffered to exist. A few ruins only remained, which were used merely as materials in the edifices of the following ages.”<sup>2</sup> It is impossible, therefore, that there should be any monumental evidence, unless it be the pyramids, previous to the 16th Dynasty. Consequently, the placing of the “unplaced kings” must be merely *conjectural*. It is on the Pyramids, therefore, that our author relies, and he tells us, that “all these works had been completed, and pyramidal constructions had ceased to be *fashionable* in Egypt long prior to B. C. 2272” (p. 57). And he estimates that the Pyramids now existing in Egypt, must have occupied at least 300 years in their erection (p. 57). But all this is

<sup>1</sup> Syn. p. 45. Byz. ed.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph. Adv. Ap. B. I. Greppo. P. II. c. 7. p. 141.

mere conjecture. According to his own showing, we do not know the names of the builders of over three of the Pyramids, and it is a matter of great uncertainty when these were erected. Not more than *two* of the builders of the Pyramids have been identified, even by Manetho, as living *before* the 18th Dynasty.<sup>1</sup> But these are all placed *subsequent* to that time, that is, later than Sesostris, by Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus.<sup>2</sup> But on the supposition that Manetho was correct, and that the two Pyramids in question were built before the 18th Dynasty, we look in vain for any evidence that all of them are equally ancient. Indeed, as far as conjecture may be allowed, the presumption is against it, as a single consideration will show. That it was customary for the kings of Egypt to erect monuments to perpetuate their names and memories, is too well known to admit of question, and that from the 17th Dynasty down they did this, we know.<sup>3</sup> Yet, not one monument has been discovered of the 21st Dynasty, if that Dynasty and the 20th are not identical, although the succession is complete, both in the 20th and 22d Dynasties. Why is this? Why are there no remains of this Dynasty, composed at least of *seven* kings? It is at this time that Herodotus and Diodorus place the builders of the Pyramids, and we see no reason why many of them might not have been erected at this very time. At all events, it is great presumption to say, that the Pyramids are all more ancient than the 18th Dynasty. We may withdraw, therefore, for aught of any thing that yet appears, from the time supposed by the hierologists to have elapsed before the 16th Dynasty, at least 200 years, so that the kings thus far identified would reach back no further than B. C. 2000, or 350 years short of the Usherian date of the Deluge. Thus far, then,

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<sup>1</sup> Venephes, fifth king of the first dynasty. Syn. p. 44; Suphis, second king, fourth dynasty, said to be the same called Cheops, by Herodotus. Syn. p. 45. But there is a disagreement between these and Herodotus. Africanus, on the authority of Manetho, places Suphis in the fourth dynasty, and Sesostris in the eleventh; whereas Herodotus places Sesostris anterior to Cheops, and ascribes some of the pyramids to Mæris, the predecessor of Sesostris. Her. B. II. cc. 107-124.

<sup>2</sup> Herod. B. II. Diod. B. II.

<sup>3</sup> No monuments have been discovered in the twenty-first, twenty-third and twenty-fourth dynasties. But the twenty-third and twenty-fourth were both short.

there is no monumental evidence that requires us to give up the shorter period.

We proceed, therefore, to inquire into the evidence to be derived from Astronomical data, and which our author, and those whom he follows, suppose must date back to an inconceivably remote period. In order to understand the nature and application of this evidence, we must recount, as briefly as may be, the character of the evidence derived from their mode of reckoning time, and of adjusting the civil and the secret years.

For a period, the extent of which is not certainly known, the Egyptians reckoned time by months of 30 days each, and counted 12 months to the year, thereby making it consist of 360 days only. At length five days were added, known in history as the *epagomane*, making the year consist of 365 days, which was the length of the Egyptian civil year ever afterwards.<sup>1</sup> But observation afterwards convinced them that this period was also too short, and that the conjunctions of the planets from which their year was dated, happened *one day later every four years*. They therefore devised the secret, or as it has since been called, the Julian year, of 365 $\frac{1}{4}$  days.<sup>2</sup> It became necessary, therefore, in order to equate the time of the civil and secret years, to devise some system of reckoning to which both could be adjusted. This was attempted by devising a period or cycle when the beginning of the two years should correspond. Now, inasmuch as the civil year fell short of the secret, *one* day in four years, *two* days in eight years, etc., it is evident, that in process of time, the new year's day of the civil year would have passed through every day of the secret year. This period would of course be four times as many years as there were days in the civil year; that is, 1460 years. Consequently, 1460

<sup>1</sup> According to Syncellus, these days were added by Aseth [Aphobis], the last king of the seventeenth dynasty. *Chron.* p. 98. It was under this king, Aphobis, that Joseph was supposed by the early Fathers to have been in Egypt—Syn. p. 49—so that our author was not the *first* to discover the fact, as he supposes.

<sup>2</sup> The antiquity of this arrangement is questionable. No mention is made of the six hours by Herodotus, who speaks on the subject (B. II. c. 4); nor by Thales (Ding. Laert. L. I.); nor by Ptolemy (Delambre. Prem. Disc. Astr. Mid. Ages, p. 8), though they all spent some time in Egypt. See Cuvier. Rev. Globe. p. 140–144.

secret or Julian years corresponded with 1461 civil years. The commencement of this period, as spoken of by the *luter* historians,<sup>1</sup>—dated from the time when the Dog Star, called by the Egyptians *Soth*, or *Sothis*, rose heliacally—was called the *Sothic* period or Cycle, and by the Greeks and Latins, the *Cynic* or *Canicular* Cycle. This period was properly a Solar Cycle. They had also various other Cycles, especially a Lunar Cycle, consisting of 25 civil years; and a Luni-Solar Cycle, produced by multiplying the Solar and Lunar elements together.<sup>2</sup> Thus  $1461 \times 25 = 36.525$ , the great Cycle of the Egyptians, at the end of which they supposed a restitution of all things would take place.

But there were several mistakes in the computations of these Cycles, by which they were rendered comparatively useless when applied to periods of great length. Thus the Julian or secret year of the Egyptians, being made to contain 365 days 6 hours, was 11m. 12s. longer than the true tropical year, so that at the end of a Sothic Cycle, the Equinox of the secret year, would anticipate the true Equinox of the seasons by 11 1-3 days.<sup>3</sup> Now as four times this number of years were necessary for the Civil year to retrograde through this number of days, 45 years more were requisite for the actual completion of the Cycle, or the conjunction of the Civil year of the Egyptian, and the true tropical Cycle would be over in 1505 years. So also the Egyptian Lunar Cycle, which consisted of 25 Civil years, contained 2h. 9m. 48s. more than the actual time, amounting, in our Sothic Cycle, to 15h. 48m., and in the great Luni-Solar period of 36,525 years, to 9d. 22h. 37m. 48s. more than the true time.<sup>4</sup> Imperfections like these are inconsistent with any great advances in Astronomical Science. They rather indicate, that the calcu-

<sup>1</sup> The first mention of this period we recollect, is in the Alexandrian Father, Clement (Strom. L. I. p. 335. Par. ed.), unless the Old Chronicle (Syn. p. 41) be older. There are some reasons for supposing the Sothic Cycle to be a modern invention. Cuvier. Rev. p. 143.

<sup>2</sup> Old Chron. Syn. p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> See Dissertation on the Ancient Cycles, by Rev. Frederick Nolan, D. D., in Vol. III. Trans. Royal Society of Literature; Ideler. Hist. Research. Astr. Obs. Arn. and Cuv. Rev. pp. 138, 139.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Nolan. Diss. Anc. Cyc. T. R. S. L. III. p. 289.

lations were based upon observations, made either very imperfectly, or for a comparatively short period.<sup>1</sup> So far, therefore, are these astronomical dates from evincing that accurate knowledge of astronomy, or that immense antiquity which some are disposed to claim for the Egyptians, the reverse is most certainly the truth.

The application of these principles will be more apparent by presenting our readers with a scheme of the Egyptian year. The commencement of the Sothic Cycle is fixed by Censorinus at the 183d Augustan year, A. D. 139, on the 12th of the Kalends of August, that is July 21st.<sup>2</sup> The commencement of the same Cycle is also said by Theon of Alexandria, to have begun 1605 years before the end of the era of Augustus, A. D. 283.<sup>3</sup> Both of these dates point to B. C. 1322, as the commencement of the same Cycle. Leaving out of consideration the imperfection of the Egyptian Cycles, the Civil year, B. C. 1322, adapted to our calendar, stood thus:—

Month.	Sothic Year.	Days.
1. Thoth,	July 21st	30
2. Paophi,	August 20th	30
3. Athor,	September 19th	30
4. Choiak,	October 19th	30
5. Tobi,	November 18th	30
6. Mechir,	December 18th	30
7. Phamenoth,	January 17th	30
8. Pharmuthi,	February 16th	30
9. Pachon,	March 18th	30
10. Paoni,	April 17th	30
11. Epiphi,	May 17th	30
12. Mésori,	June 16th	30
Epagomenæ,	July 16th	5 <sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Delambre, on the inaccuracy of Eudoxus in the determination of the Sphere. Hist. Anc. Astr. Vol. I. p. 120, etc.

<sup>2</sup> De Natali Die. c. xxi.

<sup>3</sup> MS. Ex cod. Reg. Gall. gr. No. 2390, fol. 154, in Cory. p. 330. Greppo. P. II. c. iii. p. 87, supposes Theon, in the phrase, "the years of Menophres," to refer to the commencement of a new cycle, under a king of that name. We apprehend, however, that Menophres is simply *Mēve-p-pe* (*Mene-ph-re*), that is, *Menes-the-king*; that is, *the first king* from whose accession the cycle was dated.

<sup>4</sup> In the fixed Alexandrian year, the heliacal rising of Sothis  
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It will be seen from these facts, that if we know on what day of any month the star Sothis rose heliacally, we can ascertain the date of the year. This is known, at least, in one instance. The *Memnonium* at Thebes, more properly called the *Ramessium*, is known from the descriptions, to belong to the reign of RAMSES III., called the Great,—the Sesostris of the Greek authors. His cartouches are given by our author, p. 24. This contains an *Astronomical Ceiling*, which furnishes an astronomical date of the highest importance, being nothing less than the celebration of the *heliacal rising of Sothis*, on the first of Thoth, which occurred, as we have already seen, B. C. 1322.<sup>1</sup> If this ceiling was erected by *Ramses the Great*, and the frequent occurrence of his name (being inscribed not less than *twenty-five times within the border*), leaves no reasonable doubt of the fact, he must have lived at the time of its erection; that is, B. C. 1322, instead of B. C. 1565, where our author places him.

That he did live at this period, there are various reasons for supposing. Manethe gives the 20th Dynasty twelve Kings, and 135, 172, or 178 years, but gives no names.<sup>2</sup> The monuments furnish the names of nine Kings, but give no clew to the reigns of more than two. Manetho gives the 21st Dynasty seven Kings, and 130 years,<sup>3</sup> but no names are found on the monuments. There are, then, at least, ten Kings alleged between the 19th and 22d Dynasties, to whom names cannot certainly be

took place on the 22d of Epiphi, (Tomlinson on Astro. Ceiling of Memnonium, T. R. S. L. III. p. 493,) and consequently the common Alexandrian year would begin thus; except in the bissextile, when the commencement was carried forward a day, and the year began August 30. (Strauchius, Brev. Chronol. p. 44.)

- |                           |                              |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Thoth, Aug. 29th, 30   | 7. Phamenoth, Feb. 25th, 30  |
| 2. Paophi, Sept. 28th, 30 | 8. Pharmuthi, March 27th, 30 |
| 3. Athor, Oct. 28th, 30   | 9. Pachon, April 26th, 30    |
| 4. Choiak, Nov. 27th, 30  | 10. Paoni, May 26th, 30      |
| 5. Tobi, Dec. 27th, 30    | 11. Epiphi, June 25th, 30    |
| 6. Mechir, Jan. 26th, 30  | 12. Messori, July 25th, 30   |

Epagomenæ, 5

<sup>1</sup> M. Biot supposes this inscription to represent the birth of Horus and the festival of the Vernal Equinox, and places it B. C. 3285; but he omits the border, which is important. Diss. Astr. Ceiling, T. R. S. L. p. 484. But Mr. Wilkinson places it B. C. 1322.

<sup>2</sup> Syn. p. 58.

<sup>3</sup> Syn. p. 58.

given, and who, therefore, *may* possibly be supernumeraries. On the supposition that they are to be omitted, nearly or quite 200 years must be subtracted from our author's date of the accession of Sesostris, bringing it down to B. C. 1365. This would make him living B. C. 1322, as his reign exceeded 60 years.<sup>1</sup>

This date also agrees with the account of Herodotus, who says<sup>2</sup> that Moëris, the predecessor of Sesostris, lived about nine hundred years before he was in Egypt; which according to Larcher and Fynes-Clinton, was about B. C. 460.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, Sesostris must have lived about B. C. 1360. The account given by Tacitus, also points to the same date, as the era of Sesostris.<sup>4</sup> He tells us that in the Consulship of Paulus Fabius and Lucius Vitellius (A. D. 33) the Phenix made its appearance in Egypt, after a disappearance of several ages. This bird, he says, is sacred to the Sun, and that its longevity is differently estimated, some making it 500 years, others 1461,—that the times of its appearance were fixed by tradition. “The first,” he says, “we are told, was in the reign of Sesostris; the second, in that of Amasis; and the third, in the reign of the third Ptolemy.” That the longer of these periods was the *Sothic Cycle*, is evident at sight, and it leads naturally to inquire, whether the *Phenix* was not the Coptic *Phenh*, which properly denoted a *reverting*, or *return*, and consequently might signify *period*, or *Cycle*. At any rate, it points directly to the age of Sesostris, as the time when the Cycle commenced its revolution.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Manetho says 66 years; and there is a tablet in the British Museum, bearing date the 62d year of his reign. Diss. Astr. Ceil. p. 494.

<sup>2</sup> Herod. II. cc. 13. 102.

<sup>3</sup> Trans. Roy. Soc. Lit. III. p. 494.

<sup>4</sup> Tacit. Ann. VI. c. 28.

<sup>5</sup> That the Egyptians symbolized this period by the Phenix, see Hor. Apoll. II. c. 57, Plin. Nat. Hist. X. c. 2, Solin. c. 33. Nolan, Diss. Anc. Cyc. p. 339. As both Tacitus and Pliny (Nat. Hist. X. c. 2) fix the return of the Phenix to the reign of Ptolemy Euergetes, there must have been some foundation for it. The probable explanation is, that the Egyptians observed those times, when the manifestation of Sothis fell upon one of the first days, of the *quarters* of the cycle. These would fall B. C. 1322, 957, 592, and 227; the last of which was in the reign of Ptolemy III. The

There is also another astronomical date referring to the same period. A sacred Calendar was discovered by Champollion on the walls of the palace of Ramses III. at Medinet-Habon, in which the festivals of the several months were enumerated. In Champollion's account of that inscription, we have "Month of Thoth,—Neomenia, Manifestation of Sothis."<sup>1</sup> According to this the "Neomenia," and "Manifestation of Sothis" belong to the same month, and *seem* to belong to the same day, and consequently fix the date to B. C. 1322.<sup>2</sup> But supposing the days to have been different, the time must have been still later; that is, Sothis rose heliacally on the 2d of Thoth, 1318; 3d, 1314; and so on, until B. C. 1202, when it fell upon the 1st of Paophi, and did not again return to Thoth, until A. D. 139. The date of this Calendar, then, reaches from B. C. 2782, to B. C. 2662, or from B. C. 1322 to 1202; and as no one ever pretended to place Ramses III. at that early period, he must of necessity belong to the later, where Herodotus and Tacitus place him.

The Astronomical dates of the inscriptions compel us, therefore, to bring down the death of Ramses III. from B. C. 1499, so as to fall below B. C. 1322, or 180 years later than our author. Consequently we have no certain evidence that the astronomical observations of the Egyptians, amounted to any considerable period beyond the date of this monument, B. C. 1322. They may have done, they probably did reach back into a much earlier period of history, but the Cycles can furnish no evidence of it, as all the earlier notices may have been made by calculating back from this date. No evidence, therefore, can yet be derived from the Astronomical dates of the Egyptians, that requires us to abandon the shorter period of the Hebrew Chronology.

But it is said (p. 14) that the Chaldeans were an Egyptian colony,—that they learned astronomy of the Egyptians, and that they have "observations which date back 700 years before Moses." If our author means by this, that the Chaldee Astron-

preceding date fell in the reign of Psammuthis, or Psametik II. of the monuments.

<sup>1</sup> Champ. Lett. Ecritt. d'Egypt, pp. 359–361; Trans. Roy. Soc. Lit. III. pp. 334, 497.

<sup>2</sup> In the year B. C. 1500, one of the last years of the reign of Ramses III., according to Champollion and Rossellini, Sothis rose heliacally on the 20th of Epiphi.

omy, and Astronomical Cycles were *originally modelled* after the Egyptian, he is contradicted, by every ancient historian.<sup>1</sup> But if he means simply that it was *subsequently corrected* by that, it is undoubtedly true. But then the time, when it was so corrected, or remodelled, becomes all-important. This, we believe, is conceded by all chronologists, to have been at the commencement of the era of Nahonassar, B. C. 747, or within a year or two of that time.<sup>2</sup> No argument, therefore, in favor of the great antiquity of the Egyptian Astronomy, can be drawn from the Chaldean. So far, therefore, is the Astronomical evidence from requiring us to lengthen the period previous to the 18th Dynasty, it actually requires us to shorten the time subsequent to the accession of that dynasty near 200 years, and to place it B. C. 1642, instead of B. C. 1822, as our author and his authorities have done. Add to this sum the time of the Kings of the preceding dynasties, so far as they have been identified, and they extend back only to about B. C. 1800, that is 550 years short of the Usherian date of the Deluge. In this time, all that is *known* to have transpired before this, could well have occurred.

The remaining point of evidence upon which the writers under consideration rely, is the testimony of the ancient historians, especially the Egyptians. This has been in part considered already, but must be carefully examined; in doing which three points must be regarded—the actual antiquity ascribed to the nation—the sources from which they drew the materials of their history, and the credibility of the historians themselves. The only Egyptian histories that have come down to us, in such a state of preservation, as to enable us to ascertain what their testimonies were, are the *Old Chronicle* and *Manetho*. Of the first, we only know that it went by the name of the “*Old Chronicle*,” in the days of Syncellus, by whom it has been preserved.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding the great alleged antiquity of the Chaldean astronomy, they could furnish Ptolemy with no observation on eclipses more ancient than B. C. 721, and even these were very indefinite, the time being given in hours and half hours, and the obscuration in half or quarter diameters. Ideler, in Halma's Ptolemy, p. 166, and Cuvier, Rev. pp. 143, 144.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Nolan, Diss. Anc. Cyc. pp. 32, 47, 48. It was B. C. 743, according to Usher. Thoth began this year Feb. 26th.

<sup>3</sup> Chronographia, pp. 40, 41.

Of the other, Manetho, it is sufficient to remark, that he was a native of Sebennytus, and a priest of Heliopolis, under Ptolemy Philadelphus, B. C. 250,—that he composed a work in three books, entitled *A Universal History of Egypt*, from memorials found in the Archives of the Temples.<sup>1</sup> This work has been lost, and only fragments are preserved by Julius Africanus and Eusebius.<sup>2</sup> But the work of Africanus is also lost, and we have only an abstract of it, made by Syncellus. So, too, the original Greek of Eusebius is lost, but a Latin translation of it by Jerome, is preserved from the 18th Dynasty down. This work was also translated into Armenian, and an abstract of the Greek was also made by Syncellus. The works of Africanus and Eusebius both contained the dynasties of Manetho, and these are the most considerable fragments known to exist. A comparison of Manetho and the Old Chronicle, will aid us in understanding the Egyptian system of Chronology.

The *Old Chronicle* makes the whole period of Egyptian history fill up the great Astronomical Cycle of 36,525 years, giving to the reigns of the gods 33,984 or 5 years,—to the demi-gods 217, and to mortals 2324 years, ending with the reign of Nectanebus, B. C. 346, according to Usher.<sup>3</sup> But of the reign of the gods, it has been shown by Des-Vignolles<sup>4</sup> and Dr. Nolan,<sup>5</sup> that the 33,000 belonged to a pre-existent state. But Manetho gives to the gods 971 years 6 months and 14 days;—to the demi-gods 214,<sup>6</sup> and to mortals, according to the testimony of Syncellus,<sup>7</sup> 3555 years to the death of Nectanebus, or Darius.<sup>8</sup> The apparent difference between Manetho and the Old Chronicle, in reference to the time of the demi-gods,

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<sup>1</sup> Syn. p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Whether Eusebius and Africanus copied Manetho, is doubtful, especially in the earlier dynasties. Syncellus says, at the commencement of the list of kings, (p. 43): "The dynasties of Egypt, after the deluge, according to the opinion of Africanus;" and, "Dynasties after the deluge, according to the explanation of Eusebius." And at the end of the eleventh dynasty, Syncellus says: "Thus far Manetho carries the argument in his first book. But the twelfth dynasty is headed, the first time in which it occurs, "from Manetho," etc.

<sup>3</sup> Syn. pp. 40, 41.

<sup>4</sup> Diss. Anc. Cyc. p. 206.

<sup>5</sup> Chron. p. 41.

<sup>6</sup> Chron. ii. 660.

<sup>7</sup> Syn. p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> Syn. pp. 41, 66.

is made by the use of a different kind of year,—Manetho employing the year of 365 days, while the Old Chronicle employed the year of 360 days. Thus,

985 y. $\times$ 360 d.	=354,600 d.
971 $\frac{1}{2}$ y. 14 d. $\times$ 365 d.	=354,611 d.
<hr/>	
	difference, 11 days.
217 y. $\times$ 360 d.	=78,120 d.
214 y. $\times$ 365 d.	=78,110 d.
<hr/>	
	difference, 10 days.

These coincidences show that the general system of both authors was alike. According to the Old Chronicle, fifteen generations of mortals reigned 443 years from the commencement of the Sothic Cycle, when followed fifteen dynasties, occupying 1881 years more, ending with the death of Nectanebus II., B. C. 346, or 338. But these dates in the historical period of the Old Chronicle cannot be certainly relied upon, for if we add the time given by that to all the mortal kings, 2324 to 346, it gives only 2670, falling 112 years short of the true time of the beginning of the Cycle. Such an error, for which no account can be given, is sufficient to shake the Chronological authority of the document containing it.

In regard to Manetho, we have already seen, that he could have no monumental records, anterior to the 18th Dynasty, which Rossellini places B. C. 1822, but which we have shown, must be placed as low as B. C. 1642. We have also seen, that to the 12th Dynasty there is no probability that we have the language, or ideas of Manetho. And to this we add, that the dynasties between the 12th and 18th are so uncertain, that no argument whatever can be based upon them, as will be seen from the following account of them.

AFRICANUS.<sup>1</sup>

12.7	Diospolitan Kings,	160 years.			
13.60	" "	453 "	No names given.		
14.76	Xoite "	184 "	" "	" "	
15.6	Phenecian Shepherds,	284 "			
16.32	Hellenic, "	518 "	" "	" "	
17.43	Shepherd {				
43	Theban } Kings,	150 "	" "	" "	

<sup>1</sup> Syn. pp. 48, 49.

EUSEBIUS.<sup>1</sup>

12.7	Diospolitan Kings,	245 years.	Some names given.
13.60	" "	453	No " "
14.76	Xoite "	484	" " "
15.—	Diospolitan "	250	" " "
16.5.	Theban "	190	" " "
17.4	Shepherd "	104	" "

Bare inspection of this account is sufficient to show how untrustworthy it is. And yet it seems more so from the fact that there is no uniformity in the authors who profess to copy Manetho, either in the name, order, or length of these dynasties. It is just that vague and uncertain thing we should expect in an account compiled, as we know this must have been, anterior to the 18th Dynasty, from *mere tradition*. Subsequent to this period, there is a general correspondence between all the copyists of Manetho, and he is consistent with himself. But previous to the 18th Dynasty, the external evidence of the monuments fails him, and the internal evidence of his own books is against him, so that we cannot rely at all upon his authority, for any particulars previous to that date.

Syncellus gives us a date previous to this time, by reference to the Sothic Cycle, which has been referred to Manetho, but we think, without good ground for so doing. He says, "in the 6th year of Concharis, the 25th King of Egypt, of the 16th Dynasty, called by Manetho the Cynic Cycle, was completed, in a period of twenty-five reigns, a period of 700 years, from Mes-train the first native King of Egypt."<sup>2</sup> That this was the

<sup>1</sup> Syn. pp. 48, 49.

<sup>2</sup> Syn. p. 82. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in regard to the time and identity of *Mizraim*, or *Mestram*; some taking him to be the same as *Menes*, others supposing him to be different. Mr. Gliddon supposes (p. 48) *Mizraim* to be compounded of *Mes* and *re*, "begotten of the sun;" but it seems to be more likely to have come from *Mes* and *rômi*, signifying, "the father of the race." We may as well mention in this place, that we cannot subscribe to his etymology of the word *Moses* (p. 31), "saved *by* or *from* water," though it has some high names in its support. (Joblouski, Tom. I. pp. 152-157; Gesen. *in loco*.) The reason given by the daughter of Pharaoh was, "Because I drew him out of the water." (Exod. 2: 10.) The Egyptian would be, *MOY-CA*, (*mou-sa*), "from the water," or *MOY-CEK* (*mou-sek*), "drawn from the water."

language of Manetho, is quite incredible, and the only inference that can be drawn is, that the end of the 16th Dynasty corresponded with the termination of the Cynic Cycle. But it could not have been B. C. 1322, nor B. C. 2782. If, however, it was the Cycle that ended in the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, B. C. 227, it would place the ending of the 16th Dynasty B. C. 1687. But this would be too late for the Chronological system of Syncellus. The several periods of the Sothic Cycle, to one of which this date must be assigned, are set down in the following table, in which the beginning of Thoth is given for the several *cardines*, marking the beginning of the several seasons, reckoning Julian years.

	B. C.	Thoth 1st.
4th Cycle.	3877	April 21st.
	3512	January 20th.
	3147	October 21st.
3d Cyc.	2782	July 21st.
	2417	April 21st.
	2052	January 20th.
2d Cyc.	1687	October 21st. Joseph.
	1322	July 21st. Ramses III.
	957	April 21st.
	592	January 20th.
1st Cyc., A. D.	227	October 21st. Ptolemy III.
	138	July 21st.

To which of these periods Syncellus fixed this date, is not quite certain. Probably to B. C. 2052, as he gives 274 years to the 17th Dynasty,<sup>1</sup> thus placing the accession of the 18th Dynasty B. C. 1778, which varies only eight years from his date.<sup>2</sup>

The true date of the accession of the 18th Dynasty, as determined by the era of Sesostrius, or Ramses III., could not have been previous to B. C. 1642. The date of the monument probably belongs to the 50th year of his reign, B. C. 1322,<sup>3</sup> and hence his reign was included within B. C. 1372, and B. C. 1306. Rossellini and our author, following Theophilus<sup>4</sup> and Josephus,<sup>5</sup> give this Dynasty 254 years before the accession of Ramses III. But Africanus gives but 242 years,—the Armenian text of Eu-

<sup>1</sup> Syn. pp. 83, 86, 87, 98.

<sup>2</sup> Syn. p. 98. Rossellini places it B. C. 1822; that is thirty-two years earlier than Syncellus.

<sup>3</sup> Diss. Anc. Cyc. p. 336.

<sup>4</sup> Ad Autoc. p. 240.

<sup>5</sup> Adv. Appion. B. I.



sebius, 219 years,—and the Latin translation of Jerome, 239 years<sup>1</sup>, making a difference of 38 years. The accession of the 18th Dynasty, therefore, must be placed from B. C. 1626 to B. C. 1591.

The length of the 17th Dynasty composed of *Hykshos*, or Shepherd Kings, is uncertain; Eusebius makes it 105 years,<sup>2</sup> Josephus<sup>3</sup> and Africanus, 284 years.<sup>4</sup> If, then, these two dynasties were successive, the accession of the 17th Dynasty could not have occurred before B. C. 1913, or 139 years subsequent to the date Syncellus has assigned it. The time of the accession of this dynasty, as made out from the monuments, would fall much lower even than that. Thus the accession of the 18th Dynasty, as we have seen, must be placed B. C. 1642. The 17th Theban Dynasty, cotemporaneous with the *Hykshos*, consisted of six kings, four of whom reigned 108 years. Allowing an average number of years to the two others, of 25 years each, and the accession of the 17th Dynasty would have been B. C. 1800.<sup>5</sup> Only two kings of the preceding dynasty have been identified, which together reigned 50 years.<sup>6</sup> The earliest date, therefore, of the monuments is B. C. 1850, or 496 years subsequent to the Usherian epoch of the Deluge.

It may be well, in this place, to mention a circumstance brought forward by our author, to sustain his view of the Egyptian Chronology,—we mean his reference to Joseph, whom he supposes to have been in Egypt, during the reign of the last king of the 17th Dynasty. The Exodus is placed by Usher, B.

<sup>1</sup> Cory. Anc. Frag. p. 117.

<sup>2</sup> Armenian. Cory. p. 115.

<sup>3</sup> Adv. Ap. I.

<sup>4</sup> Syn. p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> Anc. Egypt, p. 64.

<sup>6</sup> The fourth king of the sixteenth dynasty is the thirty-third of the *Tablet of Abydos*. The names of the preceding are unknown, unless it be the thirty-second. This *Tablet*, which is supposed to belong to the time of Ramses III., is said originally to have chronicled *fifty-two* Pharaohs that had preceded him, though only twenty-three are now discoverable, the previous ones having been effaced. But this list agrees with the list of Manetho, *first*, in the sixteenth dynasty (Anc. Egypt, pp. 60, 61). The *agreement* of the two, subsequent to the sixteenth dynasty, and their *disagreement* previous to that time, when compared with the facts already stated, confirms, in a most striking manner, the view here taken.

C. 1491. The Usherian date of the Exodus is 135 years, subsequent to the accession of the 18th Dynasty, and it may be well for us to see how this will compare with the supposition that Jacob went down into Egypt under the 17th Dynasty. Joseph was 30 years old when he stood before Pharaoh (Gen. 61: 46), and consequently was 39 years old in the second year of the famine, when his father went down into Egypt (Gen. 45: 6). As Joseph lived 110 years, he survived that time 70 years. Now the descent of Jacob into Egypt was 215 years before the Exodus.<sup>1</sup> Consequently Joseph died 142 years before the Exodus. It is worthy of notice, that Syncellus ascribes the introduction of the *five* intercalary days into the Egyptian Calendar to the reign of this prince,<sup>2</sup> and also, that the Cycle which ended in the reign of Ptolemy Euergetes, B. C. 227, occurred in Joseph's Viceroyship.<sup>3</sup>

We see, therefore, that as yet, no Monumental evidence has been produced, even including the Pyramids, that dates back before about B. C. 2000; also, that there is no Astronomical evidence which can date with certainty before B. C. 1650, and no Historical evidence that unquestionably reaches back even as far as this. Thus far, then, there is nothing that requires us to give up the shorter period of the Chronology. Consequently, it is not important, so far as this point is concerned, which has the greatest claims to accuracy, the Hebrew or the Septuagint. A few remarks, however, upon this point, may not be inappropriate.

That the Hebrew has much higher claims upon our credence, on mere philological and grammatical grounds, will hardly be questioned by any thorough scholar. That it is more consistent with itself than the Septuagint, all who have *examined both*, will allow. That the differences between the Hebrew and Septuagint are such that *additions* could be made to the latter, easier than *subtractions* from the former, must be evident to all who compare the two. But our author tells us, that it is indisputable that the Jews *corrupted* the dates of the Hebrew (p. 35), and that all the fathers, except "Origen and Jerome who acted under Judiac influence, denounced the interpolations." It is not a little singular, however, that these two were the only fathers of that early period whose works have been preserved,

<sup>1</sup> Jos. Antiq. B. II. c. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Syn. p. 98.

<sup>3</sup> Tacit. Ann. VI. c. 28. Plin. Nat. Hist. X. c. 2.

that were familiar with the Hebrew, and consequently, that they were the only competent judges, as to the comparative claims of the two Chronologies,—the only ones competent to compare the then ancient and modern manuscripts, and see whether the Jews had made the alterations charged upon them.

Here we might properly leave the subject. But there are a few brief considerations which deserve to be mentioned, tending to throw light upon the subject of the early Egyptian Chronology. The "Old Chronicle," as we have already seen, gave to the gods 984 or 5 years,—to the demi-gods 217 years, and began the reigns of the mortals with the commencement of a Cynic Cycle. We have then—

Gods,	- - - - -	985 years
Demi-gods,	- - - - -	217 "
Mortal Kings, whose reign commenced		
with the Cynic Cycle,	B. C. 2782	"
Giving a total of	B. C. 3984	"

which falls *sixteen years* short of the Usherian Epoch of the creation. There can be scarce any doubt, therefore, that the author of the Old Chronicle intended to fill up all the time, from the creation, and if so, it supports the Hebrew Chronology throughout. It should be remarked, however, that the number of years assigned to the mortal kings, in the "Old Chronicle," falls 112 years short of the complete Cycle, as fixed by Censorinus. The actual date assumed by the "Old Chronicle," as the commencement of Egyptian history, was B. C. 3872, or A. M. 128, or when reduced to Julian years, B. C. 3870, at which time the month of Thoth commenced April 18th.

The period assumed by Manetho as the commencement of the historical period, exclusive of the reign of the gods, was 3555 years before the death of Nectanebus,<sup>1</sup> that is, B. C. 3901, or when reduced to Julian years, B. C. 3898,—A. M. 102; according to the chronology of Archbishop Usher,—J. P. 813. At this time, the commencement of Thoth was on the 25th of April, which was at that time the day of the vernal equinox of the Julian year.<sup>2</sup> The commencement, therefore, of the Egyptian year, carried back to A. M. 102, would exactly correspond with the beginning of the natural year, and hence arises

<sup>1</sup> Syn. p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Diss. Anc. Cyc. p. 302, and authorities there referred to.

a strong presumption, that the Sothic Cycle was a subsequent invention, and according to which the Egyptian history was arranged by the later historians. It is also worthy of remark, that the calculations of the "Old Chronicle" fall short only *seven years* of being one Sothic Cycle and a half preceding the time of Joseph, and wants the same number of years of being two Cycles and a half from the time of Ptolemy III., while the calculations of Manetho exceed those periods by *twenty-one years*; and also that the two are separated only by one Solar Cycle of twenty-eight years. Both of them, therefore, evidently adjusted the Cycles of their history, to the nearest point of agreement between the civil and natural years. It is worthy of observation, too, that this year, J. P. 813, was a radical one, in reference to the ancient Cycles, the bissextile, of four years; the sabbatical, of seven years; and the solar, of twenty-eight years. Thus J. P. 813, divided by 4, 7, or 28, leaves a remainder of *one*, by which we know it was the first year of these Cycles. But when we apply to it the modern cycles,—the Indiction, and the cycle of nineteen years, we have remainders of three and fifteen, which show that these Cycles could have no connection with this date.<sup>1</sup>

That the Egyptians were acquainted with the periods of four and twenty-eight years, seems evident from the arrangement of *the birth of their gods*, who were said "to have been born on *no day* of the year," that is, on the days called *epagomenæ*. According to Diodorus,<sup>2</sup> when *Saturn* espoused his sister *Rhea*, five gods were born, "Osiris, Isis, Typhon, Apollo, and Venus." But according to Plutarch,<sup>3</sup> Osiris was born on the *first* of the *epagomenæ* (reckoning back from the end of the year); Apollo, on the *second*; Typhon, on the *third*; Isis, on the *fourth*; and Venus, or Nephtys, on the *fifth*. Consequently, their births could not have fallen on consecutive days, but must have been in different years, as the *epagomenæ* were successive. If, now, we arrange the *epagomenæ* for twenty-eight years, commencing with J. P. 813, we shall find that the supposed birth of each of

<sup>1</sup> L'Art. de Verif. Dates, Vol. I. p. 32. The year B. C. 1322, J. P. 3389, gives a radical date, being *the first year* of the Sothic, Sabbatic, and bissextile cycles, and was the only coincidence of the kind that could occur in over 4000 years. Was not that the time when the cycles were arranged?

<sup>2</sup> Hist. L. I. c. 13.

<sup>3</sup> De Isid. and Osirid, c. 13.

these gods fell on the days mentioned, in the order mentioned, at periods distant *four* years from each other. We give first, the beginning of the several years, with their characteristics.

<i>J. P.</i>	<i>Cyc. ©</i>	<i>Thoth 1st.</i>	<i>Dom. Let.</i>	<i>Week day.</i>
813	1	April 25 C.	G F.	Thursday.
817	5	" 24 B.	B A.	Monday.
821	9	" 23 A.	D C.	Friday.
825	13	" 22 G.	F E.	Tuesday.
829	17	" 21 F.	A G.	Saturday.
833	21	" 20 E.	C B.	Wednesday.
837	25	" 19 D.	E D.	Sunday.
841	1	" 18 C.	G F.	Thursday. <sup>1</sup>

And we subjoin the days of the birth of the gods, according to this arrangement.

<i>J. P.</i>	<i>Epagom.</i>	<i>Genethlia.</i>	<i>Feria.</i>	<i>W. Day.</i>
813	5 April 24 (1.)	Osiris,	Dies Mercurii,	Wednesday.
817	4 " 23 (2.)	Horus,	" Solis,	Sunday.
821	3 " 22 (3.)	Typhon,	" Jovis,	Thursday.
825	2 " 21 (4.)	Isis,	" Lunæ,	Monday.
829	1 " 20 (5.)	Nephthys,	" Veneris,	Friday.
833	— " 19	Papremis,	" Martis,	Tuesday.
837	— " 18	Cronus,	" Saturni,	Saturday.
841	— " 17	Osiris,	" Mercurii,	Wednesday. <sup>2</sup>

Such an arrangement as this could scarcely be accidental, and if designed, the Egyptians must have been acquainted, both with the solar and bissextile Cycles. All these facts go to raise a strong presumption, that the true epoch of the Egyptians commenced B. C. 3898,—A. M. 102, when the civil and natural year commenced together, and that when the Sothic Cycle was invented at a later period, its commencement was fixed to the time of the "manifestation of Sothis," at the period of its invention. And at what time was this more likely to be done, than in the days of Ramses III.? This conclusion agrees with the tradition mentioned by Tacitus, and with the astronomical dates of the inscriptions upon the monuments of Ramses. What rea-

<sup>1</sup> L'Art. de Verif. p. 32. Diss. Anc. Cyc. pp. 302-309.

<sup>2</sup> This exact correspondence between the *birth-days* of the gods, and names of the days of the week, would seem to indicate that one was copied from the other.

son, then, why that may not have been the date of the invention of that Cycle ?

In conclusion, we hope our author will continue to enlighten the public on the subject of the *hieroglyphics*, but we hope, also, that he will leave theorizing to those who have more time to collate and compare facts, than he seems to have. It is a fault, into which all are prone to fall, to undertake to draw *general* conclusions, from *particular* facts. This has been the misfortune of our author, and we hope the remarks and suggestions we have offered, will tend to cure him of it. We wish the public to be aroused to the importance of this question ; we wish to see scholars enlisted in it, and we believe our author may do much to bring about these things. But to do this, he must give us *facts*, not *theories*. Let him give the public a carefully digested summary of the evidence on these points,—that the Key of the Hieroglyphics has been discovered,—what is the character of the writing,—what are the details of history thus made known,—what is certain,—what uncertain,—and what conjecture :—what is agreed upon by the hierologists, and what things are in dispute ; let him detail these things, in the way we have pointed out, and he will find ready hearers, among those who are able to appreciate his labors, and a disposition to aid him to the utmost of their power.

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## ARTICLE VI.

### REVIEW OF WHATELY'S ESSAYS ON THE ERRORS OF ROMANISM.

*Essays on the Errors of Romanism, having their origin in human nature. By Richard Whately, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin ; late principal of St. Alban's Hall, Oxford, and formerly fellow of Oriel College.*

By George B. Cheever, Pastor of Allen-st. Presbyterian Church, N. Y.

THIS is truly an admirable book. The main purpose of it may be stated in few words, being this : to show that the errors and wickednesses, combined into so vast and complicated a scheme in the Roman Catholic Religion, have their origin in the depravity of the human heart, and not merely in the ingenuity

of priests. The errors of the Church of Rome were gradual and imperceptible in their rise; the tracing of them to their origin, and the examination of our own Protestant sects and tendencies, prove on all sides a great danger of falling into corresponding faults, a great readiness to adopt, under different names, the same habits of evil.

A single passage from one of the essays contained in this volume will develop the object of its author. "The superstitions, and the other errors of the Romanists were, as I have already observed, not the result of systematic contrivance, but sprung up spontaneously as the indigenous growth of the human heart; they arose successively, gradually, and imperceptibly; and were in most instances probably first overlooked, then tolerated, then sanctioned, and finally embodied in a system, of which they are to be regarded as the cause rather than the effects. Since then, as I have said, corruptions of religion neither first sprang from Romanism, nor can be expected to end with it, the tendency to them being inherent in our common nature; it is evident that constant watchfulness alone can preserve us from corruptions, not the very same indeed with those of our predecessors, but similar ones under some fresh disguise; and that this danger is enhanced by the very circumstance which seems to secure us from it,—our abhorrence of those errors in them. From practices the very same in name and form with theirs, such abhorrence is indeed a safeguard; while at the same time it makes us less ready to suspect ourselves of the same faults disguised. The vain security thus generated draws off our thoughts from self-examination; a task for which the mind is in general best fitted, when it is most occupied in detecting and exposing the faults of others. In treating then of such corruptions of religion as those into which the church of Rome has fallen, my primary object is to excite a spirit, not of self-congratulation and self-confidence, but of self-distrust and self-examination."

We do not agree with all the positions assumed or opinions advanced in this work; but on the whole it is full of most valuable truth; truth that commends itself to all denominations, and is well fitted to oppose the papistical influences now setting in some directions over the church of God. The book consists of an Introduction, followed by six essays on Superstition; Vicarious Religion; Pious Frauds; Undue Reliance on Human Authority; Persecution; and Trust in Names and Privileges.

This is an important catalogue of subjects, and the volume would form a timely gift to the people of our own country, if some of our American publishers would put it forth. Meantime we shall take occasion to enter on the general subject presented, not confining ourselves, however, to the course of thought pursued by Archbishop Whately, and certainly in some points differing from him. The subject is destined to command a discussion in this country different in some measure from any it has ever undergone; the sooner and the oftener it is with a proper spirit brought before the mind, the greater safety will there be to our religion and our civil institutions.

We are often reminded of Mr. Dana's profound remark, that "God is using this world as the laboratory of the universe: and that every truth, as well as every error, is undergoing moral processes enough to make the most knowing chemist stare." In some respects, it contains almost as much as the fruitful remark of Origen, out of which the great Bishop Butler constructed his stupendous work on the Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed. By a mind as profound as Butler's, quite as fruitful a use might be made of it in a history of the Divine experiments thus far, and the prophetic ones yet to be realized. Up to this time, the experiment has been that of sin and error, and God has given full sweep to their energies, and at the same time has suffered every panacea for the misery of men in their wickedness to be tried, in order that the universe might know, by a vast demonstration, which in this world only was possible, what sin is—what it is, even without punishment, and in the most favorable circumstances, and with all possible expedients to neutralize the poison of its misery. Meantime, the truth itself has been going through a great and severe process of trial and refinement. It has been subjected to so many experiments, that we may hope that the dross is well nigh smelted out, and that it is ready for use in a period of millennial glory. For there is to be a period in which the energies of righteousness to bless the world shall be as triumphantly and completely tested as ever have been the energies of wickedness to curse it. This experiment, we are sure, has never yet been made. There has never been in existence on earth any thing at all answering, or even approximating to the wondrous glory and richness, comprehensiveness and fulness of the promises on this subject. And those who contend that there has, or that these predictions have already been fulfilled, or that they are merely figurative, or that



the world is to be emptied of its inhabitants without their fulfilment, do, in fact, put into the mouth of infidelity one of its most powerful arguments. If this be your boasted divine religion, with its power to bless the world, so rapturously vaunted, it is manifest that it is a failure. And so it is; for evil has had the mastery; and if the matter were left here, and we had no other light, we must conclude that of these two elements, sin and holiness, in conflict, sin is the strongest, and will prevail. But the matter is not to rest here. There is to be another experiment. We are only on the eve, indeed, of the completion of God's grandest experiment, for which preparation has long been making, for which, indeed, the whole six thousand years now past have been preparing. And as in a chemist's laboratory, if we may be permitted to carry out Mr. Dana's allusion into more detail, the teacher and demonstrator prepares his elements, arranges them, orders every thing with great care, and up to the last moment the spectators are gazing in expectation, perhaps sitting in the darkness, till suddenly the experiment, in the full brilliancy of its success, bursts upon the senses—so it may be with Christianity. Our period being that of preparation, and sometimes the room being darkened, as it were, so that the light, when it breaks, may be more glorious: as soon as all the elements are in order—when the Great Arch-Chemist, whose omnipotent alchemy brings good out of evil, has perfectly arranged all things, the fulness of time being come, we have reason to believe that the glory of the Lord will cover the earth with astonishing rapidity, and in such brightness and blessedness in itself and in its results, that in comparison with any previous period, the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun seven-fold as the light of seven days.

Now, it is manifest that more than a sixth part of the whole world's duration thus far, and nearly three-fourths of the whole time of the publication of the Christian religion, have been filled up well nigh exclusively with the experiment of one monstrous form of Error, the experiment of a falsified Christianity, taken apart from the New Testament, bottomed on the surges of tradition, cut and modified to suit the passions of mankind, and erected into a compound establishment of civil and religious despotism. This in the occidental, along with the great Lie of the Arabian Impostor in the oriental world, have almost divided the earth between them. It is a prodigious fact for the philosophy of history to speculate upon, that the

Pope and the False Prophet, Mohammed and the Man of Sin, have monopolized for many ages the fairest portions of the world. The consequence has been, that regions which in the early ages were the theatre of the world's highest and brightest developments of intellect, have become the abode of darkness, poverty, and superstition. The sway of a false Christianity has proved worse for the world's intellect, than that of a classic idolatry; and while the North of Europe has risen in the scale of civilization, knowledge and power, the Roman Catholic South has sunk almost to the opposite extreme of degradation. If we take an ellipse of territory extending from the Straits of Gibraltar on each side, north and south, along the Mediterranean Sea, and around its oriental limit, we shall have before us a most instructive exhibition of what two of the mightiest false sects of religion that ever ruled the world, could do to sustain among mankind some of the worst curses that Paganism itself ever inflicted upon human society. No element of a beautiful, early, undiseased nature seems wanting in those regions. The air is so soft and pure, the heavens are so serenely beautiful, the productions are so rich, so abundant, so vivid, so luxuriant, that you would almost look, in the spirit of the Grecian Mythology, for a race of supernatural beings to people the hills and plains, the woods and fountains. Alas! we are compelled to feel that man is the only growth that dwindles there; and as we admire the clearness of the skies, the magnificence and picturesqueness of the mountains, the richness of the fruits, and the beauty of the foliage, we wonder at the melancholy contrast between the loveliness of God's material creation, and the degradation of the immortal beings that inhabit it. We ask impatiently and anxiously, as we see the misery and depression of our race, amidst such inestimable natural advantages, How long shall these things be? Shall the dreadful despotism of Ignorance and Superstition never cease?

Now, so far as Mohammedism is concerned, we see even in its own bosom the means for the fulfilment of the predictions of its downfall. There are within its territorial limits a series of materials, by which God may, without any miracle, almost at any time regenerate the whole Empire. It is almost superfluous to mention those Armenian, Nestorian, and Greek sects, as a collection of combustible materials on which the fire of God's Spirit only needs to descend, when the whole oriental re-

gion shall suddenly blaze up to heaven, covered with the light of the Divine glory.

Nor do we think, though there be no such materials as these within the bosom of the Pope's territories, that there is any less hope of the speedy downfall of Popery itself, and the establishment of Christianity upon its ruins. The increase in the dissemination of God's word, even in Roman Catholic countries, is full of encouragement; nor can we doubt that, as a previous step to that Baptism of the Spirit which is to be granted to the nations, the word of God is to do its work of conviction even with whole communities as with individuals, proving itself sharper than any two-edged sword even to the seared conscience of the worshipper of Antichrist. The Spirit of the Mouth of the Lord in that prediction on which the Church rests for victory, can mean nothing but the spirit and power of God's word set loose from all fetters, and exerted according to its irresistible greatness. This dissemination of the Scriptures, therefore, and of scriptural tracts, is a bright indication, to be hailed as the finger of God, in the effort for the conversion of civilized but unchristian Europe, which will comprehend the overthrow of Antichrist finally and forever.

There is not a more astonishing and awful subject of study in the world, than the rise, progress, and perfection of Popery. To find its commencement, we have to advance back into the very brilliance of the Apostolic age, and there, in the midst of the fresh light of the cross and the very labors of the Apostles, do we find the Enemy interspersing among the living stones of Christ's temple, the foundations of another temple, out of which, in due time, the living stones were to be cast, and ground to powder. We find him laying hold of some tendencies in the very aspirations of mankind after holiness, and making out of them the very strongest sinews, bands, and supports of his system. Forbidding to marry. You find it in the Apostolic age; you find it introduced and pleaded for by holy considerations; you cannot put your finger on the line where it passed from a virtue into a sin; and yet there it stands, one of the strongest buttresses of Romanism, and one of the mightiest sources of Rome's iniquity. Praying to the Virgin and to the Saints. You must come down one step at least from the Apostolic age for this, since it was not possible to make a catalogue of Christian Saints in heaven, or to pray to them, canonized, till the first living ones were dead. Then began the Enemy, the watchful Sower of

Tares, to turn the feeling of love and veneration for good men to his purposes, and even so early as the days of Augustine and his sainted mother, you find established the habit of worshipping at the tombs of martyrs; you find it considered a greater crime to neglect the memory of the saints, than to return drunk from the celebration of their festivals. Then grew the veneration for relics, and in the earliest establishment of Christianity among our own Saxon ancestors, you find processions of dead men's bones, and miracles wrought by them; which things are recorded by the venerable Bede himself, with as much pious simplicity and sincerity of belief in the righteousness and truth of such performances, as he ever displayed in praying towards the altar, or in translating the gospel into the Saxon tongue. Who now shall trace the progress of the sin, from the first admiration of the coffin of St. Thomas, or the scull of Polycarp, to the placing of their bones upon the altar, the breathing of their names in prayer, the oaths taken by their memories? This was the master-art of Satan displayed as early as the very first church among the Galatians, *beginning in the Spirit, to be made perfect in the flesh*. Whether we study the system in the abstract, or observe it in its workings among men, we will find this to be true of Romanism, that it is *the destruction of that which is good, by the gradual change of it into that which is evil*.

It is easier to follow the march of the evil, having prostrate empires for your landmarks, than it is to detect the commencement and watch the progress of the change. Between beginning in the spirit, and being made perfect in the flesh, there is a wide interval; from a morning without clouds, to the gloom of a tempestuous evening, and a midnight without the stars.

We shall mention what the system of Romanism takes away, both from Christianity and from the soul; and what it puts in the place of that it takes away. And in this delineation, we speak what we have seen, and not merely from speculation, or from history. We have passed through the regions of its proud and palmy state in Europe, the nations where it has developed and is still developing its power; in some cases, we have passed along the dividing territorial line between Protestantism and Popery, where the observant traveller may witness darkness, degradation, and misery on the one side; light, liberty, and happiness on the other. The stamps of different religions are as clear in the character of the inhabitants, as the different impressions in wax of the governmental seals of Italy and England. And even now, to make

the nations of Europe completely change character, you would only have to change upon them for one or two generations the great seals of Popery and Protestantism.

We say, then, that from Christianity and the souls of men Romanism takes away the Bible, the Sabbath, the Lord's Supper, Baptism, the Christian Ministry, the Atonement, Regeneration, Faith, Repentance, Prayer. This is a broad declaration ; it can be distinctly supported in every particular. We are to remember the circle traced by the Apostle ; beginning in the Spirit, to be made perfect in the flesh. The system takes away these gifts, institutions, and duties, in their purity ; but, passing them through its own medium, restores them changed into a machinery of evil almost omnipotent. It takes away the soul and meaning of them all, as the life of the world, but it leaves the body, the form, for the world's bondage, superstition, sacrilege, and idolatrous worship. It sets out with them as a system of spiritual duty, freedom, and communion with God, but travels round to a point in the circle, where it clasps and locks them on the world as a system of manacles and fetters.

We shall begin with the Bible. We shall not insist on the known hostility of Romanism to the Word of God, though this is one of its most prominent characteristic features, but on the process through which it passes the Word, when it reluctantly admits men to its perusal. It holds the Bible as its prisoner, and when it permits it to go abroad, surrounds it with a cohort of its own body guards, through whom alone it is interpreted. It takes away the Bible in its purity, but restores it with its fountains of truth poisoned by tradition. Its law is, if any man receive not the traditions of the Church as of equal authority with the teachings of the Scriptures, let him be accursed. The traditions of the Church are the Bible of the people ; and so efficacious with the superstitious terrors of the people, has been the persevering hostility of the Church against the Scriptures, that she has gained the great point of making the perusal of them to be regarded as a mark of heresy, and an act of impiety ! Here is indeed a damning revelation of Antichrist. If any thing could mark the burning hand and signet of the Arch-Enemy of souls, it is this : the perusal of God's Word stamped as an act of impiety. But in case this seal be broken, there is the diabolical lesson learned of the Jews, *making the Word of God of none effect through your tradition* ; there are the poisonous notes and comments ; the translations inserting the very principles of deadly

error, the very germs of power and wickedness in the Romish system; the doing *penance* of the body, instead of the repentance of the soul, and that too as the meritorious ground of salvation; the example of Jacob, *adoring the top of his staff*, and so teaching to the whole church the lawful idolatry of images. Having thus opened the veins in God's Word and inserted these virulent deadly poisons, the Church of Rome, while thundering her anathemas against Bible Societies, feels comparatively safe, even in Protestant countries, although sometimes compelled to a pretended restoration of the Bible to the people. Shutting them up to her own edition of the Bible, she is safe.

Our second point is the Sabbath. The system of Romanism takes it away and blots it out of existence as a day holy to the Lord, but restores it as a feast day and a jubilee of sin. The Roman Catholic religion destroys that great connecting link between earth and Heaven, and that great safeguard of a nation's morality and happiness, the Christian Sabbath. The day is not, indeed, cut out of the calendar; it is kept there, but not as a day of God; the people do not know what a day of God is. We call the Sabbath by that sweet New Testament title, the Lord's Day; and we endeavor to keep it for him who blessed us with it; but in their view a day's sacredness is just proportioned to its fitness for the purposes of worldly recreation; it is that quality, which devotes it to indolence and amusement. There are days already devoted to the Virgin and the saints, of greater sacredness than the Lord's day, which, indeed, in Roman Catholic countries, is but a pagan holiday, baptized into the name of Christ. The Sabbath is but one of an innumerable crowd of feast days, combining with the whole system to encourage and perpetuate the natural indolence and procrastination of the character.

In Protestant countries, the Sabbath has proved a divinely powerful agent in the regeneration and vigorous discipline of the nation's mind. It must be so, being the education of the people a seventh part of their time, in the bringing before them of themes, and exercising their thoughts upon subjects, which occupy and discipline the intellect of angels. It is in the absence of this vigorous discipline, this great tonic for a people's intellect, and in the change of it into a system of relaxation, that the national character deteriorates and runs down. Hence the great difference between Protestant and Romish countries. In New England, they use the Sabbath for the imbuing and invi-

goration of the mind with all the influences of the word of God ; in Spain they use the Sabbath for bull-fights, political revolutions, and theatres. Is not this enough to account for all the difference in character between the two countries ? In New England, the evening of the Sabbath is the favorite period for the discussion of ennobling and exciting truth ; in Spain, if a favorite drama is to be produced in the theatre, it must be Sabbath evening ; if an extraordinary display of fire-works is to entertain the people, it must be Sabbath evening. Such is the Sabbath of Romanism ; and if in some Protestant countries it dares not open its theatres, the Christian Institution is not the less emasculated of its spiritual energy—it is not the less paralyzed in its exalting and instructing influences, and divorced from the word of God.

Our third point is the Christian Ministry. The system of Romanism takes it away as a Ministry of the Word, the Bread of Life, but restores it changed into a Priesthood of Ordinances,—a priesthood, no longer the preachers of the Word, but the despots of the conscience, the keepers of the keys of Heaven and Hell. A daily sacrifice for sin, as in the Mass, and a daily priesthood to offer it up, and to absolve the conscience, are alone sufficient for the entire corruption of Christianity into a system of idolatry, superstition, and perdition to the soul. Individual religious responsibility and individual religious life are destroyed in this system, the soul's business of personal salvation being passed over to the care and responsibility of the priest. This destroys freedom, puts the conscience and the spiritual world wholly under the dominion of the priest, and inevitably moulds the priesthood into a spiritual despotism. It puts under command of the priesthood the whole eternal world of retribution, to be filled, in the absence of God's word, with whatsoever superstitious shapes of terror they please to imagine, and to be portioned out at their will to the trembling inhabitants of a world of probation. The Bible being taken away, and tradition and ghostly superstition usurping its rule, under command of a priesthood of human passions, the multitude may be moulded and governed and fettered at pleasure. In the absence of an intelligent devotion founded on the Scriptures, the religious instinct of the soul passes into dreadful superstition under absolute authority of the priest ; and with every other part of the being, and every interest in the world, in subjection to it. No possible tyranny can be so perfect as this. "The clergy of the

dark ages," observes an excellent English writer on history, Professor Smyth, "had obtained what only Archimedes wanted; they had got another world, on which to rest their engines, and they moved *this* world at their pleasure." He quotes Dryden's Sebastian :

Content you with monopolizing heaven,  
And let this little hanging ball alone :—  
For, give ye but a foot of conscience there,  
And you, like Archimedes, toss the globe !

Such is Rome's Priesthood ; not a foot, but the whole of conscience, in its dominion of that world, is theirs ; and they still toss the inhabitants of this world, and its institutions too, where they have the superiority, at their pleasure. It cannot be otherwise, for he who possesses the conscience, possesses the man.

Our fourth point respects the Atonement. We say, unhesitatingly, that the Roman Catholic religion as effectually destroys the doctrine and belief of the Atonement by the blood of Jesus, as if it were by council and decree expunged from the Christian system. Alms, masses, penances, pilgrimages, constitute the meritorious purchase of salvation ; and as to the intercession of any higher being, that of the Virgin Mary takes up the whole place, which in the Christianity of the New Testament, Jesus Christ occupies. Absolution from sin is purchased for money ; expiation for sin, if it must be made, is wrought out in Purgatory, till masses sufficient shall have been bought and offered to release the soul from hell and admit it to heaven. The principle of faith, the life of Christianity, its only life, is excluded from this system. In the mass of minds under the Romish Church, a faith in the power and goodness of the Virgin Mary is all the approximation made towards it ; so that, in truth, if the Roman Catholic religion has a Saviour, it is the Virgin Mother, and not her crucified Son. In all places and at all times to her pre-eminently the heart of the Romanist turns, as to an Omnipresent Deity. And no matter what may be the employment, or the course of life, her image sanctifies it.

In the city of Cadiz, in Spain, we were once passing by a shop of liquors with a religious friend, when our attention was arrested by a shrine of the Virgin Mary, containing her image dressed in a robe of spangled white satin, amidst a crowd of



bottles arranged in rows upon the shelves. "Look at this spectacle," said we to our companion. "What a ridiculous figure! The Virgin Mary in a grog-shop! They make her the patron saint of all iniquity." "The very place," responded the other, "where, in consistency with their religion, they should place her, as being the one where they most need the absolution of their sins, and the indulgence to commit them." We walked on, absorbed in a sense of the obstacles that lie in the way of the conversion of this people, one of the greatest of all being the utter erasement and abolition of the doctrine of Atonement by the blood of Jesus Christ.

But this is not all. The Atonement is worse than annihilated; it becomes with them a thing of daily idolatry. The sacrifice of the mass constitutes it such; the pretended offering up daily of the body and blood of the Lord Jesus for the sins of the world; they being compelled, on pain of the most tremendous anathemas, to believe that the Son of God Himself, soul and divinity, is present to their senses, and to adore him as such, in the consecrated wafer. This they worship; this is what they kneel at and adore; this is their reliance for the pardon of sin; this is their Saviour, this their God. "Where is your God?" said a little boy in Spain, who went for the first time in his life into a Protestant chapel in Gibraltar, and missed, among other things to which his senses had been accustomed in the Romish worship, the presence of the Host; "Where is your God?" It was a striking revelation of the process of religious education under that system. We are right in asserting that the Atonement is with them a thing of daily idolatry. Their system is one in which the very truth and principle which constitutes the essence of the world's salvation, is placed first and foremost as the means of daily idolatry and paganism.

Our fifth point regards the privilege and discipline of prayer. The Roman Catholic system takes this also away in its reality, but returns it as a talisman of evil. Prayer to any creature, though simply and only as an intercessor, would be an abandonment of prayer to God; but it cannot rest there; the intercessor, even though there were no image, would become the soul's idol. There is no real prayer, and scarce a possibility of it, where a crowd of saints and mediators stand between the soul and God, and to them its petitions are taught to be directed. Ave Maria! Ora pro Nobis! Mary! Mother of God! pray for us! Alas! the very conception of prayer, the very

idea of the soul's communion with God, is excluded from such a system, and the spirit of idolatry is enshrined in its stead. We speak of its practical influence over the great multitude of minds educated in it. Every saint in the calendar darts a baleful fire upon the soul. A young man in China once said to Mr. Abeel, in answer to the question, "What God do you worship?" "Oh! no matter what; just the one whose birthday happens." Precisely the same may be said of the worship of Romanism. "What Saint do you invoke?" "Just the one whose birth-day happens." It were hard to say which system is least idolatrous.

Our sixth point is that of Repentance. Here again Romanism changes directly the medicine of the soul into its poison. In the first place, it translates the Scripture command of repentance into the command *to do penance*, a complete, absolute, and most deadly perversion of the terms of salvation. In the next place, it prescribes a variety of penances and makes them a catalogue and accumulation of merits for the soul. Thus, in the very enjoining of that act and disposition on which, in the word of God, the soul's salvation depends, it induces and provides for a self-righteous disposition of the soul, which renders the repentance of the Gospel absolutely impossible. Here, both by translation and tradition, the word of God is not only made of none effect, but its result is to separate the soul from contrition and from Christ, and to educate it in a mould absolutely the reverse of that required as essential under the gospel dispensation.

Our seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth points, are those of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, Regeneration and Faith. A justifying Faith is annihilated, and ceremonies, superstitions, and works are substituted. Regeneration is taken away as a doctrine, the very conception of its nature hidden from the soul, but it is restored as a rite, to be withheld or administered at the will of the priest. The Lord's Supper is taken away as a means of grace, but restored as an infallible channel of salvation. Baptism is taken away as a seal and emblem, but is restored as an efficacious title of the soul to heaven. Both these ordinances being in the power of the priest, and both made the substance of salvation, instead of the symbol of a grace signified, a grace only in the power of God, both are turned to sustain the despotism of the priest, and to secure the bondage and perdition of the people. So are, collectively, the whole

circle of the gifts, doctrines, and institutions of Christianity, which we have mentioned.

We believe that very little modification or change has taken place in the Roman system in regard to any one of the points now passed in survey. The effect of the system on the soul is the same in the nineteenth century as it was in the fourteenth. No man can doubt this, who stands in a Romish church, in a Romish country, and long watches the worshippers. The religious effect of the system is to be tested on the poor, the grossly wicked, the degraded, the ignorant; the others are but infidels or mockers. We have watched the bearing of men who had not knowledge enough to be unbelievers. We have seen them enter the cathedral with pale and haggard countenances, and, groaning within themselves, cast themselves down at the foot of some image, or reverently kiss the picture of the Virgin. Then, after the rapid movement of their pallid lips in prayer to her or to a saint, with the sign of the cross repeated, we have witnessed the air of relief, the appearance of satisfaction, with which they leave the temple, as if every sin were forgiven, and every burden thrown from the conscience. We have felt that in such a system communion with God is excluded, and prayer has become but the vocabulary of a baptized panism.

Such is a brief sketch of the nature of this system; a scheme so tremendous, that it is truly remarked by the author of the *Natural History of Enthusiasm*, that if the history only of it were preserved, the affirmation would not be credited that it ever had an existence. It is indeed a tremendous MYSTERY OF INIQUITY, a system which reveals the hand and guidance of a mighty, sagacious, far-seeing, master-spirit of evil, from beginning to end. From the time when it first rises in the horizon, a cloud no bigger than a man's hand, to the time when it spreads over the whole heaven, it discloses a dreadful unity in the purpose and the accomplishment. Nor can any power less than an omnipotent divine agency be relied upon for its overthrow. The Church might despair in the presence of such an enemy, if she had not such a reliance; a fact which may suggest a reason for the express and repeated assurance of such an interposition, in the sacred records. The evil, we believe is not a disease to be cured, but a system to be destroyed utterly; whether with violence and supernatural judgments, we cannot beforehand, from the nature of the predictions, affirm.

“Whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming.” There is much contained in the grand expressions of this unfulfilled prediction. Perhaps the materials covered up in them may put all preceding dispensations into the shade, when God shall bring them together by his providence, and let the fire of heaven fall on them as a beacon to the universe. Amidst the reigning darkness of Popery, this text burns before us like a talisman of hope and glory. We believe that its fulfilment is near, even at the doors, and that in its fulfilment there is to be unveiled a scene of the glory of God, brighter, if possible, than even the blaze of the gospel illuminating every corner of heathenism. The conflict with this power will be keener than that with the spirit of Grecian idolatry; and the victory over this power will be greater than when the banner of the cross floated over the palace of the Cæsars. At that time, the genius of paganism, instead of being conquered, was but disguised with the insignia of Rome, and received in baptism into the bosom of the Christian church, to reign with undiminished energy for centuries. Now there is no new baptism for Popery to undergo, by which, with altered designation, but unchanged spirit, it can still inflict the curses of its despotism. Its nature may break forth in new forms, and forms better adapted to present taste and knowledge; but on the whole, we have found it out; and if nothing else of advantage should spring from the long night of ignorance and darkness in which the human race was shrouded, it is that Popery has fairly developed itself; it has proved itself the prison of the human mind, the decay and death of empires. And because this, among other vast experiments, of which this fallen world has so long been the laboratory, is so nearly completed, we are fast coming to the light. It breaks out on the right hand and on the left. We have been groping in the night for ages; we have been feeling our way through a dark subterranean passage, and now it opens. A sea of glory spreads out before us. The sun of God’s love and mercy shines upon it; the Spirit, like a dove, broods over it; heaven and earth seem blending together, and the city that John speaks of floats in the transparent air, and comes down like a bride adorned for her husband.

We used to think that there were two currents of prophecy indicating the near approach of the day of millennial glory, and that when we could see a like convergency in the affairs of men, we should feel that the appointed time for the whole world’s con-

version was drawing nigh. These two currents of prophecy are those which connect the conversion of the Jews and the simultaneous coming in of the fulness of the Gentiles, and we have thought we could see the evident commencement of the meeting of those two seas of glory. But there is a third line of prophecy which must converge to the same point; and it is that which announces so explicitly the destruction of the Romish power. And inasmuch as the fulfilment of this prediction, as well as of the others, is to be committed to the church as its instrument, there would be one star wanting in the horoscope of the world's destinies, if there were no movement corresponding with this promised annihilation of Antichrist yet commenced in reality.

Now, in reference to such a movement, perhaps we may see a new indication in God's remarkable providences with this country, as a great instrument in the world's regeneration. It was not merely to prepare a people to fight the battles of the Lord of Hosts against the idolatry of heathenism, that he deferred the discovery of this continent till it might be peopled with Protestants, but to train up a nation and a church aloof from the influences both of monarchy and of popery, and free from the incubus of a religious establishment, to be ready at hand for his purposes. He would have a Christian republic, out of which might go forth the spirit of his mouth and the brightness of his coming, to contend, unfettered by the forms of an establishment, and independent alike of the caresses and the powers of prelatical and monarchical authority, against that monstrous system which, under pretence of being the only Christianity that ought to be tolerated in the world, combines within itself all the evils both of a religious and a civil despotism. Certainly, there is not another nation on earth, nor a church in any other nation, so fitted by birth, training, providence, and grace, to contend against a false religion of such unlimited power and pretension. There is hardly another nation on earth that has not more or less of the very spirit of Popery in its composition; for Popery is the twin-sister of despotism and hereditary pomp; Popery is conservative of all time-honored, superstitious usages; it claims a strong affinity with the genius of monarchy itself; and the divine right both of kings and squires, as well as of ecclesiastical prelates, can find no better security than under its broad shield. And on almost every other church, the apathy and timidity of form and custom are hanging with a weight heavy as frost, and

deep almost as life; so that the daring, the energy, and the spiritual impulse, the alertness, vigilance, and keenness of vision, the indomitable spirit of liberty, the thirst for truth, and the power of faith and love, so distinctive of the Reformation, can rarely be found.

As to the time of this effort, we simply say, that good men and wise Chronologists have, with much consent, fixed upon the very century into the bosom of which we are thrown, as containing certain epochs pointed out in the records of prophecy as of the most intimate connection with the consummation of the plan of divine mercy to the world. The overthrow of Antichrist marks one of those epochs. Some learned and godly men have believed that the final conflict of the gospel with Romanism is to be attended by a period of persecution. Whether this be so or not, there must be a spirit in exercise which would endure persecution. The distinctive feature of Romanism is its utter annihilation of, and its deadly hostility against, the doctrine of justification by faith. Now, as at the Reformation, men had to take their stand on that doctrine, and gained all that they did gain by the freshness and power of it, so it will be in the final conflict of the Gospel with Romanism. There must be a new baptism of the Church with the fire of that truth, for it has lost much of its life-giving efficacy; we were almost going to say, it has gone out of fashion. So we may find the leaven of Romanism, even in churches opposed to Popery. The very existence in the world of such a mass of false religion—a system, the essence and energy of which strikes at the fundamental principle of life in real piety, could not but have exerted a most disastrous power, even over the atmosphere of evangelical truth; just as the neighborhood of great masses of ice, will change the climate even of a mild and beautiful region. If you should moor a chain of icebergs along our coasts, though out of sight, they would send their sharp and killing influences over all our year; they would bring the memory of December's snow into fantastic summer's heat, and the hardy plants that are native to us would be dwarfed and mildewed. It is something such an influence that the existence of Romanism has exerted even over evangelical piety: its dread shadow has fallen upon men's souls; its slow and awful transit over our world has eclipsed the sun, and in this portentous and disastrous twilight, the coldness and the terror have gone to the heart of nations.

Though, therefore, the event may not prove that the fires of

persecution will be actually lighted in this final conflict, yet the spirit of such faith as would sustain the soul at the stake, and make a second Reformation, must be called into exercise. The last conflict will not be with the organization, but the spirit of Romanism; and though its organization is the most perfect and tremendous in the world, and on this it may still mainly rely, it will find itself deceived and shorn of its strength, if once the evil spirit is exorcised. But the spirit is of that kind, that will tear the nations before it comes out of them. And yet it must come out of them before the gospel of Christ can be supreme in the midst of them. In the conflict with this spirit, therefore, there may be terrible convulsions, and intestine wars; for, as the organization of Rome, wherever it has been perfected, twines its roots about all institutions, so does the spirit of Rome, whatever be its residence, arm itself with all evil passions, especially with the omnipotence of ambition and pride.

Now it is highly probable, that not only a new convulsive movement of Romanism itself, but a general development of the spirit of Romanism, though not under the precise form of the Papal power, is to precede and accompany the final conflict of the gospel with this great enemy. The signs in the Ecclesiastical world pretty plainly indicate this. They indicate a gathering of Ecclesiastical forces on the two opposite sides of formalism and spiritualism, with no longer a debatable ground between.

There are, indeed, but two kinds of religion in the world: humility and faith on the one hand, pride and ceremony on the other. There is a religion of repentance, and a religion of penance; of self-mortification from the sorrow and hatred of sin, and of self-mortification for the acquisition of merit and self-esteem. There is a religion of rites and ceremonies, totally separate from the religion of which they are the dress; a religion of mint, anise, and cummin; and one of judgment, mercy, and faith. All ordinances, when you take away the soul of piety, the faith of the gospel, become superstitions; the watchwords and talismans of pride and spiritual despotism. There is a religion that worships God, and another that worships the altar; a religion that trusts in Christ, and another that trusts in the sign of the cross, the wafer, and the holy water; a religion that brings every thought into subjection by love, and a religion that yokes the body to the car of Juggernaut; a religion of broad phylacteries, and garment-borders, and Rabbies; a religion of

gnat-straining, and camel-swallowing, and cleansing of the outside of the cup and platter, and garnishing of prophets' tombs, and of the fathers' sepulchres. There is a religion, whose justification and whose whole essence is faith, and a religion whose whole material, inward and external, is form; and it makes but little difference what the form may be. A man may drown himself in a puddle of mud, if he pleases, as well as in the ocean. The *fetiches* and the hooks, and the amulets of dirt, and the crocodiles and lizards, and the sacred fires and rivers, of one vast class of devotees of this monstrous god of form and merit, are just as noble as the beads and scapularies, the altars and the crosses, the dead bones and pilgrimages, the saints and virgins, the wafer and the water, the masses and absolutions, the anointings and enrobings, the enshrining of martyrs and the damning of heretics, that constitute and characterize the devotion of the other. The mending of the fish's tail in the house of Dagon, was just as good a mark of religion, just as noble a work of piety, just as lofty an elevation of spirit, as the washing of pots and cups and brazen vessels in the temple. The primacy of the Pope and the burning of heretics, is just as good as the assumption of the exclusive divine right of ordination, and the consecration of all dissenters to the uncovenanted mercies of God. So that, whether it be the spitting to the left when a dog meets you, or the crossing of your threshold with the right foot foremost, or the saying "God bless us" when a man sneezes, or the eating porridge in Lent, and fish on Friday; whether it be the exaltation of the altar, or the cross, or the church liturgy; whether it be the brazen serpent, or the blood of St. Januarius, or the water of baptism; whether you flagellate yourself according to St. Dominic, or fast and wear sackcloth with Dr. Pusey; whether you deify and adore the image of the virgin, or the sign of Christ's passion, or any tradition of the ritual, the Pope, the Cathedral, or that tremendous talisman of Popery and Prelacy, the church; if this be your trust for salvation, it is all one: your God is an idol; your Saviour a figment of your own depravity; your religion is form without faith, and in opposition to it.

This formalism without faith is the religion of nature: it is the creature instead of the Creator; the altar instead of the altar's God. It is Paganism, and Judaism, and Mohammedism, and Buddhism, and Popery and prelatical domination. It is the natural movement of the fallen soul in search of some religion, but at enmity against humility and faith. This formalism itself



appears in various modes of enshrinement, according to its own taste. There is a material formalism, and a spiritual formalism. The material formalism is for the grosser nature; the spiritual, for the higher and more refined. The spiritual formalism professes to adore its rites, because of their spiritual beauty; and it sees a spiritual beauty only in connection with those rites. It professes to present the poetical side of religion to the soul; but it is merely the mint, anise, and cummin of poetry, as well as of the law; it cannot rise to the higher themes of inspiration. It is the poetry of that which is seen and temporal; not that which is unseen and eternal; it is fast-and-feast-day poetry; the poetry, not of devotion, nor of feeling, but of superstition and of sense. It is just as if Raphael, instead of employing his genius on the subject of the transfiguration, had spent his life in illuminating missals and painting the dresses of the priests and friars.

In this spiritual formalism there is much appearance, and there may be the reality of piety, but it becomes a morbid and fastidious thing, instead of the vigorous and frank benevolence of the gospel. It bears about as much relation to the spirit of the gospel, as the enthusiastic love and worship of nature in a mind like Shelley's bears to the love of God. Its worship is sought in the poetry and sentimentality of religion; its piety is a cluster of hallowed associations, dependent on the *ecce signum* of a beautiful and time-honored cathedral; the prayers and responses of a rich and tasteful liturgy. The mosses that cling to the oriel windows of York Minster would fill the soul of the worshipper with emotions of transport at the beauty of the church and its venerable institutions; but, as a manifestation of the divine wisdom, the sweetest flowers that ever breathed would go unnoticed, though they sprung up nowhere else in the world, if they covered the turf of a dissenting graveyard. The white robe of a babe to be baptized, the gorgeousness and solemnity of the priest's vestments, and the sign of the cross on the babe's unconscious forehead, make a deeper appeal than the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, named on an immortal spirit. This, to the mind of a Papist or a Puseyite, would be nothing, by a Congregational or Presbyterian minister, in a plain black coat, without a liturgical apparatus and a godfather to answer for the infant.

The spiritual formalist can have no communion of spirit with the children of God, out of the line of apostolical succession; he cannot kneel in prayer with such; there is no virtue in the

sacrament of the Lord's Supper with such ; but give him a box of consecrated wafers, and a little portable communion-service of plate duly consecrated, and he can journey all over the world, and have a comfortable sacramental occasion for his w n spirit, even though his dwelling may be beside a tabernacle, where the Lord's table is spread without a surplice, by a missionary to the heathen.

Now, wherever a mind is so warped by prejudice and unbelief, as to see a spiritual meaning and beauty in the things of religion only where the rubric of its own plan is complied with, or where a bishop in apostolical succession has laid his consecrating hand, it will soon cease to see what is spiritual, at any rate ; it will cease to regard the real meaning in the ordinances of religion, even when most liturgically and gorgeously administered. The mind so in love with the shadow, takes it for the substance : if there be but the shell, the kernel is of no consequence. This spiritual formalism tends, therefore, even in its best aspect, and in the purest minds ever deceived by it, to mere material formalism ; in its natural progress it comes to that, and all worship is form. A man in whom the insanity of this fanaticism has got such power, that he cannot receive the gospel or be blest by its ordinances except from the hands of prelatical consecration, will not long be anxious for the gospel at all, provided the form be preserved. Nor can any thing be more acceptable to the multitude of mankind than a religion so constituted : a religion of ceremony with the soul of pride—a religion, in which there shall be the forms of penance and of gorgeous humility without that contrition and abasement of heart required by the gospel—a religion of pomp and superstition without faith, of title and display without humility.

What could be more gratifying to men generally, in search of salvation, than the tenet of baptismal regeneration ? “ It is truly affecting,” remarks a Baptist missionary abroad, “ to observe the apparent sincerity and veneration with which many Greeks of considerable intelligence regard their ‘ holy baptism.’ ” A Greek can never be pressed with the subject of a change of heart, without intrenching himself behind this refuge. His religion teaches him that baptism is the first and most essential mystery, by which a person becomes a member of God's family, and a new creature in Christ, and a partaker of eternal life. In baptism, God gives to a person the forgiveness of sin, through the mediation of the Son ; this signifying,

that, as the body of the baptized is washed with water, so the soul, by the grace of God, is washed and cleansed from sins, according to the words of our Lord, 'Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.' Thus reads the Church Catechism, with its refuges of lies."

Nor is it the Greek Church alone, nor the Romish Church, that lulls men to perdition under this seducing lie of a "baptismal regeneration."

In speaking of the branches of Romish superstition existing among Protestants, Archbishop Whately dwells upon some abuses of the Eucharist, and profanations of the ordinance of Baptism. He has mentioned the evil of disjoining completely from the "outward visible sign of baptism" all "inward spiritual grace," but he has omitted entirely this prodigious and soul-destroying abuse of putting baptism as the cause and conveyancer of grace—this doctrine of baptismal regeneration enshrined in the articles of the Church of England, the tendency of which is as diabolical in lulling the human heart in sin, and carrying men unregenerate from the church on earth to the retributions of a world where "circumcision is of the heart only," as any of the worst superstitions of Romanism. We are the more surprised that such a writer as Archbishop Whately should pass over this corruption in his own church, because he has, on so many other occasions, pointed out so clearly the errors of his own denomination. He has frankly noticed a point of imperfection in the Church Liturgy, which we have never seen noted elsewhere, but which is, in itself, most powerful as an argument against it. He observes, that that Liturgy "is evidently neither adapted nor designed for children, even those of such an age as to be fully capable of joining in congregational worship, were there a service suitably composed on purpose for them." Again, he speaks of the effect of superstition in another abuse of the Liturgy, in that he "has known, for instance, a person in speaking of a deceased neighbor, whose character had been irreligious and profligate, remark how great a comfort it was to hear the words of the funeral service read over her, 'because, poor woman, she had been such a bad liver.' I have heard of an instance, again, of a superstition, probably before unsuspected, being accidentally brought to light by the minister's having forbidden a particular corpse to be brought into the church, because the person had never frequented it when alive: the consequence of which was, that many old people began immedi-

ately to frequent the church, who had before been in the habit of absenting themselves."

"All these, and numberless other such superstitions," continues Archbishop Whately, "it was the business of a corrupt priesthood, not to introduce, indeed, but to encourage and maintain, inasmuch as they almost all tend to increase the influence and wealth of the Hierarchy. Let it be the Protestant pastor's business not only to abstain from conniving at or favoring any thing of the kind, but (remembering that the original source of superstition is not in the Church of Rome, but in the heart of man) to be ever on the watch against its inroads from various quarters, and in various shapes. Towards the persons, indeed, who fall into this or any other kind of fault, we cannot be too tender or too considerate in making allowances; but we must guard against that pretended and spurious charity, which is, in reality, indifference to the fault itself, and carelessness about purity of religion."

Now, all this formalism, both spiritual and material, which constitutes so much of the essence of Romanism, is the religion of the natural heart asserting its supremacy; the religion of justification by Forms, in opposition to the religion of justification by Faith. It is, moreover, the religion of Fanaticism, Intolerance, and Persecution. The fanaticism of forms has proved itself a thousand fold more terrible than the fanaticism of feeling. Enshrined within a part of the church establishment of England, it has seemed ready recently to break out anew, with assumptions of the most deadly persecuting energy. The movement already, within so short a time, is felt through the world. The missionaries of the Cross feel it, and are destined to a conflict with it, that will sorely try their faith and patience. It casts them out and unchurches them, as intruders and enemies; as men whom the Church is to watch against and supplant, instead of encouraging and supporting them. If it dared, or had the power, doubtless it would hurl the thunders of excommunication against them.

This formalism finds its completion in an established hierarchy, forced upon the people, and consolidated by the civil law. We were once much struck with an observation, dropped in conversation by an eloquent clergyman in the city of Edinburgh. He observed, that Christ had three offices, the kingly, the prophetic, the priestly; that the Pope had usurped the priestly, Mohammed the prophetic, and England the kingly. We

have been fighting against popery; and here, said he, we are, with the monarch of England in a state establishment at the head of the Christian Church, and usurping the kingly office of Jesus Christ! In England, the head of the state is superior to the hierarchy; this is the popery of Great Britain; but the highest degree of formalism will have the head of the hierarchy superior to the state, and this is the manner of popery in Rome. In its perfection, it is death to the souls of men; it is the quickening of pride and sin. It is opposed to all missions, but those of its own Propaganda; for rather than have the kingdom of Christ set up without bishops and a prelatical hierarchy, it would have the kingdom of darkness itself continued. This fair and gorgeous dome so covers the multitude of sins, that it were almost sacrilege to suppose that anywhere in the world, beneath the shelter of its delusions, men can have gone so far in error as to need the intervention of the missionary to regain them to the truth. It is an insult to the unity, infallibility, and majesty of the Church, to suppose that any of its branches, however far gone in error, can cease to be a vital and honorable part. The genius of formalism will support its votaries, at the cost of whatever concessions of the truth it is compelled to make.

The power which we have thus delineated is tremendous; and yet, before the reign of Christianity through the earth, it is to be entirely demolished. The final conflict, therefore, of the gospel with this enemy, may be great and terrible: for if, when Antichrist dies, the spirit and god of formalism are to die also, there will doubtless be great convulsions. The opponents of Antichrist hitherto have waged war upon the centralization of its abuses, and upon the abuses themselves, in succession and detail. They have been hacking away at the great upas of desolation, while its roots run through the world far and wide, and runners shoot out of the ground, and form fair and stately children from the parent stock. If the tree is not only to be cut down, but the stump uprooted, the convulsion will shake all empires; it will bring to the ground the unchristian establishments of Christianity, wherever they have sprung from the great roots of Popery in the world. When Antichrist dies, we believe the arrogant assumption by one church, of being the only true church, and by one class of Christ's priesthood, of the exclusive divine right of priestly ordination, will die with it. We cannot believe that such a foul blot of pride and domination will be suffered to stay in the church of Christ. There is nothing more utterly

opposed to the spirit and precepts of the gospel than this. If against any one thing the warnings and denunciations of our blessed Saviour to his own disciples were most forcibly and distinctly reiterated, it is this. And if there be any one thing more fully adapted than another to fill the church with the spirit of ambition, aggrandizement, jealousy, envy, heart-burning, selfishness, luxury, it is this. It has had a full and fair development, not only in the *puris naturalibus* of Popery *per se*, but also in the Church of England; the monstrous corruptions of the establishment are its natural brood; and yet, even in this country, some men's pride of place and worship of form have reached to such a height, that they can shut their eyes on those corruptions, and maintain that, rather than the establishment should be given up, the corruptions themselves had better still be tolerated. There are some men that absolutely regard them as the best form of Christianity; just as, where slavery prevails, its abominations by some are maintained to be the best form of domestic society. Nothing but the final destruction of Antichrist will make the world believe in that declaration of our Lord, "My kingdom is not of this world."

There is much false philosophy and sophistical reasoning paraded in excuse of the formalism of Popery. It is asserted, that there is in the human mind a craving after form, and a necessity of leaning upon it, which must be gratified, and that Protestantism, in its bareness, has made an unnatural and violent division between the truth and its proper array and furniture. Doubtless there is such a craving, and it is so powerful, that in its indulgence, the form without the truth becomes much more precious than the truth without the form. Beyond doubt the nature of the mind renders form necessary, up to a certain point; but beyond a certain point, form becomes unavoidably the minister of error and sin. Form weakens the soul, while faith strengthens it; form materializes its views, while faith spiritualizes them; form worships the brazen serpent, which has been given only as Faith's occasion, and then must Hezekiah grind it to powder. Form takes the ladder Jacob saw, and, instead of climbing it, idolizes it. Form takes the staff, which Jacob leaned on in worshipping, and adores the top of it, religiously affirming that this was what the patriarch himself did. In the worship of images, under pretence of venerating the memory of saints, form finds its idolatrous climax.

In the preaching of Christ and the apostles, every requisite

of form and manner, which the constitution of the human mind renders necessary, was provided for. There are some things which the body renders necessary; the two only and simple rites appointed by our Saviour, even in their extremest simplicity, render certain forms necessary; but for the nourishment of the soul in Christ, the sincere milk of the word, without symbol, ceremony or dress, save the most forcible, instructive, and persuasive language that can be employed to convey it most directly to the soul, is all that is needed. The practice of our Lord himself, is enough to prove this. The truth is, that this tendency to the bondage of form, and this necessity for it, belong to the world's childhood, and, in the childhood of the world's education, these instincts and weaknesses have had their scope and development;—in the preparatory dispensation of Christianity, the sensuous and the tangible have ministered to the instruction and discipline of God's people. The Christian dispensation itself, is more spiritual, and therefore more simple, more unfettered with the bondage of form. Now we are become men, we must put away childish things; the whole reasoning of the apostle goes upon this supposition; and he had those to deal with, who accused him of laying bare the religion of his fathers, and of despising and rendering of no reputation the seemly and beautiful array of its ornaments.

But he replied, that these cherished and idolized rites and observances were but the shadow of things to come, and that now they had got the substance, he would have nothing to do with worshipping the shadow. These were the toys of an immature age; and to keep them under the bright light and bracing air of the gospel, would be like a man keeping the whistles and sleds, the wooden swords and paper caps of his boyhood, to play with in the gravity of fifty years.

Indeed, if our blessed Lord meant that these gradations in the clergy, from the pope, the universal bishop, downward, which mark the system of Romanism, with the gorgeous rites, ceremonies and titles that accompany them, should be adopted in his own church, why did he not sanctify and keep what he found ready at hand in the Jewish economy? What more gorgeous or significant paraphernalia could be desired, than that of the temple, with its splendid services? Not one of the apostles ever put on the Levitical robes, or the Sacerdotal mitres, or ever refused to preach in a conventicle. It was reserved for the harlot of abominations to take up the cast-off frippery

of an abolished dispensation ; to deck herself out in its gorgeous array, newly patched and spangled ; putting on the rotten rags of Judaism, gilded with the cross, and idolizing in the manhood of Christianity the cradle and standing-stool of its infancy. The vain talkers about the sacred beauty of church rituals, and the poetic and sanctifying power of their lessons, need to be reminded that these things have had their day. When the gospel gives us heavenly wings, our stilts and crutches may be laid aside ; neither do we want to keep them because forsooth they may have been made of gold and silver. These lessons have lost their vitality, and to send us back to them is like compelling us to draw again into the lungs air that has already been breathed. And yet there are those, who would lead us back to a system that requires a lord of ceremonies to usher us without mistake into God's temple, and a French posture-master to direct both priest and people in their devotions !

We have often gazed upon the gorgeous ceremonies of popery, till between the music and the painting, and the magnificent architecture and imposing forms, we have been so impressed with their power over the senses, that we have thought if a great cathedral of the middle ages could be taken by the dome and transported across the Atlantic, it would make Romanists by thousands. We are not surprised at the despotism of this system over common and uneducated minds, nor at the apologies for it in minds accustomed from childhood to regard rich forms as the indispensable requisites of Christianity. But it is strange that any mind acquainted with the history of Romanism, and that looks or can look behind the veil, should be carried away by a first impression of the novelty and magnificence of its rites ; not staying long enough among them to receive the sure after impression, both of their intrinsic idolatry and debasing and melancholy tawdriness. These things have always proved to the soul a snare rather than a ladder ; and if the travelling Protestant, with his mind filled with Wordsworth's Ecclesiastical sentimentalism, his eye with the pope's rotundity, condescension and gorgeous tiara, his nose with the fragrant frankincense, and his ear with the floating or rebounding anthems, would but stop to analyze his own bewildering admiration, and to ask where is the piety or what the religion of all this, he would find himself absorbed in a sentiment that partakes very little of the spirit of the gospel ; he would wake



out of his dream in season to prevent him from ridiculously dwelling on the delightful union of magnificence and humility in the person of His Holiness.

Now the lesson which we draw from all this is, that of simplicity in our own piety, and simplicity in the effort for the world's conversion. A great singleness of purpose for the glory of Christ will do much, even amidst the greatest obstacles; but every sinister and partisan aim will meet with a discomfiture. They who strive to advance their own church instead of the gospel of Christ, however they may seem to prevail for a season, are mistaken if they expect final success. There have been two names, derived from the blessed names of our Lord, one of which has come to signify all that is detestable and false; the other, all that is excellent and lovely: Jesuit and Christian. A Jesuit is one who seeks the supremacy of his own order; a Christian, the supremacy of Christ. So far as a man's religion leads to the worship of his own sect, or of the church, instead of Christ, it passes from the comprehensiveness of the term Christianity into the selfishness of the term Jesuitism. A Christian, so far as he worships the idea of the church instead of Christ, so far he is a Jesuit; he loses towards Christ what he gains towards the church. We apply this to every sect. The Congregationalist, so far as he seeks the prevalence of his order instead of the kingdom of Christ, is a Jesuit. The Presbyterian, so far as he maintains the divine right of Presbyterianism, and worships the book of discipline instead of the Bible, is a Jesuit. The Baptist, so far as he seeks his own sect instead of Christ, is a Jesuit. And your true prelatical churchman, so far as he worships his organization and apostolical succession instead of Christ, is a Jesuit; the great difference between him and the others being, that he makes no secret of his exclusiveness, but deprives every other church of the title of a church, and consigns every other denomination save his own to the uncovenanted mercies of God. What, then, is the true Catholicity? We know not. It will be developed with the prevalence of the Spirit of Christ, which will at length burn up all the wood, hay, and stubble, and change our violent and despotic caricatures of the body of Christ into his own glorious body. We know not. But this we know, that as yet, if any sect profess exclusively to have it, that profession is a mark that it is not there. To what extremes will not this spirit of Jesuitism lead even a devout mind! We see in Oxford a man, said

to be of marked, irreproachable piety, whose idea of the church is simply and solely that of the church of England, her baptismal regeneration, thirty-nine articles, hierarchy, prelacy, establishment, all ; and his utmost aspirations after the prevalence of Christ's kingdom, are the spread and power of that English church and its ordinances ! True Catholicity will be the last and most precious fruit of the Spirit on earth. They who now and exclusively pretend to it, are more clearly on the way to the Rome that now is, than to the Jerusalem which is above, which is the mother of us all.

There are but two things with which we can successfully combat popery, and these two are love and faith ; love against its bigotry, faith against its form. Love will conquer, when nothing else can ; and formalism cannot prevail, where faith is in active operation. A simple desire for the glory of God and the good of souls, simplicity and singleness of purpose for the world's conversion—this will conquer popery, and nothing else will.

We sometimes think that one of the greatest differences between this and the eternal world, will be the simplicity of that world, and of our spirits in it. Simplicity is strength. It was Luther's strength in the first conflict with the papal power. It lay in that one sentence, which carries the whole gospel with it. that justification by faith is the *ARTICULUS STANTIS VEL CADENTIS ECCLESIE*. The great reformer was well nigh inspired, to find out this truth, and to disinter it from the grave of tradition and ceremony under which it lay buried, and to hold it up so that men should see its living glory. For nothing is a greater characteristic of inspiration than this : the seeing of great truths in their simplicity, all extraneous things being cut off. This was what made Christ speak as never man spake ; truth from the bosom of eternity. This was subjectively the inspiration of the Apostles. And there is a sort of inspiration now, or the power of inspiration, in the possession of the mind by one grand truth. This is what the physicians call madness ; but madness is nearly allied to great power and wisdom ; and sure we are, that not only the papists, in Luther's time, but some of the reformers, also, thought that Luther was mad, and this truth of justification by faith, the devil that possessed him.

It is this truth, which many in this age are losing sight of. They are attracted by form and tradition ; they dwell with fondness on what is time-worn and venerable in past dispensations,

instead of the dawn of spirituality in the coming glory of the new. They regard truth as the backward birth of time and the church, instead of the increasing disclosure of God's Providence and Word. They are conservatives in the church of that which is without faith and without vitality, and they seek a unity in the church, which is the spurious figment of ambition and aggrandizement, and not founded on the principle of individual union with Christ. They accustom themselves to designate the blessed reformation itself, as that great "schism" which "shattered the sacramentum unitatis," since which era, "truth has not dwelt simply and securely in any visible tabernacle." They blind themselves to all the lessons which history and experience have taught in regard to the errors of the church of Rome, and especially the tremendous consequences of attaching to tradition the value of inspiration. They renounce the great principle rescued from the grasp of religious despotism by the reformation, of individual study of the Scriptures, with the right of private judgment. And they send us to the drag-net of tradition and the tomes of fathers baptized in pagan philosophy, to see assuredly what the Scriptures do mean. They adopt and praise a system of teaching, which dwells upon the external and ritual parts of religious service, whilst it loses sight of their inner meaning, and spiritual life; and if they do not send us to the seven sacraments of Rome, with prayers for the dead and purgatorial penance for the living, they speak of the simple sacraments of Christ's institution, as containing an intrinsic saving efficacy; as being the only sources of divine grace, to the exclusion of every other, and as constituting the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Thus they teach; and they even hesitate not, distinctly to declare the Lutheran doctrine of justification to be the greatest of all heresies.

All this is portentous: betokening dissolution to the church wherever it prevails. There is a passage in Cowper's Poems, which, if the poet could now rise from the dead, he would believe himself to have prophesied when he wrote it:

When nations are to perish in their sins,  
'Tis in the church the leprosy begins;  
The priest, whose office is, with zeal sincere,  
To watch the fountain, and preserve it clear,  
Carelessly nods and sleeps upon the brink,  
While others poison what the flock must drink:  
Or, waking at the call of lust alone,  
Infuses lies and errors of his own:

His unsuspecting sheep believe it pure ;  
 And, tainted by the very means of cure,  
 Catch from each other a contagious spot,  
 The foul forerunner of a general rot.  
 Then truth is hushed, that heresy may preach,  
 And all is trash that reason cannot reach :  
 Then God's own image on the soul impressed,  
 Becomes a mockery, and a standing jest ;  
 And faith, the root whence only can arise  
 The graces of a life that wins the skies,  
 Loses at once all value and esteem,  
 Pronounced by greybeards a pernicious dream.  
 Then CEREMONY leads her bigots forth  
 Prepared to fight for shadows of no worth :  
 While truths on which eternal things depend  
 Find not, or hardly find, a single friend.  
 As soldiers watch the signal of command,  
 They learn to bow, to sit, to kneel, to stand,  
 Happy to fill religion's vacant place  
 With hollow form, and gesture, and grimace.  
 Such, when the Teacher of his church was there,  
 People and priest, the sons of Israel were.  
 Stiff in the letter, lax in the design  
 And import of their oracles divine ;  
 Their learning legendary, false, absurd,  
 And yet exalted above God's own word :  
 They drew a curse from an intended good,  
 Puffed up with gifts they never understood.  
 He judged them with as terrible a frown  
 As if not love, but wrath had brought him down.

We believe that there is to be a great division through the world, between what is of Rome and what is of the gospel ; between what is formal and what is spiritual. If we are not greatly mistaken, all error will be reduced to a singular sort of unity, and Antichrist will be the great towering form, around which its enormous chrystals congregate. That there is such a principle of centralization in error, as well as truth, no one can doubt who believes that the cause and source of error is not so much weakness as sin. The church of Rome owes her supremacy to the despotic unity with which she has pursued the worship of form ; the aggrandizement of the church being the object of her efforts. The disciples of Christ must owe their success in the conflict with Romanism to the power of faith, in the simplicity of their purpose, for the conversion of the soul.

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## ARTICLE VII.

## OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF HEBREW PHILOLOGY.

By Franz Delitzsch, Ph. D. of the University of Leipsic. Translated from the Latin by Wm. W. Turner, Instructor in Hebrew in the Union Theol. Sem. N. Y.

DURING the publication of that most noble monument of German learning, industry, and typographical skill, the Hebrew and Chaldee Concordance of Dr. Julius Fürst, there was issued in the year 1838, a work, small in size, but in merit of magnificent proportions, entitled, "*Jesurun, sive Prolegomenon in Concordantias V. T. a Julio Fuerstio editas libri tres.*" Its author, Dr. Franz Delitzsch, who has given many other erudite publications to the world, is the intimate friend and favorite disciple of Dr. Fürst, and is mentioned by him in the Preface to his Concordance, where this work is largely quoted, in the highest terms of affection and respect. The design of the publication, as appears from its title, is to explain and defend the principles on which the learned editor of the Concordance proceeded in the execution of his task, and particularly in the construction of the new and original lexicon which forms its principal feature. There can be little doubt but that the author has enjoyed, throughout, the assistance and concurrence of Dr. Fürst, who speaks of the work as containing a complete exposition of his theory, and of its author as one "quo nemo adhuc melius mentem meam perspexit, et ad sensum sententiamque meam penitus penetravit." The *Jesurun* is divided into three books: the first comprises the history of Hebrew philology from its earliest beginnings down to the present day; the second treats of the value of Jewish tradition, and of the comparison of the language with itself and with its dialects; and the third advocates the comparison of the Hebrew with the Indo-germanic languages, especially the Sanscrit. The following article is a translation of the first book, which, from the lucid order of the narration, the acuteness of its criticism, and the amount of new and valuable information it contains, it is thought will prove an acceptable present to all who are engaged in the critical study of the Sacred Scriptures, or who feel interested in the history of their interpretation.

It cannot be denied, that the study of the sacred language and of Hebrew literature has made such great progress in the lapse of ages, that if the Church, which now seems almost divested of the adornments of learning, would only strive to turn all these improvements to her own use, and to render them subservient to the cause of divine truth, she might hope to collect and to store up a more plenteous and joyful harvest of fruits than she has ever yet obtained from this source. He who should venture to contradict this, must be regarded as mentally bereft of sight and hearing: he must be blind to the state of things around him, and deaf to the instructive voice of history. Meagre and defective was the knowledge of the Hebrew language which an exceedingly few of the early doctors of the Church (whose names are refulgent with glory from other sources) acquired with immense labor and difficulty from the schools of the Jews. For they were destitute of every aid except the instructions of their Jewish teachers, who then made use among themselves of the modern Hebrew, a language greatly differing from the ancient, by reason of the corruptions introduced into it from foreign tongues, and who had not yet learned to treat the sacred language grammatically, or to make a proper distinction between it and the deteriorated modern idiom. Hence it arose, that such an acquaintance with the Hebrew as the Fathers of the Church were enabled with much painstaking to acquire, was founded on the Jewish method, in itself imperfect and hard to be understood, and unaccompanied by even a moderate acquaintance with the grammar and history of the language.

Now it is certain, that however a people, guided as it were by a subtle and secret instinct, may excel in the practical use of their own language, it always remains to them something mysterious and inexplicable until, turning it from its mere subjective use into an object of contemplation, they begin to ascertain its principles and to preserve its purity, by comparing it with other languages, and analyzing the laws on which its structure depends. Who does not know how egregiously Plato (see only his *Cratylus*) and he among the Jews who most resembles him, Philo of Alexandria, blunder in the exposition of their mother-tongues? so much so in fact, that one can hardly tell whether they are in jest or in earnest! So too among the Romans, do not M. Terentius Varro and the old jurists, when attempting to give the etymons of Latin words, which they not

unfrequently do in the Digests,—we say, do not these men, certainly grave and sober enough at other times, seem then to be laboring under a sort of serio-ludicrous hallucination? And such is the case with the talmudical doctors, who must be allowed to have been profoundly versed in the speaking and writing of Hebrew: as soon as they attempt to explain the laws of construction or the formation of the language, they descend at once to the most ridiculous fancies. The reason is, they had no knowledge of grammar, which was not cultivated as a science till some centuries after; their only guide was nature, which, although it gave them a kind of instinctive knowledge of the causes and analogies of the language, could not enable them to furnish a rational and satisfactory explanation thereof to others. It is true that in the talmudic writings there is manifested a most acute and subtle appreciation of the laws of grammar, not indeed openly and clearly stated, but wrapped up in the intricacies of the Midrash, which is in a great measure *grammatical* and *masoretical*; yet even those remarks whose correctness grammatical science has since confirmed, are the result rather of natural tact than of a scientific application of the reasoning powers.

Hence, it is evident how superficial must have been that acquaintance with the Hebrew which the early Fathers of the Church obtained from the Jews of the talmudic age; for, as they neither did nor could possess that incommunicable intuitiveness by which the Jews themselves in a manner divined the formation and laws of the language, their knowledge was merely traditional or conjectural, loose and vague; and they were preserved from more dangerous defects only by the analogy of their religious belief. Nevertheless, the undying gratitude of the Church is due to the exertions of Origen and Jerome, as the men who transplanted the seeds and offshoots of the holy language from the Jewish nurseries into the garden of the Church, and who with admirable industry laid the first foundation of Hebrew learning in the minds of Christendom. *Origen* (born about 185, died 253), on being smitten with the desire of learning the sacred tongue, journeyed into Palestine to visit the famous monuments of Jewish antiquity, and to examine and if possible obtain some Hebrew manuscripts; he here availed himself of the instruction and assistance of learned Jews, among others of the patriarch Jullus, with whom it appears he became intimately acquainted. *Jerome* (b. 331, d. 420) continued to

an extreme old age a most ardent student of the Hebrew ; and from the time when in early youth he lived alone with a Christian Jew and learned the first elements of the language, he spared neither labor, study, nor expense, but toiled unceasingly through all opposing difficulties, to acquire a thorough knowledge of the "Hebrew verity." On returning to Jerusalem from Egypt, he placed himself under the instruction of one Bar-Chanina, (whom Rufinus contemptuously calls Barabbas,) a man of singular learning, as is evident from his pupil, and who, induced by a large reward, was wont to receive the latter into his house by night, to avoid the enmity of his own people. Jerome also associated with himself, in the work of translating and expounding the Scriptures, some of the most learned of the Jews, whose ability he speaks highly of, as in his epistles to Damasus. In fact, he estimated the importance of Jewish learning and the authority of Jewish tradition much more highly than his contemporaries ; in consequence of which, although he affected to be carrying on a controversy with the Jews, he acquired the censure and the enmity of many, even of St. Augustine himself, who knew not that the Punic and the Hebrew were the same language. "Memini," says he, in his preface to Job, "me ob intelligentiam hujus voluminis Lyddæum quendam præceptorem, qui apud Hebræos primus haberi putabatur, non parvis redemisse nummis, cujus doctrina an aliquid profecerim, nescio." And again, in his preface to the Book of Chronicles, he says, "Cum literis a me nuper flagitassetis, ut vobis Paralipomenon latino sermone transferrem, de Tiberiade legis quendam doctorem, qui apud Hebræos admirationi habebatur, assumsi et contuli cum eo a vertice, ut aiunt, usque ad extremum unguem." When, being already advanced in years, he desired to undertake the study of the Chaldee language, he again had recourse to the Synagogue, and placed himself under the instruction of a Jew who was well versed in both languages ; following in this the example of Origen, whose doctrinal errors he rejected.

By pursuing this method of study, Jerome became the most erudite and learned doctor of the ancient Church, being able to excel Origen by the fact that the schools of Palestine were in his own time in a more flourishing condition.\* There was, indeed, a great similarity and equality in the state of Hebrew studies in the Syna-

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\* I. G. Carpzov, *Critica Sacra* VI. § 2.



gogue and in the Church, in the time of the talmudic writers; and if this fact had been recognised by Joh. Clericus, that envious disparager of the Fathers, he would have made use of other weapons against Martianay in his *Questiones Hieronymianæ*. Indeed, after a careful examination of the works of Jerome, I can safely affirm, that he has gathered with such care and taste into the treasury of the Church whatever of most precious the Synagogue had to offer, that, next to the Talmud itself, his writings form the best source whence to derive a knowledge of ancient Jewish tradition; although it is true, that the skill in the Hebrew language which Origen and Jerome acquired from their Jewish instructors was, in accordance with the times, defective, and partook of the corruptions of the talmudic dialect, which presented as it were a rude image of the ancient Hebrew. The Church moreover in succeeding ages, as we shall see hereafter, continued in her Hebrew studies to follow in the footsteps of the Synagogue, which had been divinely constituted the guardian, not only of the sacred volume in its original form, but also of the Hebrew language itself. Consequently those Fathers of the Church who possess any knowledge of the Hebrew, attribute it to the Synagogue; and this knowledge, although turned by them from a profane to a sacred use, is never superior to that of their instructors, but on the contrary is usually more rude, more imperfect, and rarely can be said to equal it. Hence in the works of the older Fathers that agreement with the tradition of the antiquated Synagogue, and that preconceived mode of exposition not founded on argument, which perhaps the further it is removed from grammatical rules is so much the more likely to have hit on the truth;—hence those ridiculous etymologies, that idle trifling in the comparison of languages, and those attempts at explaining Greek proper names from the Hebrew;\*—hence that mixture of the modern with the ancient tongue,†

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\* See the second part of Origen's book *de Nominibus*, inserted in Opp. Hieron. by Martianay, but swarming with errors; e. g. *Κολοσαῖς* (= קול עשרי פאנף גענומען), *κολωνία* (= גלירי אַפּוֹטעקאַלוממֶיִן). Comp. Philo I. p. 57. *Μαθησια* (= מַתְּנֵשׁוּת צִיָּה), b. Taanit f. 20. *Νικόδημος* (שְׁנָקִידָה חֲמָה) נקרימוֹן שְׁנָקִידָה חֲמָה, from נִכְדָּר, נִכְדָּר).

† As *Σατανᾶς*, comp. of Aram. שָׂטָן and Heb. נָחָשׁ *serpens apostata* (*Irenæus*, in Dial. c. Tryphone); אֲשֵׁר = *παιδεία* from mod. Heb. אָסֵר (*Origen ad Matt. 18: 19*); סִינִי *tentatio æterna et odium*,

that resemblance in grammatical terminology, the not understanding of which has caused Clericus to detract greatly from the honor due to the Fathers; and finally that *midrashic* volubility which took its rise partly from the fact that they as well as the doctors of the Talmud were (as is evident from their vacillating pronunciation)\* destitute of the masoretic punctuation, whose invention is an enigma more obscure than Plato's number, and the want of which gave rise to a multitude of monstrous forms. Whatever they knew of the Hebrew language they had learned from the Jews, by whom it was still employed, in like manner as a traveller, passing through the borders of a foreign country, partially acquires its language and afterwards forgets it. Of grammatical principles they, as well as the native scholars, were ignorant; and, making use of the language for no other purpose than to explain the Scriptures, they give themselves no concern respecting its laws or internal analogies. The cognate languages, as the Punic and Syriac, which some of them were acquainted with, they knew not how to use, and hence were forced to depend entirely on Jewish tradition; this they are wont to follow in accordance with the analogy of faith, and if they occasionally desert it, they are apt to fall into absurdity. Hence we are justified in terming this the *lowest* stage of the Hebrew language in the Church.

In what may be called its *middle* stage, the study of Hebrew literature made less progress than might have been expected from these preparatives; and we here behold the Synagogue pressing forward with rapid strides, while the Church lags at a languid pace behind. The Jews in the time of the Geonim, being impelled thereto by an emulation of the Arabian scholars, returned to the study of the liberal arts and sciences, and applied themselves to grammatical investigations, which had received a new impulse in the ninth century. In this respect they far excelled the Arabians, inasmuch as they did

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from Aram. סני, סני (Cyprian Opp. p. 459 Rigalt; comp. b. Sabat. f. 58. מאי דור סיני דור שירדה שנאז לאז עליי); אולם prius = Aram. סן-אולם (Jerome ad Gen. 28: 19).

\* Thus Jerome, in epist. ad Evangelum (II. p. 570. Par.): "Nec refert utrum *Salem* an *Salim* nominetur, cum vocalibus in medio literis perraro utantur Hebræi, et pro voluntate lectorum ac varietate regionum eadem verba diversis sonis atque accentibus pronuncientur."

not treat the Hebrew as a solitary language, separate from the Aramaic and Arabic, but embraced the whole Shemitish family in their researches.\* Already had *Judah ben-Karish* (about 880) revived the study of the Targums, which in the increasing spread of the Arabic language had become neglected, and demonstrated by ingeniously selected examples the use of both the Aramaic and Arabic in the illustration of the Hebrew. How long ago, too, by the labors of *Saadias* of Fayum (d. 942), was the doctrine of the roots, the forms, and the points of the sacred language explained in works written in Hebrew and

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\* We find no use made by the Arabs of comparisons either with the Shemitish or with other languages. Their labors in the investigation of their mother-tongue were so extensive and profound, that, restricted to it as they were by their religious scruples, they did not pass beyond its bounds. Hence in their productions they constantly betray their ignorance of the cognate languages; and the etymologies of Hebrew names given in the Koran rarely even approach the truth. They knew more of the Aramaic than of the Hebrew, as the Jews dwelling in Arabia and in the neighboring countries made use of the Aramaic until they acquired the Arabic language; so that when a word is called *Hebrew* by Arabian writers, it is usually *Aramaic*. But the few words which they accidentally became acquainted with, however closely resembling the Arabic in form and meaning, they were incapable of using in the prosecution of further comparisons with the Hebrew or Arabic. For whatever presented a similarity to the Arabic language, seemed to them to have degenerated from the perfect model of their native tongue; which God himself, as well as the angels and saints that dwell in paradise, were feigned to speak. They held that the entire knowledge both of the materials and structure of their language was to be drawn from the ante-mohammedan poems and traditions, the Koran, the traditions of Islam called *Hadith*, and lastly from the pure domestic and native speech of the Bedouins. If any one had attempted to deduce a knowledge of the language from any other source, he would doubtless have been looked upon as heretical. They scarcely even dreamed of what might have been done for the elucidation of their language by internal comparison alone; there are indeed a few specimens in the commentaries of Beidhawi of what may be effected in this way, but they are scarcely the first beginnings of this important matter. The above has been kindly and liberally furnished me by H. L. Fleischer, the light and ornament of our University.

Arabic, and made use of in translating and expounding the sacred volume! Another distinguished individual was *Judah ibn-Chayuj*, of Fez, called also *Abu Zekeriya*, who is justly styled the Father of Hebrew Grammar, and who, opposing the license of the elder grammarians, was the first that confined within certain limits the theory of verbal roots, and confirmed the doctrine of their triliteral form. A little of his learning found its way into the Church; but wonderfully perverted, and in no wise improved upon, much less perfected. He is followed by a host of distinguished grammarians, among whom are the well known names of *Abulwalid Merwan ibn-Ganah*, the author of seven books of grammar; *Samuel Nagid*, who left twenty-two books; *Moses Gecatilia*,† *Jakob Elazari*, *Ibn-Ezra*, the *Tibonides*, and the *Kimchis*.\*

But we are ashamed to confess that the Church, in which the written word of God was becoming daily of less esteem, left the grammatical works of the Jews, from which in her lack of other aids she might have derived the greatest benefit, completely untouched. Indeed, the less the holy Scriptures were had in honor, the less were Hebrew studies prosecuted; so that when any applied themselves to them for controversial purposes, they were found unequal to the Jews in point of skill. In the time of Charlemagne, the Hebrew language was indeed publicly taught by the Emperor's orders, but the experiment was not attended with much success, nor was it persevered in. The study of the Oriental languages, which had sunk under the barbarism of ages, found a champion in the great Frederic II., the son of Henry VI. and Constantia, daughter of the king of Sicily, who undertook an expedition to Palestine in 1228, and, having conquered Jerusalem and a great part of Syria, brought back into Europe, among the richest of the spoils taken from the Orientals, a number of Hebrew and Arabic manuscripts.† Of those in Arabic, he had many translated into Latin by the scholars of Bologna, and into Hebrew by one *Jacobus Anatolius*, a Jew; but this latter was so wedded heart and soul to the Arabic, and with it to the religion of Islam, that he was unable to do much for the restoration of Hebrew learning, especially in

\* S. David Luzzatto, *Prolegomeni ad una Grammatica Ragionata della lingua Ebraica*. (Padova, 1836.) p. 26. ss.

† Cuspinian. de Cæsariis, p. 419. Boxborn, *Hist. Univers.* p. 779. Carionis Chron. p. 517.

the rude and benighted age in which he lived. Thus the Church suffered several centuries to elapse, in which to her shame and disgrace, while the power of the Roman pontiffs kept continually increasing, the study of letters was neglected and laid prostrate, and even the remembrance of the Hebrew gradually faded away and become extinct.

Yet, even in these wretched and lamentable times, the knowledge of the Hebrew language in the Church received some additions. For even in the tenth and eleventh centuries, a wonderful series of events imposed on the Church the necessity of providing against harm to herself, from her ignorance of Oriental letters. The descendants of the Moors and the Saracens, who were bound up in the Mohammedan superstition, had now long held possession of Spain, and had reduced it almost completely under their sway. Nor less great was the concourse of Jews who had collected there from the time of Adrian, and whose number was continually augmented by the arrival of those who, driven out of their settlements in Babylonia, sought a refuge in the West. Both of these classes turned their whole energies to the study of theology, medicine, and the philosophy of language; while in the Church the cultivation of polite letters was entirely given up and abolished. Their distinguished erudition left the Church ages behind, and armed them with an almost incalculable power against her, sunk as she was in ignorance and barbarism. Their singular industry caused them also greatly to excel the Christian clergy in a knowledge of the arts and sciences; so that, in their encounters with Christians, who were ignorant both of philosophy and philology, they were wont to bear away the palm. The Christians, therefore, lest they should become the sport and ridicule of their enemies, and suffer from the mouths and pens of those whose swords they had already so severely felt, now turned their attention to those branches of learning in which they found that their enemies excelled. They applied themselves, accordingly, to philosophy and physics, and also, that they might be a match for the impiety of the Mussulmans and the obstinacy of the Jews, to the languages of both these people. And now again, as in former times, the Church was compelled to have recourse to the Synagogue. She did not, however, employ the aid of Jews remaining in connexion with the Synagogue to prove the way to the requisition of the Hebrew, but of proselytes who come over to her,—the most of whom, however, appear to have been but little skilled in the

language and literature of their forefathers. *Raymundus de Penna Forti*, a Dominican (b. 1175, d. 1275) of the convent of Toledo, 1250, in consequence of magnificent rewards offered by the kings of Arragon and Castile, proposed to his colleagues that they should begin to study the languages of the Moors and Jews; and also instituted an Oriental Seminary, at the royal expense, that a knowledge of these languages might thus be brought into the Church. *Raymundus Martini*, a Catalonian (b. 1236), a celebrated defender of the Church, was at this time superintendent of one of the Oriental schools; he studied with one Paul, a convert, who, in 1263 and again in 1264, obtained the favor of the king in a contest at the court of Barcelona with Nachmen of Gerona, and was the first since the time of Jerome who can be considered as at all learned in the Hebrew.

At the commencement of the fourteenth century, Clemens V. endeavored to reinstate the institutions of Raymond de Penna and the kings of Spain, which, either through the carelessness of the times or the want of means, had been suffered to sink into neglect. In the Council of Vienna, in 1311, he published a decree *that in every university there should be established six professors of the Hebrew, Chaldee, and Arabic languages*, and this for the same purpose as formerly, namely, that the Church might thus be able either to repulse her enemies or to win them over to herself. On the promulgation of this pontifical decree, which was repeated and confirmed in the Council of Basle, the doctors of the Church, who, after their many vain attempts, had not yet mastered the language, had again recourse to the aid of Jewish proselytes; but as the Church had of late obtained but few of these, and still fewer who could be called men of learning, it was found impossible to appoint a single professor of the Hebrew for two entire centuries in any university, if we except a solitary one at Oxford.\* But finally in the fifteenth century, when learning began gradually to revive, and the decree of Vienna was renewed, many, stimulated thereto by the Jews who had adopted the profession of Christianity, applied themselves to the study of the Hebrew language. The number of converts indeed in this century was much greater than in the preceding one and among them there occur to us some who were rather distin-

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\* Ulrich, *De Linguae Ebraicæ inter Christianos ante Reuchlinum cultu*, Halæ 1751. Reinhard, *De Fatis Studii Hebræo-Biblici inter Christianos*, Vitembergæ 1721.

guished in that dark age, as *Hieronymus de S. Fide*, *Paulus Burgensis*, *Alphonsus de Spina*, *Paulus de Heredia*, and *Liber-tas Cominetus*, celebrated for his knowledge of fourteen languages. It must be owned, however, that the Christians of that age pushed their Hebrew studies no further than as they might subserve the purposes of controversy. Their studies were entirely of a polemical character; that is, they were undertaken for the sake of defending and propagating the doctrines of the Church; and very rarely was an acquaintance cultivated with the Hebrew for its own sake, or for the elucidation of Holy Writ. The Synagogue, on the other hand, had labored since the times of Origen and Jerome, with the profoundest learning and most admirable industry, in the investigation of its language; and had produced such an abundance of grammatical treatises, as might have well supplied all the wants of the Church. The older grammarians had been followed by a number of eminent men, who amplified and in many respects completed, according to the principles of the Spanish or Italian school, what their predecessors had so happily begun. To the older works were added in this age, the lexicons of *Solomon Parchon*\* (commonly called *Machberet*, *Aruk*, or *Sepher Shorashim*), of *Nathan Jehiel*, a native of Rome, of *David Kimchi*, and *Josef Caspe* (about 1300), who made use of all the Shemitish dialects. Hebrew-Arabic, Hebrew-French,† Hebrew-German, and Hebrew-Italian glossaries, arranged either alphabetically or according to the books of Scripture, besides works on grammar, were composed by *Samuel Benvenasti* (about 1300), *Peripot Duran Efodi*, *Immanuel Romi*, *Salomo ben-Aba Mare Jarchi*, *Messer Leon*, *David Ibn-Yahya*, and many others, whose very names are to this day unknown to the Church.

The rising sun of grammatical learning which appeared in Persia, passed over in its course to Africa and to Spain, and, illuminating with its radiance the remotest countries of the earth, penetrated even to Germany, where the *Nakdani*,‡ awak-

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\* Born in the maritime town of Calatayud (Bilbilis Nova); he wrote at Salerno 1161, Cod. de Rossi 764, 1038.

† *Rococke*, *Porta Mosis*, p. 18. Cod. Paul. Lips. 102., fol. Ross. 1109.

‡ Among these was *Simson ha-Nakdan*, whose grammatical work is preserved entire in the *Bibl. Paulina* at Leipsic, in a MS. written on parchment (No. 102<sup>a</sup>). It is composed en-

ing from the sleep of former ages, and disregarding the adverse state of the times, gave themselves up to grammatical and critical studies. The Church, however, remained wrapped in deep slumber, resting content with her slender borrowed stock of Hebrew knowledge, with which she considered herself sufficiently furnished for combat with her enemies. The Sacred Scriptures, whose guardian and interpreter she ought to have been, she did not hold in sufficient estimation to strive on their account for the acquisition of a profounder knowledge of the holy tongue. Is it not indeed wonderful that *Nicolas de Lyra*, of Normandy, who, moreover, is considered by some to have been a converted Jew (d. 1341), was the first among Christian authors since the time of Origen and Jerome, who, in imitation of the Jews, especially of Solomon Isaaki, made use of a knowledge of the Hebrew for the interpretation of Scripture? Is it not a reproach and disgrace to the Church, that nearly five hundred years after the golden age of grammatical science among the Jews, *Johannes Reuchlin* should have compiled the first dictionary and grammar at all worthy of the name (1506),\* and by which he fancied he had erected to himself a "monumentum ære perennius"? Reuchlin studied at Vienna under Jakob Jehiel Loana, physician to the Emperor, and at Rome under Obadia Sforno; he was also liberally assisted by Joh. Beham, a minister of Ulm, who had obtained several grammatical works from the Jews of that place, before they were expelled from it, and had caused them to be translated. He borrowed from the Jews every thing taught by him, even to their terminology, and not excepting a

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tirely on the principles of the Spanish school, and is a carefully digested performance, exhibiting a skilful use of the most distinguished grammarians of Spain and France, (among others of אברהם בן-יהושע fol. 1 a., and Josef Chazan of Troyes, fol. 69 b.); the latter part of the work is truly excellent, expounding masoretically the doctrine of the vowels and accents, which is founded on the Masora and the best MSS.

\* It is unnecessary to notice particularly the attempts in this line of *Petrus Niger*, a Dominican Monk (*Rudimenta Linguae Hebraicæ* c. 1450 ms. Paris), and of *Conrad Pellican*, who is said, in the *Chronicles of Neustadt*, to have studied under Elias Levita (*De modo legendi et intelligendi Hebræa*, Basileæ 1503). Reuchlin either did not know or would not notice them.



little of the Cabala! I wish not to remark on the indolence of the Church, shown in the fact that *Santes Pagninus*, an Italian Dominican who flourished shortly after Reuchlin, was the first since Jerome that translated the whole Hebrew Bible into Latin (1527), assisted by Kimchi's *Liber Radicum*, which however he badly understood throughout. It is much more pleasing to dwell on the circumstance, that the study of the Hebrew was somewhat promoted in this age also, and that the Church, instead of retrograding in this respect, continued, although only tardily and by degrees, to make some steps in advance. For she not only began to make use of the grammatical and lexicographical knowledge of the Synagogue, but, desirous of convincing the Jews out of their own books, felt compelled also to examine the writings of the Rabbins, which had been incredibly increased since the times of the Fathers, who maintain a profound silence respecting them. This will be made sufficiently obvious by a comparison of the *Dialogus* of Justin Martyr with the *Pugio Fidei*, which exhibits an excellent and rare knowledge of Jewish literature.

¶ We thus perceive how the Hebrew language, until the Reformation, was confined within the walls of the Synagogue, and how very few there were, in the meantime, that endeavored by their private studies to bring it into the possession of the Church. Fifteen centuries had elapsed, and scarcely a beginning was made towards introducing into it a knowledge of the Hebrew; but on the revival of the study of the Sacred Scriptures, which took place at the period of the Reformation, it began in consequence to be studied with great diligence both by Protestants and Romanists, as appears in the instance of *Thomas Cajetan* (d. 1535), who, after an unsuccessful controversy with Luther, applied himself to the study of the language, assisted by a learned Jew whom he supported and rewarded in various ways. The question then arises, in what way did the Hebrew language, in this its *third* stage, obtain a footing in the Church, and by what means was the latter enabled to acquire and to propagate this knowledge? The Church, it must be answered, seems by no means to have selected the most appropriate mode for the attainment of this object. It trusted to the teaching partly of those who had not themselves studied under Jews, or of illiterate converts, such as *Johannes Böschenstein*, *Antonius Margarita*, and others, whom I hesitate not to pronounce rude

and ignorant men, without judgment and without taste;\* and partly to that of Jews, whose knowledge of their language was as slender as it was profitable to them in a pecuniary point of view, as for instance *Elias Levita* (b. 1472, d. 1549), who, from a mediocre and slightly esteemed grammarian among his own people,† became a distinguished oracle of the Church, of such weighty authority that his groundless conjecture respecting the origin of the Masoretic and Tiberian punctuation, (entirely opposed as it is to the genius of the learning of Palestine, to the pronunciation of the school of Tiberias, and to the character of the Masorites,) was sufficient to lead Lud. Capellus, Joh. Morinus, and others, into the most futile opinions. Moreover, hardly had the Church been able to convert to its own use a little of the tradition and instruction of the Synagogue, and to understand Kimchi's Michlol well enough to employ it for the purpose of compilation,—hardly had the *Buxtorfs* planted those trees which, if sedulously watered, might have borne fruit to a succeeding age, —when there arose some who rejected the authority of their Jewish masters, and substituted absurdities concocted from their own brains instead. Among these were *Joh. Forster* (d. 1556), a pupil, strange to say, of Reuchlin, *Samuel Bohle* (d. 1639), and one *Bibliander*, who all seized upon the over-bold opinions expressed by Luther, as to the recent invention of the points, the corrupt state of the text, and the worthlessness and even injurious tendency of the Jewish writings; but who seemed to have forgotten his opinion in the case of Pfefferkorn, and with how much modesty he owned that the Kimchis had solved the difficulty for him.

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\* Among the more learned of the converts who taught Hebrew in the Romish Church, about the time of the Reformation, are to be reckoned *Alfonsus Zamora* (*Vocabularium* 1514, 1526), *Paulus Paradisi*, a Venitian, who was invited into France by Francis I. (*De modo legendi Hebraice*, Paris 1534), and *Gulielmus Franchi* (שמש לשון הקדש *Sole della Lingua Santa*, Bergam. 1591, 99, 1603. *Alphabetum Hebraicum*, Rom. 1596.)

† *Elias Levita's* reputation appears to have arisen from the fact of his writing in a style easier to be understood, and more adapted to the occidental taste. But I confess I do not comprehend on what grounds it is affirmed that this *Elias* brought the grammatical system of the Jews to perfection, and that the more distinguished grammarians who followed him are of no account. (*Gesenius, Geschichte der heb. Sprache* § 32.)

The Church was still an infant in the knowledge of Hebrew, when, on account of the errors she considered herself to have imbibed with her nurse's milk, she came to the conclusion that she needed no further nutriment or support from that quarter; and although hitherto her whole knowledge of the Hebrew had been derived from the tradition of the Synagogue, she conceived that she had now obtained possession of the language in her own right, and consequently set about the composing of grammars and the interpretation of Scripture for herself. Into what and how many errors, and into what vain and fruitless labors our grammarians were led, by this haughty boasting, it would be painful to recount. The ignorance that accompanied this early stage of the study caused them to mangle the Hebrew like a subject long since dead, and to fancy that any further instruction was superfluous. Hence arose a multitude of ridiculous systems and hypotheses, into which they would never have fallen had they esteemed more highly the teachings of the Synagogue, and examined its grammatical productions with greater care. Hence there crept into their lexicography that sort of superstitious divination and logical subtlety in the definition and derivation of words, over which the reigning philosophical and dogmatical systems had such influence, that the lexicon of Santes Pagninus is preferable to Stockius's *Clavis*; hence, too, originated those obscure and perplexing arcana that gave during whole centuries such trouble and disgust to learners, the *Cubus et Quadratum Grammaticum* of *Elias Hutter* (1590), and that *Systema Morarum* invented by *Jac. Alting* (d. 1699), and completed by *J. A. Danz* (d. 1727), on which many down to our own times have fruitlessly expended so much time and labor. To this source, also, are to be attributed those vain lucubrations respecting the rhythm and metre of Scripture, and that almost incredible number of treatises on the accents, all and every one of which were equally laborious in the undertaking and bootless in the execution. But that I may no further transgress the bounds of this third stage of the language, suffice it to say, once for all, that whatever is sound and historically proven in the grammatical exegesis of this orthodox age, is owing to the Synagogue, while the rest is to be attributed to their own presumption. Yet it is certainly the case, that Hebrew studies made some progress even during this slight use of the teachings of the Synagogue. For although Jewish literature was attended to for the most part only for polemical purposes, and their

ability to understand, not to speak of criticising it, was very imperfect; still the Church did in a manner lay open the way to its recesses, and formed some judgment of what and how much it contained that might be converted to her own use. The violence of controversy did much to obscure her vision, unskillfulness in the modern Hebrew gave rise to frequent misconceptions, and the defective state of history and criticism produced many crude opinions; still the Church, although she has since entirely neglected this study, produced some excellent things, and has prepared the way for us by some admirable works, such as those of the Buxtorfs, whenever we may undertake to remodel or complete what she has begun.

Towards the close of the sixteenth century, the *fourth* stage of Hebrew studies commenced, in which the Shemitish dialects, as well as the other Oriental languages that had become known to the Romish missionaries, began to be sedulously investigated and compared with the Hebrew, as the Greek and Latin had been before. This was done with great learning and with still greater industry in *V. Schindler's* pentaglot lexicon (1612), in *Joh. Fr. Nicolai's* harmonic lexicon (1670), and especially in the heptaglot lexicon of *Edm. Castell* (1669); to these were added a number of harmonic grammars, in which it was customary to join to the Shemitish dialects languages of a totally different character, as the Persian. This comparison could not however make up for the neglect of Jewish tradition, especially as it was merely external, and depended on conjectures arising from a resemblance in the form and meaning of words, and not on any fixed principles. Still the Church now for the first time perceived the comparison of the Shemitish languages to be a powerful aid in the investigation of the Hebrew—one which the Synagogue in former days had begun to make use of, but had latterly in a great measure neglected. For *David Provenzale* compared only the classical and Romance languages; *Salomo ben-Melek*, where he compares the Arabic, borrows for the most part from Abulwalid; and most of the others either confine themselves exclusively to tradition, as did those great masters of the masoretic art, *Menahem Lonzano* and *Salomo Yedidya Norzi*, or else they undertake to explain the Hebrew out of itself, assisted only by a comparison with the modern Hebrew and Aramaic, of which class were *Abraham Velmezi* or *Balmes*, *Mose Provenzale*, and *Mose Lebuzi*. The following, who were preceded by many grammarians both of the Spanish and Italian

schools,\* composed the rules of grammar in verse, viz: *Immanuel Benevento*, *Samuel Archivolti*, *David de Pomis*, *Juda Carpentorasi*, *Salomo Oliveyra*, *Sabatai Premslau*, *Isaak Samueli Posnani*, and *Salomo Hanau*, to whom, truth obliges me to confess, none of our own grammarians in that age are to be compared. It was very detrimental to the Church, that in pursuing her Hebrew studies she continued to despise all intercourse with the Synagogue; this is sufficiently evident from the fact that those who have of late written on the history of Hebrew grammar, have not been able even to name any one Jewish grammarian later than *Elias Levita*, whose *Masoret ha-Masoret* was published in a wretched German translation (1772) by *J. Salomo Semler*, a person of very slender pretensions. In fact there were not wanting men who rejected the comparison of the dialects and ancient versions, considering the Hebrew as so sufficient for its own explanation, that light derived from any other source would tend rather to obscure than to illustrate it; among these was *Jac. Gussetius* (d. 1704), who deceived himself with the idea that the ancient Hebrew could be explained by the mere comparison of passages and a studious observation of the analogies of the language. To him must be added *Casp. Neumann* (d. 1715) and *Val. Loescher* (*De causis Linguae Hebrææ*, 1706), the former of whom attributed to each letter a certain hieroglyphic or symbolic signification, and the latter a logical value. They both agree that the triliteral stems proceed from *biliteral roots*† (called by *Neumann characteres significationis*, and by *Loescher semina vocum*), and that their signification results from the innate force of these binary compounds. This hypothesis gained such currency, that there exist perpetual commen-

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\* Among these was *Rabenu Tam* (d. 1171), of whom we possess a poem consisting of forty strophæ on the laws of the accents, and which contains by way of acrostic the name of *Jakob bar-Meir* (MS. in bibl. Ross. no. 563), and of *Mark Sam. Girondi* (Luzzatto, *Prolegomeni*, p. 28), whose grammatical work is contained in the preceding part of the MS., and is entitled שניי נקיר, which, as well as the ספר יריריה of *Josef Chazan* of Troyes, follows the principles of the Italian school, and exhibits a total ignorance of the theory of *Juda Chayuj*, as does also the work of *Salomo Isaaki*.

† See *Jo. Engestroom*, *Tentamen gradualè de Hebræorum primitivis biliteris*, Londini Scand. 1738.

taries on the Scriptures, in which the meaning of the more difficult words is deduced in a most ridiculous manner from the aggregate power of the several letters. Still, the error of these men is deserving of our respect, both because it proceeded from a veneration for Scripture, and because by these first attempts they promoted the study of the comparison of the language with itself, which they felt to be a most efficacious instrument for its investigation. They attempted, in fact, to divide the indissoluble germs and as it were atoms of language, and to ascertain wherefore they had this or that meaning—in a word, to lay bare the innermost mysteries of human speech. This they undertook to perform, not in the *historical* manner, that is, by proceeding from the external (of which they knew but little) to the internal, but after the *ideal* method, that is, by precipitate conclusions from the internal, which they fancied their conjectures had reached, to the external.

Against Gussetius, who extolled internal comparison to the skies, and against *J. Drusius* (d. 1616), and in fact all who consider Jewish literature as of any value for the explanation of the Scriptures, arose *Alb. Schultens* (d. 1750), an author of the Belgic school, with whom, according to our reckoning, the *fifth* age of Hebrew studies began. He attacked Jewish tradition in the most furious manner, declaring that all who favored it were infected with the plague; he also endeavored, not simply by vehement language, but as it were with the very thunders and lightnings of eloquence, to level before him all who, imbued with the errors of the foul Synagogue, maintained the Hebrew to be a sacred and primeval language. "O incredibiles excessus," exclaims he, in the Preface to his Arabic Grammar, "in quos magna etiam ingenia, fulgore *Linguae et Scriptionis Sanctae* delusa, abierunt! O tristia, adhuc quidem, fata literaturæ hebraicæ! quæ ex longa captivitate per reformationem sacrorum educta, graviora mox sentire cœpit vincula, atque sub *Rabbinorum* auctoritate avecta est in Babyloniam judaicam, ut *Christianorum* quoque doctorum opera ac manu commodis subserviat Synagogæ in *Epha* sua!" These phillipics one could pardon, had he contented himself with refuting the really blameable errors of his predecessors, and had not passed over from the Jews to the Moslems. Among the Oriental languages which began to be treated both grammatically and lexicographically in connexion with the Hebrew, and were now brought daily more and more into use for its elucidation, the

*Arabic* occupied the first place ; and, as the study of the Sacred Scriptures gradually ceased to be the whole aim of the learned, it began to inspire many with a most violent admiration. To this, indeed, no one could object, had they but taken care not to deliver up the holy mother into bondage to her beautiful daughter. But such was the blind zeal with which Schultens combatted for the dignity and authority of the Arabic, that he declares it to be a more lucid language than the Hebrew, not perceiving that, as being of a much later date, it has need of illustration from the Hebrew, rather than the Hebrew from it. These rash opinions were the source of many errors, which were multiplied by his followers to an incredible extent. For these Arabizing Hebraists never thought of inquiring into the age and origin of the Arabic, its primitive relationship to the Hebrew, and the genius and peculiarities of each language, so as to determine more accurately how far the former might properly be employed in elucidating the latter. And thus it happened that the Arabic, a much younger and, through the fault of those who have treated of it, a much obscurer language,—whose grammar before Ewald and whose lexicography to this very day have been merely *empiric*, came to be regarded as a very key of Solomon for unlocking the secret recesses of the sacred tongue. This perverse and inconsiderate system of employing the Arabic became so firmly established and interwoven with Hebrew lexicography and the exegesis of the Old Testament, that even in this our own age it has scarcely been eradicated. Still it cannot be denied that, notwithstanding the errors of this period, an evident progress was made in Hebrew studies. Albert Schultens, the founder of the *hyper-arabizing* school, was also the parent of the *comparative* study of Hebrew. This is vastly different from the *harmonic* method of former times, its object being, as he himself well observes, “ that these studies, which now are in an almost perishing condition, may again be made to flourish and to bring forth fruit more and more abundantly ; that we may not be content with saluting the thresholds of the dialects, or with remaining stationary in the outer halls thereof, but may force our way even to their innermost chambers ; in order that through this deeper and more intimate acquaintance with them, we may clearly perceive their *harmony* and truly sisterly connexion, whereby they constitute and represent *one body of primeval language* ; and that the true genius of the *Hebrew dialect*, with its ancient riches and admirable gifts, may shine forth from

the candlestick of the Church, and clear up with its gladdening light whatever of obscurity yet remains." This praiseworthy aim he indeed pursued, but did not attain; for, he made no distinction between *dialectic* and *exotic* comparison,\* and the former he circumscribed within the narrow bounds of the Arabic language, altogether neglecting the Chaldee, and but rarely using the Jewish commentaries; while his disciples, who made the Arabic their sole oracle, left them entirely untouched.

If we now look back upon the several stages of the study of Hebrew which I have briefly described, we perceive that no aid to the investigation of the language was left undiscovered or unemployed, although many errors and abuses accompanied these first attempts. Our forefathers (to whose memory a reverence is due far higher than mere learning can command) have left us eternal monuments of immense erudition and stupendous industry: they laid many sources of knowledge open to us, and prepared the way for those advances which either have been or yet remain to be made; much they foresaw which they could not themselves accomplish,—and, which is by no means to be despised, they have taught us by their own errors what we have to avoid: yet if we suffer ourselves to suppose that they have laid the true foundation for the investigation of the Hebrew language, we are deceived by a superstitious veneration for antiquity. This is in fact a task which could not be accomplished by men who attached no weight to the authority of tradition; who were ignorant of the laws of *internal*, the requirements of *dialectic*, and the bounds of *exotic* comparison; and who, to crown all, knew not the necessary connexion and proper mutual employment of these several aids. The question then arises, What was accomplished in the next ensuing or *sixth* stage of Hebrew studies? We answer, the comparison with languages of the same and of different stocks was certainly carried much further; although in such manner, that the Arabic constantly had the preference over the Aramaic dialects, while the modern Hebrew was totally neglected. The study of Jewish literature sunk into disuse, and was even attacked with the ut-

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\* By *comparatio dialectica* the writer means the comparison of a language with another of the same stock, as the Hebrew with the Arabic; and by *comparatio exotica*, the comparison with one of a different stock, as the Hebrew with the Sanscrit.—Tr.



most virulence by some, as for instance *J. D. Michaelis* (d.1791), whose rashness and inconsistency are shown in forcing in Arabic etymologies and even foisting them on the Septuagint. Etymology even in this period was not restricted by certain laws; and the more the boundaries of Oriental learning became increased, the further and wider were these wanderings extended, and the greater was the field laid open for the exercise of a perverse ingenuity. Still it must be owned that Hebrew studies acquired in this stage a degree of solidity and firmness to which they had not before attained. In it arose three distinguished men who are deserving of high praise for their efforts in promoting a knowledge of the Hebrew tongue, namely : *Wilh. Gesenius*, *Herm. Hupfeld*, and *Henr. Ewald*.

*Gesenius* explained in the most lucid manner the principles of grammar, which had hitherto been so repulsive to students by reason of the complex form and harsh technicalities in which they were involved; he introduced order where there had been confusion, and adorned all by the pellucid clearness of his style. He was moreover the first to institute a sober and at the same time more extensive comparison with other languages; and although he here oftentimes fell into error, he ever and anon pointed out the way, by a kind of happy augury, to what was afterwards found to be the truth. He was the first to introduce into Hebrew lexicography the use of the Sanscrit, the study of which had begun to infuse a new life into the philology not only of the classical, but also of the Shemitish languages. He banished philosophy from the province of lexicography, although we sometimes observe it returning by stealth under the garb of rationalism; he perceived, if he did not always avoid, the errors of the Belgic school, and pursued the happy medium between the extremes of too much and too little in the use of comparisons from the Arabic; and, although he showed too great an enmity to Jewish tradition, he inserted in his lexicon a great deal of useful matter from the grammatical works of the Jews written in Arabic, and especially from *Abulwalid*. *Hupfeld*, who perceived that the comparison of languages as hitherto pursued was rather conjectural than founded on induction, entered into a critical examination of the doctrine of sounds in his *Exercitationes Æthiopicae* (1825). He also, in his dissertation *De emendanda ratione Lexicographiæ Semitiæ* (1827), diligently examined the systems of *Neumann* and *Loescher* as well as of *Schultens*; and, which we with grati-

tude acknowledge, he recommended also the comparative study of the Japhetic languages, religiously observing the peculiar genius of each dialect as well as of the whole Shemitish family. He moreover rejected the doctrine of primitive triliteral roots, maintaining that they consist originally of a smaller number of elements, which have been increased by means of prosthesis, epenthesis, or paragoge.\* This work, however, contains two suggestions which have no probable foundation in truth: one is, that an equivalence in the *powers* of roots results from an agreement in their *forms*; the other, that all roots are derived from *biliteral* germs, which are onomatopoetic in their origin;—both of which theories may be shown by a comparison of the Hebrew with the Sanscrit to be false. Ewald also, who has proved himself a strenuous opponent of the *empiric* method of Gesenius, has done much to deserve our grateful thanks. He entered deeply into the investigation of the nature of language, in the formation of which he rightly contends that chance has had nothing to do. He carried out the ingenious speculations of Hupfeld, concerning the sounds of letters; and, not content with a study of the mere externals of language, sought to penetrate to its very foundations. Being of opinion that the laws of the Hebrew language are not to be sought away from itself, but must be drawn from an examination of its inmost recesses, he applied the torch of reason to the elucidation of its structure, which he considered worthy of the profoundest study,—in order thus to bring to light the principles and producing causes of the phenomena that present themselves to our view,—and, by laying bare as it were the very vitals of the language, to arrive at a knowledge of the spirit by which it is animated. Accordingly this school, whose principles have been applied by *Ferd. Hitzig* to the interpretation of Scripture, has received the name of *rational* in contradistinction both to the *empiric* and *historical* schools. Ewald was the first to rescue the grammar from the arbitrary force of mere opinion, the hazards of conjecture, and the dicta of antiquity, and to bring it within the reach of scientific investigation; yet in so doing, he favored too much that philosophy which proceeds in the Platonic manner from ideas obtained by reflexion to the investigation of phe-

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\* This conjecture had already engaged the attention of many, among others of *Mat. Norberg*, in *Opuac. II. dissert. 15 et 16 (De verbis nudis et auctis Græcorum)*.

nomena, rather than the Aristotelian method of inquiry, which ascends by induction from the observation of things to their nature and causes. So much is Ewald given to philosophizing, that to peruse his *Kritische Grammatik*, you must suffer yourself to be dragged through a Dædalian labyrinth of the most repelling obscurities: his style is exceedingly labored, and his mode of investigation still more so. You must toil as though you were reading the Parmenides of Plato; and after all, if you apply the gold you think you have obtained with all this painful exertion to the touchstone of history, the teacher of experience, you will often find it to be false metal. He seems to think that the Hebrew language has been preserved entire for the exercise of his ingenuity: he pays not the least regard to antiquity, passes by the tradition of the Synagogue with perfect indifference, and looks upon the grammatical science of the Jews as the sapless technicalities of a language long defunct. He accordingly goes to work to explain the Hebrew from itself, relying on his own powers, and looking upon all that has been done before him as of no account. He has of late begun to compare the Hebrew with the Sanscrit, but still insists that they are divided from each other by a wide wall of separation; which, however, on a nearer examination almost totally vanishes.

While on this topic, I cannot pass by that most sagacious investigator of the Sanscrit and the Indo-germanic languages descended from it, *Franz Bopp*, who yet remains to Germany the worthy successor to the fame of that exalted genius and profoundest of scholars, *Wilhelm von Humboldt*. In his works on the Indo-germanic languages, and especially in his *Vergleichende Grammatik* (1833-42), he has shown and explained by an abundance of examples the nature of the letters and the changes which they undergo; he has also adopted Humboldt's distribution of roots into *verbal*, *nominal*, and *pronominal*, which illuminates with the light of day the grammar of all languages; and has shown in those of the Sanscrit family how much in the Shemitish languages still remains to be done. He has laid down the best general plan for the treatment of grammar, and has opened the way to the comparison of languages, which alone can enable us to explain the peculiarities exhibited by each: and though he excludes from his comparisons the Shemitish dialects, of whose conformity with and natural relationship to those of the Sanscrit family he is not yet convinced, still he has prepared the latter by his able analysis of them for a com-

parison with the former; and, if I might be allowed the figure, he, acting as bridegroom, has led forth the Sanscrit as a betrothed encircled by her companions, to be joined in holy wedlock to the head of the Shemitish tribe. *A. F. Pott* also, whose erudition and industry are such that I know not which most to admire, has done excellent service to the historico-analytical school; and, although occasionally his comparisons are far-fetched, and his fondness for analysis carried to extremes, he has stored up a rich harvest of the most acute observations in his *Etymologische Forschungen* (1833-36), and has given a list, after the manner of *Rosen*,\* of those Sanscrit roots whose meaning is established beyond a doubt, to the number of *three hundred and seventy-five*. Of these *J. Fürst* has undertaken to show that there is not a single one that is not also Shemitish.

With *Julius Fürst*, whom I am proud to call my friend and master, a new age of Hebrew studies has begun, which, if you will not consent to call it the golden age, you will at least allow to be the next to golden. For this I will now give my reasons. The sources to which all scholars in all ages have applied in order to obtain a knowledge of the Hebrew are three, *tradition*, *comparison*, and *philosophy*—the interpreter as it is called of nature: these aids, although in no period entirely separated, have never yet been properly conjoined into one equable system. One or the other has always prevailed to the neglect of the rest: thus in the talmudic age of the Synagogue, an almost exclusive attention was paid to tradition,—in the middle ages, to the comparison of the dialects,—and in later times, to philosophy; and this has engendered false views of grammar in the minds of many. In the Church, the tradition received from the Synagogue, whence she drew what knowledge she had of the Hebrew, predominated until the seventeenth century; its place was then supplied by comparison, first the harmonic so called, and then the etymological, as applied both to the Shemitish dialects and to the foreign languages which by degrees became known to the learned world; this was finally succeeded by philosophy (the favorite system of the rational school), which, despising tradition, and bestowing less attention on comparison, endeavored to explain the secrets of the structure of the Hebrew by the light of reason. The *historico-analytical* school unites all these aids

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\* *Radices Sanscritæ. Illustratas edidit Fridericus Rosen, Berolini 1827.*

in such proportion, as to form together one homogeneous and powerful instrument of investigation. It is called *historical* because, desiring to commence its investigations from the very beginning, it applies itself to tradition, especially that of the Jews, which is preserved in numerous literary monuments, and forms the depository of many things which we would vainly seek elsewhere;\* and because it considers that the connexion of the Hebrew both as to form and meaning with the other six families of ancient languages is to be shown historically, and that each law of the language is to be historically ascertained, namely, by comparing the Hebrew with itself, with its dialects, and with other languages, particularly the Sanscrit. It receives also the name of *analytical*, because it considers language

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\* Here belongs the doctrine of the vowel points, the diacritical signs, and the accents, which are all commonly included under the name of the masoretic punctuation. This topic, being purely historical and traditional, has not yet been discussed by a single one of our grammarians with satisfactory learning and perspicuity. *Ewald*, it is true (in his *Abhandlungen der orientalischen und biblischen Literatur*, 1832, p. 130 ss), has treated the matter with great philosophical sagacity, but as usual without any reference to authorities and with an entire dependence on the received text (whose accentuation is faulty throughout) and on his own ingenuity. The right way was first entered upon by *G. Riegler* and *A. Martinet* (*Hebräische Sprachschule*, 1835), who however drew their materials from the not philosophical but wholly historical work of Heidenheim. *Benjamin Heidenheim* (d. 1832), than whom our age has produced none more skilful in the masoretic art, in his book of the Laws of the Accents (משפטי הטעמים *Rödelheim* 1808), has used for the historical foundation and development of this doctrine—besides what was furnished him by the Masora, and by a large collection of MSS. with whose critical application he was well acquainted—the most ancient treatises on this topic by writers of his nation, as for instance the מתברר בן-אשר attributed to *Aharon ben-Asher* of Tiberias, and written in rhymes of equal length; the ספרי מקרא of *Ibn-Bileam*, a Spanish Jew; the שער הנגידות of *Moses Nakdan*; the lexicon of *Solomon Parchon*, &c. Excellent information has recently been afforded us on this subject by *S. D. Luzzatto* in his *Prolegomeni* (see note to p. 197), who far surpasses our own writers in his knowledge of the history of Hebrew grammar.

as the product, not of blind chance by means of an accidental con-  
course of atoms, but of a certain forming and guiding providence  
seated in the mind of man; and accordingly endeavors by a rational  
analysis to separate the accidental from the essential, the divisible  
from the indivisible, the native from the foreign, the roots from the  
stems, the branches from the leaves, the warp from the woof. When  
this is performed in an intelligent manner, we perceive that the  
primary material of all the ancient languages consists in an assem-  
blage of roots, equally flexible and commutable, and agreeing in  
three essential respects, that is to say, in number, form, and signifi-  
cation; they are found pervading all these languages, are the sources  
of all their strength and richness, the original producers of all their  
wealth of words, however *different* the latter may become while  
following *common laws* of formation and propagation. When by  
means of this analysis we have ascertained that the Shemitish  
family constitutes in fact but one language, whose triple branches  
rest on a single stem, we find also that the Sanscrit tribe cor-  
responds to it in the manner of an equilateral triangle (!). The  
following are favorite maxims of the *rational school*: that the  
Shemitish dialects are simpler in their structure and less liable  
to change than the more highly developed languages of the  
Sanscrit stock; that the former are propagated by the *forma-  
tion* of roots, which is brought about partly by internal vowel  
changes and partly by the external addition of inseparable in-  
crements, while the latter are formed by the *composition* of  
separable words either subordinate or co-ordinate one to the other  
in signification; that the Shemitish are inferior to the Sanscrit  
languages in the power of multiplying verbal roots, in the variety  
of their vowel sounds, and in the regularity of their formation;  
and lastly that the former are more spiritual and the latter more  
coporeal in their nature. But on instituting the analysis we have  
above described, these dogmas are found to be vain and incoherent,  
and the fancied excellencies of the Shemitish languages as well as  
their defects vanish into thin air. I will merely allude in this  
place to other discoveries of Dr. Fürst which will prove of signal  
service in the investigation of the language, as for instance the  
absurdity of the so-called verbs שׁוּ and יָצוּ, which were invented  
by arabizing grammarians after *Menahem Ibn-Saruk*,] for the sake  
of obtaining roots of the usual triliteral form;—the *vocal power*  
of the letters א, ה, and ו, which being established does away with  
a multitude of discrepancies

between the Shemitish and Sanscrit languages;—the doctrine of *verbal prepositions*, which, though running through the whole language, have heretofore been recognised by none; as also the *nominal* prefixes and endings, which before had scarcely been thought of, although common to the languages of both stocks;—the division of the verbs into verbs ending in a vowel, concave verbs, and perfect verbs; and of the conjugations into fundamental, intensive, extensive, and reflexive;—and finally the assertion of the primitive nature of the pronominal roots, which grammarians have heretofore most absurdly derived from verbs. All these I shall treat of separately and in their proper order in the sequel.\* I will merely add a few words respecting the labors of Dr. Fürst in propounding, carrying out, and perfecting the principles of the historico-analytical school, of which I have asserted him to be the founder. He first set himself to work to bring to light the so-called *Chaldee* language, the oldest of the Shemitish dialects, which he saw was despised by many, and had been suffered to sink into the deepest shades of obscurity; his object being to prove its relationship to the other Oriental languages, and by means of it, as affording the clearest evidence thereof, to demonstrate the close consanguinity of the Shemitish and Sanscrit families. He published accordingly his *Systema Linguae Chaldaicae* (1835), a work which received the applause of all its critics (among whom it is sufficient to mention Wilh. v. Humboldt), and which shed the most brilliant light, not upon the Chaldee only, but also on the Hebrew itself. To this succeeded an Aramaic Chrestomathy entitled *Charuze Peninim* (1836),† in which he vindicates the principles of the historico-analytical school against the attacks of Ewald, and confirms by a number of examples the doctrine of verbal prefixes, of which the germs only were developed in his former work. Having completed the Chrestomathy, Fürst applied himself with fresh zeal to the editing of *Buxtorf's Concordance*, a truly great and arduous undertaking, especially as the character of the editor himself as well as the progress of the age would not endure the republication of old and for the most part obsolete matter, unless what our predecessors had so well begun should appear per-

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\* They form the subject-matter of the third book.—Tr.

† The full title is as follows: *חֲרֻזֵּי פִּנְיִימ* Perlenschnüre aramäischer Gnomen und Lieder, oder aramäische Chrestomathie mit Erläuterungen und Glossar.—Tr.

sected by more mature knowledge and set forth with additional advantages. Accordingly, he added to the Concordance a Hebrew and Chaldee lexicon, which had also been considered indispensable by the previous editors, *Isaak Nathan* (1445), *Joh. Buxtorf* (1632), and *Mario de Calasio* (1662); this is given in modern Hebrew, and also, with a few omissions and additions, in Latin. Here the signification of each word is developed, and all the passages of Scripture cited in which it occurs; this is done with constant regard to tradition, by first seeking out the original germ or Sanscrito-Shemitish root, and distinguishing it from the formative additions by which it is propagated and its various meanings diversified;—and this not by way of conjecture, but according to certain fixed rules. The different uses are given in which a word occurs in the monuments of Hebrew literature, whether frequent or rare; the various acceptations which flow from the primary idea are enumerated in an order which is rather historical than logical; numerous observations are made concerning the grammatical inflexion of the word, the difference between it and its synonyms pointed out, and the period designated in which it was in frequent use, acquired a new meaning, or became employed in some peculiar manner; and lastly, the distinction is laid down between prosaic and poetical terms. In this lexicon, the author has paid more attention to the etymological than to the exegetical part, which he has thought better to reserve for one of larger dimensions. In this portion of his labors, which is truly excellent, there is little, we are glad to acknowledge, which is taken from others; and there is nothing at all admitted that is not examined anew and improved upon where necessary: there is much that first strikes the mind by its novelty, and then equally delights us by its truth. It is necessary however to compare with the Latin lexicon that in *modern Hebrew*, in which is found an abundant collection of synonyms, a constant comparison with the modern Hebrew and Aramaic, and a cultivated style, which emulates, as far as the subject will allow, the brevity of *Ibn-Ezra*, the copiousness of *Salomon Papenheim*, and the ease of *Elazar Kalir*. It is true that this kind of writing, being somewhat hard and difficult, may displease many modern scholars, whom the learning and manners of our age render averse to the Hebrew style of composition, and who, regarding the ancient authors as the only fit models of imitation, look upon the other treasures of the language with contempt and dislike; but if we will only take the



pains to accustom ourselves to its peculiarities, we cannot but own it to be ingeniously remodelled, curiously polished, and adorned with the finest gems of eloquence. Thus much of the Concordance, which gives a faithful representation of the gradual improvements that have been made in Hebrew philology. When this laborious undertaking shall have been brought to a close,\* it will be followed by a Hebrew lexicon, which has been already for some time begun, and is now drawing towards its completion, and in which the distinctions between the simple, augmented, and compound roots and words will be marked with even still greater nicety; this, again, is to be succeeded by a grammar, in which will be explained in a plain and lucid manner all the undoubted discoveries made in the course of the preceding works.

In these seven stages which I have thus briefly sketched, the science of the Hebrew language has been begun, continued, and completed; and if these be compared to the steps of a ladder, it can hardly be denied that we have now attained the last and topmost round. At no period have we been permitted so wide and unobstructed a view of the languages of the East, as that which has been opened to us within our own memory. We are placed, as it were, upon an eminence from which we may look forth on the languages of the remotest nations, and embrace them almost all within the sphere of our observation. From the time when we recognised in the Sanscrit our venerable mother-tongue, and in the Aramaic the ancestral speech of the Shemitish race, we have been enabled through our perception of their mutual relationship to enter also into a close familiarity with the Hebrew. Through a Divine Providence it has arisen that our age, which had disgraced itself by a most reprehensible disregard of the Sacred Scriptures, now abounds with numerous helps towards their better understanding, which our forefathers neither possessed nor could scarcely have any idea of. Hence it follows, if we mistake not, that now is being sown the seed of a harvest that posterity will reap; and whose maturity, although not yet arrived, rapidly draws near, by the aid of that

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\* This, it will be recollected, was written during the progress of the Concordance, which was published in twelve parts, extending from the year 1837 to 1840.—Tr.

Almighty grace which is removing every obstacle to its full and perfect development. "Plus ultra vocamur," says a distinguished doctor of our church, "ad eam in Scripturis facultatem, quæ sit *virilis et regalis*, perfectionique Scripturæ satis prope respondeat." Oh that the time may hasten in which learning shall minister to faith, and all our progress to the advancement of the Church; and when all shall drink to the full of that ocean of divine truth, of which as yet we have tasted but a few holy and precious drops! Already, methinks, the rays of the dawn are breaking through the thick shades that have so long environed us. Already the time approaches, when all the languages of the earth shall stand around the sacred tongue, and, like the sheaves of old, shall make obeisance to *Joseph's* sheaf; when all our studies shall revolve about the Word of Life, perpetually encircling and tending towards that holy luminary.

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## ARTICLE VIII.

### THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1843.

By the Editor.

THE Triennial Assembly was opened, on the appointed day, with a sermon characterized by those excellent qualities which mark the discourses of Dr. Wisner. The representation was, of course, not so large as in the Annual Assembly,—being limited to one delegate from each Presbytery, however numerous,—but was sufficiently large, and every way respectable. Some were there, who were also delegates, at the time of the division. Some with the wisdom of gray hairs; some in the vigor of mid-life; others in all the ardor of youth.

The Moderator, the Rev. Ansel D. Eddy, of Newark, N. J., presided with great impartiality and decorum, and the members universally exhibited a compliant, fraternal spirit. We think

few assemblies have witnessed as much of the *suaviter in modo* with the *fortiter in re*. The former was so evident as to call forth the remark from many, that "this was the only General Assembly within their knowledge, that seemed to have done any good to the city." Its influence must have been happy, for there certainly was manifested very much of the spirit of the gospel.

It is not our purpose to give a detailed view of the proceedings of the Assembly,—these have been abundantly reported through the weekly papers,—but simply to remark briefly on those topics of public interest, which elicited discussion.

*Dancing.* The first subject which excited attention, was a memorial from the third Presbytery of New-York, on the subject of promiscuous dancing, calling the attention of the Assembly to its prevalence in the churches, and the necessity for renewed exercise of discipline, in order to its suppression. The fact of the prevalence of dancing by professors of religion, not only in the large cities, but throughout the length and breadth of the land, seemed to be admitted on all hands. Some, however, thought that the evidence of the fact before the Assembly was not such as to call for action on the subject; some, that it belonged to the lower judicatories alone to attend to matters of discipline; that it fell not within the province of the Assembly, as now limited in its powers, to enter into the detailed evils existing in the church, and that it would be of little avail for this body to bear its testimony against prevailing sins. Others contended, and we think rightly, that the constitution expressly empowers the Assembly to act in such cases, and that one of its chief duties must now be, since its judicial powers are cancelled, to consult, in every way, for the spiritual good of the church, and to send down its admonitory voice, when any particular sins are evidently becoming prevalent.

Promiscuous dancing had become so peculiarly one of the amusements of a world lying in wickedness, and was in itself productive of so many evils, which seem inseparable from it, that all denominations of evangelical, spiritual Christians had denounced it as an amusement unbecoming the Christian profession, and savoring too much of a love of the world. Among others, a loud testimony was borne on this subject, some years since, by the Episcopal Convention. But the impression has been gradually gaining ground, for a few years past, that it is a graceful accomplishment, and a very innocent recreation,

highly conducive to good health, both by the exercise of the body, which it ensures, and the cheerfulness of the heart, which it inspires. We confess, we are afraid of it—afraid it will spoil the piety of many, seduce others away from the spiritual walks of the devoted follower of Jesus, and render the line of distinction between the church and the world so ill defined, as to lead multitudes to rely on a false hope, and stumble over worldly professors into the gloom of eternal night. Let it ever be remembered that “the friendship of the world is enmity with God;” that we must “come out and be separate;” “have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness,” and “avoid even the appearance of evil.” Dancing is not essential either to healthful exercise, or to a cheerful spirit: and, whilst we are decidedly unfriendly to locking up the sympathies, and freezing the animal spirits of children and youth, we cannot but feel that danger to the spirituality of the individual and the church is near, when those who profess to love Christ, and follow in his steps, manifest a disposition to enter into the vain and exciting amusements of an ungodly world.

*The Sabbath.* After hearing some very forcible and appropriate remarks on this subject from Rev. Justin Edwards, D. D., strong resolutions were offered, bearing decided testimony against public violations of the law of the Sabbath prevalent in our land, and encouraging the church to more decided action on this great question, so deeply involving the highest interests, and the permanent existence of this republic. Even these resolutions met with opposition from some few of the members; not, however, because the opponents did not feel sensible of the prevalence of the evil, nor because they did not fully sympathize with others in their love for the Sabbath, and their ardent desire for its better observance, but because they did not believe it the appropriate business of the Assembly to bear testimony against public evils.

We should have been disposed to believe, that this opposition and the arguments on which it rested had taken possession of the minds of those who presented them, in connection with their fears of the question of slavery, and had, unawares, become with them a principle of universal application, had not the venerable Dr. Hill himself warmly advocated the passage of the resolutions, and expressed astonishment at the declaration of opposite sentiments, and especially at the ground of that opposition. He believed it the *duty* of the Assembly to bear its *testimony* against

crying evils, and regarded the antagonist opinion as new-fangled doctrine, such as he had never before heard expressed in the General Assembly.

As intimated on the former topic, we are quite of the Doctor's way of thinking ; and we should regret to see the powers of the Assembly so construed, or so frittered down, that its solemn voice of admonition could not be lifted up against violations of God's law. Far distant be the day, when the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, shall resolve that it has no right, and is not in duty bound, to express its disapprobation of acknowledged sins.

Whatever may be said to the contrary, its testimony has great weight with the churches, and is felt even by the world, to be a powerful testimony. On this very question of the Sabbath, its decisions will be everywhere known, and generally respected, as the final judgment of a wise and educated body of men, from all parts of the union, and of more or less influence in their spheres of action at home. We should have felt as if an important link were wanting—as one of the speakers expressed it—in that golden chain of testimony which we trust is to enircle this land on this great subject, if this Assembly had withheld its testimony.

*Slavery.* Under the present constitution of government and society in this country, the subject of slavery is one of peculiar interest. No nation on earth is situated in respect to it as we are ; for its existence among us is diametrically opposed to the fundamental principle of that glorious Declaration of Independence, which resulted in our freedom. To proclaim the one on our fourth-of-July anniversaries, and, at the same time, to foster the other, is a mockery of truth, a proclamation to the world of our own inconsistency, and a practical desertion in the life, of the principles which we loudly proclaim with the lips.

In consequence of occasional rash procedures and unguarded denunciations, on the part of some of those interested in the great cause of emancipation, the sensitiveness of the South had become so extreme, that any agitation of the subject whatever, whether politically, ecclesiastically, or otherwise, was looked upon as disturbing the body politic, and interfering with individual and exclusive rights of southern men. Hence, it became a serious question, whether, in our ecclesiastical organizations, we ought to act at all on the subject of slavery, as we manifestly could not, without sensibly affecting the feelings of many of the southern ministers and churches, and compelling them to

adopt a separate organization, thus marring the unity of the church. On the other hand, it was felt that slavery is so manifestly a violation of the fundamental principles of the gospel, and the duty of the church to bear its solemn testimony against every crying evil so clear, that for the church in her organized capacity to shrink from the responsibility of testifying against the evil, would be to abandon the cause of truth and righteousness, out of a sinful, selfish regard to consequences.

Thus stood the matter when the Assembly convened; and men entertaining these opposite views, and coming from North, South, East, and West, were delegates in that Assembly. The question must be discussed. It was seen on all hands that there was no possibility of avoiding it. There were men there, who would never submit to an entire exclusion of the whole subject from the attention of the Assembly: and consequently all prepared themselves for a full and free expression of opinion, with a desire to reach the truth. It was resolved to sit with open doors, that all, who chose, might hear and report the discussion. The moment was big with interest when that great Assembly entered on a free, full, untrammelled discussion of that great subject which now agitates the world!—How was it to proceed? How issue? Would the speakers, ardent in the cause, be able to preserve their dignity and suppress passion? Or should we be obliged again to witness, what had been too often seen already in that same place, ebullitions of evil feelings and unguarded denunciations of brethren? If the discussion should grow too warm, would the community bear it?—And the issue! Were those who had thus far walked together in love, now to be sundered? Was this Constitutional Assembly to be broken into fragments, and were its members to go home alienated from each other, and weeping over the divisions of Israel? None could tell. All was dark uncertainty.

There was evidently a large representation in favor of some decided action on the subject; and in the earlier part of the discussion, votes on a substitute for the original report of the committee, and on a question of indefinite postponement, clearly indicated a strong feeling in favor of bearing testimony against the sin of slavery. At one time it was thought such testimony would certainly be borne by a decided vote of the body; but after a calm, deliberate, and protracted discussion, it was finally resolved, by a large majority, to leave the subject, where it has been, with the lower judicatories.

The argument, condensed and expressed entirely in our own language, was nearly as follows : On the one hand it was contended that slavery was a governmental, civil evil, made legal by the laws of the Southern States ; and not only legalized, but manumission, except for colonization, actually prohibited. Many good men, therefore, were involuntarily slave-holders, desiring to manumit, but being unable, because their slaves preferred bondage to colonization in Africa. To censure men, therefore, for what they could not help, without breaking up all the foundations of order and of society itself, did not seem to be the spirit of the gospel.

A second argument was, that a system of slavery, quite as bad as that of the United States, existed under the Roman Empire, in the days of the Apostles, and without any decisive antagonism on their part. The churches were not urged to ecclesiastical action, but, on the contrary, the relation of master and slave was distinctly recognized, and their respective duties clearly and gently pointed out. The conduct of the Apostles is a safe guide, and if they did not deem it necessary ecclesiastically to denounce slavery as a sin, we need feel no scruples about following in their steps. To act differently from them in similar circumstances, might be a very dangerous action. The proper and only safe mode of action on this system, so interwoven with the whole civil polity of the Southern States, was to imitate the Apostles, in preaching the truth on the great subject of salvation, and promulgating the grand principles of the gospel. Christ's kingdom is not of this world, therefore, his ministers are not to meddle with political matters, but to preach the gospel.

The other principal argument, on this side of the question,—that which we think had most weight,—was, that the unity of this great portion of the church is far more desirable than any divided testimony against slavery as a sin. We had lived and loved together ; had walked through the furnace, and had come out purified ; God had diffused the spirit of brotherly kindness among us, and had poured out his Spirit in nearly all our churches : why, then, should we proceed to such action, in a case at least doubtful, as would certainly lead to the secession of those Southern ministers and churches, which now sympathize with the Constitutional Assembly, and greatly prefer its organization and principles ? Shall we now, simply for the purpose of having the testimony of this Assembly against slavery, and that

at best the testimony of but a meagre majority ; shall we run the risk of marring the unity of our church ; of driving off our Southern brethren who love us, and whom we love in the faith ; and of becoming a spectacle to the world ? Will such a result be as likely to accomplish good, as our dwelling together in the unity of the Spirit, preaching Christ crucified, and in our several allotments at home, exerting our influence, according to our own views, on any and on all subjects of interest to the church and the world ?

On the other side it was contended, that although slavery is a political institution, and emancipation on the soil prohibited by law, Christians are not blameless, because they are part and parcel of the people, from whom the statutes proceed, and by whose representatives they are enacted. They voluntarily profess allegiance to the government, knowing its enactments on the subject of slavery, and do not, as the martyrs did, lift up their voices to testify against the iniquity of the laws. They ought rather to suffer wrongfully, being willing to be persecuted for righteousness' sake, and even to see the pillars of society shaken, than by silent acquiescence, help sustain those pillars when evidently resting on bases of error. Grant that the system is interwoven with all the relations of society, authorized by legal enactment, and enforced by judicial decision, can this justify the Christian in holding his fellow-man in bondage, under a system of law, whose every enactment is a violation of divine prerogative and human right ? Can he, with a clear conscience, live and move, and have his being voluntarily, where he is under a necessity of sanctioning a system which is diametrically opposed to the first principles of the gospel, which Jesus died to promulgate !

Nor could any one, under any circumstances, it was argued, be justified in buying his fellow-man. Let it be allowed that he is suffering the torments of a cruel master, that he is about to be torn from his family and sold into distant bondage ; that he comes imploringly and casts himself at your feet, begging your interposition by purchase, and promising to serve you faithfully all the days of his life ; still you cannot do the deed, because in so doing, you recognise the right of ownership in the master ; you contract for that which is not property as property ; you make the man a chattel ; you recognise as alienable, that which is inalienable, life and liberty ; you sustain the iniquitous system of slavery ; you act on the principle of doing wrong, that



good may come, and of choosing, between two moral evils, that which is the less, and, whilst prompted by feelings of compassion for the wretched, you disregard ultimate results and the greatest good of the whole, in consulting the present, temporary welfare of a few individuals.

In reply to the second argument of the opposite side, it was said, that although slavery existed under the Roman Empire, in the days of the Apostles, it differed from the slavery of our Southern States in several particulars, and was by no means so heinous; that although the Apostles did not directly assail the system as then legalized, but only proclaimed principles which they knew must ultimately undermine it, it does not follow that an Assembly of Ministers of the gospel, in this day of light and of farther advancement towards a full appreciation of the lofty humanities of the gospel, are not bound to testify against a system worse in some of its features than that of Rome, and, from the organization of the union and of the church, throwing a weighty responsibility, in respect to it, on the members of that Assembly.

It was further contended, that those passages of the Scriptures adduced in proof of the recognition of slavery as justifiable by the Apostles, were misunderstood and misinterpreted; that while the relation of master and servant was recognised as existing, the Apostles by no means justified it, when they exhorted Christian slaves to be obedient and patient, and to exhibit in their lives all the graces of the Spirit, that they might thus show forth the praises of Him that had called them out of darkness to light, and convince a gainsaying world of the power and efficacy of the religion of Jesus. Just so should we now exhort Christian slaves in this land, who have unbelieving masters, not forgetting either the exhortations of the Apostles to the latter, and reminding the slave, too, if he could obtain his liberty, to use it rather, as a better state. If the Apostles' exhortations to servants to bear and forbear could be rightly construed into a justification of compulsory servitude; then, on the same principles of hermeneutics, would the Savior's exhortation, when smitten on the one cheek, to turn the other, justify assault and battery, and His direction when the cloak is taken, to give the coat also, justify robbery. These exhortations to servants, which undoubtedly recognise the relation of master and slave, could never be meant to justify the system, because the fundamental principles and the entire spirit of the gospel are manifestly and totally opposed to

it. No man can read the gospel of the kingdom, and imbibe its spirit, without sensibly feeling that slavery, as legalized in this land, is founded on principles directly counter to it, and encourages practices which it positively condemns.

In reply to the other principal and probably most influential argument, it was contended that, however important the unity and harmony of this part of Zion, it could never be as important as testimony against the evils of the day. Indeed, peace was desirable only on the basis of truth and holiness. First pure, then peaceable. Whatever, then, might be our aspirations for the unity of the brotherhood, those aspirations could only be breathed out in connection with higher aspirations after the purification of the church from the evils existing in its bosom, and corroding its vitals. We should regret deeply to see our brethren of the South go out from us because we testify against an evil which they cherish, and of which they ought to repent, but we cannot suffer sin on our brother, without admonition, nor can we avoid feeling deeper sorrow that they should uphold, by their countenance, a system of so flagrant iniquity. Let our brethren of the South be brought to feel that they are the chief pillars in this temple of abominations, and that as soon as their support is removed, the temple itself will begin to crumble, and soon be levelled with the dust. Neither should it be forgotten that there is danger of division in the North, if this Assembly persist in its determination to bear no testimony against the sin of slavery. Which would be the deeper wound to Zion? Would it not, on the whole, be better, if division must occur,—which we deprecate, as much as our brethren who differ from us,—that the North should be united, and the South form a separate organization, than that the North should be rent asunder, and but a small portion of it remain in union with the South?

We propose no interference with slavery as a civil institution; we do not set ourselves in opposition to civil law; we only ask a testimony as to the iniquity of the system; only express an opinion as to its moral evil and contravention of the divine law. And why, if we believe it a sinful system, should we hesitate so to pronounce it? Shall we bear our solemn testimony before the world, against the sins of Sabbath-breaking and dancing, and pass by on the other side, as if we saw not, this legalized iniquity, which is depriving God and man of their rights? Never ought it to be: never can it be with some of us. Brethren are mistaken, if they presume that we shall go with them, in the

passage of resolutions, which leave this flagrant sin untouched by the Assembly.

The discussion of this agitating question was conducted in the true spirit of free inquiry, and proved, to a demonstration, that the community will bear the discussion, when conducted in a Christian spirit, and with a desire only for the triumph of truth. The whole issue is infinitely better than if the subject had been indefinitely postponed. As it was, all had an opportunity of fully declaring their sentiments, and although not satisfied with the result, have the pleasure of reflecting that their individual testimonies will go out, through the press, to the ends of the earth.

For ourselves, we felt that the spirit of love reigned in the Assembly, and, although in favor of mild yet firm action, on the subject of slavery, we are satisfied that members sacrificed their own preference to a conscientious conviction that, under the circumstances, more good, both present and ultimate, would be thus accomplished.

We are of opinion, however, that this question cannot be put to rest, and that ecclesiastical organizations, as well as individuals, will be obliged to form and to express their opinions either affirmatively or negatively, as to the sinfulness of the system of bondage established by law in this land of liberty. And the day is probably not far distant when men will feel, with Dr. Hook, that "every Christian man, whether laic or cleric, is in duty bound to consider, *not what is expedient at the moment for the sake of peace, but what is beneficial to the cause of truth*;" and with Bishop Wilson, that "*if for fear of offending men, or from a false love of peace, we forbear to defend the truth, we betray and abandon it.*" The great problem then, is, *What is truth?* We cannot persuade ourselves that it is other than true, that the legalized slavery of the United States is a system at war with the fundamental principles of the gospel, and that it can never be defended but by a perverted view of the system of Christianity. Can it be else than sinful to enact laws providing for the regular sale of human beings, even the sale of free colored debtors, to satisfy the claim of a white creditor? Can that be justifiable, and consistent with the will of Christ, which tends to the severance of those ties, of which Jehovah has said: "What God hath joined, let not man put asunder?"

Is not that love of liberty which burns in the bosom of the slave, a part of our common nature, and a high gift of Heaven? Then to quench the spark cannot be right. In the language of Gov.

McDowall, of Virginia, "It is allied to his hope of immortality ; it is the ethereal part of his nature which oppression cannot reach ; it is a torch lit up in his soul by the hand of Deity, and *not to be extinguished by the hand of man.*" In that of Mr. Preston : "Happiness is incompatible with slavery. The love of liberty is the ruling passion of man, and he cannot be happy without it."

Does not slavery, in as far as it can, nullify the relations between God and his creatures ? Does it not take away from man his right to life, liberty, and the regulation of his actions, responsible only to his Maker, and thus interfere with his accountability and his duty ? Oh, it grates upon our ears to hear grave divines say : "*Slavery is not forbidden by the Divine law, so it is left to our own judgment, whether we hold slaves or not.*" —Dr. Dalcho. "*Slavery as it exists at the present day, is agreeable to the order of Divine Providence.*" —Rev. Mr. Freeman.

"Earth is sick,  
And Heaven is weary, of the hollow words,  
Which States and Kingdoms utter, when they talk  
Of truth and justice."

That slavery is a wrong, an injustice, we doubt not for a moment ; and we hail the day, when every shackle of mind and body shall be broken ; when the poor slave, that now bows humbly at his oppressor's feet, shall lift himself up in the attitude and dignity of humanity, and shout *I am free* ; when the doomed spirit, which now groans under its bondage, shall burst all its fetters, and, unmanacled, drink in the living waters of God's truth, to its own refreshment and recovery, until it put on the very semblance of humanity redeemed, and join in the chorus of the skies : *Peace on Earth ; good will to man !*

Then the question returns, granting the system of slavery to be sinful, shall we as a church, through our highest ecclesiastical organization, bear our testimony against it ? There would seem to be no difficulty whatever, in answering this question in the affirmative, having once determined that slavery is sinful. Yet there are unquestionably peculiar difficulties surrounding this subject. The fact that it is, in many cases, an involuntary state on the part of the masters, a responsibility devolved on them by no choice of their own,—that it is a part of the civil constitution of the States in which they live, and manumission prohibited by law,—that action by the church might be interpreted as an un-

becoming interference with civil authority, and expose Christians resident in slave States to obloquy and to the charge of revolutionary action,—all these and other circumstances render this no ordinary question, nor one very easy of solution.

Yet, notwithstanding all these difficulties, regarding slavery in this Union as peculiarly offensive to God, and rendering us obnoxious to his displeasure, we are inclined to believe that the church, in her organized relations, is bound to look the subject in the face, in the fear of God, and openly to express her opinion. We deprecate all harsh, radical measures; all wholesale exercise of discipline, such as was perpetrated in 1837; but we think the peace of Jerusalem will be promoted, and the cause of truth and righteousness be subserved by candid, considerate, calm action on this great subject, to which the providence of God is now directing the attention of the world.

Let us talk it over then kindly; let us weigh well the obstacles; let us pray fervently for light; let the North withhold itself from fanaticism and faggotism, and let the South meet her responsibilities; the ministers and Christians of that section of our happy Union bear their testimony boldly but discreetly, and we have little doubt that now, when passion on the subject has well nigh been lulled to rest, men everywhere can be brought to see the evils of slavery, and the church's influence in its speedy removal be powerfully felt and acknowledged with gratitude.

- There is no occasion for division in our body on this question.
- We think that the Southern church itself, if the subject be presented in such an aspect as it can be, will be brought to feel the importance of the Assembly's testimony, and unite in a vote to that effect. Amen and Amen!

## ARTICLE IX.

## CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*The Anabasis of Xenophon : chiefly according to the Text of L. Dindorf ; with Notes : for the use of schools. By John J. Owen, Principal of the Cornelius Institute.* New-York : Leavitt & Trow. Boston : Crocker & Brewster. 1843. pp. 366.

THE *Anabasis* of Xenophon we regard as, beyond all question, the best adapted, of all the writings of antiquity, for a primary classical school book. It is in the first place a specimen of the finest Attic, and at the same time so remarkably easy and intelligible, that the Tyro may read it with delight, whilst to the critical philologist it exhibits all the elegancies and peculiarities of this most refined dialect. There is besides an air of romance about the *Retreat of the ten thousand*, which imparts all the interest of the most lively work of fiction, whilst the inimitable simplicity of the style, and an indescribable air of truth which pervades the whole narration, secure our entire confidence ; so that we never doubt that the descriptions are those of an eye-witness of too strict integrity to misstate, and too religiously calm amid dangers, to allow that false coloring, which might arise from an enthusiastic excitement of the feelings. Xenophon himself was one of the noblest characters of antiquity,—a practical moral philosopher, a most brave and skilful commander, excelling in all the social virtues, and at the same time most sincerely religious. Every morning witnessed his devotion ; every march was commenced under the auspices of prayer and sacrifice. In short, he was one of the most finished specimens of all that was meant by that noble Attic term *kalonagathos*, or the perfect Grecian gentleman of the old school, in an age when sophistry and skepticism had begun to make serious inroads on the ancient faith and purity of life.

A good edition of the entire *Anabasis* has been wanted in our schools, and we think the work of Mr. Owen well calculated to supply the defect. It has evidently cost him much labor, and exhibits everywhere evidence of the most thorough research. The notes form about one half of the volume, (364 pages,) and seem admirably adapted to the wants of the

student. We discover in them the practical teacher, most intimately familiar with the actual difficulties that daily occur in a scholar's progress. They are minute and full to a degree that some might deem excessive, and as calculated to make the learner's task easy. It should be borne in mind, however, that in the present state of classical learning among us, such books are needed for teachers as well as for scholars. The latter cannot have too many aids, if he is only guided by an instructor, who will see to it that he thoroughly understands their reason and application, instead of abusing them for the mere purpose of temporary facilities in recitation. The style of this author, although in general remarkably plain, is characterized by occasional obscurities of a most perplexing kind, arising chiefly from the use of military phrases, and from carelessness in local description. These passages have received peculiar care, and are generally cleared up in a very satisfactory manner. Special attention has been paid to the geography of the country, and in this respect the notes of Mr. Owen (comprising as they do, the latest information of missionary travellers respecting those interesting regions,) are entitled to the highest commendation.

Were we disposed to find fault with this work, it would be in respect to what may be styled the author's excessive caution in supporting his positions by too numerous references to authorities. Our own idea of a classical book is, that it should contain simply the results of the editor's best judgment in his selections from preceding compilations. Without fearing the charge of plagiarism from a succession of plagiarists, he should aim at spreading before the student the best and fullest information from whatever source derived. Mr. Owen frequently on a difficult passage, or in regard to a various reading, gives us the opinion of Schneider, and Borneman, and Dindorf, and Poppo, and then generally with most excellent judgment, gives his own, or selects the one which seems to him to be best. In almost every case of the kind, we feel disposed to confide in the correctness of his decision. Now for all the purposes of the student, the result of the author's investigations was all that he needed, and there is no probability that even the more advanced scholar would step out of his way to consult the authorities to which we are so copiously referred.

These minor faults, however, may be corrected in a second edition, and we simply suggest them to the author for that purpose. Without going into that detail which our limits will not allow, we conclude by cordially recommending the work

to teachers as a very valuable addition to our stock of classical school books. We much prefer, for this purpose, an entire work, (especially one so delightfully interesting as Xenophon's *Anabasis*,) to such fragmentary productions as most of those that are generally styled Greek and Latin Readers. It may well be doubted, whether in teaching a language, it is the best plan to arrange its several departments by regular rank and file in separate lessons, instead of presenting them as a whole, and as they naturally occur in some plain and interesting native author. We should be glad to see this book have that place, which it so well deserves, in all our classical schools, and have no doubt, that could its plan be carried out by teachers, with the same fidelity which the author has exhibited in the execution, it would be productive of the very best results. L.

2—*Classical Studies. Essays on Ancient Literature and Art. With the Biography and Correspondence of eminent Philologists.* By Barnas Sears, President of Newton Theological Institution, B. B. Edwards, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary, and C. C. Felton, Professor in Harvard University. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1843.

We have here one of the most beautifully printed books of the day, doing honor to the taste both of those who projected its costume, and of those who executed the order. We love to look on a beautiful book, and therefore regret the demand for the too cheap publications of the day, because they render it somewhat hazardous for a bookseller to expend his means in adding value to his publications, by offering them to readers in an attractive dress. We trust, however, the day is not far distant, when society will roll back the tide of trash which is pouring in its muddy waters with tremendous power, and adulterating the very fountains of individual and social life. Let good men rise and say, it must not be. Let them combine their influence for the encouragement of that which is decorous and useful.

The character and acquirements of the gentlemen, who have undertaken the task of these translations, are in themselves a pledge of the intrinsic value of the articles, as well as of the faithful execution of their part of the labor. We do rejoice in the diffusion of literature of so high an order, and cannot but believe that these translations will greatly tend to waken the aspirations of youth after higher and higher attainments in classical studies. After all new methods of education shall



have been tried, we shall, at last, come back to the conviction, that there is nothing so effective in disciplining, refining and elevating the mind as these same, oft-rejected and much abused classical studies.

But of the work itself. It contains a powerful plea for classical learning, in the form of an Introduction, whilst the articles themselves tend to the same end. The first is a view of the schools of German philosophy, embracing notices of Heyne, Winckelmann, Wolf, Heindorff, Bekker, Böckh and Hermann. The second is a translation of an essay of Tegnér, on the Study of Greek Literature. The third from F. Jacobs, on Classical Antiquity. Fourth, on Grecian works of plastic art, by the same author. Fifth, the correspondence of eminent philologists. Sixth, on the Dutch Philologists, Hemsterhuys, Ruhnken and Wyttenbach.

These are followed by other articles on valuable topics, and numerous notes, giving brief biographies of most of the eminent scholars mentioned in the body of the work. Let every lover of learning read the whole volume.

- 3.—*Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation. A Book for the Times. By an American Citizen. Second Edition.* New York: M. W. Dodd and Robert Carter. Boston: Tappan & Dennet,—Crocker & Brewster. Philadelphia: Perkins & Purves. Cincinnati: George L. Weed. 1843. pp. 239.

This volume has been already noticed editorially in the Repository, and has also been the basis of a distinct review. The fact of a second edition having been called for, is evidence that the author's labors have been appreciated. The argument we think sound and conclusive: and should be pleased to have the book read by those of the intellectual class, who are still skeptical as to the divine origin of the Bible.

- 4.—*Incidents of Travel in Yucatan. By John L. Stephens. Illustrated by 120 Engravings. In two volumes.* New-York: Harper and Brothers. 1843.

The author has here added two beautiful and valuable volumes to his "Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas and Yucatan." Mr. Stephens is deservedly a popular writer; and his recent investigations among the ruins of Central America and Yucatan, are appreciated by the scientific world. They have done much towards a satisfactory solution of the

question as to the origin of these mouldering ruins. The Daguerreotype views and drawings taken on the spot by Mr. Catherwood, will be of permanent value, and we are happy to know that it is proposed to publish them in an enlarged size, at \$100 a copy, under the auspices of the N. Y. Historical Society. Should the proposal be carried into effect, it will be an honor both to the Society and the country.

In the present volumes, we are introduced into many scenes of interest, portrayed in Mr. Stephens's easy, natural style, and have the details of his visits to forty-four ruined cities. But five of these had ever been visited by white men, and the existence of most of them was unknown to the residents of the capital. "It has been the fortune of the author to step between them and the entire destruction to which they are destined; and it is his hope to snatch from oblivion these perishing, but still gigantic memorials of a mysterious people." We commend the book as one tastefully got up, and especially as a monument of patient, persevering scientific research, which will tell on future generations.

5.—*Essays on the Church of God*, by John Mason, D. D. Edited by the Rev. Ebenezer Mason. New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 258.

We read this book in our youth, with pleasure and profit. It bears the stamp of that gigantic mind, which wrought it out, and will fully compensate any one for reading it. Let all young ministers study it well. The style is forcible and lucid, and the arguments powerful. No one can rise from its perusal, without feeling that he has acquired clearer and more scriptural views of the church and its officers. The author treats of the Term Church—Its Organization—The Mode of perpetuating the visible Church—Initiating Seal—Infant Members—Uses—Results—Officers, Ministry, Uses, and Qualifications.

On all these topics, the discussion is thorough and strong, and in the peculiar style of Dr. Mason. The chapter on the qualifications of the ministry, is a triumphant vindication of the necessity for high intellectual attainments, on the part of those who would minister, in the fittest manner, at the altar of God.

The son could scarcely erect a better monument to the father, than by the republication of these Essays in a separate form, thus rendering them accessible to all at a low price.

- 6.—*Lectures on the Epistle of Paul, the Apostle, to the Romans.* By Thomas Chalmers. New-York: Robert Carter. 1843.

This work is to be completed in five monthly parts, at 25 cts. each, three of which have been already issued. The name of Chalmers is, in itself, a guaranty that the lectures are no common-place affairs. They were originally delivered to his own people, and published at their request, and we are sure they will be sought after by many in this land, who have read the splendid thoughts and language of many of his sermons already republished here. These lectures are, by no means, critical, but good specimens of expository preaching.

- 7.—*Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature.* By John Kitto, assisted by several scholars and divines. New-York: Mark H. Newman.

This Cyclopædia is to be comprised in fifteen parts, of 80 pages each, to be published monthly, and each number to be accompanied by a plate or map. Names of high repute are announced as contributors; and if the first numbers are to be considered fair specimens of the whole, they promise well for the value and utility of the work. It will embody the discoveries and elucidations of the most recent travels and researches, and, in this respect, will be preferable to earlier works in the same department.

- 8.—*A Greek Reader for the use of Schools; containing selections in prose and poetry, with English notes and a Lexicon.* By C. C. Felton, A. M., Eliot Professor of Greek Literature in Harvard University. Second edition, revised. Hartford: H. Huntington. June, 1842.

We take pleasure in commending this work to the instructors of Academies and High Schools, as eminently adapted to the wants and capabilities of pupils in the Greek language. The selections are judiciously made and well arranged. The notes upon each selection are introduced by a brief but discriminating notice of the writer's life, style, and general character. The translations are faithful and full of life, not only furnishing to the student assistance in obscure passages, but also examples of close, accurate and elegant renderings, which are too rarely to be met with in works of this kind. The references are made to the excellent Greek grammar of E. A. Sophocles. The student who carefully examines these references, will not only find them of great use in elucidating

the meaning of a given passage, but will obtain a knowledge of his grammar, which will prove invaluable in his future studies. The general appearance of the work is neat and tasteful. We should have preferred a type with a larger face, and yet so distinct is the impression, that the smallness of the letter is no great objection to the book. We wish the work an extensive circulation, which we have little doubt it will obtain.

L.

- 9.—*Apostolic Baptism. Facts and Evidences on the Subjects and Mode of Christian Baptism. By C. Taylor, editor of Calmet's Dictionary of the Bible. With thirteen Engravings. New-York: B. H. Bevier. 1844. pp, 228.*

The publishers have done well to give this volume to the public. We think there is, at least, a sufficient array of "Facts and Evidences" to convince any one that immersion was not, in the ancient church, the only mode of baptism, that it was by no means essential to the rite, indeed, that in itself it was not baptism at all. The engraved representations of various baptisms, taken from early paintings and sculpture, testify to facts, in a manner not to be controverted. They prove positively that, in the day in which they were made, affusion was considered the proper mode of dispensing baptism. We should be glad to see these "Facts and Evidences" of Mr. Taylor, editor of Calmet's Dictionary, as well as some articles in the Repository, by Dr. E. Beecher, receiving due consideration on the part of the scholars amongst our Baptist brethren; for then we should hope soon to see the day, when their peculiar views should no longer deprive us of the privilege of sitting with them at our Saviour's board, nor them of the pleasure of acknowledging us to be fully entitled to all the privileges of Christ's house, equally with themselves.

- 10.—*Popular Exposition of the Gospels, designed for the use of Families, Bible Classes and Sunday Schools. By Rev. John G. Morris, A. M., and Rev. Charles A. Smith, A. M. Vol. II. Luke—John. Baltimore: Publication Rooms. 1842. pp. 366.*

This is the second of a series of Expository volumes on the New Testament, by ministers of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, intended principally, no doubt, for the families and schools connected with that branch of Zion. The English language is now so generally spoken and read by the Germans of this country, especially the youthful portion of them, that

some such expositions as these were felt to be needed. They are wholly of a practical, popular character, and adapted to be used in Bible classes and Sunday schools. The churches of that denomination will feel more confidence in them, as coming from their own ministers; and we rejoice in the belief that none but evangelical sentiments will find a place in these volumes.

- 11.—*The New Purchase : or Seven and a half Years in the Far West. By Robert Carlton, Esq. 2 Vols.* New-York : D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia : G. S. Appleton. 1843.

This Sir Robert Carlton, Esq., whoever he may be, is evidently telling us tales of our Far West, which have a considerable smack of reality about them; and the reality often not so very enchanting either to the dramatis personæ. We ourselves have seen somewhat of this far-famed land, yet not in so early a stage of its settlement; but we have admired its broad beautiful prairies, with their profusion of flowers; we have swum some of its deep currents on horseback, and have been caught and lost too in its thickets and on its deceptive steppes.

The author of the *New Purchase* has written us a very amusing book, detailing many of the stirring scenes among the original settlers of different localities in the West.

His description of the early mode of crossing the Alleghanies, before the smooth turnpike was constructed, or the railroad passage even thought of, is to the life; and he that would laugh a little over a shaving scene in the west, where 'tis said good old elders keep "brier hooks" of razors to try the temper of their clerical brethren—let him read this same Robert Carlton's description of it in the second volume.

The author is, we presume, a lover of true religion and generous piety, yet we think some of the scenes might have been represented as effectively without the use of the precise language of the actors, when it is unbecoming. There is an occasional profane speech, with which we should not wish our children to become familiar by reading.

- 12.—*An Inquiry into the Organization and Government of the Apostolic Church ; particularly with reference to the Claims of Episcopacy. By Albert Barnes.* Philadelphia : Perkins & Purves. 1843. pp. 251.

This is a convenient and excellent manual on the points of controversy between Episcopalians and those who maintain

the purity of the ministry. It pays little regard to the fathers, but presents the scriptural argument as fundamental.

It would be well for members of the church to be furnished with armor fitted for the conflict which is at hand; and we know of nothing, in the same compass, so satisfactory as this small volume by Mr. Barnes. On the basis of the Scriptures, any one may be prepared to meet an Episcopalian, when he sets up his exclusive claim to ordination; and with the great body of the church it will be of little avail to quote learned passages from the Fathers. Whatever they may have written and done, it is not by authority. The word of God alone is the rule of faith, and the basis of all order in the church.

The substance of this "Inquiry" first appeared in the *Quarterly Christian Spectator* in 1834-5, as a reply to Rev. Dr. H. U. Onderdonk's "Tract," entitled "Episcopacy tested by Scripture." It is now remodelled, however, and appears, not in opposition to Dr. Onderdonk directly, but to the Episcopalians. Somewhat has been added on the subject of "Confirmation," and the whole has been evidently penned in the kindest spirit, and with a sincere desire to arrive at the truth.

- 13.—*The Kingdom of Christ; or Hints respecting the Principles, Constitution and Ordinances of the Catholic Church.* By Frederick Denison Maurice, M. A., Chaplain of Guy's Hospital, and Professor of English Literature and History, in King's College, London. From the second London Edition. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: Geo. S. Appleton. 1843. pp. 595.

This volume, by Professor Maurice, will doubtless be extensively read. The style is winning, the thoughts are lucidly expressed, and the propositions and arguments such as must attract notice, certainly in England, if not here. Mr. Maurice is full of the idea of a "CHURCH UNIVERSAL, not built upon human inventions or human faith, but upon the very nature of God himself, and upon the union which he has formed with his creatures." Such a church, we think, exists, and embraces in its bosom all, of every name, who love the Lord Jesus in sincerity and truth. The author's desire seems to be to have this truth more universally felt and acted on. So far, we accord with him. But then, we fear, at the same time, that his views of the efficacy of baptism, of the power of absolution in the ministry, etc. etc., will tend to render the church too much a kingdom like those of this world, and not one of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.

Mr. M. does not go with the Romanist in denying the distinction of National Churches, and maintains also that the Church is a spiritual body, holding a spiritual Head: yet he leans so far over towards Rome, that, if in Rome, he might easily do as Rome does. We ourselves love unity and hate sectarianism, but the unity we love, is the unity of the Spirit; not a unity resting on external forms and services, but on a living faith in the heart, prompting holiness in the life.

Whilst, therefore, we should fear the tendency of some of Mr. M.'s principles, and cannot sympathize with him in all of his sentiments, we can commend the spirit in which the book is written, as doing honor to his heart.

- 14.—*The Scripture Doctrine of Christian Perfection stated and defended; with a Critical and Historical Examination of the Controversy, both Ancient and Modern.* By Rev. George Peck, D. D. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1842. pp. 474.

This work, by Dr. Peck, will be appreciated on all hands. It will be regarded by his own denomination as an accurate history and a good defence of the doctrine of perfection as held by them: and it enables others to know definitely what the Methodists of the present day mean by it.

For ourselves, we feel obliged to Dr. Peck for presenting the subject with so much ability and wisdom of research: and, although we should not be disposed to adopt the views, we can readily see that, with certain explanations, it may not be so very heterodox, and would certainly be far preferable to some other species of perfectionism, which have been recently broached in this land.

- 15.—*Psychology, or Elements of a New System of Mental Philosophy, on the Basis of Consciousness and Common Sense. Designed for Colleges and Academies.* By S. S. Schmucker, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Gettysburg. Second Edition, much enlarged. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1843. pp. 329.

The first edition of this work was favorably reviewed in the Repository by Dr. Krauth, and also noticed by the editor. It will, therefore, be unnecessary for us to repeat our estimate of the work at length. It has our hearty approbation as a suitable text book on psychology, especially as now enlarged on some topics of interest omitted in the former edition, such as,

—"the classification of the different entities in the Universe; the subject of mnemonics; the processes of perception and sensation, and the theories for their explanation; the different classes of feeling; the nature of analytic reasoning, and laws of human belief; imagination; and the operations of conscience."

Without these additions, the system was incomplete; with them, it embraces all that is needful as an outline, to be filled up and extended by the living teacher.

The philosophy will not, of course, be sufficiently ideal and transcendental for some minds; yet even such will confess that Dr. Schmucker has investigated the science of mind with more than ordinary attention.

- 16.—*The Simple Cbler of Aggawam in America.* By Rev. Nathaniel Ward. Edited by David Pulsifer. Boston: James Monroe & Co. 1843. pp. 96.

This "Simple Cbler of Aggawam" was the Rev. Nathaniel Ward, born at Haverhill, England, in 1590. In 1631, he was summoned before the Bishop to answer for nonconformity, and was forbidden to preach. Having a warm friendship for the pilgrims, he embarked for New England in 1634, and was soon settled as pastor of the church at Aggawam or Ipswich. He had much to do in framing the laws of the infant Commonwealth, and in drawing up a Body of Liberties. In 1645 he wrote the "Simple Cbler," and published it in 1647, after his return to England.

Fuller, in his "Worthies of England," says of him: "Following the counsel of the poet,

Ridentem dicere verum,  
Quis vetat?

He hath in a jesting way, delivered much smart truth of the present times." Increase Mather thus writes: "An hundred witty speeches of our celebrated Ward, who called himself the *Simple Cbler* of Aggawam, (and over whose Mantel-piece in his House, by the way, I have seen those three words engraved, SOBBIE, JUSTE, PIE, and a Fourth added, which was LETE,) have been reported; but he had one Godly Speech, that was worth 'em all; which was, *I have only Two Comforts to Live upon; The one is in the Perfections of Christ; The other is in the Imperfections of CHRISTIANS.*"

This same "Simple Cbler" has written some sharp things, and withal some very true things, in this little volume. Among



others, this: "Every singular opinion, hath a singular opinion of itself; and he that holds it a singular opinion of himself, and a simple opinion of all contra-sentients: he that confutes them, must confute all these at once, or else he does nothing."

And this:

"No king can king it right,  
Nor rightly sway his rod;  
Who truly loves not Christ,  
And truly fears not God.

He cannot rule a land,  
As lands should ruled been,  
That lets himself be rul'd  
By a ruling Roman Queen."

- 17.—*The History of the Christian Religion and Church, during the three first Centuries. By Dr. Augustus Neander. Translated from the German, by Henry John Rose, B. D. Philadelphia: James M. Campbell & Co. New York: Saxton & Miles.*

We have received from Messrs. Saxton & Miles, two parts of this valuable work. The whole will be completed in five numbers of the Biblical Cabinet, each containing ninety-six pages 8vo., in double columns, long primer type. Neander is chiefly known as an ecclesiastical historian, although his labors are not restricted to this department. He is deemed impartial, thorough in his researches, and desirous of exhibiting the truth. His spirit is good, and his aim high, and he is ranked among the friends of the truth in opposition to rationalism. And although we should differ with him in some of his principles and interpretations, we rejoice in his labors as tending to counteract the spirit of infidelity in his own country. The History before us will be read with interest and advantage, by those who would know more of the state of things in the primitive church.

- 18.—*The Keyes of the Kingdom of Heaven, and the Power thereof, according to the Word of God. By that Learned and Judicious Divine, Mr. John Cotton, Teacher of the Church at Boston, in New-England: tending to reconcile some present differences about Discipline. London: Henry Overton. Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1843. pp. 108.*

This is a reprint of an old work of John Cotton, that learned and judicious divine, who was summoned before the Court of High Commission for not kneeling at the sacrament. He

fled, however, and came to this country in 1633; and so great was his influence in New-England, that he has been called her *Patriarch*. The present volume was prepared as an antidote to the disorders originated by Ann Hutchinson and others, and also as a defence of Congregationalism.

The old style of the book, in spelling, punctuation, etc., has been preserved, rendering it quite a curiosity. Should the plan be encouraged, other similar works will be issued.

- 19.—*The Remains of the Rev. James Marsh, D. D. late President and Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, in the University of Vermont; with a Memoir of his Life.* Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1843. pp. 642.

Dr. Marsh was undoubtedly one of the finest scholars of our country, and his Memoir and Remains must be sought after by the intelligent public. Through Messrs. Leavitt & Trow, we received the work, but at so late a date, that we can only notice it very briefly. It is an octavo volume, printed with large type and on good paper, making a beautiful book. It contains an interesting memoir, by Professor Torrey, to whom Dr. Marsh intrusted his manuscripts before his death, and by whom they have been arranged, as we find them in the volume before us. From the glance which we have been able to take at the work, we presume there will be found in it food for the mind—suggestive topics for reflection. We have a systematic arrangement of the Departments of Knowledge, with a view to their Organic Relations to each other in a General System—Remarks on some points connected with Physiology,—Remarks on Psychology,—Three Discourses on the Nature, Ground, and Origin of Sin, with several Tracts, etc.

- 20.—*Church Psalmist; or Psalms and Hymns for the Public, Social, and Private Use of Evangelical Christians.* New-York: Mark H. Newman. 1843. pp. 653.

Psalmody is to the church a subject of the highest interest; a good collection of psalms and hymns one of her best possessions. What delightful and useful sentiments are impressed on our hearts by the hymns of the sanctuary, in which we united in our youth. What a treasure would they be on some solitary isle of the ocean. How precious in old age, and on the bed of death.

The church should look well to her psalms and hymns. They are earliest learned and longest remembered. How important that they should be good and true. The verse too, in

which they are expressed, is of no trifling importance. The songs of the sanctuary may be made a by-word and a reproach to Zion, if dressed in too homely and vulgar a garb. Every thing about them ought to be chaste, classic, dignified, appropriate to the worship of Him, who is supreme excellence.

We have weighed the "Church Psalmist," and it is not found wanting. The classification is philosophical, the selections choice, the poetry good, the variety sufficient, the sentiments scripturally orthodox. Having said thus much, it is scarcely needful to add, that we think churches about to make a change could scarcely do better than to adopt this collection.

It would be pleasant to have entire uniformity throughout the Presbyterian and Congregational churches, in the use of a book of psalms and hymns, so that wherever we might go, we should find our own psalm-book; but this is perhaps scarcely to be expected.

- 21.—*Dominici Diodati, J. C. Neapolitani, de Christo græce loquente Exercitatio; qua ostenditur græcam sive hellenicam linguam cum Jvdæis omnibus, tum ipsi adeo Christo Domino, et apostolis nativam, ac vernaculam fuisse.* Neapoli, M. D. CC. LXVII. Edited with a preface, by ORLANDO T. DOBBIN, LL. B. Trinity College, Dublin. London: John Gladding. Dublin: Curry & Co. New York: Wiley & Putnam. 1843. pp. 187.

We have here a reprint—of course in Latin—of a very rare work, which, when it appeared, excited universal attention, and secured for its author many tokens of the high estimation in which his labor was held. It became so scarce, at length, that neither Pfannkuche nor Hug was able to find a copy of it, even at Naples. The copy, however, from which the present volume has been reprinted, was purchased there in 1823. Fabricy and Wiseman both had access to it in the libraries of Rome, and Ernesti, in 1771, published an analysis of it, having probably found it at Leipsic.

The author undertakes to prove, in the three sections of his book, 1, that the Greek had become the national language of Palestine in the time of Christ, 2, that Christ, his Apostles and the Jews generally spoke Greek, 3, that the basis, on which the opposite opinion rests, will not support it.

Although we are not yet ready, with the editor, to adopt the opinion of Diodati, believing only, with Ernesti, Hug and others, that the Greek language had become almost, if not quite

as prevalent in Palestine, in the age of the Apostles, as the Aramæan, we feel grateful to him for affording us the opportunity of reading Diodati's argument for ourselves, in his own language and arrangement. We also thank him for his favorable notice of our own labors in placing Winer's Idioms within the reach of English scholars: and we certainly think, as he does, that an acquaintance with Winer is "indispensable to the scholar." When shall American students be taught to study it? Till then, their knowledge of interpretation of the New Testament must be meagre.

#### ADDITIONAL NOTICES.

*Walks in London and the Neighborhood.* By Old Humphrey.  
New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter.  
1843.

Mr. Carter has complied with our request, that, if Old Humphrey appeared again, he would let us see him. He appears in somewhat of a new form, but still retaining his characteristics. Piety pervades his "Walks."

*The Family of Bethany: or Meditations on the Eleventh Chapter of the Gospel according to St. John.* By L. Bonnet. Translated from the French. With an Introductory Essay, by the Rev. Hugh White. New-York: Robert Carter. 1843. pp. 256.

The Introductory Essay is good, but disproportionately long. The Meditations are interesting; many of them striking and profitable. The family of Bethany has always been precious to the Christian, as one which Jesus loved. Mr. Bonnet has well represented it in these pages.

*Lessons on the Book of Proverbs, topically arranged, forming a System of Practical Ethics, for the use of Sabbath Schools and Bible Classes.* Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1843. pp. 107.

For this small volume we are indebted, we believe, to Mrs. Louisa Payson Hopkins. The book of Proverbs cannot be too much studied, and we regard this as one of the very best helps in that study. It is a system of ethics.

## ARTICLE X.

## LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

*Russia.*

THE University at Dorpat has recently lost two of its most valuable professors—Huek, Professor of Anatomy, and Jansche, Professor of Philosophy.—Much has lately been done for the cause of education in Siberia. At Irkutsk there is a gymnasium of a high order, besides other schools there, and in many of the villages. Von Rupert, Governor-General of East Siberia, has founded an Institute for the instruction of girls of the higher class.—Professor Koch, accompanied by a number of young artists and scientific gentlemen, has set out on a second journey of scientific research, intending to traverse Great Armenia and the Caucasus.

*Prussia.*

A plan is proposed for the union of the Universities of Königsberg and Greiswald, as at the latter there are more professors than students, and at the former almost a like disproportion.—The Sanscrit manuscripts, purchased in London, from the estate of Sir Robert Chambers, are now in the University Library of Berlin, under the charge of Professor Hofer of Greiswald.

*Germany.*

THE King of Bavaria is about to erect, in his palace-park, a house like those of Pompeii, after the design made at Pompeii by Professor Zahn.—The *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, established first by Hegel, have now been suppressed by the Saxon government, after having been exiled from Prussia in 1841.—Dr. Fr. Von Raumer has been appointed Rector of the University of Berlin.—Dr. Schöll has been called as professor extraordinary to Halle.—At Leipsic, Dr. Fr. A. Schilling has taken the place of Dr. Winer as Rector of the University. In this institution are about one hundred professors.

*France.*

A manuscript of the celebrated republican, Buonarotti, has recently been discovered, which throws much light on the period from 1789 to the year V. of the Republic.

*Great Britain.*

A large secession has taken place from the established Kirk of Scotland, and formed a free Presbyterian Church.

*United States.*

Rev. Leonard Woods, D. D., of Andover Theological Seminary, will continue the discussion of the questions on Liberty and Necessity, especially in relation to Edwards's system, in the October number of the Repository.

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OCTOBER, 1843.

SECOND SERIES, NO. XX. WHOLE NO. LII.

ARTICLE I.

REVIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. PART THE SECOND.

By Truman M. Post, Professor of Languages, Illinois College, Jacksonville.

*The Social Influence of Democracy. By Alexis De Tocqueville, Member of the Institute of France, and of the Chamber of Deputies, etc., etc. Translated by Henry Reeve, Esq. With an Original Preface, by John C. Spencer, Counsellor at Law.*

THE Philosophy of Human Society is destined to become the great study of the age. The laws and condition of social progress, virtue, and happiness; the action and destiny of intellectual, moral, and political organisms; those thousand fixed forms of religion, law, government, and opinion, into which human society has crystallized; the characteristic passions and tendencies of the million: these are topics which are forcing themselves with grave and solemn interest upon the mind of our times. The investigation is one not stimulated by a liberal curiosity merely, but by convictions, every day stronger, of its practical and imperative necessity. It is becoming more and more felt, that it involves the problem which the nations must solve or die.

Men are learning from melancholy experience, that it is vain attempting to sustain political systems apart from the intellectual and moral life of a people, and that when institutions cease

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to be expressions of that life, they must soon be frittered away by reform, or retrenched by revolution. Society ever attempts to assimilate to itself the forms which constitute its visible embodiment, and failing of that, it labors incessantly to throw off what it feels unsuited to its nature, and a restraint upon its development and action.

But again, between the political forms and the spirit of a people, there is a mutual interaction. Outward institutions are not simply passive expressions; they become to some extent the plastic *moulds* of the national mind. Once created, from whatever cause, they tend to form it to their own likeness, and to stereotype with their image all after times. The products, at first, of intellectual and moral causes, they become in turn the efficient producers of such causes, and standing, as they do, permanent forces amid shifting generations, their influence, though slow, must be mighty and sure, and will perpetuate itself in the virtue or vice, ignorance or enlightenment, the magnanimity or meanness, activity or torpor, of the millions they overshadow. If they are favorable to a pure morality—the only permanent basis of human society—they of themselves furnish, for any people, an augury full of political hope; if not, they or society must die; either by slow and putrid dissolution, or in agony and convulsion; or rather, in the latter case, they *and* society must die; they throw themselves upon the pyre on which they lay the corpse of an empire.

The questions, then, that demand the investigation of the citizen or statesman, with regard to systems of political institutions, relate not only to the mutual relations of the different parts of those systems—their internal harmony, and aptitude for self-perpetuated, facile and secure action, and their operation on outward and material interests: but with a deeper earnestness they compel him to ask, what are the great social principles which gave them birth; and of the existence of which, as the central forces of society, they still, if possessing vitality, stand as indices? and whether they continue in harmony with their primordial principles? whether they now represent the ruling spirit of a people? and again, what is the influence of this dominant and central power, and of the institutions which are its visible organs, on national thought, feeling, and manners?

Immediately connected with these inquiries relating to the physiology, so to speak, of society, is the study of social patho-

logy and therapeutics—the laws of disease and cure in political bodies. These inquiries, it will be perceived, involve the gravest questions that can engage the human mind—the requirements, value, and destiny of all political systems, and of human society itself.

These are among the questions, which the work standing at the head of this article, attempts to discuss in relation to Democracy—particularly as it develops itself in American society. The author selects for investigation the Democratic form amid other social forms, because he believes, that into this type the universal society of the race is fast and irresistibly working itself; and he singles out American society, not as exhibiting the peculiar and only outward form of Democracy, but as revealing its essential spirit and action.

The attempt, and I will add, the execution, merit well of our age, and especially of our Republic. He has attempted to show Democracy to itself. It is too commonly the fact, that those vast and universal movements of human society that are seen from time to time in human history, pursuing, with the vehemence of passion and the steadfastness of fate, their peculiar ends, are ignorant, meanwhile, of what it most behooves them to know themselves. Self-knowledge is as rare in nations and ages, as in individuals; and introspection, difficult and ungrateful at all times, alike to the million and the one, becomes especially so, when outward excitements are multiplied, and an intense and restless strife for immediate and physical well-being, gives overshadowing prominence and exhaustive interest to the present, the material and the partial, and leaves little taste or aptitude, for self-contemplation or general surveys. At such periods, a calm and wide-seeing Philosophy, applied to the analysis of the present or the forecast of the future, is rarely met with.

Such an age is our own. Embarked as we are on the River of Destiny, we are content, for the most part, with taking simply the course and rapidity of the eddies, on which float our individual interests, or at most, those of a party or section; while few mark the progress or direction of the mighty flood on which we are borne. The rush of waters and the crash of many shipwrecks are in our ears: fragments of old systems, mingling with the fresh glistening forms of those new-born, are driving past us; and in the distance, it may be, the breakers lift their white signal, and the cataract utters afar its warning roar; and



the stifled cry of the millions that sink, blends with the shout of those that exult as never to die. Unheeding, meanwhile, we chase the bubbles in our own little vortex; or we pursue the rainbow painted on the spray in the forward distance, unmindful that it overarches the cataract: or, if awake to the perils that press, struggling to keep our individual fortunes afloat amid the wild drift, we cast but brief and distracted glances at the fearful power that sits upon the flood; rarely have we leisure or vastness of vision to take its aspect or dimensions. We exult, it may be, in the assurance of movement, but few discern whether that movement is toward Light or Gloom. Or, to change the figure, while, as in astronomy, we study the internal relations of our own particular system, we dimly read the movement of that mighty system of systems, of which our own is but a fragment.

The power that now sits dominant on the tide of human affairs, is Democracy: it is the ruling spirit of our era, the gravitating social force. It is the result which the turbulent and diversified civilization of modern times is elaborating; the universal solvent, into which all social, civil, and ecclesiastical inequalities are sinking.

Democracy is the *fact* of our era; whether our choice or not, matters little—it is our destiny. Ever since modern civilization began to emerge from the chaos in which sank that of the ancient world, European society has been moving toward this result, with a steadfastness that marks a great law of Providence. Like such laws, this tendency is beyond the power of human strength, or sagacity, to arrest or divert. The spirit that animates this movement, and that, through a thousand years of vicissitude and revolution, has with such persistency and vigilance, and such instinctive discernment, pursued its peculiar ends, now scents its quarry not from afar, and with accelerated rapidity hastens towards its assured goal—its day of universal triumph. That day, neither force nor fraud, nor shifts nor expedients, nor wisdom, nor piety can stave off: it is the destiny of the race: it is the ordinance of Heaven. All that remains for human wisdom is to direct and attemper this power; to prevent its extravagances and atrocities; and no longer exasperating by vain resistance, to endeavor to enlighten, humanize, and Christianize it. While Owenism, Agrarianism, and Infidelity, and the Protean shapes of Anarchism are aiming to intoxicate, blind, and madden it, it belongs to

Christian Truth and Love to penetrate it with a purer, milder, and more benign reason.

The germinant principle of Democracy is involved in the essential definition of a human being. It is no obscure corollary from the religious relations of man, especially as disclosed by the Christian Faith. It is the immediate inference which common sense and feeling draw from the revealed facts of our common origin and destiny, and of our direct relations to a common God: confirmed, also, by the consciousness of a community of reason and moral sentiment, and of innate and inalienable rights, and essential and intransferable obligations. Thus it is the child of common reason wedded to a common faith. Deriving life from these sources, it is idle to speculate upon the probable chances of baffling or quelling the democratic energy of our times. The child of nature and religion, the assurance of its life is embraced in that of its parents.

The developments of Democracy in its hours of triumph, in modern times, have thus far been too often the paroxysms of a force gigantic, but ignorant and brutalized, and taking a moment's revenge for ages of wrong; stimulated by the fearful energies of despair, or the no less fearful energies of sudden and blind hope: and again, after an hour of frightful ascendancy, throwing itself, crippled and exhausted by its excesses, at the foot of a new tyranny. Its final ascendancy, however, is foretokened with assurance, by past ages of painful but certain progress: but whether its future course shall be through the abyss of revolution upon revolution, (from which it shall bring out the wisdom of woful experience,) or whether it shall be guided to its Heaven-appointed goal by the benign and purifying influence of Truth and Love, is the great problem of our times.

Such is the consideration that has stimulated our Author to the writing of these works. He regards the course of Democracy as a *fact*—permanent, irresistible, and universal. Therefore it is that he attempts to delineate this type of society—to analyze and estimate its forces and tendencies; and to forecast its action and danger, and its ultimate results. He approaches the subject as a philosopher and a philanthropist, not as an advocate. His work is written not so much for America as for Europe, and especially for France. He selects American society for his analysis, as exhibiting Democracy in the most mature and natural state in which it has yet been exhibited; as showing more of its full form and features, and less perturbed

by extrinsic and accidental influences, than where it is yet struggling into life, or when new-born of revolution, it still feels the tumultuary and convulsive throes of its birth. He does not regard Democracy as restricted to our political forms; its outward mechanism and organization may be widely varied. Nor does he look to our society for an exact and universal paradigm of its social results: allowance is to be made for peculiarities of origin and history and local influences. But the force of these being estimated, he aims to discern in our political institutions and our social condition, the vital spirit and the essential tendencies of Democracy, and thence to educe general truths, in the light of which human society may forecast its dangers and provide against them; and foreseeing the ultimate goal to which the hand of Heaven is leading, may move toward it intelligently and tranquilly, with the calmness of certainty, if not of hope.

His philosophy consists in the application of the known laws of human nature to the phenomena of our Democracy, and in constructing general propositions from the principles thus indicated. By thus pursuing facts to their principles, and principles until they disclose some universal psychological or social law, he attempts to separate the local, temporary, and accidental, from the essential, the permanent, and the universal, and to distinguish what is merely American from what belongs to human society everywhere.

It is not the aim of this article to attempt a minute criticism or analysis of these works, or to sit in judgment on their general merits. Their wide celebrity renders this gratuitous, and their high reputation might give the air of presumption to common censure or praise. The first volume, which relates to the influence of Democracy upon political institutions, was published some five years since, and has been repeatedly reviewed, both in Europe and America, with different degrees of ability, and generally with high and deserved commendation. The verdict of public opinion with regard to it may be considered as already rendered, and recorded. It has given the author rank amid the standard writers and profound thinkers of our age. The second volume, on which alone it is our present purpose to remark, will be found more attractive to the general reader than the former; it embraces also, in our view, questions of weightier moment. In it he attempts to analyze the influence of Democracy upon those interests, to which all political institutions are

but ministers and guardians ; and with relation to which alone they possess any value—the inner and spiritual life of a people, their opinions, tastes, and sentiments, and the habits and manners which are the expression of the national mind. Again, he briefly treats of the reaction of these intellectual and moral products of Democracy upon its political institutions. In this volume, as in the first, the design of our author has in general been executed with great candor and ability. There is usually exhibited the same accuracy of observation and sharpness of analysis ; the same perspicuous insight into human nature, combined with a philosophy clear, far-seeing, and rapid in its generalizations. It is, on the whole, a beautiful specimen of general reasoning applied to topics deeply involving the sympathies, affections, and hopes of the American heart. You may at times, perhaps, find difficulty in admitting the perfect accuracy and completeness of his facts, and the correctness of his postulates ; but in all cases you are compelled to admire the acumen and boldness with which he pursues facts to their principles, and principles to their remote consequences. The imagination is captivated by the brilliancy and grandeur of his generalizations, even though the reason may feel compelled to start back from his conclusions. The logical defects, which we may think we discover in the work, arise mainly from his Gallic bias toward general ideas. The French mind in our times is marked by a taste for rapid and sparkling generalization: we must also accord to them a superior faculty in this kind.

A fondness and aptitude for general ideas are essential to the philosophic faculty, and if accompanied with patience and the love of Truth, may be most favorable to the progress of an enlarged and liberal philosophy ; but if they lead one to seek after the brilliant, rather than the true, and to overstate, rather than fail to be striking and authoritative ; or if they lead to the hope of arresting general truths by impatient and hasty inductions, then, indeed, “they lead to bewilder, and dazzle to blind.” They produce a style which is apt to fascinate the inexperienced reader, and delight him with the idea that he is rapidly enriching his mind with new and profound truths. In perusing works, therefore, marked by this bias, there is need of constant watchfulness, lest one be surprised or dazzled into false conclusions, and a necessity of studying the intellectual and moral peculiarities of the author, before committing one’s self to his guidance : indeed, where it is strongly developed, the highest intellectual

and moral endowments will not warrant implicit trust. A passion for what is positive and generic may mislead the clearest and purest mind. Where great questions are at issue, the feeling of suspense is so painful, and that of certain knowledge so delightful, and the assurance of the discovery of vast truths so grateful both to our self-complacency and our indolence, that they will often blind the severest analysis, the most sincere love of Truth. Generic terms seem to furnish a sort of rainbow-bridge to ultimate conclusions, along which one may pass with easy and delightful rapidity to the desired goal, without weltering through the vast and chaotic morass of particulars, out of which the splendid arch should have been constructed. The writer unconsciously deceives himself by the use of generic terms, making the same algebraic characters represent the same values in different parts of his calculation.

In this fondness and faculty for generalization M. De Tocqueville shares largely; but in him they are uniformly tempered by a sincere love of Truth, and are guided, in most cases, by patient, accurate, and comprehensive induction. Some cases, where they seem not to have been so, will be presently pointed out. But, as a general fact, while with a bold and rapid hand he projects the outlines of vast social principles, these principles will be found to bear a severe scrutiny, and satisfactorily to classify and solve many important phenomena of American society; and his intellectual structures will be proved solid as well as glittering. Where they seem to be based upon insufficient data, we should remember how small was the field open to his survey, and how brief the experience from which he could reason, frequently those of our Republic alone; and when his generalizations seem not to accord with his facts, we should not forget how extremely difficult it must often be for a foreigner to ascertain facts with the precision and correctness of coloring essential to their true significance, especially when these facts are spread over a mighty territory, and amid a most miscellaneous population; and the inquirer himself may be surrounded by those incompetent to inform, or interested to deceive. Perhaps a simpler and deeper piety would have better qualified him to appreciate the religious element in American society, and to estimate its position and force in the system. A warmer devotional glow, if it would not have added to the accuracy and clearness of his philosophy, might have placed him on a higher point of vision, and taught him to take the course of human

destiny, by the lights not only of earth but Heaven, and might have shed upon some of his pages the hues of a brighter hope.

As it regards rhetorical qualities, his diction is commonly marked with crystalline clearness, and often, as it appears in the translation, (the original work we have not seen,) it is highly nervous and significant; though at times it becomes obscure, from his frequent use of abstract and general terms, which, to English minds at least, are bounded by a vague and waving outline. A defect which, we are informed, has been somewhat corrected by the translator. The term *Democracy*, he does not use in strict uniformity of import: at one time making it denote the rule of the people; at another, synonymous with political equality. Saving a few exceptions of this kind, the language is lucid, simple, and pertinent. His style is of the Ionic order, combining strength with elegance; and often reminds one of the severe beauty of the antique. In sententiousness and dignity, and in frequency of striking antithesis, it approaches Tacitus; while often, in the ease and clearness of its flow, it is more like Xenophon, or Cicero in his philosophical treatises. Often, too, like the great Roman Historian above alluded to, in a pathos, intense but tranquil, in a vigor and grandeur of thought, flashed, not painted, and in loftiness of moral sentiment, he rises to the heights of philosophic eloquence. Not unfrequently he passes from a chastened beauty to a subdued majesty: often strong, he is never too strong for himself. He has dignity without state, and force without passion.

In brief, to him who wishes to study the practical operation of our political institutions, and the impress of democracy upon the intellectual, moral, and social character of a people, sketched with graphic boldness and general accuracy, and analyzed with a philosophy always candid and acute, and often profound, in a style clear, calm, and grave, generally marked with quiet strength and sober beauty, but which, at times, swells to a solemn grandeur and pathos, we know not where we would refer him sooner than to these volumes. They deserve a place not only in every family library, but in the course of study in every American College. They treat of subjects of vital moment to ourselves, and in their consequences affecting the interests of the human race; and they exhibit facts and philosophy, without which no education in the American Republic ought to be entitled liberal—the facts and philosophy of our institutions and society. Their style, and the philosophic method to which they

would discipline the student, in addition to the knowledge they impart, come in to substantiate their claim to hold a rank in a course of Collegiate study, at least until a superior substitute can be presented. As it is, they fill a niche otherwise vacant; they meet a felt want, and if not the best imaginable supply, they are at least the only one extant. And that this supply has been offered us by a foreigner—one not biassed by personal interests, nor committed to partisan views, but standing aloof, and noting with the speculation of a calm observer—is a recommendation rather than otherwise. Though it may have taken from the thoroughness of insight, and accuracy of detail in some cases, it could hardly fail to render his views of the whole less distorted and perturbed, and his general judgments more tranquil and more just. Extreme proximity, though favorable to minute exactitude, often prevents our taking the relative proportions of things. Nearness often perplexes and confounds. It requires a distant view to appreciate the symmetry of St. Peter's. As it is, we have reason to be grateful, that text books so valuable to the student of American history and society have been furnished from whatever source. Nor will we leave this point without expressing surprise and regret, at the little prominence these departments of study hold at our universities. As an intellectual discipline, M. De Tocqueville has shown they are susceptible of a philosophical method, tasking the highest powers of the human reason. As a treasure-house of social and political truths, the records of no empire are richer than our own. Her life has been one laboratory of great principles. She has, too, a rare wealth of illustrious examples of heroic and holy virtue, of valor, patriotism, and piety, and of civic eloquence, wisdom, and magnanimity. Superadd to this, that she is the living exhibition of a social power, the mightiest at present on earth, and which is fast moving towards universal empire—i. e. Democracy—and it will be perceived, that the claims of this study to a prominent position, if not to a separate chair of instruction in American universities, are strong.

Yet it is not so much from what these works have accomplished, as from that of which they give augury, that we regard their appearance with pleasure. We cannot but hail them as "first of a long line of many such." Whether or not they have brought out results of high practical value, they have at least opened a new and rich vein of inquiry, which cannot fail to be followed up till it yields priceless treasure. They are

pioneer efforts to collate materials, and establish principles, for a new science—that of the Philosophy of Human Society. May we not hope that such a science may be one of the important gifts of the past world to the future ages? The bequest to the millennial era, of gloomy chiliads of disorder, disappointment, passionate conflict, and doleful change? May we not hope, by means of induction from experience, to arrive at important and universal truths, relative to the nature and tendencies of societies, and to demonstrate the necessary operation of great social causes, that embrace vast masses and consecutive generations? and may it not be possible thus to forestall or provide for the ultimate consequences?

Human character has its average; and this average we may arrive at by generalizing the facts of human history; just as Life Insurance Companies, though unable to pronounce with certainty upon the duration of any specific life, yet by induction from a sufficient number of particulars, can arrive at an average, on the presumption of which they graduate their premiums, so as, in the aggregate, to secure to themselves a profit from their policies. The character of societies is the average character of man; and their action is the expression of that character. Thus the conduct of masses is subject to general and ascertainable laws. And up to a certain limit, the certainty of our calculations would seem proportioned to the number embraced in the bodies corporate, whose action and fortunes we attempt to forecast; as average estimates are always safest when applied to large masses. Thus despotisms, though at present becoming rather the stereotyped expression of fixed modes of thought, and feeling, and policy, rather than of individual caprice or passion, still, as they must embrace as an essential element, the control of an individual, admit of less certain presage than aristocracies; and aristocracies, unless sufficiently numerous to ensure the invariable triumph of the corporate interest or passion over that of the individual, are more uncertain in their action than democracies.

Thus, though the course of democracies, within a limited view, often seems perturbed with caprice and passion, and while frequent changes in administrative measures and outward forms, and dominant parties, is perhaps the necessary condition of their existence, still the passions and interests, which in the long run sway them, and the persistency with which they cling to their essential properties, and pursue, through all changes, their vital



ends, are certain as the great laws of animal instinct. They are but an evolution of what lies most deep in the universal human heart ; and from that heart in one age we can reason to its history in another. Great Nature wheels on her course unchanged, in the external universe and the soul of man. The material world, with its barriers and exigencies, will be around our races as they move into the light of the 100th century, nearly the same as they are now, or were before the flood ; and human nature will be human nature still—the same as in the days of the Cæsars or the Pharaohs. If the future of this world is not to be a transcript of its past, it will not be because great individual or social laws are annulled, or like causes have ceased to produce like effects, but because mankind, grown wiser by experience, and listening to the suggestions of Celestial wisdom, will aim to amend and change causes themselves ; and strive not so much to fetter the hands as to cleanse the heart, out of which are the issues alike of individual and social life ; and because they will have learned to watch and respect the great laws of Nature and of Providence, and not to disregard or defy them.

As we hope well for the race, then, we are compelled to believe that it is possible for the nation to discover these laws in the past, and, taking counsel by experience, to guard against future shipwreck. It augurs well for the coming age, that there are those who are attempting to educe and generalize these laws ; not that the importance of such a work has not been felt before, and the attempt partially, at times, been made. That extraordinary man, whose passion and genius for order, seemed to crystallize into system whatever he touched—Aristotle—attempted to reduce political facts to a science. We have to regret the loss of a work in which he described and analyzed all the known forms of government of his time, two hundred and fifty-five in number. Something of the kind also was attempted by the framers of the American Constitution. But these attempts were made for specific or political ends—for governments rather than societies—for the machine rather than the motive power.

The present seems likely to constitute an epoch in this province of investigation. A diligence and enthusiasm, hitherto unprecedented, are exhibited in the ascertainment and classification of social facts.

The works of M. De Tocqueville on American Democracy,

and the attempts of other writers of the same school, to collate, and generalize the facts of European society, nobly lead on the enterprise. Let similar analyses be applied to all the political and social systems which history develops, and let some intellectual architect, like the author of the "Principia," or the "Novum Organum," appear, with a genius vast, sincere, and mighty enough truly to generalize and interpret these materials, and may we not with confidence hope that new light may be thrown across the pathway of nations, and universal and perpetual laws be traced, through the social, as they have been through the astronomical world—laws, by the observance of which human society, with new rapidity, security and courage, may move on to its golden era? Or is all this a pleasant dream? While man, the individual, builds upon the experience of his predecessors, and thus might perpetually ascend, must his progress be limited by the fact, that he is prisoned in by a society which admits of the assignment of no certain laws, or the ascertainment of any universal truths; but which is marshalled on to its destiny by blind chance, or inexorable fate? While the individual is on the advance, must society remain from age to age stationary as the brutes, or ever return upon itself in the same dreary and bloody circle? We cannot acquiesce in such a gloomy conclusion. It is in our view cowardly and enfeebling, and as contradictory to a sound philosophy as to a cheering faith. Therefore, we hail with high pleasure the volumes before us. We are grateful for what they bring, and still more for what they promise. Nevertheless there are some opinions, to which the author arrives, which we regard as mistaken and mischievous, and from which our reason and our hopes for the race compel us to dissent.

Some of these, as vitally affecting our courage, and energy, and plans of action, we have thought it not consistent with duty to permit to pass unnoticed; and after a consideration of these, we have thought it might not be barren of interest and utility, to attempt to carry out some of the principles he has developed, and others akin to them, in their application to ourselves, and inquire what dangers and duties they indicate, and what horoscope they project of our empire.

What are to be the religious and intellectual and social features of the Democratic Era, which is opening upon us, is among the vast questions M. De Tocqueville attempts to solve, or at least to penetrate with conjecture. The answer he gives to the first

of these—that relating to the religious condition of the coming ages—seems to us alike opposed to the indications of Providence, Prophecy, and Philosophy. History, and the laws of the human mind, appear to point to dissimilar and more cheering results; and when we turn from these pages to those of the Sacred Oracles, and walk along the illumined perspective of the future they disclose, we feel as if escaped from the dim cell of a St. Dominic, or the stifling gloom of the sacred office, into the blessed light of day.

We refer the reader to chapter 6th, vol. 2d, entitled “Of the progress of Roman Catholicism in the United States.” He concludes as follows: “There ever have been, and ever will be, men, who after having submitted some portion of religious belief to the principle of authority, will seek to exempt several other parts of their faith from its influence, and to keep the mind floating at random between liberty and obedience. But I am inclined to believe, the number of these thinkers will be less in democratic, than other ages, and that our posterity will tend more and more to a single division into two parts, some relinquishing Christianity entirely, and others returning to the bosom of the Church of Rome.”

A startling conclusion truly. Most American readers would dismiss it with a shrug or a sneer, sorrowing at a weakness in a mind they are compelled to respect and admire, but as too palpably absurd to merit refutation. We shall not so treat it. The frequency, with which such conclusions are drawn by Catholic writers, indicates some apparent foundation. Let us inquire, then, with the seriousness to which our author is entitled, whether the belief to which he “is inclined” can be sustained by fact, and logic. Is there a natural tendency in Democracy to combine with Romanism, in Civil Liberty to ally itself with Spiritual Despotism?

We may find it at least instructive to observe, how a mind of such sagacity and candor, has been led to a belief so wide from our own; and we may be sure, that the facts which have seemed to him adequate to authorize it, have in them what strongly claims our regard. By looking at chapters fifth and sixth, it will be found, that his opinions relative to the religious tendencies of democracy, are based, first, upon supposed facts observed in American society, and secondly, on the necessary tendencies of the human mind under the influence of democratic institutions; which tendencies he thinks explain those facts,

and prove them to be a characteristic and legitimate result of democracy.

First, then, let us look at his facts. Those failing, doubts at least will be cast over the philosophy that accounts for them. His sixth chapter opens with this startling enunciation: "America is the most democratic country in the world, and it is at the same time (according to reports worthy of belief) the country, in which the Roman Catholic belief is making most progress;" after which he significantly remarks: "At first sight this is surprising." To an American, I apprehend it will be both "surprising" and new; or it augurs poorly for the spread of Romanism in other countries. If we found representations of this kind in these volumes only, we should suppose the ecclesiastical connexion of the author had unconsciously biassed his judgment, and distorted the language of facts, if it had not led him to mistake wishes for facts. But the great candor of the author, and the uniform occurrence of such statements in Catholic writers relative to this country, will not permit us thus to account for them. Their uniformity proves them to be a part of a *system*. For instance, in Chateaubriand's "Sketches of Modern Literature," in connexion with facts and reasonings, most novel and extraordinary, relative to the connexion between Romanism and civil liberty in Europe, we find it gravely asserted that "most of the western states are now Catholic. The progress of this communion in the United States exceeds all belief. Here it has been invigorated in its evangelical element—popular liberty, while other communions decline in profound indifference"!! The facts, and the argument will, we imagine, strike an American as equally "surprising" and original. It is stated also in the "Annalles de la Propagation de la Foi" for June 1839, "In ten years the number of the Faithful has increased one third. In the Atlantic states they form a powerful minority. In the greater part of the western states they form a plurality, and at some points perhaps a majority of the inhabitants"!! This statement, though evidently phrased with a view to convey to the careless reader, more than the words strictly interpreted might hold the writer responsible for, will seem hardly less "surprising" than the former. Such uniformity and persistency of misrepresentation seem to point to a systematic fraud somewhere, or to a singular consistency in delusion. It may arise in part from ignorance, but it looks like Jesuitism—like a deliberate

imposture, practised by the Romish priesthood in this country, on their patrons in Catholic Europe, or rather a fraud by the Romish Church upon the Romish world, to stimulate their charities and their zeal. Such statements have been frequently put forth without any formal contradiction, because their notorious absurdity, amid an American community, neither required nor admitted one. This silence on our part has probably furthered the design for which they were made. They seem designed for effect upon Europe, to stimulate the hopes and enterprise of the Papists, and abuse democracy in the eyes of its Protestant friends, and at the same time to demonstrate it to its Catholic admirers, to be the "evangelical element" of Romanism; while despotic and penurious Austria, on the other hand, is to be allured into the great North American mission, by the promise of the eventual subversion of popular liberty; Jesuitism it is, that is to put a hook into the nose of the great Leviathan, now grown so fierce that none dare stir him up. Our silence meanwhile has undoubtedly been used to our disadvantage. Upon those for whom these statements were designed, the impression has been made, that the question at issue has gone against us by default.

As a summary refutation of statements, like those above quoted, let us invite the attention of our transatlantic brethren to a few statistics, which will show the value of M. De Tocqueville's statement for the purpose for which it is used. They will indicate, that even granting to be true what he says of the increase of the Catholic communion in this country, it will prove nothing of the religious tendencies of democracies. It would simply demonstrate that free institutions, civil and religious, a cheap and rich soil, and high wages being presented on one side of the ocean, and starvation and civil and religious oppression driving nations into the sea on the other, there will naturally set a strong tide of migration from the latter to the former; and this of course will produce a "surprising" increase of the communion to which this migration is attached. Such is the relation of the United States to some of the nations of the old world, and especially those of Catholic Europe; and hence the increase of that communion in this country, which has given color to the sanguine predictions of its adherents. But the increase as little proves the tendency of democracies towards Romanism as the present condition of Hindoostan does the tenden-

cies of Brahminism towards the English Episcopacy, or the irruption of Northern Barbarians the tendencies of Roman civilization towards Vandalism.

The increase of Romanism in the United States is mainly the *increase of Catholic immigration*. A failure to notice this fact gives to the reports, which Catholic Ecclesiastics are wont to make from this country, though true in words, all the mischiefs of a positive falsehood in their logical interpretation. But not only is the cause of increase unnoticed in their inferences from it, but the increase itself is exaggerated. That the Catholics constitute "a majority of the population" of any of the western states, except perhaps the one originally planted by them, is a statement too much of the Bombastes vein, to require serious denial on this side of the Atlantic. Nor do they form a "plurality" in any state other than the two founded by themselves. In most of the other states, they are far from being a "powerful minority," and it should be remembered, that Protestantism, though divided on minor points, in relation to Romanism should be reckoned as one body; in suspicion and aversion toward that system they are united. The "Annalles" quoted above estimate our Catholic population at 1,250,000. No other estimates, which we have seen, put it higher than 1,000,000; but granting it to amount to 1,200,000, their increase by birth and immigration during the last ten years has not exceeded 700,000. A few statistics will deprive this augmentation of much of its marvellousness. The council, held in Baltimore in 1830, estimated the population then within the Romish communion at 500,000. Statistics from the port of New-York (see the American Almanac for 1838) show a foreign immigration at that port from 1830 to 1837 as follows:—

1830	-	-	-	30,224
1831	-	-	-	31,739
1832	-	-	-	48,589
1833	-	-	-	41,702
1834	-	-	-	48,110
1835	-	-	-	35,303
1836	-	-	-	60,541

The number of passengers, who arrived at New-York from Jan. 1st to July 27th, 1837, was 34,554.

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We may therefore safely estimate the whole number for 1837 at 60,000

For the years 1838 and 1839 we have no returns.

Suppose them equal to the average of the two years preceding, and the one following, and we have for

1838,	60,000
1839,	60,000

According to a statement in the North American

Review for Jan. 1841, from Jan. 1st to Nov.

1st, 1840, the immigration at New-York

amounted to 58,000; we may therefore put

the total for the year 1840 at 60,000

According to these estimates the whole number

of arrivals at the port of New-York, from

1830 to 1841 amounts to 536,208

According to the statements of the Commercial Advertiser, reported in the American Almanac for 1838, the arrivals at the port of New-York in 1836 were to the whole number of arrivals in the seaports of the United States during the same year, nearly in the ratio of 56 to 80. Applying this ratio of that year (and we have no means of arriving at that of any other) to the above estimate of arrivals in New-York, and we have for the whole immigration on our seaboard from 1830 to 1840 inclusive, 766,011.

Reports from the port of Quebec, from 1830 to 1837, make the immigration at that port during those seven years, 216,437. At the annual average this estimate furnishes, applied to the four years subsequent, the total of immigration at Quebec from 1830 to 1841 would amount to 340,113. In all probability, especially in view of the enormous amount of public works executed in the United States during that period, more than two thirds of this number have found their way into the United States, giving us an immigration, by way of Quebec, of 226,742, during the above period. Add this to the arrivals on our seaboard, and the total of arrivals in the United States from 1830 to 1841, amounts to 980,753.

The next question is, what proportion of these are Catholic immigrants? To answer this, we must inquire from what countries they come; and we regret that we have before us, to illustrate this point, only the reports of a single year, though we know of no reason why this may not be taken as a sample

of the rest. In 1836 the whole number of passengers arriving on our seaboard, were estimated at 80,952. Of these, from the British Isles were 47,792; from the German states 20,142; from France 4,443: making from these sources a total of 72,377. We may safely calculate that seven-eighths of these arrivals were immigrants, giving us an immigration from these countries of 64,448. Now, no one acquainted with the character of the immigrants from these sources, will doubt that at least five-sixths of these, amounting to 53,707, were French, German and Irish Catholics. Now, supposing that seven-eighths of the 80,952 passengers who arrived that year were immigrants, the ratio of the Catholic to the entire immigration of the year was nearly that of 53 to 71. Apply this ratio to the aggregate immigration on our seaboard from 1830 to 1841, and it gives, as the result for this period, 571,811. Of the immigration through the Canadas during this period, at least (as the Irish generally pass to the States while the English remain in the province) five-sixths, we might say nine-tenths, amounting to 188,951, may be added to the above sum. This gives us the sum total of Catholic immigration from 1830 to 1841, 761,762. This estimate is unquestionably too small; we have purposely made it so in order to avoid all cavils.

Now, according to the estimates of Catholics themselves, their increase during this period, allowing 50,000 to have been added during the last year, has not exceeded 800,000; and this estimate is thought to be too large by at least one hundred thousand; but at their own reckoning, against an augmentation of 800,000 there is an offset of above 760,000 immigrants, in addition to natural increase meanwhile. The latter we admit is not great; sickness and accident have dealt hardly with the poor emigrant; but amid a people that is doubling itself every thirty years, may not the natural increase fill up the deficit of 40,000?

In the light of these facts, does the progress of the Romish communion among us "exceed all belief?" Is it even very "surprising?" Does it indicate a mighty change in the course of public sentiment, or merely in the course of shipping? Does it show an increase of Romanism, taking Christendom at large? Could not a person speedily grow rich, on this scheme of gain, by shifting coin from one pocket to another? Is there any thing to warrant a tone of triumphing gratulation, even in view of numerical increase, to say nothing of intellectual and



moral value, in a country where nations are literally born in a day? But we should not compute numbers merely. A regard to the intellectual and moral worth of the increments, leaves still less reason for exultation. While Romanism has been receiving into her communion her ignorant and pauper masses in hundreds of thousands, Protestantism has gathered around herself from the bosom of our nation, and warm from its heart with pilgrim blood, her millions. Could this article reach the ears of the foreign patrons of the Romish priesthood in this country, we would say to them, as knowing something of the West, the representations made to them of this part of our republic, if not in the letter, are at least in the intent and impression, glaringly false. The disgorgement upon our shores, within ten years past, of almost a million of foreigners,—a multitude which, though comprising many that we gladly welcome, consists to a great extent of the refuse of the prisons and poor-houses of the old world, and of the abject or turbulent outcasts of ghostly and secular despotisms,—furnishes the philosophy both of the growth of Romanism in this country, and of the recent alarm on that subject.

Among the extremely ignorant and credulous, the demi-savage of the frontier, or the frivolous rabbles of our great cities, priestly charlatanism and pretension may from time to time inveigle a convert. Music and painting, and costly decoration, and pompous ceremonial, may allure the weak, the voluptuous, the libertine, and the sentimentalist. But into the true American heart little intoxication has been thrown. Upon the substantial and intelligent citizens of the United States, the fascination of outward and sensuous attractions is likely to produce but little impression. We are, in general, too much of a matter of fact people,—requiring to be convinced rather than delighted,—to be converted by mere appliances to the taste, by the lull of music, or charms of painting, or by the sublimity and richness of cathedrals; and we are too much inclined to have our own way, even in things sacred, to be cheated out of our liberty of thinking as we will, and speaking as we think, by suavity of manners, or splendor of costume, or consecrated titles, by the soft matin or solemn vesper, or the imprisoned sanctity of seraphic sisterhoods. Romanism may, from time to time, secure a convert; and so do the impostures of Mormon and Matthias. For no delusion, however absurd or blasphemous, can fail of some supporters amid a people, where so much intel-

lectual and social activity is at work, not only amid the enlightened masses, but ferments in wild freedom amid the dark-minded and the fanatical. But the case of an intelligent, native born American, turning from Protestantism to Romanism, is exceedingly rare. The truth is, Romanism is almost universally felt to be antagonist to the spirit of our institutions, and as such, it is regarded with suspicion, and its thronging armies from abroad, with alarm.

If Romanism triumph in this country, it will be the triumph of fraud over generous confidence, of banded and drilled ignorance over schismatic intelligence, of cunning over strength, of the disciplined and mechanical armies of a ghostly despotism over the remiss or factious forces of civil and religious freedom. Yet let not too much reliance be reposed on the factions of Protestantism, or the power of priestly demagoguism. Let an aggressive purpose against any great principle of our institutions be disclosed and avowed, and the very alarm will be a band of union.

But should Romanism conquer in ten thousand enterprises like the one now directed towards these United States, by the means now employed, it would prove nothing of the affinities of Democracy and Religious Despotism. It would prove the tendency of democracy toward Romanism, just as much as it would its tendency to breed Germans and Irishmen, and no more. The facts then, even if admitted as De Tocqueville states them, being found entirely irrelevant to his conclusions, his reasoning to account for those conclusions has no longer any significance. Yet we will not leave it here. Let us consider a little the principles, to which he attempts to reduce his supposed facts, and by means of which he attempts to shore up his general conclusions. We read the human mind widely amiss in history and in our own breast, or his philosophy is as mistaken as his facts, in attempting to prove the necessary tendency of democracy toward Romanism; his reasonings, succinctly stated, amount to the following propositions: 1st. "Men cannot do without dogmatic belief," especially in "matters of religion," (see book 1st, chap. 5th,) and peculiarly indispensable is such belief in democratic communities. 2d. The taste for unity, which the nature of their institutions produces, requires, that the source of dogmatic belief should be one. "Religious powers not radiating from a common centre" are naturally repugnant to their mind, (see book 1st, chap. 6th.) 3d. Therefore, to

Rome, whose "great unity attracts" them, the democratic ages will return. It will be seen that the connexion between the 2d and 3d of these steps implies an intermediate one, viz. that Protestantism recognizes and presents no one source of authority in matters of religious belief and discipline.

His views, as it regards the first proposition, are developed in chap. 5th: "Men," he remarks, "are immeasurably interested in acquiring fixed ideas of God and of the soul, and of their common duties to their fellow men."—"None but minds singularly free from the ordinary anxieties of life—minds at once penetrating, subtle, and trained to thinking—can, even with the assistance of much time and care, sound the depth of these most necessary truths. Studies of this nature are far above the average capacity of men, and even if the majority of mankind were capable of such pursuits, it is evident that leisure to cultivate them would still be wanting." "Fixed ideas of God and truth are indispensable to the daily practice of men's lives, but the practice of their lives prevents their acquiring such ideas."

That these statements, rightly understood, convey an important truth, and one to be deeply pondered in our times, none will deny, but couched as they are in general terms, they may be abused to conclusions the most false and mischievous.

What is meant by "dogmatic belief"? Is it belief without reason? or simply belief without prior personal experience or investigation of the logical grounds on which all belief ultimately reposes? One would think, from M. De Tocqueville's reasoning about it, that it was like our coats, to be put off or put on at our pleasure, or a creature of popular suffrage that could be ordained or deposed, like the gods of the Roman pantheon, by the greatest number of votes. But is not this form of belief as involuntary as any other, the nature of the evidence that compels it being the only difference? Is not what we term "dogmatic belief" always based on a confidence in the *character* of the dogmatizer?—on presumption of his sagacity, knowledge, truthfulness, and benevolence, or on evidence of celestial commission and guidance? Is it not obvious, that trust in the mere dicta of others is not at our own option, and cannot subsist except in view of some qualities entitling them to credence? The question, then, whether the democratic ages will seek their source of dogmatic belief in the Church of Rome, must be determined by the inquiry, whether they will find in that church grounds warranting such confidence, and not whether they

would gladly find some one authority on which to repose. Unity alone, even did it subsist in it, to the extent which its advocates claim, would not, of itself, be sufficient to attract belief. For men cannot forget, that unity can warrant trust only so far as it is the result of intellectual freedom. The united testimony of millions on the rack will not secure it. As long as men repeat only what they are taught and compelled to utter, on pain of imprisonment and torture, the conspiring voices of a thousand generations can only carry with it the authority of the first utterer.

Mankind remember, with a vividness but too painful, what Romish unity has cost—the smothering of the human mind through dark and doleful centuries, and the consequent stagnation of human society through those long cycles of sin and shame—how many battle-fields it has crimsoned,—how many dungeons reared—how many a genius, heaven-inspired, it has stifled—how many a pure and noble heart it has broken—how many of the gentle, the brave, the gifted, the lovely, and the pious, has dismissed from the dungeon, the wheel, and the stake, to Heaven. The world will be slow to forget, that it is the pale and sickly child of fear; and the unity of despotism will have as little charm for democratic ages in the spiritual, as in the political world.

But after all, what is the vaunted unity of Romanism? Amid the dogmas of councils that contradict each other—the opposing decisions and contradictory legislation and mutual anathemas of popes—the conflicting assumptions of antagonist sacred colleges—where shall we seek it? How arrest the tenuous and changeable phantom? Amid clashing infallibilities, which shall be *the* infallible? The “voice of the Universal Church,” what is it, too often, other than the rescript of the last dominant faction, stamped with guilty frequency in blood? The strongest hand it has too often been, however polluted and crimson, that has clutched the keys of St. Peter. What then is the unity of Rome save the unity of organism merely—the unity of body with diversity of souls—the identity of a corpse, tenanted in succession by many vampires?

But if, fleeing the dreadful responsibility of her many inconsistencies, absurdities, and crimes, for which, in their time, the Romish Church arrogated the direct inspiration and warrant of Heaven, she now endeavors to take refuge in the plea of unity and infallibility in “matters of faith alone,” who shall

draw the line where faith ends, and vision begins? Who shall divide the realm of implicit belief, from that where logic ceases to be blasphemy, and thought is no longer revolt against Heaven? Who shall erect the awful barrier, over which the "limitary cherub" shall stand sentinel, and the glittering sword of God brandish its fiery circles, warning profane reason afar? Who but the infallible church itself? Thus presenting again the spectacle of an infallible spiritual despotism, the arbiter of its own limits. Might we not expect, this claim granted again, to see that ambitious despotism gradually extending its domain, under the pretence of relevancy to things spiritual, until all secular interests should be overshadowed by its supremacy, as time is overshadowed by eternity, and the visible is overhung by the invisible world?

What, then, are the grounds upon which she will challenge the trust and obedience of coming ages? Will they be allured to her doctrine and discipline, by the fact that born in the twilight of an eclipsing faith, like the earth-born monsters of fable, they attained their portentous growth in profound night? Will they find reason for implicit adhesion to a theology that to a great degree grew up apart from the Bible? nurtured and matured amid ecclesiastics, and hierarchs and councils, not unfrequently too ignorant to read the word of God, or with just learning enough to distort or wit to sneer at it? men subtle to torture isolated passages into puerile or wicked sophisms, and to wrest history into allegory, and plain fact into mystery, in support of some blasphemous usurpation? with imagination to extract from the mission of the Galilean fishermen and the "gospel of the poor," the meretricious pomp, and gorgeous ritual, and impious pretension of the Innocents and Gregories; or with a frivolous and cold-hearted skepticism, that trafficked in the superstitions it fostered, and made mockery, alike of the faith on its lying lips, and the abused credulity of the human race? Will they give in an unquestioning submission to a discipline, which, taking root in a brain-sick philosophy, fostered by popular ignorance and priestly ambition, ripened to deadly fruitage under the dog-days of spiritual despotism?—an Upas, whose leaves drank the poisonous dew of the long night of modern history, and whose branches still moan with airs borne from that dungeon-era of the human mind—from the penitential cell, the pallid vigil, the dim confessional, the midnight oratory, and the profound glooms of the Sacred Office—from sunless chambers,

whose fearful secrets were whispered only in the ear of God, and of human remorse, cruelty, and despair—the sighs of cloistered passion, unslaked desires, repented or broken vows, impenitent regrets, and nature trampled and stifled, but panting still immortal; a tree, around whose trunk blanch the bones of a glorious army of martyrs, and of unnumbered suicides of the hair shirt, the iron girdle, and the scourge. Will Christendom be persuaded to regard *that* as the Tree of Life? Will it, without interrogatory, receive to its faith and obedience that system of theology and of discipline? Will it seek for light and order there? or will the fruit of that faith and discipline atone for the untold agonies and sins of their growth? Did Rome use her ascendancy, reached by a path so tortuous and foul, so wisely and so well, that Christendom will be charmed by the memory to commit to her again the keys of dogmatic belief? If with its spirit subdued by ages of spiritual oppression, it at length could no longer tolerate her, will it, in its democratic era, with the wild passion of liberty in its heart, be fascinated to submit to her, a second time, its liberty to speak and to think?

Nor can the Romish Church shake herself from the past, and say those were the sins of her youth and her ignorance. She never was ignorant, never was young. She has always stood in the full blaze of divine illumination. Born, like Minerva in the fable, immediately of celestial power and wisdom, she had, from the outset, her full panoply—the mature perfection of her source. Other systems may change—to them there is a place for repentance—but she is not man that she should change, nor the son of man that she should repent. The vicar of Heaven, she partakes of its immutability. Such are her pretensions. They debar her from any plea of infancy or inexperience, or any promise of amendment. She cannot deny, nor denounce, nor lament, the past. In an evil hour she clad herself with the mail of infallibility. As with the armor of the knights of the middle ages, its wearer once down cannot rise under it, nor evade the strokes aimed at her. The harness of her strength has become a stifling compress, forbidding all growth or change. She must, then, in every age, be held to a strict reckoning for all her past falsehoods and cruelties. Nor can she identify herself with Christianity, and charge upon that blessed mission of love her impurities and her crimes. Vain is her attempt to foist herself upon mankind as *The Church*, and to grapple her putrid system to the eter-

nal pillars of the Temple of God. The original charter of our religion, witnessed by the signature of Heaven, and which the nations hold in their hand, refute the libel, and forever forbid the union. Vain is all her array of saintly names, her Anselms, her Augustines, her Las Cases, her Fenelons, her Cyrans, and her Pascals, in proof of her assumptions. We bless God for them, that in the darkest eras he leaves Himself not without witness, that, under the most mischievous systems, there are men whose hearts are purer than their heads, and whose devotion is stronger than their philosophy or theology. But they are no more the products of her faith and discipline, than was Socrates the offspring of Athenian Polytheism. Romanism is no more Christianity than was "Caliban a God;" and now that the fumes of their long intoxication, from her drugged cup, are passing from the brain of the nations, it will be hard to brutify them again with the delusion. Alas! Christianity slept—and the night-hag pressed on her perturbed slumbers, and abused with wicked dreams her long repose.

What title then will she show, that will constrain "dogmatic belief"? Will she point to her history, whose dark hues make the crimson annals of the secular Cæsars seem white? Will she hold out her sceptre, still wearing the bloody fingerprints of her Alexanders and Borgias? Will she direct to her stream of ecclesiastical authority, that has puddled through ages of fraud, incest, and massacre? Will she lead the nations to this, as the River of Life, of which they are to drink and become immortal? Will she point to her purple, still dripping with Albigensian massacre, and the carnage of St. Bartholomew, as the white mantle, descended to her from the meek and lowly Jesus? Will not mankind see on it forms more hideous than the demoniac emblazonry of her Auto-da-fe? Will she point to her unity, built up of the suffocating fears of those that dared not think, and the strong despair of those that dared?—that mighty cloister of the human soul, whose top shut out the light of Heaven, and whose foundations were in sepulchral gloom—which towered amid the silence of a field of graves, and through whose rusted gratings and thick air the winds of Heaven breathed but a wailing and stifled monotone—its tranquillity the stillness of fear, its order the regularity of despotism? Will she vindicate her title to the love of the democratic ages, by directing them to her long war against free thought and liberal

philosophy, and her continued denunciations against the "pestilent liberty of speech and the press"? Or, finally, will she attempt to cover the past, and to come forth to the nations in the guise of an angel of light? This she will attempt; but in an age of free and fearless inquiry, can she accomplish it? Can she bribe or awe history to perpetual dumbness? Or will she bewitch the human reason with her sorceries, or charm the memory of the world to forgetfulness? Will she dazzle with the splendor of her ceremonial the eye that would look narrowly at her? Or shall the grandeur of her cathedrals cover the multitude of her slain? Will the nations, sobered from a long delirium-trenens, be fascinated to drink again of that cup, which they have found to be brimming with the "wine of the wrath of Almighty God"? All this must be done, before the democratic ages will see in her that title to confidence which must ever form the basis of dogmatic belief and "return to the bosom of Rome"?

But it is not true, that Protestants recognize no one source of authority in matters of religious belief. They do recognize such an one, and one that is "single and uniform." It has the singleness of God, the uniformity of inspiration. It is the Bible. Therefore the want of such unity of authority need not drive them to Romanism. True, they acknowledge no church or hierarchy as the infallible hierophants of Heaven; they claim to have no inspired expositors of the word of God, and there may consequently be a diversity of exposition. But may there not, also, be a diversity of exposition of the canons and decrees of the councils and the Vatican? And if, to remedy this, new canons and decisions are issued, will they not, as long as human language and intellect are imperfect, and human nature perverse, be liable to misrepresentation? So that rescript upon rescript, and bull explanatory of bull, canon declaratory of canon, would be requisite to infinity. Will the words which man's wisdom teacheth be less obscure and bungling than those of the Holy Ghost?

In arguing the necessity of "dogmatic belief" to free nations, our author remarks, (chap. 6th,) "I am inclined to think that, if faith be wanting in man, he must serve, and if he be free, he must believe." Noble sentiment! and worthy to be written on marble. But "he must believe" what? The dogmas of the councils of Nice, Chalcedon, Ferrara, and Trent? The imperial edicts of the Vatican? Of the Gregories, the



Clements, the Urbans, the Alexanders, and Leos? The decretals of Isidore, the fatalism of Augustine, the legends of the saints, the worship of the Mother of God? Purgatory—the real presence—the distinction between homousia and homoiousia, and between “sufficient” and “efficacious grace,” or the divine legitimacy of the successors of St. Peter? Must he believe *these*, or serve? Must he receive *these*, on pain of temporal as well as eternal perdition, or rather the great verities of a just and present God, a crucified and risen Atoner and Saviour, a regenerating and sanctifying Spirit, man’s fallen estate and way of recovery, a future retribution “according to deeds done in the body,” the universal law of meekness, mercy, justice, purity, and love, giving the sanctions of celestial command to the dictates of the natural conscience, and arraigning its violators at the Tribunal of Eternal Doom? Which of the two classes of dogmas are those, without the belief of which freedom cannot live? And is a heaven-inspired interpreter required to decipher *these* from the Bible?

If, in expressing his belief of the incompatibility of complete religious “independence” with entire public freedom, our author means, by religious independence, the denial of any principle of authority in religion, the sentiment is truly philosophic and profound; and no Protestant will dissent from him: it is his adhesion to such a principle of authority—the Bible—that constitutes him a Protestant. But if he means that the rejection of all interlocutory authorities between the human mind and the revealed Word of God, or any authority adding to, or overruling that Word, not exhibiting, in its warrant, the same sign manual of Heaven, is incompatible with entire public freedom, we would ask, upon what chapter in human history, or on what laws of the human mind, this opinion is based? Are not the liberties of Europe, at this hour, attributable manifestly to the assertion of such independence, in the Lutheran Reformation? Has not Protestantism almost invariably been the handmaid of civil freedom, while scarlet-clad Rome has almost uniformly been throned on the “Beast” of secular tyranny?

There is a natural affinity between religious and civil despotism. This Rome appears, in all her history, instinctively to have discerned, and has manifested a uniform affection for her secular sister. If she has ever quarrelled with her, it has been with reluctance—not because she loved her the less, but self more. The exceptive cases are few, and those rather apparent than

real. They were the result of circumstances, that threw her for a time into an unnatural alliance, which she took the first opportunity to escape from and betray. When she has been found on the side of resistance to tyranny, it has been not because she hated human liberty the less, but because that tyranny was hostile to herself, and displaced her own—because her self-love was stronger than her natural affection; and I doubt not, should the despotisms of modern Europe become opposed to her, she will, against those despotisms, clamor most stoutly for the rights of man, while the voice that should be raised in their behalf, under the shadows of her own supremacy, would speedily be stifled in depths, read only by the eye of God. And should the public sentiment of the globe tend, with overmastering force, toward civil liberty, her love of life might lead her to give the lie to all her past history, and attempt to palm herself upon mankind as the friend of popular freedom. But there is a vital bond connecting her with secular despotism, which she cannot sunder—their life-blood beats from the same heart. History and philosophy both show this. The same principles underlie civil and religious liberty. These two species of freedom shade into each other, like the colors of the spectrum.

It has been resistance to spiritual tyranny, that has taught men to question that of the State; it has been resistance to secular power, attempting to coerce religious belief and practice, that has led to the investigation of the foundations and limits of all human governments. The direct allegiance of the human soul to a higher than all human power, being once recognized, the doctrines of the divine right of kings and of the duty of implicit obedience in the governed, is exploded forever. Thus, Protestantism and civil liberty have ministered to each other in all modern history. Thus, hand in hand, have they come down through ages of proscription and blood; with shield to shield, have they stood in the battle-fields of England, Scotland, Holland, and Germany—over the ocean they were waisted by the same wing—side by side have they grown beneath the pine and the holly in the solitudes of the New World. All that is best of American civilization is the joint offspring of both. Take the map of Europe, also, and mark off the countries which have made the nearest approaches to entire public freedom, and you will have limited the domain of Protestantism. The exceptions are only those countries, which, under the banner of Protestantism, have erected new Papacies. For whatever tem-

poral power, be it king, or sacred bench, or consistory, or synod, comes between the human mind and the Bible, matters little—it is Papacy still. Note those districts where political as well as intellectual life beats most feebly, and your eye will rest upon lands where Protestantism was early suffocated in her own blood, and civil and intellectual liberty perished with her.

Now, such having been the alliance which civil and religious liberty have instinctively and invariably formed, during the ages of their imperfect development, what facts of history, or laws of mind, warrant the prediction, that, as they approach the period of their mature growth, they will begin to shrink from each other in fear, and that men “frightened at the prospect of their unbounded independence” will voluntarily surrender the one or the other? Especially, are we to believe that men, who would not, for their life’s blood, sacrifice the tithe of a hair of their political freedom, will deliberately and spontaneously commit the arbitrament of the unspeakable interests of their spiritual being, and their liberty to think and to speak with reference to these interests, to a ghostly despotism, whose hands still drip with the gore of their fathers, and whose attributes of awe and majesty the very philosophic method born of their civil institutions teaches them to despise? Will not he, who has ceased to be awe-struck at sceptres, soon trample on the crosier also? History and philosophy alike preclude the opinion, that one domain of thought should continue free and full of light, joined on to another, dark and clanking with chains—and much more, that the soul, in one department perpetually disciplined to self-reliance, and to bear no restraints, except those imposed by its own reason, should in the other, where immortal consequences impend, and the mightiest motives press on it with the claims of personal duty, and stimulate its anxious search after truth, voluntarily submit itself to a despotism over its reason, and an espionage upon its thought, and in order to escape from the painfulness of doubt, and the labor of inquiry, should take refuge beneath a tyranny whose shadow has been to human society like that of the Angel of Death.

To attempt to combine the salvation of liberty in one department of the human mind, with its loss in another, is to attempt an outrage on nature—to join the body of life to the body of death; and we hazard the prediction, that those countries which possess religious liberty apart from political, or political apart from religious, will ere long lose the one, or gain the other;

and that governments which think to reconcile their subjects to the loss of political liberty, by fostering among them education, and freedom of intellectual and moral inquiry, are undermining themselves, and nursing under their foundations the earthquake, at which the cities of the nations shall fall. They cannot teach mankind to question all else, and leave their own authority unarraigned. They cannot make their subjects free and bold philosophers, and keep them permanently timid and slavish politicians. The human mind can be free nowhere, and enslaved anywhere—it can rest nowhere between absolute slavery and entire freedom. Till the universal human mind reaches one of these points, agitation and revolution will be the course of human affairs.

Most vain then is the anticipation, that democratic ages will drift toward the Romish despotism. Her assumptions most assuredly will not remain unquestioned, or be submitted to without challenge, in a type of society most impatient of mere authority in every thing else; which regards no human opinions as sacred, and looks upon the most gray antiquity without awe; which being itself created from the ruin of older forms and fixtures, boldly pierces through show and dress, and rates things at their intrinsic and essential value.

The belief of M. De Tocqueville, therefore, relative to the tendency of democratic ages toward the Papacy, seems to us as little sustained by his philosophy as his facts. We can perceive nothing in the intellectual habits and tastes of such ages, that warrant such a conclusion, or that does not forbid it. The alternative will be not between Romanism and Infidelity, but Infidelity and Protestantism. The distractions of Protestantism may disgust and drive to Infidelity—not, I think, to the “bosom of Rome.” But Protestantism in its essential nature is no offence to the democratic taste for “impartiality,” “simplicity, and unity” in the governing power—it is in perfect and beautiful accord with it. It is only when it proves false to itself, and becomes a spurious Romanism, that it exhibits the spectacle of “religious powers radiating from different centres.” Its schisms are, to a great extent, the offspring of spiritual tyranny attempted or resisted—the effects of the spirit of the Papacy lingering in Protestantism—the paroxysms with which the demon rends the body he is loath to leave. They are the product, not so much of the right of private opinion allowed, as withheld. We acknowledge we have no partiality for this form of the Papacy. It offends by its inconsistency, and disgusts by

its pretension, and provokes contempt by its imbecility, while its tendency to annihilate the authority of religion itself awakens the most solemn alarm. But it still has the merit, that it asserts in word the eternal principles of religious liberty, though it constantly and glaringly violates them—that its theory is better than its practice, and may in time amend it; whereas Romanism is, by her essential principles, necessarily and unchangeably bound to her present policy.

Nor do the divisions of Protestantism deserve to be entitled “several religions.” Nor is this their impression. Such language is strange to us. They all hold of the same great charter, and deny all religious powers emanating from any other centre. They recognize, in general, the same fundamental truths. They are associations for a special purpose, whose powers are limited to the purpose for which they combine, and to the numbers that voluntarily enrol themselves in them. It seems impossible for a Frenchman to comprehend the American idea of a church. He seems ever to have before his eyes, as answering to this term, some great central power, with authority commensurate with that of the State, and within these limits grasping the keys, if not wielding the sword, and claiming exclusive spiritual jurisdiction.

Now, if there are sects among Protestants putting forth such pretensions, arrogating to be *the* church exclusively, or not conceding to others the same right, moral as well as political, of ecclesiastical association as they claim for themselves—assuming to overshadow our empire with their authority, while other organizations are but instances of intrusion, usurpation, or revolt; or, if by means of a national centralization, and by subordinate grades of administration and jurisdiction, they are seen causing their edicts for the adoption or amendment of rituals and symbols and ecclesiastical order, and their commands to believe or disbelieve, to profess or abjure, receive or excommunicate, to be urged with oppressive and riving force through every little band of disciples in the land; converting the peaceful hamlet into the theologic arena, the simple-hearted believer into the cunning and zealous partisan, diverting his energies from the work of sanctification and conversion to jangling and proselytism; breaking up the little flock, gathered with much toil and grief in the wilderness, that in their weakness and desolation had been drawn together by a sense of a common feebleness, and love of a common Saviour; and exhibiting to the

sneering infidelity and libertinism of her cities, the scandal of mutual suspicion, calumny, and denunciation, amid the professed followers of a religion of peace and love ;—I say, if there are sects, in whole or in part, answering to this description, they will present the spectacle of two or more suns claiming to rule the same hemisphere—of religious powers radiating from different centres—of empire overlapping empire—the lines of conflicting sovereignty crossing and recrossing in all directions—tyranny jostling tyranny—assumption clashing against assumption. They will offend democratic ideas of both spiritual and organic unity ; and to the extent that any large and powerful ecclesiastical organization, calling itself Catholic or Protestant, may exhibit such a taste for despotism, our countrymen must be pardoned if they watch its ambitious temper with jealousy. A centralization, a unity in the hands of such a power, might be calamitous to liberty. But let these vast and ponderous organizations disappear—let them cease to grate on the ear of the nation their jostling clangor, let their chain-work of subordinated judicatories and administrations cease to rattle and clash over the heads of the people—let the Church centralize in love on earth, but in authority in heaven, and the taste of democracy for unity need not be offended, nor its jealousy be aroused, by associations for religious purposes, more than by those for literary, educational, and commercial ends. There is an essential and eternal unity in truth, reason, and God. These are the recognized centralizing authorities of democracies : all others they regard as illegitimate and tyrannous.

Let us not be understood as wishing to palliate the guilt or absurdity of the present position of Protestant sects in this country. The evils are many and dreadful. The waste of men, of money and of mind—the tendency to disorganize society and to generate intellectual and moral sordidness, to narrow and degrade education, we would not attempt to extenuate ; and especially, the fearful sacrifice of piety, and moral power, and of the souls of men. But we deny these to be the legitimate results of genuine Protestantism—they are the offspring of a bastard Papacy. It is believed, as we have said above, that the schisms of Protestantism are chiefly the exponents of attempted usurpation upon religious liberty—the forms on which such attempts are prosecuted, or in which they are resisted. To the same cause, we believe, is attributable those movements of religious, combined with social, anarchism, that our times are witnessing

in the East and West—in the East, openly warring upon the institutions of the Sabbath and the Church, on civil law and domestic order, and ultimately on marriage, property, and society itself—and in the West, urged on by a rude, clamorous and Cyclopean force, manifesting itself more or less in all of the various religious organisms, and at work in the darkness and the depths of society, full of vehement sincerity and blind passion, ignorant to build up, mighty to destroy—clamoring for union, yet pervaded with the intensest venom of schism—wordy for charity, yet the very impersonation of hate—vaporing of liberty, without intelligence to discern, or liberality to grant, the freedom wherewith Christ has made free—arrogating to be governed by the Spirit, yet enslaved and enslaving to the most narrow literalism, and the most lifeless formalism—deriving its strength from appeals to low prejudice and petty ambition, vulgar envy, to the love of novelty, and an impatience of established order, often amounting to an insurrection against all religious restraint. Such forms of fanatic anarchism, like those of Anabaptism in Germany, and fifth-monarchy men in England, are the natural result of usurpation upon human liberty, attempted in violation of acknowledged principles. There will not be wanting those that will perceive the inconsistency and resent the wrong, and who, without the capacity or the candor to make true discriminations, will declare war against all existing religious institutions. Others again, under the plea of violated rights, will be eager to wreak their revenge upon all religious and social restraints. Thus those who are restive under any settled order—who are galled by the bonds of all moral obligation, and who regard religious truth as an intrusive alarmist upon their pleasures—the agitator and the epicure—the skeptic and the demagogue—the driver of a puling theophilanthropy and a sensual sentimentalism—the witling of a flippant blasphemy—the desperado of a philosophy shallow and putrid, or dashing with waves upheaved from the bottomless darkness, against all order human and divine,—these will combine with the ignorant bigot and sincere enthusiast, and the aspirant to the glory of a religious reformer in the alleged vindication of human liberty.

Such, however, is the homage our nature compels to truth, that it is impossible to gather a party, unless around some semblance of it. The most atrocious conspiracies against human society have had some truth as a nucleus. They take their stand upon some real wrong, or some great principle really violated. We

must ever beware of furnishing to the elements of mischief in society any such germ of crystallization. If we do, we may be sure they will not be slow to perceive it, and their common affinities will gather them around it. For though some truth is required as a principle of life, it needs marvellously little to leaven an immense mass of dead falsehood with the most acrid fermentation. It requires but a single spark to explode the mighty mass of combustible matter, that gathers with time under the most stable structure of man. It is one of the mischiefs of all despotism that it drives reform into the arms of revolution; it is the curse of spiritual tyranny, that it forces spiritual reform into this evil alliance. The companionship in which reform is found again reacts upon itself, and tends to divide society between anarchical ultraism and bigoted conservatism.

Most disastrous for mankind are those periods, when liberty becomes identified with anarchism, and order with the defence of old abuses. Such an alliance is most mischievous to both. It drives from the ranks of reform those very spirits most needed to enlighten, attemper, and guide its movements—minds of clear vision, and cool temperament, and pure taste, blending with a strong love of liberty an inextinguishable thirst for order. These it disgusts, or alarms. Between liberty on the one hand, and order on the other—between abuses which they hate, and excesses which they abhor, they withdraw into neutrality, or their intense abhorrence of anarchy drives them into the arms of the opposers of all reform. Again, such a connexion is most disastrous to order, as it leads it to throw its shield around abuses constantly provoking attack and incapable of defence, and to grapple itself to falsehoods which, being intrinsically rotten, must fall, and are likely, in their fall, to drag down in ruin all that attaches to them. Thus reform, without curb or guide, is left to run its blind and passionate course of disastrous defeat or more disastrous triumph, and order married to despotism lives to corrupt and oppress, or with the tyranny she has espoused is laid on the block of revolution. Thus, in the sixteenth century, it was the excesses perpetrated in the name of religious liberty—springing in part from the fact that the Reformation was not true to its own principles—that drove out or kept aloof from that great movement the minds that should have tempered it. This was the cause which finally stopped it in the middle of its course, and left European society to reach, through ages of agony and shame, the prize that then seemed within full



grasp. The violence of the German chiefs, and of the fanatics of Munster, neutralized the timid but gifted Melancthon, silenced the sarcasm and learning of Erasmus, and enlisted them at last in behalf of Romish absurdities. It was the atrocities of French Jacobinism, that threw the mighty intellect of Burke, with its natural sympathies with freedom, into the lists of Toryism—made Southey a lauder of the Divine Right, and the democratic dramatist of Tuscany, the lofty Alfieri, stoop to courtly sycophancy. We may add, this country, at this time, exhibits the spectacle of a small party rallying around great and eternal principles, that, in other times, would have bid legions of swords leap from their scabbards, and would have filled millions of hearts with enthusiasm, and millions of voices with eloquence and prayer; but by its extravagancies, and by the acrimony into which it was provoked by wanton attacks in its early history, driving away from it hundreds of thousands who most warmly embrace its first principles, but who, because they cannot fellowship the temper and measures, and the extravagant theories, in company with which these principles are found, shrink away from a contest where they can wish to neither party a victory. Thus the moderate and cool-headed class, whose gentleness and clear-sightedness are especially in requisition, withdraw, and leave the fanaticism of conservatism and the fanaticism of reform to battle for a field which they should have claimed as their own.

Order in this world of ours lives only by reform. Ruinous for any human institute is it to think to remain stationary while the great globe is turning. Society shrinks back with horror from the abyss into which the anarchists would plunge her, but the rocks, meanwhile, on which she fixes her obstinate step, are shaking with a mighty Niagara, whose undermining fury is foaming beneath. But American society and the American Church cannot long abide on such a foot-hold. They can stand nowhere but upon the everlasting basis of Truth and Right. Whatever in the constitution, discipline, creeds, and usages of religious organizations, will not bear the closest scrutiny—whatever in their spirit or practice will not defy the most malignant interpretation, they may be sure will be seized hold of by a party, whose vulture scent of moral carrion is stimulated to unnatural keenness by their impatience of religious restraint and hatred of all excellence higher than their own. We may be sure, that every restraint not clearly warranted by the great original charter of our faith, will cause to explode from out of es-

established systems some Reformer, with perhaps more zeal than knowledge, who for one defective feature will think he does God service in laying the whole structure in ruins. Let such a Reformer come forth—smarting under a sense of wrongs, real or imaginary—strong in a conscious jealousy for God and human liberty—with a mind powerful but narrow, vehement but erratic, exhibiting the not unusual combination of a rancorous zeal, and deep sincerity, with low cunning and popular artifice—let him blow the alarm trumpet, and beat the reveille, and the “vasty deeps” of popular delusion and passion will be moved, and will pour forth their armies, multitudinous, and of every hue. Malcontents of all orders, who have points of common sympathy in the worst or best parts of human nature—the weak and the wicked—the enthusiast and the hypocrite—the pious duper and the pious dupes—the open-throated atheist and the sanctimonious charlatan—the political intriguer and the religious aspirant—in short, all who, for any cause, hate or fear established order, will rally to the call. All these will rally around the religious anarchy; and whatever abuses, inconsistencies, and scandals may attach to religious bodies, they will seize hold of, and knot them into a scourge of scorpions to lash the offending organisms. Thus bringing their impeachment, they will throw down the gauge of battle, and call in the million to the arbitrament. Failing of all else, they may at last invoke the Powers of Ruin that heave restlessly beneath all established systems, and they will come,

*Κοιτος τε, Βριαρεως τε, Γυγης τ' αατος πολεμοιο.*

They will come, and the triumph of Reform will be the restoration of Chaos.

This religious Anarchy, Papacy is anticipating with wishful eyes; she urges it on; she stimulates the prejudices and passions that are to work it out, with the design, when it occurs, to spread out to the weary and bewildered millions her bosom, with its delusive show of peace, and to allure them to abandon both their liberty and their license, their weariness of doubt and of thought, their spiritual life and its spasmodic agonies, together in her embrace. It is no new thing for the Church of Rome, when it suits her purpose, to play the demagogue, and agitate in the name of civil and religious liberty. While she claims to herself the changelessness of marble, to her agents she grants a wonderful elasticity of principle and of conscience. Not unfrequently she has been seen in history, in one country framing conspira-

cies, plotting rebellion, and weaving dark and tortuous intrigue, nominally in defence of liberty of conscience, while in another she was imprisoning and burning those suspected of its exercise. In one clime, her Jesuits, in the assertion of the most unbounded civil and religious liberty, leave a Roger Williams and a Jefferson far behind them; while in others, they invoke the dagger of the assassin and the sword of the magistrate against the champions and confessors of these "pestilent" doctrines. Against Henry IV. of France and Elizabeth of England, they preached up doctrines bordering on Jacobinism, constantly inculcating on their subjects the right of deposing and killing kings, while amid those of Philip II. of Spain, they were teaching the human mind to crouch in the dust before the heaven-descended majesty of tyrants. Again, under the reign of the Stuarts, her agents stood forth as the champions of universal toleration, stimulating resistance to the established Church even to treason, while in France, they were abusing the weak superstition and iron power of the Bourbons to pursue the Huguenots with imprisonment, confiscation, and exile. Thus, in our own times, while along the Danube Rome is teaching implicit obedience to despotism under penalty of eternal damnation, in the wilds of Connaught she is instigating passions, blind and mad with oppression and fanaticism, to banded assassinations in resistance to "the Powers that be." On the shores of the Levant she persecutes for change of religious sentiment; in the Pacific she forces on the government of a feeble island universal toleration, not only of native believers, but also of foreign missionaries, considered by that government as corrupters both of its polity and morality. Along the Tagus and the Po, she withholds the Bible, and sedulously darkens the human mind, while her zeal for human enlightenment leads her to strew with her schools and universities the borders of the Mississippi. She overlooks the corrupt Italian, the dark-minded Austrian, and the bigoted Spaniard, but her sympathies glow with strange intensity, for the "scum of Protestant sects" along the shores of the Hudson, the Chesapeake, the Ohio and Illinois. Her prelates keep the conscience of Metternich at Vienna, or harangue the populace, in a political canvass, at New York. Professing to be as impeccable as the Holy Ghost, and as immutable as the decalogue, her pliancy and suppleness are most admirable, presenting in the outer courts of her temple forms elastic and changeable as vapor, while in the gloomy recess of her shrine, stands her own iron statue, rusting in the blood of fifty generations.

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Now, as in Ireland she conspires and assassinates for religious equality, and in England clamors most loudly among dissenters against the union of Church and State, we predict in this country she will be found, although with her canons full of denunciations of temporal and eternal penalties against heresy, yet in ostensible alliance with religious and social Jacobins in the professed vindication of spiritual liberty against ecclesiastical intolerance. She will attempt to foist herself upon the populace as the champion of those wronged or oppressed by Protestant sects, in hopes that she will at least be received as protector and mistress. In this hope, we think, she will be disappointed. But she may do our institutions and our moral sentiment, meanwhile, terrible mischief; she may loosen the bands of religion on the public mind—may dazzle and delude the weak and ignorant, and perplex the faith of multitudes, and may swell fearfully the hosts of unbelief: a Republic tottering on the brink of infidelity, she may perhaps have power to impel down the abyss; but convert the turbulent, free-thinking American Democracy into a devout, superstitious, and submissive flock of the vast fold of Rome, she never will. However adroitly she may intrigue, and shift, and falter between parties in equipoise, she can never thereby change the great laws of the human mind or neutralize permanent moral causes.

So far are we from believing that the democratic ages will return to the bosom of Rome, that we think Romanism cannot live in those ages. She can live in them only by that freedom and tolerance of religious opinions that must forbid her spread, and ultimately prove fatal to her. Her whole policy and legislation show that she has an instinctive dread of such freedom and tolerance, a presentiment that she is to die by them. If she lives by them, she lives on poison. The spectre of a night of centuries, like other phantoms of night, she will fade into air as the day-dawn of truth brightens into morning. Indeed, paradoxical as may seem the assertion, with all her boasted growth in this country, she is at this moment dying among us. A name may spread, while the reality is perishing. The term Roman Catholic, for aught we know, may survive these thousand years; but the thing, we believe, will have died long before. But we are not now writing of mere terms. A Church assuming to be an inspired interpreter of Heaven—an authorized interlocutor between God and the Bible and the human mind—claiming the right, though it may for a while veil it under ex-

pediency, to coerce belief by force, and to punish heresy by spiritual and temporal penalties—arrogating to itself an allegiance paramount to that of the state, and to hold in its hand the sceptre of pardon, the keys of Heaven, and the chains of Hell—such a Church and the freedom of human reason and speech can no more co-exist, than two bodies can fill the same space at the same time; the one negatives the existence of the other. Such a Church we mean by that of Rome. Such she is and such must ever be; to strip her of these attributes is to slay her.

Now, the temper and institutions of democracies tend directly to produce in the mind a denial of such prerogatives; but he that denies these claims of the Romish Church, ceases by that very act to be a Romanist. This is the very result that our institutions are working in the Catholic masses brought to our shores. On their landing they are baptized into a spirit directly the antithesis of Romanism. As they become fused with our population, they cannot fail to be affected with the intellectual and moral sympathies, that enfold them like an atmosphere. Foreign priesthood and colleges can no more shut them out from these influences, than they can from the heat and cold of our climate. Conversion by this process, unnoted and unmarked by change of name, is constantly going on. The strict genuine Romanists among us would be found feeble, both in numbers and character, and those few rarely dare declare themselves. Multitudes in this country are Romanists only in name. From the most absurd and pernicious, yet most essential dogmas of that sect, they have long since cut loose. They have become Americans—they have become freemen, civilly and spiritually; they have learned to resist priestly dictation in secular matters; they yield to it little more than a nominal submission in spiritual. They acknowledge no temporal allegiance to Rome, and their ecclesiastical allegiance sits loosely on them. They assert and exercise liberty of reason and of faith. Should issue ever be joined between Romanism and Americanism—between their civil and ecclesiastical allegiance—we should find them rallying, amid the foremost and warmest-hearted, around our institutions. This class of men we respect and honor; we do not wish to forget, that in times that have tried men they have been true—that they have been prodigal of their wealth and their blood for American institutions—that among those who perilled their “lives and fortunes and their sacred honor” in the assertion of the imprescriptible rights of a human being, stands

the hallowed name of Carrol. We are aware, too, that in a recent political canvass, in New-York, many have rejected indig-  
nantly the dictation of a Romish prelate, and nobly cast their  
suffrages for the political equality of all sects. We are sorry to  
be obliged, in speaking of an ecclesiastical system, to use a de-  
scriptive title that seems to embrace such men. It is to be re-  
gretted that a name, most justly odious, is retained when the  
reality has been repudiated. We regret the wrong often done  
to their character, and the injury inflicted on their feelings, by  
an indiscriminate warfare on names. But they must remember  
that there is properly implied in the name they wear, that  
upon which self-defence compels an American citizen to wage  
implacable war, and that they must charge the wrong they  
think done them, to the false and undefined position in which  
they stand: for though *they* may change, *Romanism*, properly  
so called, cannot change. There may be in this country, for  
centuries to come, those calling themselves Roman Catholics,  
yet asserting for themselves and others freedom of faith, of  
worship, and of conscience, and while nominally adhering to  
the decisions of the "Universal Church," may by interpretation  
and construction of these œcumenical decrees find latitude for  
the widest and wildest excursiveness of the human reason—a  
body rejecting her spiritual despotism and superstitions, the  
doctrines of saintly intercession and virgin worship, of penance  
and justification by works, of clerical celibacy, and of in-  
dulgences, of venal pardon, and the right of persecution, of  
paramount allegiance to Rome, and the exclusive salvable-  
ness of those within her pale—such a class as probably M. De  
Tocqueville himself belongs to; there may exist in this coun-  
try a sect of this description, nominally adhering to the Papacy;  
yet they will not be Papists, and when they are the sole repre-  
sentatives of that name in this republic, Papacy in this country,  
however great the number of her nominal adherents, is dead.  
We should not be surprised if this were the process of her dis-  
solution. But we must never forget that these are not Roman-  
ists, nor be lulled into the delusive belief of the amended or  
mitigated nature of Romanism herself. This can never be.  
Amendment or mitigation, with reference to her, are absurdities  
and self-contradictions. She cannot cease to be a Spiritual  
Despotism without ceasing to be at all; for this is her essence.  
In this country she can live only by hypocrisy and disguise—  
she plays the Jesuit, and bides her time. Real amendment is

to her annihilation, vital reform is suicide. All other despotisms have some power of assimilation, and are striving to eke out their lifetime by conciliating the Spirit of the Age. We see this verified in the present policy of Russia, Prussia, Turkey, and Persia, and other absolute governments. But Romanism cannot repent, or change; with her, to accommodate is only to dissemble—conciliation is but conspiracy. Her past assumption and tyranny she cannot renounce—she cannot plead immaturity, or ignorance, or error. All the arrogance and the crimes that attach to her days of pride, she must continue to wear. Her purple of infallibility she cannot put off, though she finds it a shirt of torture. It cleaves to her, and is part of her—not a shred can she tear off—not a thread can she whiten—with all her stains of sensuality and blood uncleansed—her titles of arrogance and her names of blasphemy emblazoned upon it, she must wear it down through the light of the nineteenth century.

If our language seem to our Roman Catholic fellow-citizens unduly severe, or wanting in a discriminate charity, our reply is, we war with things, not names. To the terms Papacy or Romanism, we must attach the significancy developed in the crimson dictionary of history. By these terms we mean things. We mean a system self-bound to immutability. That system cannot change—an attempt to renovate or amend it, would be as fatal as that of the daughters of Pelias to restore their aged father to the graces and vigor of youth. Thus, whatever her nominal adherents may profess, the Papacy itself is self-stereotyped. Pursued by the Furies of crimes, she cannot repent—the shadows of her pride and power waiting in mockery around her decrepitude—her imperial scarlet become a Nessian tunic—wearing the likeness of a crown she cannot throw off, though it burns her brow—her feet slipping in the gore of her innumerable slain—the crosier, the scourge, the brand, and the rusted keys, still clutched in her trembling hands, she must go down to the coming ages. What she has been she must be or die, or rather, must be and die.

And are we to believe that around this shadow of ghostly power the democratic ages are to be attracted?—that they will rally to the support of her tottering steps, and kiss her sandals mottled with the gore of a thousand years, and bow in the dust before that eye, the light of whose cruel majesty has long since faded?—that they will sluice their own veins to feed her fail-

ing life-streams—and for her wage battle and death? No, hers will be a retinue, not of living nations, but of a pale host of such shadows as gathered on the soul of Richard on the field of Bosworth. On her steps will attend, not the accents of living acclaim, but voices, like those from under the altar in the Apocalypse, swelling from a thousand heights and dales—from the city and the waste—from the Escurials and the Bastiles of half the globe—from the glens of the Alps, the plains of Provence and Holland—from the heaths of England, the mountains of Hungary, the Sierras, and the Apennines—from a thousand years of darkened intellect, and abused faith, and seared conscience, and broken hearts, and lost souls—from stifled human reason and bleeding human nature—from outraged man and from blasphemed Heaven, will gather over her in one mighty cloud of accusation, and arraign her for the grave. Such will be the attendants of her final hour. The pomp the democratic ages will form for her, will be that of her funeral—the train they will bear, will be the robe of her sepulture—the chant they will sing, will be the Pæan of the Prophet of Israel over the monarch of Babylon.

That the coming era, then, will not be one of the triumph of Romanism is, we think, as clear in the light of Philosophy as of Revelation. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by the recent movement of the English Church towards Rome. This movement indicates no tendency of the Democratic ages, but is in direct opposition to their spirit. It is not the product of our times, but of antagonist principles grafted on the English Church the century succeeding the Reformation—the hybrid Papacy of the Stuarts attempted to be held in combination with Protestantism. Our age simply witnesses the explosion. It is no farther responsible for Puseyism or Anglo-Romanism, than because its unceasing light and heat will not permit conflicting principles to be combined in the same system, but compels each to develop its affinities and disclose its consequences. The interest which attaches to recent Roman Catholic movements in the United States, has led us to dwell longer than we intended on this topic of our Author; and here the length to which this article has been protracted, compels us to leave him for the present. Whether the democratic ages, escaping from the extremes of credulity, will pass to the extreme of skepticism, and whether the human race, fleeing the tyranny of the few or the one, will at last take refuge beneath the more hopeless tyranny



of the million, these and other grave matters of thought, started in these volumes, we cannot touch upon now. We have, as it may be perceived, but just entered upon the course of inquiry proposed to ourselves. We may possibly resume it at some future time.

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## ARTICLE II.

### THE ARK OF THE TESTIMONY, AND ITS APPENDAGES.\*

By Rev. Enoch Pond, D D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me.

WHILE the Israelites were encamped before Mount Sinai, Moses was repeatedly summoned into the mount, to hold converse with God, and to receive messages for the people. It was on one of these occasions, that particular directions were given him respecting a place of public worship, called *the tabernacle*, which was to be erected for the congregation. Not only was a complete pattern of the tabernacle exhibited to Moses, but he was favored with a full *description* of it, in all its parts, and of the manner in which every part was to be prepared.

In connection with the tabernacle, and as an integral part of its sacred furniture, he received directions, also, respecting what was called *the ark of the testimony*. Of all the sacred symbols of the Jews, the ark and its accompaniments were held to be the most important, and were regarded with the deepest veneration. As one of the Rabbins justly remarks, they were "the *foundation, root, heart, and marrow* of the tabernacle and

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\* The Author was led into the train of thought exhibited in the following Article, from listening to Prof. Bush's Lectures on *the Tabernacle, the Ark, the Shekinah, and the Cherubim*; and though he feels constrained to dissent from some of the Professor's conclusions, it gives him pleasure to unite his voice, with that of many others, in bearing testimony to the learning, the ingenuity, the elegance, and general good influence, of those Lectures.

temple, and of all the worship therein performed." Their place of deposit was in the *holy of holies*, where they were approached only by the high-priest; and by him only once in a year. Undoubtedly, the ark and its appendages were of high *symbolical import*—full of glorious spiritual *meaning*; and this meaning (if it can be arrived at) will, in all probability, be of deep interest to us, as it was to the church in ancient times.

The material of the ark is called by the sacred writer "shittim wood;" a hard, beautiful, and most imperishable kind of wood. "Two cubits and a half shall be the length thereof, and a cubit and a half the breadth thereof, and a cubit and a half the height thereof." Supposing the cubit to be a foot and a half, the ark would be three feet nine inches in length, and two feet three inches in breadth and height.

"And thou shalt overlay it with pure gold, within and without, and shalt make upon it a crown," or rim "of gold round about. And thou shalt cast four rings of gold, and put them in the four corners of the ark; and thou shalt make staves of shittim wood, and overlay them with gold, and put them into the rings by the sides of the ark, that the ark may be borne with them. And thou shalt put into the ark *the testimony* that I shall give thee." By the testimony, we are to understand the *two tables of stone* which Moses was about to receive, and on which was inscribed, with God's own finger, the law of the ten commandments. It deserves particular consideration, that the ark was prepared to receive these two tables of stone, and that it contained, originally, nothing else.\*

"And thou shalt make a mercy-seat of pure gold; two cubits and a half shall be the length thereof, and a cubit and a half the breadth thereof." The mercy-seat was the covering of the ark, or lid of the chest. It was of the same dimensions as the top of the chest, and probably was *dropped down* within the crown or rim of gold above described. It is important to be remembered, that the covering of the ark was called the *mercy-seat*.

"And thou shalt make two cherubim of gold in the two ends of the mercy-seat. And the cherubim shall stretch forth their wings on high, covering the mercy-seat with their wings. And their faces shall look one to another; towards the mercy

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\* Whether it ever contained any thing else is doubtful. See Heb. 9: 4.

seat shall their faces be." Of the cherubim, I shall have occasion to speak more particularly, as I proceed.

"And thou shalt put the mercy-seat above upon the ark; and in the ark thou shalt put the testimony that I shall give thee." In other words, thou shalt put the two tables of stone in the ark, and then carefully place upon it the covering—the mercy-seat. "And there I will meet with thee, and I will commune with thee from above the mercy-seat, from between the cherubim, of all things which I shall give thee in commandment unto the children of Israel." God here promises to take up his abode upon the mercy-seat, between the cherubim, and there to hold sensible communion with his people, Ex. 25: 10-22.

When the tabernacle had been erected, and the ark prepared and put in its place, all this was remarkably, gloriously fulfilled. The God of Israel manifested himself *visibly* upon the mercy-seat, between the cherubim. He manifested himself in the appearance of a cloud, from which beamed forth a dazzling, brilliant light, called the Shekinah. "A cloud covered the tent of the congregation, and *the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle.*" We have repeated references to this glorious manifestation between the cherubim, in other parts of the Old Testament. Thus Aaron was particularly directed *how* and *when* he might enter into the most holy place; for, says the God of Israel, "*I will appear in the cloud upon the mercy-seat,*" Lev. 16: 2. It is in reference to this, that we so frequently hear of the God of Israel as *dwelling between the cherubim*. Here was the visible manifestation of his presence and glory.

It was here, also, that God communed with his people, and gave *audible responses*, when consulted by Moses, and afterwards by the priests. Moses had no more occasion, when the tabernacle had been erected, to go into the mount to learn the Divine commands. He received them from off the mercy-seat. Thus it is said of Moses, "When he went into the tabernacle to speak with God, that he heard the voice of one speaking unto him from off the mercy-seat, that was upon the ark of the testimony, from between the cherubim," Numbers 7: 89. And long after Moses was dead, we find the children of Israel receiving Divine communications in the same way. Thus, when Phinehas, the son of Eleazer the priest, stood before the ark of the covenant, and inquired, in behalf of his people, "Shall I yet again go out to battle against the children of Benjamin my

brother ? The Lord said, Go up, for to-morrow will I deliver them into thine hand," Judg. 20 : 28.

The temple of Solomon was built throughout according to the Divine direction ; see 1 Chron. 28 : 12, 19. Its construction was very similar to that of the tabernacle, only on a much larger scale. When it was finished, the ark of the covenant, with its appendages, which had so long rested in the most holy place of the tabernacle, was with great solemnity removed into the most holy place of the temple. And when it was removed, "the cloud," we are told, "filled the house of the Lord, so that the priests could not stand to minister because of the cloud ; for *the glory of the Lord had filled the house of the Lord*," 1 Kings 8 : 11. The glorious Shekinah, which before had rested upon the mercy-seat in the tabernacle, now entered the holy of holies in the temple, and took up its dwelling there. And here it remained, through all the succeeding generations, till Jerusalem was taken, and the temple destroyed, by Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon.

That the Shekinah was the symbol of the *Divine presence*—the presence of the *Deity*, there can be no question. "There," says the God of Israel, "will I meet thee, and I will commune with thee from above the mercy-seat, from between the cherubim." Accordingly, the God of Israel is continually represented, in the Old Testament, as dwelling between the cherubim. "Give ear, O Shepherd of Israel ! Thou that ledest Joseph like a flock, thou that *dwestest between the cherubim*, shine forth," Ps. 80 : 1. "The Lord reigneth, let the people tremble ; he sitteth *between the cherubim*, let the earth be moved," Ps. 99 : 1. "O Lord of Hosts, God of Israel, that *dwestest between the cherubim* ; thou art the God, even thou alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth," Is. 37 : 16.

No believer of the Old Testament can doubt that the visible glory between the cherubim, was a symbol of the *Divine presence* ; or, in other words, a manifestation of *God*. But it has been made a question among Trinitarians, which of the adorable persons of the Trinity is here more specially exhibited. Is it the first person, or the second ; the Father, or the Son ?

Notwithstanding the highly respectable authorities which may be adduced in support of the sentiment, that the Divine personage here manifested is the Son of God, I feel constrained to reject it, and to adopt the other supposition. My principal reason for so doing is, that by regarding the Shekinah as a

representation of Christ, we introduce confusion into the sacred symbols, and make the import of them an absurdity.

It is certain, from various passages in the Bible, that Christ, as Mediator, sustains a *priestly office*; and that the high priest in Israel was an eminent *type* of him. This typical relation is very fully exhibited in the Epistle to the Hebrews; see chap. 9. But if the Shekinah was a symbol or type of Christ, and the high priest a type of Christ; the service of the high priest, on the great day of atonement, becomes most singularly absurd. Symbolically, *typically*, Christ enters into the holy of holies, and makes expiation to himself! He burns the holy incense and presents the blood of atonement before himself! He is himself not only the priest and intercessor, but the very personage to whom the intercession is made!

Nor is this the worst of it. The whole service on the day of atonement was typical of what is now doing in heaven. The holy of holies, in the Jewish tabernacle and temple, was itself a type of the most holy place above, into which the great High Priest of our profession has entered, with the blood of atonement, and with the incense of his intercession. "Christ," we are told, "is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are figures (or types) of the true, but into *heaven itself*, now to appear in the presence of God for us." The Divine personage before whom Christ appears in heaven is unquestionably the same that was symbolized by the glorious Shekinah on earth. As the holy of holies on earth was a type of heaven, and the intercession of the high priest before the Shekinah was a type of our Saviour's intercession in heaven; it follows, of necessity, that the Shekinah itself represented *the personage* before whom our Saviour now intercedes. Hence, if the Shekinah represented Christ, then Christ is himself the heavenly personage before whom his own intercession is made. On this ground, the same absurdity, which was set forth typically in the holy of holies on earth, is literally enacted in the court of heaven. Christ appears in heaven before himself! He is Mediator to himself! He presents the blood of atonement, and offers up his intercession, to his own person!!

Absurdities such as these most certainly are not to be admitted. And I see not how they can be avoided, on the supposition that we make the Shekinah a representation of Christ. I feel constrained, therefore, to reject this interpretation, and to consider the Shekinah as a visible, glorious representation of *the*

*Father.* This restores beauty, order, consistency, and harmony, to the otherwise disturbed and distorted sense. In the tabernacle and temple, Christ, by his type, presented his intercession before the symbol of his Father; as he now, in his own Divine person, appears before the same glorious personage above.

In the vast work of man's redemption, *the Father* is officially supreme. It belongs to him to guard the laws, and sustain the honors of the eternal throne. It is to him, therefore, that the expiation of Christ was made. It is before him, that Christ presents the blood of atonement, and offers up the incense of his intercession. And as the Father is the personage before whom Christ actually appears in heaven, so the Shekinah before which Christ typically appeared in the most holy place on earth, must be regarded as a representation of the same person.

And this perfectly accords with the *appearance* of the glorious Shekinah. Had *Christ* been shadowed forth in it, we might have expected the appearance of a *human form*, as this was the form in which he *actually* appeared on the earth, and in which he often appeared, before his incarnation, to the patriarchs and prophets. But the Shekinah seems to have presented no definite form whatever. It was a dazzling brightness, beaming forth from the cloud; fit emblem of Him, who is represented as dwelling in light unapproachable, "whom no man hath seen, or can see" and live.

But we must now turn to those other important appendages of the ark, viz., *the cherubim*. Of these there were two; one on each end of the lid or covering of the ark, called the mercy-seat. They are represented as "stretching forth their wings on high, and covering the mercy-seat with their wings." They are also represented as having "faces looking one to another, towards the mercy-seat." In the most holy place of the temple, there were two other cherubim, of much larger dimensions, not attached to the ark, but standing one on either side of it, and overshadowing it with their wings, 1 Chron. 3: 10—13.

The precise form of the cherubim is not made known to us; nor is it certain that all the cherubim spoken of in the Scriptures were of the same form. Those described by Ezekiel had each of them *four* faces, looking towards the four points of the compass. Those in the tabernacle and temple seem not to have had more than *two* faces each, perhaps not more than one; as it is expressly said that their faces turned *inward* towards each

other, and towards the mercy-seat. The cherubim of Ezekiel had each of them *four* wings, Ezek, 1: 6—10. It does not appear that those in the tabernacle and temple had more than *two*. The cherubim of Ezekiel were furnished with *wheels*, as well as wings; an appendage not mentioned in connexion with any of the other cherubim figures spoken of in the Scriptures.

It is not likely that the cherubim were images or resemblances of any *earthly*, created object. They were symbols of some order of *heavenly beings*. This is evident from the *place* which they occupied, both in the tabernacle and temple. Their place was in the holy of holies, close by the Shekinah and the mercy-seat; and as the holy of holies was itself a type of heaven, and as the whole service performed there was but a resemblance of what is done in heaven; so, manifestly, the cherubim were symbols or resemblances of some class of heavenly beings. But who? What? What order of heavenly beings do they represent?

By Mr. Hutchinson and those of his school, they are regarded as emblematical of the Trinity. But this idea is too absurd to require consideration. God, who strictly forbade that any image or likeness should be made of himself, would not have instructed Moses, almost in the same breath, to form such an image. Besides, the God of Israel is always represented as distinct from the cherubim. He dwelt "*between* the cherubim," and could not have been represented by them.

The suppositions chiefly prevalent among Christians in regard to the import of the cherubim are, that they denote either *the angels of heaven*, or *the glorified spirits of saints in heaven*. The former of these is the more common opinion, and after much study and reflection, I am constrained to think it the true one.

From what we know of the cherubim, their characters and offices are entirely *consonant* to those of the angels. The angels are deeply interested in the great subject of *redemption*. They study it with profound attention, and learn from it "the manifold wisdom," and the abounding grace and glory of God. "Into which things the angels desire to look," 1 Pet. 1: 12. The cherubim too, as exhibited in the tabernacle and temple, appear deeply interested in the same wonderful subject. Their faces are turned inward upon the *mercy-seat*—the place where mercy and truth symbolically meet together, and where right-

ousness and peace embrace each other, contemplating the wonders and glories of the scene, in a posture of the most devout attention.

The angels are interested in *the church of God*—in the *worship* and *ordinances* of the church; and are thought by many to be present in the assemblies of the saints; see 1 Cor. 11 : 10. So the cherubim are represented as deeply interested in the church, and as being present in her most solemn acts of worship. Besides the cherubim in the most holy place, pictures of cherubim were inwrought in all the curtains and veils of the tabernacle; thus indicating that the beings, of which these were the types, were present there to behold the ordinances and worship of that sacred place. Also in the temple there were not only the standing figures of cherubim in the most holy place, but Solomon, we are told, “carved all the walls of the house round about with carved figures of cherubim;” indicating the same important fact as before; see 1 Kings 6 : 29, 35; 2 Chron. 3 : 14.

The angels are represented as not only loving and serving God, but delightfully *praising* him. At the dawn of the creation, “the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy.” And at the birth of our Saviour, the angels heralded his incarnation with songs of praise. So the seraphim (which are supposed to be the same as cherubim) are represented as engaged in the most reverential acts of devotion and praise. They cry one to another in the upper temple, “Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory,” Is. 6 : 3.

If it be said that the acts and offices of the cherubim, here referred to, are no more consonant to those of the angels than they are to those of glorified saints, and consequently that nothing can be determined from them in regard to the question before us, I proceed to notice *other* representations of Scripture respecting the cherubim, which are of a more decisive character.

The placing of cherubim at the entrance of the garden of Eden, “to keep the way of the tree of life,” is perfectly natural, on the supposition that they signify angels; but hardly to be accounted for on the other supposition. There were no glorified saints at this period in heaven; nor, so far as we know, in any part of the universe. And if there had been, why should their representations or types be stationed at the entrance of the garden of Eden, “to keep the way of the tree of life”? All this



seems very consonant to what we know of the offices of angels, but not at all in conformity with what God has revealed to us respecting the employment of glorified saints. They are not posted as sentinels in different parts of God's kingdom, and charged with the performance of arduous and responsible duties ; but " they *rest* from their labors, and their works follow them." They have entered upon that *rest* which remains for the people of God.

But this leads me to remark further, that the cherubim, like the angels, and not like the saints, are represented as the *servants*, the *ministers*, of God's throne. I hardly need quote passages to show that the fact here asserted is true of the angels. They are represented as *standing*, in the posture of servants, round about the throne. " I am Gabriel, that *stand* in the presence of God ; and am *sent* to speak unto thee, and to show thee these glad tidings," Luke 1 : 19. It was in their capacity as servants to the throne of God, that the angels appeared unto Jacob, ascending and descending on the ladder which reached from earth to heaven, Gen. 28 : 12. It is in the same capacity that they are spoken of as " doing the commandments of God, hearkening unto the voice of his word ;" and as being " ministering spirits, sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs of salvation," Ps. 103 : 20 ; Heb. 1 : 14.

It is interesting to look through the Bible, and notice the *extent* of the angelic ministry, and the manner in which it has been accomplished. We find the angels ministering to Abraham in repeated instances : to Hagar in the desert ; to Lot in Sodom ; to Jacob, on his return from Padan-Aram ; to Moses ; to Joshua ; to Gideon ; to Manoah and his wife ; to Elijah the prophet ; to Daniel, in repeated instances ; to Zechariah the prophet, and Zechariah the priest ; to Mary the mother of Jesus ; to Joseph ; to the shepherds ; to Peter and John ; to Paul, and Philip, and Cornelius ; to the soul of Lazarus, after its release from the body ; and more than all, to our Lord Jesus Christ. At the close of his temptation, " angels came and ministered unto him ;" and in the garden of Gethsemane, " there appeared an angel from heaven unto him, strengthening him." Indeed, it is said of the angels of the Lord, " that they encamp round about them that fear him, to deliver them," Ps. 34 : 7.

And in waiting around the throne of God, the angels have been ministers, not only of his mercy, but of his *wrath*. It was through their instrumentality that Sodom and Gomorrah were

destroyed ; that the Egyptians were visited with such desolating judgments, Ps. 78 : 49 ; that the people of Israel were smitten, after they had been numbered by David, 2 Sam. 24 : 16 ; that the hosts of the proud Assyrian were cut off as in a moment, Is. 37 : 36 ; and that the impious Herod was devoured of worms, even before he was laid in the dust, Acts 11 : 23. It is through the ministry of angels, that both the righteous and the wicked are to be gathered, at last, before the throne of judgment, to hear their destinies awarded, and to enter on the changeless retributions of eternity.

But I have said more than was necessary to show that angels are the *servants* of God's throne. Their very name imports as much as this :—*angels, messengers*, whose office it is to do the commandments of God, and bear his messages from one world to another.

It will be evident, on reflection, that the office of the cherubim is very similar. They, too, are represented as standing near the throne of God, apparently waiting the intimations of his will. In the tabernacle and temple, their place was close by the glorious Shekinah, the visible manifestation of the presence of the Most High, and when Isaiah "saw the Lord sitting upon his throne, high and lifted up," he saw also the seraphim standing near it, ready to fly on his errands of mercy or of wrath.

The cherubim which Ezekiel saw, were in a still more obvious attitude of service. They are represented as *bearing up* the throne of God, and as constituting, by their wings and wheels, the chariot of his glory. He saw the likeness as of a firmament *upon the heads of the living creatures* ; and "above the firmament was the likeness of a *throne* ;" and upon the throne was "as the appearance of a *man*," \* Ez. 1 : 22, 26. It is with reference to this representation, that we read of "the *chariot* of the cherubim," 1 Chron. 22 : 18. It is also said of the Jehovah of Israel, "*He rode upon a cherub*, and did fly," Ps. 18 : 10.

It must be evident from what has been said, that the angels and the cherubim stand in the same relation to the great Sovereign of the universe, and are employed in the same offices and

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\* The personage here presented, I have no doubt, is the Son of God. He appears in a *human form*. He also was the person whom Isaiah saw, sitting on his throne, surrounded by the seraphim, see John 12 : 41.

works. But where do we find any such representation in regard to glorified saints? They are indeed the servants of God, in the sense of rendering him a devoted obedience; but where are they represented as bearing God's messages from world to world; as the executors of his will in different and distant parts of the universe; as sustaining even the throne itself, and bearing on their swift wings, and rolling on their burning wheels, the symbols of the incumbent Deity? The similarity of the office of the cherubim to that of the angels, and its dissimilarity to that of glorified saints, clearly indicates that they are the representatives of the former, and not of the latter.

But there are other Scriptures which go to identify still more conclusively the angels and the cherubim. It is often represented in Scripture that the angels were present on Mount Sinai, at the giving, of the law, and had some agency or office in that great event. Thus it is said, that the Israelites "received the law through *the disposition of angels*;" or, as it might be rendered, "through *ranks of angels*," Acts 7 : 53. The law is also represented as "the word spoken *by angels*;" and as ordained *by angels* in the hands of a Mediator," Heb. 2 : 2; Gal. 3, 19. But it appears from a passage in the Psalms that *these angels were cherubim*. "The chariots of God are twenty thousand, even thousands of angels; the Lord is among them, as in Sinai, in the holy place," Ps. 68 : 17. That the beings here spoken of are cherubim, is evident from three considerations:—

1. Like the cherubim, they are called *chariots*: "The chariots of God are twenty thousand;" compare 1 Chron. 28 : 18.
2. The Hebrew word here rendered angels literally signifies *double ones*, in allusion to the bi-form or quadruple form of the cherubim, having in some instances *two faces*, in others *four*.
3. "The Lord is among them, as in the *holy place*," the *Sanctuary*. Here is a manifest reference to the cherubim in the most holy place of the tabernacle and temple, standing around the glorious Shekinah. The beings spoken of in the 68th Psalm are, therefore, *cherubim*. But they are also *angels*—the same that were on Sinai at the giving of the law. "The Lord is among them, as *on Sinai*."

The foregoing observations seem to me to prove, as fully as the nature of the case admits, that the "cherubim of glory," as they are called in the Epistle to the Hebrews, were the representatives of *angels*, and not of *glorified saints*. And I know of but one passage in the Bible which seems to conflict with this

idea. The four living creatures (improperly rendered beasts) which John saw in heaven, in the opening of the apocalyptic visions, are represented as *distinct* from the angels, and as uniting with the four-and-twenty elders in singing the song of *redeeming* love: "Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain, and *hast redeemed us to God by thy blood*, out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation," Rev. 5: 8—12. But it will be borne in mind that these living creatures are never called cherubim; nor are they of the same appearance as the cherubim of Ezekiel. Ezekiel's living creatures, or cherubim, had each of them four faces and four wings; whereas the living creatures of John had each one face and six wings. The living creatures of Ezekiel were furnished with wheels; of which we hear nothing in the description of John. Nor can the appearances in the two cases be identified, from the fact that they are both called *living creatures*, as this was the most general term by which they could be called, and seems to have been applied to them by the two prophets because they knew not what else to call them. Ezekiel afterwards understood that the living creatures which he saw were cherubim; but those which John saw are never called by this name. The most that can be said of them is, they are *like* the cherubim; just as it is said of glorified saints, that they shall be *like* the angels, and *equal to* the angels.\*

The four living creatures of John, in connection with the four-and-twenty elders, undoubtedly represent the redeemed church in heaven; but as these living creatures are never called cherubim, and can only be said to be like the cherubim, the passage does not conflict with the idea, that cherubim are properly the representatives of angels.

Without dwelling longer on the *exegetical* part of this subject, I proceed to deduce from it some important doctrinal and practical reflections.

1. We learn from it the value of the Old Testament Scriptures. There are those calling themselves Christians, who utterly reject the Old Testament, and will not acknowledge it as any part of Divine revelation. The God of the Old Testament, they say, is a ferocious God; delighting in war, and blood, and vengeance, and altogether a different being from that God of love

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\* See Mark 12: 25; Luke 20: 36.

which is revealed to us in the gospel. The *religion* of the Old Testament is held up in strong contrast with that of the New, as though there could be no affinity or harmony between them.

It is enough to say of views such as these, that they are essentially infidel. It is impossible to separate the two Testaments, and retain the latter; for this is grafted directly on the former. It is connected with it by a thousand ligaments; so that if the Old Testament is given up, the New cannot possibly be retained, and regarded as the truth of God.

But there are Christians, who have no thought of discarding the Old Testament, by whom, as it has seemed to me, this part of the Bible is greatly undervalued. They consider a large portion of it as the worthless record of an old legal dispensation, which is forever done away, and which, of course, is now comparatively useless. Consequently, they neglect it, as scarcely deserving their attention.

But such were not the views entertained of the Old Testament by our blessed Saviour and his Apostles. How often did they quote it; and with what respect and reverence did they uniformly treat it! They spoke of it as the *word of God*, and constantly appealed to it as the standard by which to judge of their doctrines and practice. It was the Old Testament of which Peter said, "We have a more sure word of prophecy, to which we do well to take heed, as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in our hearts." It was the Old Testament of which the Saviour said, "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they that testify of me."

A large portion of the Old Testament is obviously of the highest importance. Its history has instructed and benefited the church in all ages. Its prophecies have confirmed the faith of thousands, and attested the inspiration of the whole sacred volume. Its poetical parts have been a constant means of warming the hearts and elevating the hopes of believers. Will the church ever cease to listen with admiration to the harp of David, and to join with rapture in the devotions of the sweet Psalmist of Israel? And that we so generally neglect the *ritual* parts of the Old Testament is owing to our own dulness and ignorance, and not to any want of interest in the subject itself. The ritual institutions of the Israelites were to them, I have no doubt, the richest part of their Scriptures. They were emphatically *their gospel*. It was through these types and

rites, that the pious in Israel discovered the foundation of their hopes. And could *we* learn to look at these rites with the eye of one of the ancient prophets, and behold through the symbolic veil their high spiritual bearing and import, we should see that they covered the same religion which is professed by us, and that they poured a flood of light on many subjects in which we, as Christians, are deeply interested.

In the preceding pages, we have considered the single subject of *the ark of the testimony*; its structure, its contents, its covering, its appendages. We have seen enough already to know (and we shall know more about it as we proceed) that *this* is a highly instructive subject. It teaches many important lessons, which Gentiles, as well as Jews, are slow to learn. Nor is this the only instructive symbol of the Mosaic ritual. Whether we understand it or not, *the whole* is instructive. The whole is included in the book of God, and not only demands, but *deserves* the prayerful attention of the Christian student. What lessons of interest did Paul draw forth from the Mosaic ritual, in writing his Epistle to the Hebrews? By tracing, in a variety of particulars, the connexion between shadow and substance, type and antitype, he has unlocked the mystery which might otherwise have hung over the ritual institutions, and instructed Christians, in all ages, to draw living water from these wells of salvation.

There is yet another standard by which to test the value of the Old Testament Scriptures, and to which, before dismissing the topic, I must for a moment advert: I mean the spiritual *attainments* of those who were trained and instructed under them. Where is the believer in modern times, who has more faith than Abraham; or more meekness than Moses; or more patience than Job; or more fervor than David; or more spiritual understanding than Solomon; or more tender, benevolent affection than Jeremiah; or more firmness in the cause of God and truth than Daniel and his three friends? But how, I ask, was the piety of these eminent saints nurtured? Where is the holy truth, the sincere milk of the word, by means of which they grew to such commanding stature, if not in the Old Testament? Is it not evident, from the consideration here adduced, that this portion of Scripture *is*—what Paul represents it to be—“*profitable*, for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness”?

2. But to come more directly to the ark. In this sacred symbol, with its appendages, contents, and place of deposit, God is

teaching us, and impressing upon us, *the high regard which he has for his holy law*. In illustration of this, let me call attention, for a moment, to the structure of the ancient temple, and to the place of deposit for the ark.

The temple, with its several courts, was surrounded with a high wall, 750 feet square, including more than twelve acres. Immediately within this exterior wall, was what was called *the court of the Gentiles*. Passing through this, you came to another wall, inclosing *the outer court of the temple*. Passing through this, and the outer court, you came to a third wall, inclosing *the inner court of the temple*. Passing through this, and the inner court, you came to the gate of *the temple itself*. Passing through this, you first entered what was called *the sanctuary*. Here stood the great altar of burnt-offering, surrounded by the priests, engaged in presenting the sacrifices of the people. Passing through this apartment, you next entered *the holy place*. Here stood the candlestick, the table of shew-bread, and the altar of incense, on which was offered the morning and evening sacrifice. Passing through this, you entered, at last, *the holy of holies, or the most holy place*. In the temple, this was a spacious room, thirty feet square, and overlaid with pure gold. It was situated in the deep recesses of the temple, and protected by its sacred, successive inclosures. It was open to none, except the high priest, and to him only once in a year. And *what did this splendid, awful apartment contain?* Not an individual thing, except the ark of the covenant and the cherubim covering it. And what did the ark of the covenant contain? Nothing (originally) except the tables of stone, on which was inscribed *the moral law*. And now, in this whole, wonderful, awful structure—this vast institution—*what a high and sacred regard did God manifest for his holy law!* How could he have manifested for it a higher regard, or put upon it a greater honor? He laid it down (where it still lies) at the foundation of the whole scheme of mercy. He laid it down in the most sacred recess of the temple, and at the foundation of the entire service of his church. Here rested the tables of the law, covered and protected by the wings of mighty cherubim. Here they rested—overshadowed by a visible manifestation of the Divine presence and glory—to be approached by no foot but that of the high priest, and by him only once in a year. How could the great Sovereign of the world have said, in more intelligible language, “This law is holy, and must be maintained. It has been transgressed, but

shall not be dishonored. No scheme of mercy can ever be tolerated, which brings the least stain upon the law. Till heaven and earth pass, one jot, or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled."

3. In the ark and its accompaniments, God sets before us, not only the honors of the law, but that, in some way, there is *mercy* for those who have transgressed it. Over the ark there was laid a *mercy-seat*; and here God was graciously pleased to dwell, and to hold communion with his people.

Though the law is in full force, retaining all its honors as a rule of life, it is of no avail to us now, as a foundation of hope. Its insupportable curse rests on the head of every child of Adam. It kills and condemns every transgressor, who essays to build on it a hope of heaven. But God has been pleased to erect a throne of *mercy*. Over the ark, which contained his righteous law, he was pleased to lay a *mercy-seat*; and this he selected as the place of his rest. Both in the tabernacle and temple, the *mercy-seat* was the place where the tokens of the Divine presence were specially visible—where rested the glorious *Shekinah*—the pillar of cloud and of fire. Here, too, was the place where God promised to meet his people, and hold visible, sensible communion with them. "I will appear in the cloud, upon the *mercy-seat*. There will I meet thee, and there will I hold communion with thee."

To the ancient believers, all this was full of precious, glorious meaning. They saw in it that, in some way, "mercy and truth had met together;" that "righteousness and peace had embraced each other." They saw in it that a holy and righteous God could yet be *merciful*; that, in some way, he could be just to himself and his law, and yet justify the penitent, returning transgressor. In short, they saw in it a way of *salvation*; a *foundation* on which to rest their immortal hopes.

4. Nor did the ark, and the services connected with it, leave the ancient worshipper altogether in ignorance as to *the method* of salvation. Once every year, on the great day of atonement, he saw the high priest—the highest officer in the church—venture into the holy of holies, attired in his sacred vestments, to sprinkle the *mercy-seat* with *blood*, and to burn incense before it. By this awful service, the priest was instructed to propitiate the God of heaven, and make an atonement for the people. In these symbolical transactions, the believing Israelite saw much of *the method* of salvation. Through these typical atonements,



made by the blood of bulls and goats, he looked forward to a greater atonement, made once for all, consisting in a richer sacrifice, and more precious blood. In the literal incense which was burned before the mercy-seat, he saw a type of that more prevalent intercession, which was to be offered before the throne of God above. In short, the entire service of the priest, on this occasion, pointed him forward to the nobler services of his great High Priest in heaven, when he should enter into the holy places not made with hands, there to appear in the presence of God for us. Thus the pious in Israel were led to look for a *Saviour to come*; and led to exercise that *faith* and *confidence* in him, which stood connected with their eternal salvation.

5. The ark and its appendages were fitted to teach the Israelites, and to teach *us*, that the gospel of salvation, so far from impairing or dishonoring the divine law, tends rather to *vindicate* and *establish* it. The mercy-seat, on which the glorious Shekinah rested, was the appointed *covering* of the ark. It *covered* and *protected the law, which was deposited under it*; thus teaching a lesson which not a few, in our own times, have need to learn.

There are those who seem to consider the gospel as above the law, if not in palpable contradiction to it. From expressions sometimes used, one might suppose that God had, at length, discovered that his law was unreasonable; or at least that it was unsuitable to the condition of man;—‘It requires more than his creatures in this world can perform. It threatens more than they can endure. He has been pleased, therefore, in mercy, to take it out of the way, and to substitute for it the milder dispensation of the gospel.’

But opinions such as these are in palpable contradiction both to law and gospel—both to the letter and spirit of all true religion. What is that law, which it is pretended is so unreasonable and unjust? “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself.” And is this an unreasonable requisition? With how much less than all the heart should the God of heaven require his creatures to love him? With how much less than all the heart does any one think that he ought to love him? And if our neighbor, our fellow creature, is as worthy as ourself, why should we not love him as ourself? This holy law, so far from being suspended or annulled, is in full, unabated force throughout the universe. It is in force in heaven, and in the keeping of it the happiness of that world

consists. It is in force on earth, too, and ought to be obeyed perfectly here, as there; and the gospel of salvation, so far from impairing it, goes (as I said) to *cover* and *protect* it—goes to *vindicate* and *establish* it.

The suppliant, when he approaches the mercy-seat to plead for pardon, does not come finding fault with the law. He does not say, while bending before the throne of grace, ‘Thy law, O God, was unreasonable and cruel. It was so strict that I could not obey it, and of course am not to blame for transgressing it.’ But he consents unto the law, that it is just and good. He mourns and repents, he reproaches and condemns himself, for all his disobedience. He says with the apostle, ‘The law is holy; but I am carnal, sold under sin. All that God has required is right; and all that he has threatened is just; and for my numberless transgressions, I have no excuse. *Pardon mine iniquity, for it is great. God be merciful to me a sinner.*’

We here see how the very terms and spirit of the gospel all go to vindicate and establish the law. It is impossible, in the nature of things, for any person to comply with the offers of the gospel, and become interested in its blessings, till he acknowledges his obligations to obey the whole law, and heartily consents to it, that it is good. What, I ask, is that *repentance* which the gospel demands, but a holy sorrow for having broken the law? And what is that *forgiveness* which the gospel promises, but forgiveness for having transgressed the law? And what is the *salvation* of the gospel, but deliverance from the condemning sentence of the law? And for what did the Saviour appear in our world, but to magnify the law, and make it honorable, and open a way of reconciliation and redemption for those who had broken it? In every view we can take of the gospel, it rests upon the firm foundations of the law, and goes, not to supersede its claims, but to vindicate and establish them. Well then might the Apostle exclaim, “Do we make void the law through faith? Nay, we *establish* the law.” And well might the sacred ark of the testimony, enclosing in its bosom the moral law, be *covered* and *protected* by the mercy seat.

6. We learn from the ark and its appendages the deep and abiding *interest* which holy angels feel in the wonderful subject of man’s redemption. Cherubim were erected on either end of the mercy seat, and extended their wings over it. In addition to these, more lofty cherubim were erected in the most holy place of the temple, under the shadow of whose wings the whole

ark was deposited. And besides these, we are told that Solomon carved the entire wall of this most sacred apartment "round about with carved figures of cherubim." The faces of these figures (which, we have seen, represented the holy angels) were all turned inwards on the ark, in a posture of the deepest and most devout attention; thus indicating that the ark, with its appendages and contents, furnished matter of the profoundest interest and astonishment to the angelic world. Angels here saw that law which they loved and obeyed carefully deposited in the most holy place, and honored with tokens of the highest regard. They knew that this law had been dreadfully violated by man, and had reason to expect that its fearful penalty was about to be executed on him. They had seen it executed on a part of their own number who sinned, and they had reason to expect that a flame would suddenly burst forth from the ark, to devour and consume an apostate world. But instead of this, they saw the ark covered with a mercy seat, and saw the Holy One of Israel descend and take up his abode there. They saw him holding communion with apostate creatures, and dispensing pardons to guilty men. They saw the curse of the violated law removed, and yet its authority sustained and strengthened. They saw it pass away, as a foundation of hope for sinners, and yet remain in full force, and increased effect, as a rule of life. They saw, in short, that a *just God* could consistently *save sinners*; and not only that he *could* save them, but that he was most sincerely disposed to do it. They heard him crying from the mercy seat, "Ho, every one that thirsteth; come ye to the waters; and he that hath no money, come ye; buy wine and milk, without money and without price." "Look unto me and be ye saved, all ye ends of the earth."

Now these things, there is reason to believe, are matter of delight and wonder to the angelic world. "Into which things the angels desire to look." With intense interest, they cluster around the mysterious ark. They bend over it; they fasten their eyes upon it, in a posture of the most devout attention. They are never wearied or satisfied with this blessed employment. Their mighty energies are engrossed, and their eternity occupied, in searching into the wonders, and pouring forth the praises of redeeming love.

O that Christians in this world might imbibe more of their fervor, and more closely imitate their example! that those, who are chiefly interested in the work of redemption—for

whom the Son of God died, and the glorious provision of the gospel was made, might be more deeply engaged, and more delightfully occupied, in looking into the wonders of redemption, and laboring to promote its triumphs in the earth !

7. In view of the light which the ancient believers enjoyed, and the knowledge they gained from their instructive ritual, and from other parts of the Old Testament, the inquiry suggests itself, In what respects are the privileges of Christians, under the new dispensation, superior to theirs ? That they are superior, in *some* respects, there can be no doubt. As much as this is intimated by our Saviour, when he said, "Among them that are born of women, there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist ; notwithstanding, *he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he,*" Matt. 2 : 11.

The superior privileges of Christians above those of God's ancient covenant people, consist not in this—that we have another and better religion than they, or another and easier path to heaven : for true religion and the way of salvation, under both dispensations, have been the same. God has opened but one path from these apostate regions to the heavenly mansions ; and in that path all true believers, both before and since the coming of Christ, have walked.

Nor are our privileges greater than those of the ancient saints, in that we belong to another church, and are brought into another and better covenant. For the church of God, and the covenant of the church, under both dispensations, have been substantially the same. "My dove, my undefiled, is *but one* ; she is the only one of her mother." Christians are grafted into *the same good olive tree* from which the Jews, for their unbelief, were broken off, Rom. 2 : 17–24.

Nor are our privileges superior to those who lived before the coming of Christ, in that we have received much important truth, which to them was wholly unrevealed and unknown. Perhaps it would be difficult to mention a single important doctrine of religion, which is in possession of the church now, which was not shadowed forth, with more or less of distinctness and impression, to the people of God in ancient times. We have seen how much and how rich instruction was conveyed under the symbol of the ark. And yet this was but *one* of the Jewish symbols—but one of the means employed by God of imparting to his ancient covenant people a knowledge of his truth and will.

The points in respect to which Christians are exalted to higher privileges than those of the ancient people of God, may be reduced, perhaps, to the three following. In the first place, though we are not favored with a large amount of *new, unrevealed* truth; those truths which were but dimly seen before, are brought forth into *much clearer light*. They are presented in a way to be more impressive, commanding, and powerful. Instead of the type, we have received the antitype. In place of the shadow, we have got the substance. What the patriarchs saw through a glass darkly, we see as it were face to face. A vast amount of prophecy has been fulfilled. The great Redeemer of his church has come. The world has been blessed with his personal ministry, and that of his Apostles. Life and immortality have been brought to light in the gospel.

Then, in the second place, the ordinances of religion are much less numerous and onerous now, than formerly. As the old dispensation was one of symbols, typical rites and institutions were greatly multiplied. The circumstances of the church required that they should be. And yet this extended ritual is spoken of by the Apostles as a yoke—a *heavy yoke*—which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear, Acts 15: 10. It is a mercy to the Christian church, that this yoke of ceremonies, being no longer demanded, has been removed, and that the simple rites of the gospel have taken its place.

But the great blessing of the new dispensation consists in this: it is emphatically a *dispensation of the Spirit*. The Spirit of God was indeed operating in the earth, ages before the coming of Christ. He was then, as now, the origin and cause of all the holiness which existed among men. But since the resurrection of Christ, and the ushering in of the new dispensation, the Spirit of God has been poured out upon the world in richer and more glorious effusion. A new and wonderful efficacy has been given to the truth. A new impulse has been added to the cause and kingdom of Christ. Revivals of religion are frequent, converts are multiplied, and the influence of the gospel, instead of being confined to a single family and people, is being diffused all over the earth.

We are not in the number of those who are accustomed to think or speak diminutively of the privileges of God's ancient covenant people. Compared with the world around them—compared with the notions which not a few, at this day, entertain of them—their privileges were very great. But in several

important respects, ours are much greater ; laying us under higher responsibilities ; demanding that we be much wiser and holier persons ; more heavenly in spirit, more conformed to the Divine image and will, more devoted to the cause of Christ, more useful in the world. Whether any of us really *are* more eminent saints than some who lived before the coming of Christ, may admit of a question. Or rather I fear it will *not* admit of a question. Instead of rising above them, my apprehension is that, in instances not a few, we fall far below them. But whatever our spiritual attainments may actually be, there can be no question as to what they should be. They ought to rise in proportion to our light and advantages, and ought to be as much superior to those of the ancient saints, as our means and privileges are the more valuable.

8. From the ark and its appendages, Christians may learn what their feelings and conduct should be in regard to *their places of public worship*. The place of deposit for the ark, both in the tabernacle and temple, was emphatically a *holy place*. It was holy, because the Lord was there. It was holy, because the blessed angels were there. The symbols of heaven were brought down to earth, and here was the place of their abode. And we know with what reverence this sacred place was regarded, by those who lived under the former dispensation. They would no more have obtruded into it, for any common or secular purpose, than they would have obtruded into heaven itself.

But if the Jewish sanctuary was a holy place, the same may be said of the Christian sanctuary ; and for the same reasons. The Lord is still in his holy temple ; not indeed by a visible Shekinah, but by *spiritual* manifestations of not less awful import. The holy angels, too, who, by their appointed symbols, waited around the mysterious ark, and seemed to fill the whole sanctuary with their presence, are still present in the assemblies of God's people, beholding the order of their worship, and ministering to them who shall be heirs of salvation. The Apostle Paul uses it as an argument for the strictest decorum in the house of God, that the holy angels are there as witnesses, 1 Cor. 11 : 10.

When Moses was about to approach into the near presence of God, he was commanded to take the shoes from his feet, because the ground on which he stood was holy. And the Divine injunction still is, "Keep thy foot when thou goest into the

house of God, and be more ready to hear, than to give the sacrifice of fools." "God is greatly to be feared in the assembly of his saints, and to be had in reverence of all them that are about him." "I will be sanctified in them that come nigh me, and before all the people will I be glorified." These sentiments are equally true and applicable under the new dispensation as under the old; and should lead us, when we come into the sanctuary of the Most High, to feel as Jacob did when he said, "How dreadful is this place! This is none other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven!"

9. The ark and its appendages teach another lesson, and it is the last to which I shall here direct attention. It refers to the traits of character which Christians must exhibit, in order that they may be like the angels. The cherubim which Ezekiel saw had each of them four faces; that of a man, a lion, an ox, and an eagle. The faces of the cherubim connected with the ark were, probably, the same in kind, though the same number of faces seems not to have been attached to each. It has been often remarked, and I think justly, that these faces were indicative of the *characteristics* of angels; the human face denoting their intelligence and wisdom; that of the lion, their courage, generosity, power, strength; that of the ox, their patience and submission, their readiness to bear burdens and perform labors in the service of Christ; while the face of the eagle denoted their lofty purposes, their exalted aims, and the rapidity of their movements in discharging their commissions of vengeance or of love. Now these are the very traits of character, which should distinguish every child of God. They are the traits of character which all Christians *will* possess, when they arrive at heaven, and are made *like* the angels. Accordingly, the living creatures which John saw in heaven, and which (with the elders) were the representatives of redeemed saints, appeared with the same faces as the cherubim. In this respect, they were *like* the cherubim.

The traits of character to which I have referred—those which belong to the holy angels, and will belong to the saints when they arrive at heaven, and are made *like* the angels—should be assiduously cultivated by every Christian, while here on the earth. We should be aiming to grow in all knowledge and spiritual wisdom; in nobleness of disposition, courage, and strength; in patient submission, and fidelity to Christ; in the elevation of our views and purposes, and the activity of our

endeavors to promote His cause, till we arrive, in these respects, to the stature of angels, and are permitted, in connexion with them, to bend and worship before the eternal throne.

The Lord strengthen and assist all who read these pages, in their endeavors thus to grow in knowledge and in grace! The Lord bless them abundantly in this most important of all the labors of life! The Lord graciously receive them, as they pass, one after another, from this to the eternal state, and make them *as the angels of God in heaven!*

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### ARTICLE III.

#### HELPS IN PREACHING.

By Rev. Miles P. Squier, Geneva, N. Y.

GREAT simplicity characterizes the instructions of the Bible. It presents truth in forms adapted to the common apprehensions and general reading of men; and freed from those limitations of meaning, which obtain in books of science, and attend an abstract and technical phraseology. Its statements are direct, obvious, and unencumbered. They meet our consciousness, and find a response in the principles of our being. The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul. The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart. Reason and conscience are with divine truth. Its appeal is to the giant principles of the soul. Its resources of influence are such as should give it sway over mind, and as entitle it to success everywhere.

Corresponding results have often been witnessed in its history. The preaching of our Lord was attended with large success, as was the Baptist's before him. Thousands were converted on the day of Pentecost. The people of Samaria gave heed, "with one accord," to the preaching of Philip; a precious revival of religion gave great joy in that city. The same encouraging fact is illustrated along the track of apostolic instruction—through Asia Minor, and into Europe—in the conversion of



Lydia and the jailer—among the Bereans—and in the rapid spread of Christianity, even to the city and palace of the Cæsars.

Similar fruits have been witnessed in later times, quite down to our own. We may refer to them under the preaching of Edwards, and the Tennants—of Brainerd among the Indian tribes, and of Whitefield. The Sandwich Islands are now an example of the triumphant success of divine truth over rude mind; and such would seem to be but the legitimate effects of the Gospel wherever preached. It is attended with every resource of conviction; every ground of belief; every argument for submission and trust; and yet the results above referred to do not uniformly attend the labors of the Christian ministry. Often, alas! very often, are they far otherwise. Nor would it seem legitimate to ascribe the want of success to the Holy Ghost. The office-work of the Spirit is embraced in the economy of the gospel. We live under the dispensation of the Spirit. He was given to abide with the church always, and may not be supposed to be now wanting, where all else is as it should be, in the appliances of the gospel. We fully acknowledge the obstacles which the truth meets in the rugged soil of the heart, as well as in the constitution of society, and the state of the world. But the conversion of such hearts, and of such a world, is the object proposed in the gospel, and in the love which has commissioned it unto all nations for the obedience of faith. For this is it adapted, and sent, and making all requisite allowance for the varied circumstances in which the recipients of Christian effort are found, may not something of the diminished success of the word, so often witnessed, be set over to its defective application? May it not be, that the church pursues her work of disciplining men to Christ, with too little intelligence and discrimination? May she not be unapprized of the *exact fastnesses* of the heart, or too little studious of the best methods of reaching its sources of feeling and action? May she not sometimes muffle the edge of the sword of the Spirit, disarm the thunderbolt from on high, and misdirect the artillery of heaven? If so, she does well to look accurately at the more appropriate features of the work to be accomplished; to keep her eye on the landmarks of her agency, as the *pillar and ground of the truth*; and which may help her in its administration, as a "worker together with God."

In this article we propose some *helps to success, in the application of truth for the conversion of men.*

We do not here attempt a *general survey* of the principles on which the cause of Christ should be prosecuted, and the truth maintained on the earth ; but confine our attention to a single point, the *application of truth to impenitent mind for its conversion*, and to some helps in that appropriate effort.

1. *An enlightened view of the state of impenitent mind, as to its powers and susceptibilities.*

It is not mind destitute of reason, or conscience, or susceptibility to motives. It can reflect on religious subjects, and be influenced by moral considerations. It is capable of being moved by truth and by all the considerations of the gospel, as really as any mind can be. Man by the fall lost none of the constituent elements of his intelligent nature, but retains them now as a rational, accountable agent—capable of being approached, and legitimately approached and influenced, by all the considerations and truths to which rational intelligence is open ; and the practical conviction of this, is an aid in preaching the gospel. The reason and conscience of impenitent men are with the truth, so far as they get possession of it. The preacher may feel that he has a coadjutor, in the constituent principles of the being of those he addresses. It is to the reason and the susceptibility of *morally right* emotions, in view of the truth of God, that he constantly appeals, and it is ground on which he should stand with no misgivings or distrust.

The objection to impenitent mind is its wrong action. Temptation succeeded with Adam, and “ he fell from his estate of holiness by transgressing the divine command.” All that is wrong in man,—all that the law charges against him, is of the nature of transgression. It is some feeling, emotion, or action, of which he is conscious, and in which he violates law. In this state of unrecovered rebellion impenitent mind now is. There is a misdirection of its powers, susceptibilities, and course. It follows other lords and other gods than the true Jehovah. The sinner has become vain in his imaginations, and his foolish heart is darkened. Self, the world, pleasure, pride, self-sufficiency, and various lusts, have crowded into his imagination, absorbed his attention, and characterized his affections, and he is now wholly astray from God, in the spirit, the habit, and the degeneracy of sin. He is like the disobedient, apostate child in a family, or the rebel province

of an empire. All that is predicable of him, which has relation to the law of God, is counter to that law.

We do not say that sinful indulgence has no eventual tendency to weaken and depress the constitutional powers of the soul,—that the heathen have not lost intellectual stature in this way, or that all sinners have not, or that the gospel has not this result of sin to encounter, more or less, wherever it is sent; but that we are not called to dispense it, under the disheartening impression that there is in it no inherent applicability to the sinner's mind—that the great elements of his moral being embody no power of responding to it;—that when the truth gets his attention, pierces the veil that sinful indulgence has cast over the mind, it still finds no intelligence, no reason, no divinely constituted moral nature to address there, and to move in accordance with its communications;—that the mind is physically disabled, and incapable of apprehending, feeling, and yielding to the claims of God, presented in the gospel;—that there is no correspondence between the truth and the properties of the mind it addresses, and no direct and perceived relation between *preaching* it and the *submission* and *obedience* it requires. It is our privilege, and for our help, to feel that all truth is adapted to mind, and all mind to truth. There is no statement in the gospel, which may not legitimately be made to man in apostacy, and no motive it contains, which *he* is not inherently able to feel and appreciate. Motives to repentance may be drawn for *his* use, and be pressed upon him, with the hope of direct influence and success, from the *holy nature*, and *intrinsic excellence* of God—from the inherent *wrong* of sin—from the loveliness of piety—from the purity of heaven, and the elements and blessedness of the rest that remaineth there. Indeed those very considerations which keep angels in their spheres, and fill heaven with joy, often have the most influence with the sinner, in convincing him of his guilt, folly, and wretchedness, and in leading him to Christ. We may come to him, then, with the messages of truth, and reason with him on the great subjects of “righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come,” with as direct an aim and hope of conviction and persuasion, and all the happy issues thereof, as on other subjects than those of religion. The subject matter of the gospel, stands related to the needed and intended issue of it, in the conversion and salvation of men, at the same point as truth on other subjects does to its action on mind. Other truth does not have influence, if it fails to secure

attention, or is neutralized by prejudice, or is rendered inoperative by unbelief or any other cause ; and the object of this position is to place divine truth on the same parallel with all truth in physics or morals, as to its action on the constituent principles of mind, and that it should ever be dispensed with this full conviction and encouragement. Indeed, if it were not so, why is the revealed will of God given at all to apostate man?—why send for Paul into Macedonia, or to Rome?—why give the gospel to the heathen, or preach it at home?—why seek to *persuade men*, as did the apostle, or use his inspired exhortations—“as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ’s stead, *be ye reconciled to God.*”

II. *A discriminating view of what conversion is.*

Conversion is the change, which occurs in the sinner, in becoming reconciled to God, in passing from impenitence to penitence ; from entire sinfulness to incipient holiness. It implies a knowledge of the facts of revelation, to some extent, or their equivalent, and appreciation of them ; a conviction of the truth—prevailing, successful conviction of it,—conviction in the judgment, compunction in the conscience, contrition for disobedience, and acquiescence of spirit in the claims and will of God. It is the sinner yielding to the truth, and in view of it repenting of his sins, and returning in penitence and submission, from the error of his ways, to his legitimate objects, and relations, and feelings, as an intelligent and responsible agent and creature of God. It does us injury to feel that there is some unappreciable enigma about conversion ; some occult, theological mystery, from which we are warned to stand aloof, on pain of the penalty of presumption or sacrilege. There is nothing in this event which is monstrous or unaccountable—nothing which infringes or suspends the conscious and rational action of the mind—nothing but what is according to the laws of mind obtaining on other subjects. Its occurrence is, indeed, the highest reason in the universe. It is the sinner *yielding to reason*, and conscience, and truth, and duty, and God, from the best considerations which can move mind,—any mind, human or angelic. It is his giving up sin for the wrong and unprofitableness thereof, and falling in with right from the constraining and appreciated obligations thereof. There is no more difficulty in accounting for the sinner’s repenting, than for Adam’s sinning. Mutability of purpose and character, is an attribute of finite minds. One who has acted wrongly hitherto, is not therefore incapacitated to

act rightly. He is not obliged to continue in his wrong. He need not always sin and hate God and his neighbor. And so we reason in common life. So the Bible treats the subject of the sinner's return to God. Its exhortations to repentance are unembarrassed with any philosophical objections at this point. Hinderances there are, as we shall see, but they lie not here. The means, the object, and end of conversion, all instruct us that it is an intelligent, rational process of mind, involving the highest exercise of its powers of thought and feeling. Many of the conceptions, which are wont to hover about and encumber this subject, are the coinage of a scholastic age. The mists that settle upon it are from times previous to that of Bacon and the inductive philosophy, and they show themselves in the varied forms of an antinomian theology, or in the more subtle insinuations and effects of a professedly by-gone "taste-scheme."

"Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis,  
Tempus eget"——

The conversion of the sinner is his repentance. So Peter preached, in the great revival at the pentecost. "Repent and be baptized, for the remission of sins,"—"Repent and be converted," (turn yourselves, active voice,) "that your sins may be blotted out." The appeal of Christ to the sinner was in like form, as was that of Old Testament prophets: "Repent and believe the gospel;" "Turn, for why will ye die;" and James, addressing the disciples, says "He that converteth the sinner from the error of his way, shall save a soul from death, and hide a multitude of sins."

In a theological sense, the word *conversion* describes the event under consideration, contemplated in the aspect and from the direction of the divine influence employed therein, and *repentance*, from that of the sinner's agency and compliance therein; but neither is the one without the other in this event, nor is it accomplished without the concurrence of both. Truth and the Spirit influencing the sinner, and his repenting under this influence, make it predicable of him that he is a converted man; that he is changed from nature to grace, from a state of apostasy to a state of reconciliation, and hence issues that event which we rightly term conversion. See its type in the compunction, mental agony, and submission of the prodigal son, and his return to his father; in the moving of the multitudes under the preaching at Pentecost, when three thousand were turned

to the Lord ; and see, also, a striking resemblance to it, when a disobedient, refractory child sinks upon the knee of its parent, convinced of its wrong, confessing, forsaking it, and returning to its duty in the family again.

Agencies from without do not constitute conversion. They are seen at the point of inducing and securing it. The sinner is not converted before he repents. He is in no way changed in moral character or condition, until penitence occurs. Conversion is a result through influences inducing right action, in an intelligent being, from and in view of considerations adapted to the issue. So far as appears, the process is in the highest sense rational, and need not be encumbered and scandalized by a technical and abstract phraseology, tending to make it less so, and to weaken the conscious responsibility of men in relation to it.

III. *A just apprehension of the agency of the Holy Spirit in conversion.*

This feature of the subject has been to some extent involved in the previous discussion, but it merits further attention. The gift of the Holy Ghost is superadded to the other provisions of grace, and to the grounds of success, which truth has on other subjects than that of religion. It is wholly a superadded economy, all in the grace of God, to give efficacy to the gospel on the minds of men, and sway them, in view of the truth, "to *apply* the merits of redemption purchased by Christ." Its need has grown out of the apostacy of man ; its indispensableness out of the obstinacy of his heart, and his utter alienation from God prevailing against all the influences of the truth, unaided by the Spirit. Truth is obligatory on us without the Spirit's agency. We should be bound to believe and obey God, and become all that the gospel requires, if the economy of the Spirit had never been granted. Its agency God may now forego in any instance, and yet hold us responsible for the improvement we make of his truth, and for the success of those communications of the gospel which are made to us. We know not that angels have the Spirit's agency, or need it, and we do know that its dispensation on earth adds new responsibility to men, and affixes the characteristic of a peculiar desperation, and recklessness, and guilt on him who to other sins adds this, that "*he does despite unto the Spirit of grace.*"

That the agency of the Spirit is co-ordinate with the truth, to give it success, and secure the issues which it is adapted to have on mind, if more than the statement of the position

be needful, the words of the promise to send Him, are in place, as proof: "But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall *teach* you all things, and *bring all things to your remembrance*, whatsoever I have said unto you." "But when the Comforter is come, even the *Spirit of Truth*, which proceedeth from the Father, *he shall testify of me*." "When he, the Spirit of Truth is come, he will *guide* you into all truth"—"he shall take of mine, and show it unto you." How much soever, in these quotations, is appropriate to the miraculous dispensation of the church, and the prophetic office-work of the Holy Ghost, it recognizes him as the *Spirit of Truth*,—associates his operation with the truth, and indicates, plainly enough, the line of his influence in leading and guiding his people to the truth.

He is said, too, to *reprove* the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment, and on grounds calculated to induce conviction,—he is said to "*strive* with man," and we are exhorted not to "*grieve* the Holy Ghost," and are admonished of the sin against the Holy Ghost. All these expressions show that the commerce of the Spirit is with the activities and living responsibilities of the soul; that his agency on men, is laid out where it is, philosophically, capable of being resisted, grieved, checked, and turned aside. Men treat the Spirit as they treat the truth, and often resist both, in resisting either. "Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost,"—and hence the unpardonable nature of the sin against the Holy Ghost: it thwarts the ultimate provision of grace.

The varied phraseology quoted above, would be very inappropriate, if the Spirit's work consisted in the lodgment of a substratum in us, in the entire passivity of the soul, as a mere foundation for right emotions. Setting aside the monstrous metaphysics of such a position, such a work, in its occurrence, does not use the truth, or involve the agency or responsibility of man. It might be performed on him, for aught we know, in sleep, or in utter ignorance of God, and when under no impression of duty. It would be a merely sovereign work of divine, creative power, having in it no correlation with truth or moral obligation.

The word of God is styled "*the sword of the Spirit*," showing the truth to be the instrument of his contact, influence, and subduing power over the souls of men.

To the same end, is the testimony of consciousness. The mind in conversion, in the commencement and progress of piety,

is *conscious* of no impression but *in view of the truth*. Although responsibility attends the whole process, we are aware of no influence, except in accordance with light in the understanding. We feel only in view of considerations drawn from the Bible. We repent in view of the wrong of sin, and the rightness of God's law and government, and the claims of his goodness and grace. We believe, from the evidence of the truth; we love, from an apprehension of the excellency of the truth, of the appreciated perfections of God, of the abounding reasons for loving Christ; we submit, from the overwhelming conviction of truths adapted to produce submission. Such was the penitence of David, and of the prodigal son; such is the reminiscence of the Christian; such is the language of the convicted sinner, and of the new convert, whose whole soul is full of praise: such, the testimony of any one who has been conversant with seasons "of refreshing from the presence of the Lord." Indeed, if it were not so, religion has no more virtue than instinct, or the service of God than that of idols.

With the intimations of consciousness, coincides the doctrine of the Spirit's agency, as taught by our Saviour in the interview with Nicodemus, so far as applicable to the point before us. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." There is an influence exerted, though the agent be not seen, and the agency be recognized in the effects. These are according to truth. There is no infringement of the laws of mind, no suspension of its conscious responsibilities, all is in accordance with the legitimate tendencies and results of truth on our intelligent nature. It is the Spirit of God, with the truth; his co-ordinate, mighty, sufficient agency, with it and for it, giving it deserved success; inducing repentance and every Christian grace, in view of considerations adapted to such issues; giving the issue which truth has over sinless mind without the superadded economy of the Spirit, which it ever should have over all mind, and which it would have over us, but for our sinful degeneracy of heart and life.

A reference may here be fairly made to what is known of the nature of mind, and the laws of influencing it. We can conceive of no way in which it can be swayed to good or evil, but through considerations presented to its view: changes in it, irrespective of these, must be irrespective of accountability, and



be without moral quality or character. What, too, are the analogies of the subject? How is the mind influenced on other subjects than that of religion, by other beings than the Spirit of God? How are men influenced by one another? how by Satanic agency, and that which is wrong? How came angels to sin? How was Eve tempted—a pure, sinless spirit, until temptation entered? She saw that the tree was *good* for food, and that it was *pleasant* to the eyes, and a tree to be *desired* to make one wise; considerations vastly magnified, no doubt, by the suggestions of the adversary, and filling, at the time, the whole horizon of her view, at least enough to give them a prevailing influence over her; and “she took of the fruit and did eat.” In this instance, a mind capable of choosing, and considerations inducing choice, seem to be all the material facts of the case. Habit and previous character were against the issue. A holy being became sinful in this way. Does it help us to the conclusion, that a sinful being may become holy, in the same way, “*mutatis mutandis*?” The assertion that the law of the Spirit’s agency is wholly unique and incapable of illustration, from the sources here referred to, is certainly gratuitous, is without necessity and without proof. But if there be any analogy, as here contemplated, and the agency of the Holy Ghost may be regarded as in the direction and channel of the truth; his impressions as coupled with the annunciations of the gospel, to give them their deserved and full effect; then is the doctrine of the Spirit the source of defined and intelligent encouragement, to commend ourselves, in dispensing truth, to every man’s conscience in the sight of God.

#### IV. *An accurate analysis of the hinderances to conversion.*

It was the fault of scholastic times to invest the subject of our repentance and recovery to holiness with an abstract and involved phraseology, and clothe it with a form of expression which has little alliance with the thoughts or language or associations of men in other departments of knowledge. There was in it bad logic, an imperfect analysis of mind, and an ill-directed effort to preserve the forms of orthodoxy, though sure to diminish its power. Nor are the effects of this impolicy yet fully worn from the face of the church. The good or ill success of the gospel is often taken out from the channel in which ordinary instruction is viewed, and based upon recondite theories, which the mind of the applicant cannot well investigate or comprehend. Faith is made too abstruse a principle for ordinary

apprehension. Conversion is viewed as part of a mysterious economy, not obvious to reason nor connected with the legitimate issues of instruction. The obstacles to piety are referred to, in some implanted principle of evil, occult in the essential nature of man, intangible to the sinner himself, and independent of his agency, and capable of removal only by a sovereign act of God, as an indispensable prerequisite to the force of truth upon the mind, or to a capacity for the discharge of duty. But the doctrines of grace are not aided by such recondite statements and conceptions. All this is like David in the armor of Saul; but the cumbrous ritual of other times, that can only embarrass inquiry, and muffle the edge of "the Sword of the Spirit." It would seem important, also, that the popular mind be free from the habit of resolving the difficulties of conversion into physical obstructions and inabilities in the nature of man. Such a reference of the matter cannot but be attended with a weakened sense of responsibility—with a spirit of self-justification, on the part of those in sin, and a diminished response to truth, as it reaches them in the ordinary avenues of instruction. The subject will bear a more practical reference, and may be brought more fully under the notice of observation and consciousness. In this light is it presented by our Saviour himself in the parable of the sower. This parable is recorded by two of the Evangelists, with an accompanying exegesis, and presents in clear light the relations between the word of God and the hearers of it. Hinderances are here detected, in the inattention and frivolity and worldliness of men, and in the agency of "the wicked one;" in minds full of other things than the word of God; in sensibilities benumbed and deadened by sinful habits and courses, and affections enlisted in behalf of selfish and worldly gratifications, preventing due consideration of the word, and its taking root in them, "*unto faith and salvation.*" The especial type of hinderances will, of course, change, with the ever-changing circumstances of the hearers of the gospel; but how multifarious soever, they should not be looked for in the essential properties of the mind. They are rather the accretions of its history, than the ingredients of its being. They have arisen from its wrong action at first: they spring from that which is of the nature of the habit from within, or temptation from without. All sin is of the general nature of any particular sin: all sinful habits, much of the nature of any particular sinful habit. The obstacles to repentance in the sinner, are like the obstacles to reformation in

the inebriate; they are to be overcome through considerations of truth and obligation, and not by a creative fiat, in the listless passivity of the subject. And when repentance has occurred, the sinner will usually find the special obstacles that had prevented it, to be the most ensnaring of any in his future course, as in the case of one recovered from a particular vice. His progress away from them, and his strength against them, will be gradual, and his history illustrate the law of habit, in respect both to the sin and the holiness of men. This feature is observable in all changes of character, and not least in the highest of all changes, that from sin to holiness, from apostasy to reconciliation with God. And the reference here is, to the intent that it may contribute its influence to divest that event of needless mystery, and to exhibit it as a rational process in accordance with light in the understanding, and convictions in the sensibilities of the soul.

This view of the obstacles to piety accords, it is believed, as well with the lessons of experience as with the nature of mind, nor is it in conflict with the phraseology of the Bible. The "cannot" there found, is always that of popular use. It is correlated with facts that have arisen in the history of the agent,—with the circumstances in which he is found—with his sinful and depraved habits and state—with the variety and strength of those hinderances which have accumulated upon him in the ways of sin. It refers to what is predicable of man since the fall,—of that which is of the nature of sinful habit, in the progress of human history, and of temptation from without, acting on the course and character of man. To recur to a previous illustration, it is the inability of the drunkard to refrain from his cups,—of the voluptuary, to forego his pleasures,—of the idle man to shake off his sloth. It is the inability of one addicted to falsehood to speak the truth—of the "swearer" to cease his profaneness, or "of them accustomed to do evil," in any form, "to learn to do well:"—and those hinderances are so accumulated and prevailing, and their practical views so entirely uniform, that they are well described, for all the purposes of speech, in the language of the Bible and of common life. "Joseph's brethren hated him, and *could not* speak peaceably to him." "Ye *cannot* serve God," says Joshua, "for he is a holy God." "For this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with

their ears, and should understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them." These are the words of Christ in immediate connection with the parable of the sower, and very graphically describe the effects of a long abuse of privilege, and great degeneracy in sin. "How *can* ye, being evil, speak good things?" "No man *can* come unto me, except the Father, which sent me, draw him." This last is justly esteemed a strong passage, but if the scope of the paragraph containing it admits of its being applied to the specific subject of conversion, the difficulty in the case was not the want of competent powers for the discharge of duty, "but erroneous opinions—pride, obstinacy, self-conceit, and a deep felt contempt for Jesus;"\* as is obvious from the next verse, which says, "Every man that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me."

No view of the hinderances to conversion should be entertained, which shall lessen a sense of responsibility in dispensing the truth or in receiving and obeying it. This event, as before remarked, is not to be regarded as a merely arbitrary and sovereign act of God, sustaining no perceived relation to the means employed in it, but strictly of the nature of a consequence of those means, and resulting from considerations of truth and obligation, made prevalent, and inducing repentance; as choice results in other things. The gracious economy of the Spirit does not change the relations of the subject. "He takes of the things of Christ and shows them unto us." The truth is the instrument and channel of his power. This indispensable and sufficient agency is but our encouragement in the direction of the truth for all the issues for which we commend it to the understandings and consciences of men, for their conversion, sanctification, and eventual salvation.

V. *A just consideration of the province of the Will.*

The will is inherently capable of varying its volitions. It need not of necessity follow the track of previously prevailing habits and desires. It may at any time change its choice with respect to any subject, on sufficiently appreciated inducements thereto. It may choose right to-day, though it never has before. Desires, passions, habits, biases, propensities, by whichsoever name the state of the affections is referred to, when correlated with choice, are to be viewed in the light of motives

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\* Barnes.

influencing choice; and choice implies a decision in view of conflicting motives, those supplied from reason, conscience, truth; the Spirit may prevail against those from passion and habit, propensity, or evil counsel. They always do in a change for the better, they fail to do it in a change for the worse. The lover of "strong drink" may supply considerations from reason and conscience, the love of family or reputation—or his friend may—that shall get him triumphantly past his accustomed haunt of dissipation, and take him home unharmed to-day to the bosom of an anxious family, though it has not been done before for months or years. Our first parents, though "created in the image of God," could sin, and did, right abreast of all previous habit and propensity. Their experience, and habits, and propensities could not have been taken away, as an indispensable prerequisite to the entrance of temptation. They were *met* by temptation, and by it overcome. They were not, by a sovereign act of God, previously withdrawn. They were put upon the field of strife, and through Satanic art and influence brought under, and temptation prevailed, and that, too, against truth, obligation, and sweet experience of the love of God. Angels, with biases and propensities the growth of ages, we know not how long, in the full sunlight of God's countenance, were not impervious to temptation, to a counter course of conduct, and temptation prevailed with them—inducements to sin overcame their long sustained and fortified propensities to holiness,—quenched the light of all their experience of the perfections and worthiness of God. They became apostates even without the example or influence of any other being in the universe, in the direction of revolt. Redeemed men or angels now, are not continued in holiness because of incapacity to be influenced by motives to do wrong, but through an economy securing the preponderance of motives in a right direction. Men are turned from their accustomed courses and habits from various considerations,—from prudential reasons sometimes—from public and patriotic motives—from love of kindred,—of partner or child. *Conflicting* passions and appetites may alternately gain ascendancy. These are matters of daily observation, and with the resources of influence, found in the truth and Spirit of God, brought to bear upon the intelligent nature and susceptibilities of man, is it wonderful, that he should turn from sin to holiness—from the service of idols to his rightful Lord and Redeemer?

The views expressed in this article, help to define and concentrate the agency of the church as a worker together with God in the gospel. They set aside diverting influences, which are wont to obtrude themselves upon our path; and give directness to the efforts which we are commanded to make in behalf of the regeneration and sanctification of those in sin.

Among the helps here indicated is that in relation to *prayer*. The resort in prayer as connected with the inculcation and results of truth, is not in abatement of the perceived responsibilities of preaching or hearing the word, but in furtherance of them. It is seeking a co-ordinate, efficacious influence with and for the truth—to deepen its impression—to quicken the sensibilities of the mind in view of it, to secure the submission of the soul to the claims of God, propounded in the gospel, and to induce repentance, and cordial faith and love, and every Christian grace.

These views illustrate the importance of *discriminating* truth; of availing ourselves of the laws of mind in dispensing it; of falling in with the consciousness of the sinner, and making all that is said to him, intelligently to aid conviction and the work of the Spirit. We know not but that the work of the Spirit in conversion may be as truly embarrassed, and his agency thwarted, through unskilfulness in the application of the truth, as by inattention and diversion of mind in the hearer.

*Finally.* These views indicate the nature of the address which is appropriate to the *inquiring sinner*. It should lay intelligently on his conscience, his sin and guilt and grounds of condemnation; the claims of truth upon him as a rational, accountable creature, under every obligation to love God with all his heart. It should represent these claims as immediate and overwhelming—instant upon him with ever increasing weight until he submits, and turns to God. It should admit that no doctrine of the Bible, nor relation of the subject, advises the sinner to wait where he is, until by some extraneous afflatus, irrespective of truth and conviction, he is borne within the enclosures of the kingdom, he knows not how or why. He must not be encouraged in the idea that he is merely the *subject* of influence in this matter; that he is but the *passive recipient* of the process in which he is changed from nature to grace, and that if he but hold himself subject to this action upon him, the further responsibility of the issue is not his. Such a position misconceives the doctrine of *divine influence*, the laws of mind, and the nature of conversion, and, while the sinner retains it, is like

a mountain of ice in his way. His true position in securing every help from without, is that of an active and immediate responsibility to truth; that of mental effort at compliance with just what God requires; that of concentrating the constituent elements of his being on that which the Saviour meant when he said, "Repent, and believe the gospel."

The agency of the Spirit is our help *in repenting and believing*, and in the very *process* thereof, on a responsibility wholly our own. It is in "working out our own salvation," that "God works in us both to will and to do."

The address should inculcate this responsibility, and aim at convincing the sinner that, until he repents of sin and believes on Christ, he is disowning the truth, and resisting and grieving the Holy Ghost. That his only resort is in coming at once to the mercy-seat, in penitence and humiliation of spirit, and casting himself, as one self-ruined and perishing, on the provisions of grace there revealed. There and then it is that reconciliation takes place—that his character, state, and destiny change, and that he consistently has hope, as a child and an heir of God.

## ARTICLE IV.

### CHARACTER AND THEOLOGY OF THE LATER ROMANS.

By the Rev. Albert Smith, Prof. of Rhetoric and English Literature, Middlebury College, Vt.

IN a recent number of this work,\* we undertook to show that the early Romans were not less remarkable for probity, frugality, chastity, patriotism, good faith, and general morality, than for the valor, fortitude, and perseverance, by which they conquered the world. These known and admired features in the character of that celebrated people, we traced to the religion that prevailed among them in the earliest periods of their national existence—a religion which we maintain to have been, in some important respects, superior to that more imaginative

\* No. 18, Article I.

and splendid, but at the same time more sensual and corrupting system, which was afterwards received from the Grecian world, and established on the ruins of the old simplicity. We attempted to prove that the first religion of the Romans embraced the elements of a right theology, and that it exerted a highly favorable influence over the national habits, manners, and institutions. The worship of a Deity under simple forms and without images; a deeply-seated reverence for the Divinity and for sacred things; a practical recognition of the superintending providence of God; a firm belief in the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments; are fundamental principles of true religion. To the existence in the public mind of these elements of theological belief the excellence of the Roman character is, we think, to be ascribed. On these as its foundation rests the colossal fabric of Roman greatness.

The present Article is designed to be the counterpart of the former. We propose to show that in later times there was, in the Roman character, a striking change for the worse; that this change is not to be exclusively attributed to the increase of luxury, and the influx of foreign vices, but chiefly to a preceding change in the national religion consequent on the introduction of Grecian modes of thought, the spread of Grecian philosophy, and especially the establishment at Rome of the worship of the "human Olympus" of the Greeks. A few additional remarks will make it evident that the general corruption of morals in the later periods of Roman history, the overthrow of liberty, and the final downfall of the Empire, are not to be referred to the defectiveness of education, and the want of a system of public instruction.

I. The description which has been given\* of the character and manners of the Romans is true only of the earlier centuries of their history. If the state of morals and the mode of life, in the later times of the republic and under the empire, be placed beside the preceding account, a striking difference will be observed. The simplicity, the integrity, the frugality, the industry, the good faith, the patriotism of former days are gone, and in place of these good qualities the most destructive vices have become prevalent. This change was effected gradually. The Romans maintained their early character for upwards of five centuries, until the times of the

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\* Vol. IX. pp. 258—264.



second Punic war, and in the seventh century from the founding of the city corruption became general. The destruction of Carthage is the period commonly referred to as the turning point of the national manners, and the civil wars of the following century nearly completed the overthrow of the ancient virtues. Sallust, who lauds so highly the virtues of the early Romans, is very explicit in regard to the degeneracy of their descendants. He represents Jugurtha, a hundred years before Christ, as acting on the full persuasion that the Romans were entirely destitute of principle. When this Numidian prince was departing from Rome, having often looked back upon it in silence, he at last broke out into these remarkable words: \* "A city set up for sale, and soon to perish if a buyer can be found!" —a prediction that was speedily verified. This historian describes the state of morals in the time of the Catilinian war in language which will not endure a literal translation. "It is worth while, when you have observed the houses and country-seats piled up like so many cities, to examine the temples of the gods built by our ancestors, the most religious of men. But they adorned the shrines of the gods with piety, and their own houses with glory: nor did they deprive the conquered of any thing except the power of doing injury. While their descendants, effeminate wretches, with the most crying injustice, take away from their allies all those things which as conquerors their brave ancestors had left even to their enemies: as though to do injury and to exercise dominion were one and the same thing." "Nor were licentiousness, gaming, and other refined gratifications less prevalent. The sexes relinquished all regard to chastity. Sea and land were ransacked for all kinds of dainties to gratify the palate. They slept before the time of sleep; they waited neither for hunger, nor thirst, nor cold, nor fatigue; but all were anticipated by way of luxury. These things inflamed the youth when their resources failed, to the commission of crimes."†

Augustine confirms the representations of Sallust, and remarks: "Other writers also express their assent to these things, although in a much less eloquent style."‡ The same

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\* *Urbem venalem, et mature perituram, si emptorem invenit.*—Bell. Jug., § 35.

† Bell. Cat., § 12, 13.

‡ Et alii scriptores in haec consentiunt, quamvis eloquio multum impari.—De Civ. Dei. II. 18.

Christian father adds: "See the Roman republic (facts which I do not first state, but which were advanced long before the coming of Christ, by those authors from whom these things are drawn) gradually changed, and from a very fair and excellent, made a most vile and profligate state. See, after the destruction of Carthage, and before the advent of Christ, the ancient manners, not gradually supplanted as before, but swept away like a torrent, insomuch that the youth were corrupted by luxury and avarice."\* This writer brings forward in the same connection the comments of Cicero on the sentiment of the poet Ennius, that the Roman greatness had its origin and support in the excellent character of the fathers of the state. "Moribus antiquis stat res Romana, virisque." "Which line," says he, "he seems to have expressed like an oracle, with equal brevity and truth. For the men, without the aid of such morals, or the morals, had not these men controlled the power, would neither of them have been able to found, or so long to maintain so great and widely extended a republic. Thus before our recollection, the morals of our country produced excellent men, and excellent men preserved the ancient morals, and the institutions of our ancestors. But when our generation had received the republic, like a very beautiful painting, although fading through age, it not only neglected to restore it to its former freshness, but it even took no care to preserve so much as the form, and as it were the faintest outlines. How much then remains of those ancient morals, on which he said the Roman power depended, when they are so consigned to oblivion, that so far from being cultivated, they are even unknown? And what shall I say of the men? For the morals perished through a want of the men, of which great calamity we have not only to trace the causes, but also like culprits to clear ourselves from guilt. For by our own corruption, and not by any accident, we retain the republic only in name; while in reality we have lost it long since."† It is needless, as Sallust observes, to exhibit at

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\* De Civ. Dei. II. 19.

† De Civ. Dei. II. 21. In this connection the remarks of a modern writer on the same passages from Ennius and Cicero, may be interesting. "It was her morals which raised Rome to such a height of glory; and these morals, *which the fear of the gods maintained*, relaxed as soon as the great ceased by their example to cherish among the people this regard for the reli-

large the redundancy of proof which every portion of the later periods of the Roman history furnishes of the total degeneracy of morals that prevailed. It will be sufficient to refer to the graphic and glowing picture given by Seneca of the general corruption:—

“These so many thousands hastening to the forum at the dawn of day, how base are their lawsuits, how much more base the advocates who manage them! One summons his father to court for things which ought rather to be praised. Another joins issue with his mother. A third comes forward as an informer against a crime of which himself is more evidently guilty. The judge is elected to condemn the very things which he has done, and the circle of bystanders, corrupted by the smooth representations of the patron, side with the injuring party. Why should I specify individual cases? When you see the Forum thronged by the multitude, the Septa filled with the rush of the whole crowd, and that Circus where the people show themselves in the largest collections, be sure of this, that the amount of vice is in proportion to the number of men. Between those citizens whom you see in the garb of peace, there is nevertheless no peace. A trifling consideration is sufficient to induce them to destroy each other. No one is profited ex-

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gion of their fathers. It is to the ancient morals, and to the great men whom they had formed, that Ennius attributes the greatness of Rome. Cicero, in quoting this verse of Ennius, confesses that there remained nothing of the ancient morality which had supported the republic. That virtuous people who would select only virtuous men to rule them, no longer existed, and if they had existed, in whom among the great would they have found those ancient virtues? It is sufficient to read the descriptions which Cicero himself has given us in different places, of the characters of his cotemporaries, to be convinced that corruption had already reached its height, and that Titus Livy was in the right in saying that ‘their vices had come to such a pitch that they could neither bear them nor endure the application of a remedy.’ ‘We no longer recognize that religious people of whose good faith and probity Polybius boasts so much. The great ridiculed the auspices; the ministers of religion performed the ceremonies with more than negligence, and soon there was left no restraint upon ambition on the one side, and corruption on the other.’—*De Beaufort, Republique Romaine, l. 354.*

cept by the injury of his neighbor. The fortunate they hate; the unfortunate they despise. Oppressed by those above them, in their turn they abuse their inferiors. They are distracted by opposing passions. They desire all things brought to ruin for the sake of a small gratification and a pitiful booty. Their life is like that of the Gladiators, who fight with the same persons with whom they live. This is an assemblage of wild beasts: except that brutes abstain from waging war with their own kind, whereas these delight in mutual laceration. Only in this one thing do they differ from brute animals, that the latter have compassion on those who nourish them, while these devour even those by whom they are supported. Never will the wise man cease to be angry [with crime] if he once begins. All things are filled with crimes and vices. More is committed than it is possible to remedy by coercion. A monstrous contest for supremacy in guilt is carried on. The love of sinning increases daily, and shame is continually diminished. Laying aside respect for what is good and just, lust rushes on whithersoever it will. Crimes are no longer concealed: they come forth before our eyes. So public has abandoned wickedness become, and so powerful is it in the minds of all, that innocence is not merely rare, but is nowhere to be found. Think you that these are individuals or but a few who have violated law? On all sides, as if at a concerted signal, they rush forth to the utter confounding of right and wrong.

— Non hospes ab hospite tutus,  
Non socer a genero: fratrum quoque gratia rara est.  
Imminet exitio vir conjugis, illa mariti,  
Lurida terribiles miscent aconita novercæ,  
Filius ante diem patrios inquirat in annos.

And how small a part of the crimes is this? He has not described the hostile camps drawn from the same families and neighborhoods, the clashing oaths of parents and children, the torch applied by the citizen to his own country, troops of furious horsemen galloping around to search out the hiding places of the proscribed, the fountains rendered deadly by poisons, pestilence purposely created, the trench dug around besieged parents, the prisons overflowing, fires raging through whole cities, deplorable abuses of power, secret conspiracies for dominion and for the public ruin, those things gloried in which while they can be suppressed are regarded as crimes, robberies and rapes, and language itself defiled with obscenity.

Add now the perjuries of the public faith, treaties broken, whatever is not defended by force carried off as the booty of the stranger, swindlings, frauds, breaches of trust, for which three places of public justice are not sufficient. If you wish the wise man to exercise as much displeasure as the nature and extent of the crimes demand, he must not be angry merely, he must rave."\*

It need not be asked whether such a state as Seneca has here described could be free. A civil despotism, with the mockery of a senate and of freedom, had already usurped the seat of liberty, soon to be displaced by a military domination still more terrible. And the remaining history of the empire is a continuous record of atrocities, in number and enormity as much exceeding any similar developments of depravity which the black scroll of humanity exhibits, as the theatre on which they were performed was grander and more magnificent than any other which has displayed its pageantry before the eyes of men.

II. There is a question of some interest which, at this stage of the investigation, is worthy of examination. Was the great change in the Roman character which has been pointed out, produced solely or chiefly by the extension of the boundaries of the republic, the introduction of foreign luxuries, and the contaminating influence of the vices of other nations? The triumph of the Roman arms, and the unparalleled prosperity of the nation, are commonly referred to as causes of new moral evils to the state. This result seems to have been foreseen by some of the wisest Romans. It was owing to such views that Scipio Nasica (Augustine *De Civ. Dei.* II. 18) was unwilling that Carthage should be destroyed. With the extension of the empire, the honor and profit connected with the public offices were increased. Sallust evidently regards this extension, with the ease and luxury which followed, as the great cause of the decline of virtue and the general corruption. The Roman conquests in Western Asia, and the consequent introduction of the refinements of Grecian art, and the effeminate vices of the East, are particularly referred to as sources of the national decay. "The Romans amalgamated with the inhabitants of Gaul, Illyricum, Pannonia, Dacia, Spain, and Britain; or the inhabitants of these countries were converted into Romans. The case was entirely different with Greece, and still more with

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\* *De Ira*, II. 7, 8, 9.

the provinces in Africa and Asia. The Roman colonies, merchants, magistrates and soldiers, in the last named provinces, made so small a number in comparison with the natives, that they were not able to supplant either their laws and customs, or their language and religion. On the contrary, it was matter of complaint from the earliest times, wherever the Roman legions trod Asiatic and Egyptian ground, that the brave warriors of Italy, under the sky of Asia and Egypt, became enervate, and that they received the vices and superstitions of the vanquished instead of imparting to these their mode of thinking and morals. When these degenerate Romans returned to their native land, they of course brought with them the vices and superstitions to which they had been accustomed, and infected with them the hitherto uncorrupted mass of the people. This was done by many thousands of the inhabitants of the provinces, who were brought to Rome by a desire of gain, by ambition, and by the wish to find protection against oppression, or satisfaction for injustice which they had suffered.”\*

There is no doubt that this statement is substantially correct. By the extension of the empire the Romans lost in virtue what they gained in power, and their intercourse with conquered nations proved destructive to their morals. But it may still be asked, ‘In what manner was this result produced? Were the enervating effects of luxury and ease, the vicious examples of the nations whom their arms subdued, and the corrupting influences of extensive political domination the only moral causes which undermined the virtue of the Romans, and finally overthrew the vast fabric of their power? Why was not the Roman character able to abide the test to which it was subjected by the prosperity which its own excellence secured? Did the influences by which that character was formed at length cease to exist? or were the noble qualities to which those influences had given birth, at last extirpated by antagonist causes introduced in later ages?’ In the early ages, the Romans were a rude and simple nation of warlike husbandmen, possessed of a small territory, without the means of gratifying avarice, and free from temptation to foreign vices. But this primitive rudeness, and this freedom from temptation was not the *cause* of their virtues. Other heathen nations in the same state of civilization have been entirely destitute of such noble traits of character. These

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\* Meiners Geschichte der Religionen, I. 122.

admirable qualities were produced by the institutions which existed among them—institutions whose foundations were laid in *religious belief*. In later ages the Romans became as profligate and abandoned as they had been upright, temperate, and patriotic. At this period they were possessed of great power, and exposed to new causes of corruption. Those causes doubtless exerted their influence. But the change which had taken place was not wholly external. It was something more than new relations to other nations which overthrew the virtues of the Romans. There was an essential change in their institutions. Religion was overthrown. While other influences tended to this result, the removal of religious belief from the minds of the people was by no means the least of the causes which brought down the Romans from the height of moral greatness, as well as of military glory and political power, which they had reached. This we shall now attempt to prove.

III. The most important features of the religion of the early Romans have been pointed out in our discussion of that part of the subject. It is certain that in the first ages of the state religious belief had firm hold of the public mind, and that the institutions of Numa gave direction and strength to this belief. Whether the length of Numa's life, or some other cause be assigned, the religious spirit of his institutions became thoroughly incorporated with the national habits of thought and feeling. A change afterwards took place; but this change was unquestionably gradual. Dionysius does indeed state,\* that during the reign of Tullus Hostilius, the successor of Numa, many of the religious ceremonies were neglected. He says, also, that under this martial prince the people became not only more warlike, but also more avaricious, and that they neglected their husbandry. But, on the other hand, he represents the first act of Ancus Martius to have been a speech in a general assembly of the people, in which he points out the evils that had come from the abuses which had crept in. Praising the pious and peaceful institutions of his grandfather, he exhorted the people to return to agriculture and the grazing of cattle, and to abstain from violence and rapine. At the same time receiving from the priests the sacred writings of Numa, he transcribed them afresh, and set them up in public that they might be open to examination. It would seem, however, that in the sixth century from

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\* Antiq. Rom. III. 36.

the founding of the city, the forms of religion had been so much changed, that when Numa's books had been accidentally discovered, it was thought prudent by the senate to have them burnt.\* But the external drapery of religion is of inferior importance, so long as its essential elements remain unchanged. These have their seat in the national belief. It is by the subversion of these, and not by any change of form, that religion is overthrown. It has been shown that for nearly two centuries the Romans worshipped the Deity without images; that for a much longer period they were in all things very religious; that they regarded themselves as under a moral government, administered by divine power; and that they believed in the immortality of the soul, and in a future state of rewards and punishments. But this religious groundwork was afterwards entirely swept away. Commencing with the establishment of image-worship, the work of reform went on from step to step, till the religion and the character of the early Romans disappeared together.† The influence of religion, as it once existed, has been described in the words of Polybius. Even in his time, it would seem, the change had commenced. It need not be denied that the refinements of Grecian art contributed to enervate the stern conquerors of that ancient home of liberty. But it was the skepticism of Greek philosophy that cut the nerve of the Roman character. It has been maintained that philosophy was cultivated in the earliest times of Rome. But the whole history of the state is opposed to such a supposition. While other sciences, and many of the arts, were introduced, and cultivated to a greater or less extent, philosophy appears to have been very little known as a distinct branch of knowledge till near the time of Cicero. The attention of the Roman youth was first turned in this direction by the philosophers Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes, who, near the close of the sixth century from the founding of the city,‡ were sent to Rome as ambassadors from Athens. Cicero describes one of them, not only as a philosopher, but as an orator of such consummate skill that he defended no proposition which he did not establish, and attacked none which he did not overthrow.§ It is not strange

\* Liv. XL. 29.

† De Beaufort, I. 363.

‡ Brucker. Hist. Philos. 286. Cicero De Oratore, II. 37.

§ De Oratore II. 38. Carneadis verò vis incredibilis illa dicendi, et varietas, perquam esset optanda nobis; qui nullam



that these distinguished men were able to enkindle among the Roman youth a transient zeal for the study of philosophy. But the sterner spirits among the leading men at Rome at that period regarded this introduction of the Greek philosophy, as the forerunner of evils to the state. At the instance of Cato the elder, the ambassadors were honorably dismissed, and the youth directed to study the laws and institutions as before. Soon after, the Greek philosophers, and even rhetoricians, were forbidden to live at Rome. But the relation of Rome to other parts of the world had become such that it was found impossible to prohibit the cultivation of foreign literature, or to check the spread of new opinions. The young men of Rome having obtained the command of armies in the East, came in contact with the cultivated minds of Greece and other countries, and were captivated by the beauties of philosophy and the charms of eloquence. The acquaintance with philosophy became general, and exerted so much influence, that Scipio Africanus, and others like him, must be regarded as little, if at all, more the productions of the Roman than of the Grecian world. Sylla brought from Asia an extensive library, containing the works of Aristotle and of Theophrastus, and Lucullus completed the establishment of Greek philosophy at Rome, by gathering around him, in his magnificent retreat, a crowd of the most eminent philosophers of his age. From his time all the Grecian sects flourished at Rome. The judgment of Cato proved correct; for the influence of the Grecian mode of thinking soon manifested itself, and in nothing more strikingly than in reference to religion. A full examination of the tenets of the Greek philosophers, with an account of the progress of the different sects at Rome, and their influence there, would lead to a much more extensive investigation than is consistent with the design of this article. The connection of the Greek philosophy with the religious belief, and the state of morals in the later times of the republic, and under the empire, will be sufficiently evident from a brief statement of the prevailing views in theology, which we will now make for the purpose of comparing these later views with the elements of religion as they existed in the earlier Roman theology. When the Greek philosophy had taken root, what were the current opinions respecting the exist-

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unquam in illis suis disputationibus rem defendit quam non probavit; nullam oppugnavit, quam non everterit.

ence and character of God, the divine government, the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments? These are the fundamental truths of religion, and it is on these, more than on all things else, that individual and national morality depend. What then was the state of the public mind in reference to these in the later days of Rome?

1. *Rejection of the national gods, with atheism and general skepticism, became extensively prevalent.*

This fact, and its connection with philosophy, are distinctly stated in the following passage from Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*: "The spirit of inquiry, prompted by emulation and supported by freedom, had divided the public teachers of philosophy into a variety of contending sects; but the ingenuous youth who, from every part, resorted to Athens and the other seats of learning in the Roman empire, were alike instructed in every school to reject and despise the religion of the multitude. How, indeed, was it possible that a philosopher should accept as divine truths, the idle tales of the poets, and the incoherent traditions of antiquity; or that he should adore as gods, those imperfect beings whom he must have despised as men! Against such unworthy adversaries Cicero condescended to employ the arms of reason and eloquence; but the satire of Lucian was a much more adequate, as well as more efficacious weapon. We may be well assured, that a writer conversant with the world, would never have ventured to expose the gods of his country to public ridicule, had they not already been the objects of secret contempt among the polished and enlightened orders of society."\*

The change of views here spoken of commenced in the higher ranks, and among those who had been connected with the armies in Greece. But as indifference to the spirit, or neglect of the forms of religion, cannot long be confined to the leading men of a nation, the new sentiments soon became general. The proof of this change in regard to religion is abundant and decisive. Of all the ancient writers, no one refers to the fact more frequently or with greater explicitness than Dionysius. In one of the many passages in which the subject is mentioned by him, after having described the solemn religious ceremonies with which the kings, and after their expulsion, the consuls and other magistrates were inducted into office, he condemns the

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\* I. 19.

neglect or perversion of them in his own time, and observes: "But to exhibit the extent to which a disregard of the Deity prevails among some at the present day, would be no trifling work."\* The testimony of Livy to the same effect (vol IX. p. 262, Liv. III. 20) has been already cited. It is not to be supposed that Grecian influence was exerted only on the most distinguished men, or on those families whose sons were sent to Athens to be educated. Education at Rome came eventually almost entirely into the hands of Greeks, so that even the small children were instructed by Greek slaves.† A more full description of the results of the prevailing views in religion is given by Müller: "When religion became more and more the object of philosophical doubt and thoughtless mockery, it soon came to be incapable of inspiring, in ordinary men, with its former majesty, either terror or consolation. Under the Cæsars all the gods vanished before that self-interest, whose altar was the palace. Prosperous vice in purple, Tiberius and Claudius among the gods, the gods inexorable respecting eternal Rome, Augustus in unshaken power, Brutus deserted, Paetus Thræsea the victim of Nero—all this filled well-disposed men with excusable doubts and involuntary contempt. The greatest minds generalized the belief: The universe is Pliny's God; God is every thing from eternity, in every thing, over every thing, and it is vain to seek him; he fills every thing, all feelings, the soul, the spirit. In vain the stoic senators and wise men contended for the gods of old Rome, and the sovereignty of religion, against the rashness of the age; in vain they endeavored to found the new structure of morals on philosophical axioms, (a palace on a groundwork of Mosaics,) one after another of which, in moments of the omnipotence of passion, gave way. It required so much effort to live after mere ideas, that those who attempted it consisted at last of a few quiet men, who were lost in the other sects."‡

Although the Epicurean philosophy met at first with much

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\* *Antiq. Rom.* II. 6. See also II. 14, 24, 74. III. 21. V. 60. VII. 35. VIII. 37. X. 17.

† *Hegels Werke*, IX. 322.

‡ *Allg. Geschichte* I. 430—432. In regard to the efforts of the Stoics to restore the power of religion by connecting it with natural philosophy, see Meiners *De Vero Deo*, pp. 270, 271.

opposition at Rome, yet the proof is conclusive that it spread there to a very wide extent. It was embraced by many distinguished men, and Cicero often speaks of the followers of Epicurus as very numerous at Rome.\* It cannot, indeed, be affirmed that the Epicureans wholly denied the existence of the gods; but their system certainly rendered such beings superfluous, and so far as the universe is concerned, altogether unimportant.† Epictetus charges them with getting themselves made priests of gods which, if their opinions were correct, had no existence, and with interpreting to others oracles which they themselves despised.‡ The same accusation is made against them by Plutarch.§ It cannot be believed that the development of this philosophy, in the elegant and seductive poem of Lucretius, had nothing to do with the downfall of religion at Rome. "While Catullus diverted the licentious youth with voluptuous conceptions," says Müller, "and gave refinement to their audacity, Lucretius excited among the thinking Romans dangerous doubts respecting the nature of things. The point of view to which he conducted them was opposed to that on which the laws and virtue of Rome were founded, and accelerated the decline of morals already depraved by luxury. In Lucretius were admired the majesty of ancient poetry, and the seductive charms of the Epicurean philosophy in the germ."||

2. In regard to *the doctrine of divine providence* the views of the Epicureans, and indeed the prevailing views in the later times of Rome, are better defined and more certain than those which relate to the existence of God. The Epicureans taught that the gods live a happy and careless life, wholly unconcerned

\* De Finibus, I. 7. II. 25. † Brucker. Hist. Philos. 272.

‡ Diss. II. 20. § 2, 3, 4.

§ Non posse suaviter vivi sec. Epic. 22. Take the comment and translation of Neander. "How painful to the philosopher, if he had a human heart, to be obliged to stand cold as a hypocrite, where men were assembled on the highest and most sacred business of the heart! He utters hypocritically—as Plutarch out of the fulness of a pious heart says—prayer and adoration, from fear of the multitude, and he pronounces words which are contrary to his conviction, and while he sacrifices, the priest who kills the victim appears to him no better than a cook." Kirchengeschichte I. 13.

|| Allg. Geschichte, I. 181.

about the affairs of men. The world was not created by them, nor have they any thing to do with its government. They neither punish the bad, nor reward the good. It is obvious that this view of the divine nature lays the axe at the root of all religion. This was clearly seen by those among the ancients who examined the tendency of such a doctrine, and by none more distinctly than by Cicero.\* The Epicureans did indeed affirm that they worshipped the gods on account of the excellence of their nature as beautiful and happy, and that Epicurus himself wrote books respecting piety towards the gods. "But what reason do you urge," replied Cotta, "that men should be mindful of the gods, when the gods are not only unmindful of men, but care for nothing, accomplish nothing?" "For piety is justice towards the gods; but how can the relationship of right exist between us and them, when there is no connection whatever between God and man?"†

He maintains that the mere existence of superior beings is not a sufficient foundation for religion. These higher beings must have some connection with the world. Men must be dependent on them, and have something to hope and fear from them, or there is no room for piety.

"But Epicurus," continues the same writer, "effectually eradicated religious feeling from the minds of men, when he removed from the immortal gods their assistance and favor. For although he says that the nature of God is most excellent and glorious, he denies that there is benevolence in God; he takes away that which most strikingly characterizes an excellent and glorious nature. For what is better or what more excellent than benignity and beneficence? Take this from the character of God, and you would make no one, either God or man, dear to the Deity; no one loved, no one esteemed by him. Thus it follows, not only that men are neglected by the gods, but that the gods themselves are neglected by each other."‡

Neander regards Pilate, when he put to our Saviour in mockery the sarcastic question, "What is truth?" as the representative of many distinguished and educated Romans of his time. These were skeptics in the strict sense, who doubted whether there is any such thing as truth. Others, he thinks,

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\* See Bib. Repos., vol. IX. p. 278.

† Cicero De Nat. Deor. I. 41.

‡ Ib. I. 43.

contented themselves with a sort of vapid, dead Deism, which did not absolutely deny the existence of a God, but put him as far off as possible. Theirs was a sort of lazy divinity, who let every thing go as it would. All belief in a close connection between the Deity and the human race; all sympathy of God with men; and all seeking after intercourse with the Supreme Being, is, in their view, fanaticism. The world, at least, and human nature, are without a God. The same historian cites the testimony of one of the Christian Fathers in respect to the opinions prevalent in his day: Justin Martyr says of the philosophers of his time, "The majority now do not inquire at all, whether there is one God, or more Gods than one, whether there is or is not a providence; as if this knowledge contributed nothing to happiness. They seek rather to convince us that the Deity cares indeed for the whole, and for the species; but not for me and thee, and for individual men. We need not, therefore, pray to him at all, for every thing is repeated according to the unchangeable laws of an eternal revolution."\* The relation of these semi-atheistic notions to the lives and morals of the Romans is here stated only in a negative form. But they are exhibited in bolder language by Robert Hall, in his Sermon on Modern Infidelity. "It was late before the atheism of Epicurus gained footing at Rome; but its prevalence was soon followed by such scenes of proscription, confiscation, and blood as were *then* unparalleled in the history of the world; from which the republic being never able to recover itself, after many unsuccessful struggles, exchanged liberty for repose by submission to absolute power. Such were the effects of atheism at Rome."

3. It has been shown that in early times the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was received without question. It must be supposed that greater refinement, together with higher and more widely extended intellectual cultivation would not, at least, cast any doubt upon its truth. But such is not the fact. *There were whole sects of philosophers by whom this doctrine was rejected.* Such were the disciples of Democritus, the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, the Skeptics, and especially the numerous and influential Epicureans. Cicero, in the treatise in which he undertakes to prove the immortality of the soul, represents the contrary of this doctrine, as the opinion not only of the Epicureans,

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\* Kirchengeschichte, I. 17.

but of the whole crowd of philosophers. "Throngs of gain-sayers come forward ; not only Epicureans, whom indeed I do not despise, but what is quite remarkable, every very learned man holds the doctrine in contempt ; my favorite Dicaearchus, also, has most strenuously argued against our immortality."\*

From Cicero's account of the opinions of the philosophers respecting the soul, it is evident that the ancient simplicity, and implicitness of belief, was at that period no longer in existence. The greater number believed that the soul is not distinct from the body, and those who admitted its separate existence, supposed it to be extinguished at death, or soon after. Even the Stoics, who did most for religion, had no confident belief in the future existence of the soul. It is obvious that when such views prevailed, the foundations of religion were undermined.

4. The disbelief of the immortality of the soul implies of course the *overthrow of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments*. But the rejection of the latter doctrine appears to have been much more general and decided than of that of mere future existence.

Even in the time of Polybius, skepticism on this point had become prevalent, and Cicero in his oration for Aulus Cluentius, represents the doctrine as universally rejected.† Cæsar, in his speech on the Catilinian conspiracy, shows clearly that he had no belief in this doctrine ; and it is probable that he expressed the prevailing sentiment of the Roman gentlemen at that period.‡

Among those who undertook to administer consolation on the death of friends, the general mode of reasoning appears to have been to assume either that the soul will die, which is no evil, or that if it lives, it will be happy, which is far better. It is a remark of Leland, that the structure of Cicero's argument in the very work in which he pleads for the immortality of the soul, excludes the doctrine of future punishment.§ It was not, therefore, merely the poetic imagery that Cicero denied, but the doctrine of future punishment itself. The same was true of the Stoics. "No one," says Seneca, "is so much a child as to be

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\* Tusc. Disp. I. 31.

† Pro A. Cluentio, § 61.

‡ Bell. Cat. § 51.

§ Advantage and Necessity of Revelation, II. 370. "Si maneat, beati."

afraid of Cerberus;”\* and, “Those descriptions which picture to us the terrible infernal regions, are so many fables. The poets have invented these things, and alarmed us with idle terrors. Death is a release, and the end of all our sorrows.”†

It is manifest from many passages that the same opinions were held by the poets. We find Juvenal singing,

“Esse aliquid manes, et subterranea regna,  
Et contum, et Stygio ranas in gurgite nigras,  
Atque una transire vadum tot millia cymba,  
Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum aere lavantur.”‡

Lucan also :

“Et quid, ait, vani terremur imagine visus?  
Aut nihil, est sensus animis a morte relictum,  
Aut mors ipsa nihil——.”§

It was impossible that such sentiments held by the philosophers, poets, and great men of a nation, should not exert a powerful influence over the vulgar mind. These opinions must necessarily descend to the lower ranks. Lucian (Jupiter Tragedus, C. 17. T. II.) represents an Epicurean and a Stoic as disputing before the people about providence—the rabble inclined to the Epicurean.|| If the victorious party in such a contest carried with it the popular mind, how strong must have been the influence of both, in regard to a doctrine which they were agreed in rejecting. Servius (Ad Æneid, XI. 755) expressly testifies that unbelief was spread as extensively among the common people as among the learned.¶

From the preceding representations it is evident that in later times the fundamental doctrines of religion were extensively rejected in the Roman world. But the removal of all belief in the great truths on which the national religion was based, did not put an end to superstition. On the contrary, this vice was increased a thousand-fold by the change. It is a singular paradox, but an unquestionable fact, that while disbelief in the existence of any God was rapidly gaining ground, the number of the objects of worship was continually increasing. The rage for foreign gods became a mania, and new divinities were summoned from every quarter of the globe—as though the great gulf of atheism could be filled up by a motley collection of un-

\* Epist. XXIV.

† Sat. II. 149—152.

‡ Bib Repos. II. 282.

† Consol. ad Marciam, XIX.

§ Pharsalia, III. 38—40.

¶ Bib. Repos. II. 282.



couth images and barbarous names. The baser the gods the more popular they proved. Several of the emperors devoted themselves to the worship of the Syrian and Egyptian deities. With these new divinities came tribes of priests, soothsayers, necromancers, astrologers, magicians, jugglers, interpreters of dreams and signs, fortune-tellers, and all the other panders to the general superstition. Nor was it simply the superstitious fears of the people that these men dealt with. They ministered to the appetites and passions of the multitude, and became the instigators and negotiators of the most abominable crimes. Under the direction of men who, for a certain price, engaged to furnish means of escape from the wrath of God and man, assassinations, parricides, and impurities of every kind were committed. Nero rejected all the gods except one female divinity, and her he finally subjected to a gross indignity.\* At the same time he kept a magician to reveal to him the future, and to exorcise the ghosts of those whom he had murdered, especially that of his mother, by which he was continually tormented. In this example of Nero, we have an illustration of the operation of unbelief and superstition among the Romans of that age. Not that all were as bad as Nero, but all shared in the general skepticism, and all had consciences, which, from the depths of pollution and crime, cried aloud for some mode of expiation. It is impossible for skepticism to annihilate, though it may pervert, the religious nature of man. Hence the prevalence of unbounded superstition.

IV. It has been shown that a great change took place in the moral character of the Romans, and that this change was intimately connected with the preceding change in the national religion. By some, however, it may still be supposed that the prevalence of atheism, superstition, and vice, among the later Romans, is to be ascribed chiefly to the want of a general diffusion of knowledge. Let us, therefore, glance very briefly at this point. The true relation of education and knowledge to morality among the Romans, may be seen by considering attentively two striking facts.

1. *At the time when the people were most deeply sunk in superstition and vice, there was more knowledge in the nation, and this knowledge was more widely diffused, than ever before.*

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\* Suet. Vita Neroni, § 56.

The slender means of education possessed by the virtuous and noble Romans of early times, and the small amount of knowledge which existed among them, have been already stated. Through the virtues of their ancestors, which were the offspring of religion, the Romans became the masters of the world. They were the successors of the Greeks in power, and although themselves the conquerors, submitted to be taught by those whom their arms subdued, and adopted as their own the Grecian learning. Thus a people whose ancestors, though virtuous and free, had been by no means distinguished for intellectual cultivation, became possessed of treasures of foreign knowledge. The spread of the Greek philosophy at Rome, in the time of Sylla and Lucullus, has been already referred to. From that period all existing sects, the Pythagoreans, the Academics, the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and especially the Epicureans, flourished in Italy.\* But philosophy (as has been already intimated) was a study for which the Romans had no genius, and in which they never distinguished themselves. It was, therefore, later than other sciences and arts in gaining foothold at Rome. Before the period mentioned, the Roman education had been greatly improved, and a knowledge of the arts and sciences diffused to a greater or less extent. In the war with the last king of Macedonia, an eclipse of the moon occurred on the evening preceding the decisive battle of Pydna. As Paulus Æmilius, the Roman general, was apprehensive that the superstitious fears of the soldiers would be excited, he caused the army to be informed of the approaching obscuration, with its cause.† This was more than a century and a half before the birth of Christ. Whether this eclipse was calculated by Roman science, or by Greeks in the Roman service, it shows that knowledge was beginning to spread, at least among the higher ranks. It is observable that Livy ceases by degrees to relate the prodigies, which in the first ten books of his history he so conscientiously records. This is no doubt to be attributed, in part at least, to the increase of knowledge. While the habit of looking back with wonder and admiration to antiquity permitted, and perhaps required, the relation of such marvellous events of the most ancient times as had become incorporated with the history

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\* Brucker. Hist. Philos. § 288.

† Buchholz Philosophische Untersuchungen Ueber Die Römer, I. 158.

of the nation, the diffusion of knowledge forbade the belief that the same things could occur in less remote and better defined periods. In the time of Quintilian, it appears, the sciences were taught to the common people. "Even among our country people," says that writer, "there are but few who do not know, or seek to learn something of the natural causes of things."\* The soldiers in the army of Crassus, it seems, were able to read amatory romances.†

2. *Education at Rome furnished no security to virtue.*

It either simply refined the prevailing superstition, and changed its form, or in sapping the foundations of the existing religious system, it swept with it all religious belief, and thus eradicated the seeds of virtue.

It is objected that whatever may have been the increase of knowledge, and the improvement in the modes of instruction at Rome, there was no system of universal education, such as is proposed at the present day. This is readily admitted. But before the freedom and happiness of a nation are confidently rested on any scheme of education, it is proper to inquire whether education (without religion) *so far as it has been enjoyed*, has produced the effects which are expected from it.

Whatever may be said of the mass of the Roman people, it cannot be maintained that the higher ranks were not well educated. Were they virtuous in proportion to their cultivation? Was the line of division between the educated and the uneducated not only intellectual, but moral, so that the virtue and good principle were on one side, the immorality and crime, for the most part, on the other? This was not the fact. Vice reigned alike among the educated and the uneducated. It asserted its empire over high and low, over the polished courtier not less than the untutored peasant. The description of the

\* Bib. Repos. II. 282.

† "These things were to amuse the populace. But after the farce was over, Surena assembled the Senate of Seleucia, and produced the obscene books of Aristides, called the *Milesiaks*. Nor was this a groundless invention to blacken the Romans. For the books being really found in the baggage of Rustius, gave Surena an excellent opportunity to say many satirical things of the Romans, who, even in time of war, could not refrain from such libidinous actions, and abominable books." Plutarch, Life of Crassus.

dreadful state of morals given by Seneca is not applicable to the uneducated only. The moral debasement was universal. The same is true of the representations of Sallust. The debauched and desperate band of Catilinian conspirators were nobles; and it is plain that such a company could not have been collected except where depravity reigned among the higher classes. When Jugurtha directed his emissaries to tempt all men with gold, it must be supposed that leading, influential characters are meant; and these were polished and refined. "All things are venal at Rome," does not simply *include* the educated, it refers especially to them. In conjunction with the poets and philosophers, such statesmen as Lucullus, Catiline, Crassus, Claudius, Anthony, Pompey, Cæsar, and Augustus, were the men who corrupted the morals, and subverted the liberties of their country.

Theirs were characters produced by a skeptical period. They were men who, like Napoleon, carried their hearts in their heads. They were men who, for the most part, rejected all belief in future retribution, and even future existence, and denied the very being of a God. Or if at any time the terrible goadings of conscience vanquished their unbelief, we see them giving way to the grossest superstition.\* For strange as it may seem, the rankest skepticism and the extreme of superstition appear to be next door neighbors.

There were doubtless noble spirits among the educated and

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\* Augustus was afraid to stay alone in the dark. Nor did he ever do so; but whenever he waked in the night called for some one to sit with him. In a thunder-storm he always wrapped himself in the skin of a sea-calf, and if the peals happened to be unusually severe, or rather when the heavens indicated that they might be so, (ad omnem majoris tempestatis suspicionem,) he crawled into a deep hole dug in the ground for the purpose. From this hiding-place he came forth when he had sufficiently quaked, to furnish the nations in their turn an opportunity to quake. The seal-skin was regarded as a kind of amulet or defensive charm. The other measure was taken on the authority of the philosophers, who taught that the lightning never penetrates more than five feet into the earth. The emperor's weakness respecting thunder probably had something to do with a fright which he had while on a journey one night, when the lightning struck his vehicle, and killed the servant who was carrying the light before him. These and other superstitions, see in Sueton. Vita, Augusti 29, 78, 90—93.

refined. Such were Pliny the elder, and others like him. They did not sink to the brutishness of Cynicism, nor give themselves up to the mere polished licentiousness of the disciples of Epicurus. But these were exceptions. And while their good taste preserved them from the grossness of sensuality, they advocated principles which overthrew religion, and sapped the foundations of morality. "It is ridiculous indeed," says Pliny, (Nat. Hist. II. 7,) "to make that which is the highest of all, mingle in and take care of human affairs. Must we believe, or must we doubt, that this highest would be degraded by so sad and complex a ministry? It is hardly possible to judge, which may be of the most benefit to the human race; since on the one hand there is no respect for the gods; and on the other, a respect which men ought to be ashamed of." "Still it is of use in human life, to believe that God takes care of human things; and that punishments, though sometimes late, (since God is so much occupied in his vast cares,) will never fail of being inflicted on crimes; and that man is not therefore the most nearly allied by birth to the Deity, in order that he should be next to the brutes in debasement. But it is the special consolation of imperfect human nature, that God cannot indeed do all things. For neither can he call death to his own relief, should he desire it—a noble refuge which he has given to man in the midst of so many evils; nor can he endow man with immortality, etc.; by which things the power of nature is doubtless declared, and that is what we call God." Pausanias also testifies of himself in many passages, that although he quotes the traditions of his religion, he yields them no belief; and commonly no one attributes any credit to them, except merely because he has heard them related from his youth up, (Pausaniae Descriptio Græciæ I. 3, II. 57.) Many Romans, also, in the time of the Emperors, may have been led into infidelity by a polite rhetorical education; for he whose taste and rhetorical powers merely are cultivated, commonly loses a spirit of deeper and more serious investigation, and superficially pronounces a skeptical decision on the highest subjects. So Arnobius delineates the unbelieving Romans of his time—(Arnobius Adv. Gentes)—"Because you know how to inflect words properly, because you avoid barbarisms and solecisms, because you can compose or criticise a well-constructed discourse, you also think you know what is true and what is false; what can take place, and what cannot; and

what is the nature of heavenly and of earthly things" ? Theodoret also complains, that "so many half learned among the heathen refuse to take an interest in the barbarian wisdom of Christianity; while in old times, the truly wise travelled through all lands in order to become still wiser."\*

3. In the state of things which has been described, *there is no reason to believe that the deterioration of public morals, and the fall of the empire, would have been prevented by any (not religious) scheme of education.* Had patriotism increased in strength as education was improved in its character and extended in its influence; had the more general prevalence of morality gone hand in hand with the diffusion of knowledge among the people; such an inference might have some degree of plausibility. But the truth is *just the reverse.* For the striking fact which we may observe in the history of Athens is true also of Rome. The period of morality was the period of comparatively little intellectual cultivation; while knowledge, crime, and political insecurity are found to have been coeval. "We see from the time of Sylla," says M. De Beaufort, "new laws established every day, and their penalties rendered more severe; but the more the rigor of punishments was increased, the more did impunity and the facility with which the judges might be corrupted, increase the number of criminals. The resources of the government being once relaxed, it was impossible to restore them to order. The laws which had been made for a free people, who knew how to use their liberty wisely, were no longer adapted to a nation which had degenerated into license. Morals had been to them in the place of laws. It was the simplicity, the frugality, the virtue of this people that had elevated the republic to that high summit of glory which it had reached. It was also the corruption of morals that destroyed it."\*

Suppose the Roman system of education to have been ever so defective, at that period when the prophecy of Jugurtha was literally accomplished, and the empire was set up for sale by the Pretorian guards, and struck off to the highest bidder, who would seriously imagine that those evils in the state which had reduced the empire to this deplorable condition could have been remedied by imparting either to the people, or the soldiers, or to both, a greater amount of knowledge? Could the operation

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\* *Republique Romaine* VI. 288.

† *Bib. Repos.* II. 280, 281.

of the causes which had brought about this state of things have been in this way even retarded? Had there been in every village a printing press—a lyceum, and half a dozen public schools; had the gratuitous lectures on the arts and sciences been as able, and the amount of their influence as important as they were at Athens, or as they are in our own country at the present day; whatever changes may have been produced in regard to particular events, and in respect to the *manner* in which the empire fell, there is not the least reason to suppose that the certainty of its ruin would have been at all diminished. From a close inspection of the whole history of the Roman people, nothing can be clearer than that *education* in the restricted and erroneous, but too common sense—intellectual cultivation—the diffusion of knowledge among the people—was with them neither the source nor the preserver of public morality and free institutions. It was not knowledge that formed the noble character of the early Romans, but it was the Roman character that secured the acquisition of whatever amount of knowledge the exigencies of the state might require. As knowledge was not the procuring cause of morality, so neither had it power, when that cause was removed by the overthrow of religion, to secure the perpetuity of freedom.

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## ARTICLE V.

### EXAMINATION OF DR. EMMONS'S THEORY OF DIVINE AGENCY.

By Amos Bullard, Leicester, Mass.

UNLESS the doctrines of the venerable dead may be freely examined, there is little hope for the progress of truth. So long, however, as truth is making progress, he who seeks it with an honest and fearless mind, cannot entertain all the opinions of his predecessors. Some things, at least, that were credible to them, may be incredible to him, when seen in the light of new discoveries and advancing science. By that light, he may possibly discern more in the temple of truth than they, and like them, may confidently “reckon his own insight as final;” yet *his* visions, too, must pass the ordeal of the future. But if it be remembered that the *characters* of men, unlike their

opinions, are to be tried by the standard of their own age, no one need fear that an examination of Dr. Emmons's philosophy will injure his good name. Should his theory of divine efficiency, which, as some one pleasantly remarked, he cherished "as a part of his holiness," prove indefensible, neither his piety nor his genius will be dishonored in the eyes of those who shall duly consider the circumstances in which he adopted that theory. A glance at some of those circumstances may be proper, before examining the theory itself.

Divines contemporary with Dr. Emmons, seem to have used the Bible as a text-book of philosophy. They often endeavored to establish their philosophical opinions by appeals to Scripture, though its writers do not profess to teach any thing in a scientific manner. With respect to this matter, the right principle, of late fully asserted, is this: "Since the Bible is not a system of philosophy, a mere quotation of its texts, or their incorporation, cannot be received in proof of a philosophy. We must take the Bible facts and affirmations in their pure simplicity; and we must examine the metaphysics on its own legitimate grounds. We are bound, as Christians, to believe the words of Scripture wherever we find them; but we are not bound to believe the philosophy which a father or doctor in the church has seen fit to connect with them." But in the time of Dr. Emmons, this principle, if not unacknowledged, was in practice much neglected. If, then, he made literal annunciations from the Bible, the basis of theories purely philosophical, and erred in so doing, other illustrious divines of his day were in the same error. It is well to remember this, in forming an estimate of him as a theologian.

When Dr. Emmons was forming his theological opinions, sacred criticism, as a science, was unknown in this country. We must not be surprised, therefore, if divines of that period, in founding a metaphysical scheme on some passage of Scripture, were accustomed to do so without critically investigating it. In such an operation, it was not then the usage to "inquire, and make search, and ask diligently, whether it be truth, and the thing certain." "If we look at Emmons's sermons for the learned exegesis which we may find in a German commentary, we shall look for what he undervalued, and for what his proper contemporaries had never heard of." Let us not do him wrong in measuring "his attainments by the standard of modern scholarship." If he built stately theories professedly on biblical



foundations, without a knowledge of biblical science, and cared not that men should say of him, "he hath an interpretation," so long as they would say, "he hath a doctrine," let not this detract from his merited fame. Let it be borne in mind that, in his early theological researches, he labored under disadvantages from which no one was then free, but which now no longer exist.

But it is chiefly important to observe what the prevailing philosophy was, when Dr. Emmons came upon the stage. It was the *necessitarian* philosophy. Mental science had not been redeemed from its immemorial bondage, an *a priori* method of determining psychological questions. Truth was sought, not so much by appeal to the records of consciousness, as by inference from gratuitous premises. The testimony of facts, which is always true, was put to silence by logic, which is often false. New England minds were still influenced, not only by the pantheism of Berkely, but by the fatalism of Hobbes. The current of infidelity was then, as it ever is, setting towards the doctrine of necessity, and strange as it may seem, not a few evangelical divines were swept away in the same direction. The question, whether actual efficiency is an attribute of the mind, was debated by great and good men on both sides, but more by a sort of logic seemingly machinated for the purpose, than on the ground of facts and first principles. Edwards triumphed, in virtue of his mightier enginery. And as when Hume had refuted the unsound arguments by which Descartes endeavored to substantiate first truths, he claimed to have overturned those truths themselves; so when Edwards had "demolished the metaphysics of Whitby," his school felt assured that the doctrine of a free will was laid to its perpetual rest. It had then no defender in this country so mighty as its assailant, whilst the opposite doctrine had reached its "most palmy state." It was a less questioning age, and powerful minds were more despotic than at present. Such had been the character and style of metaphysical reasoning, that fallacies might not only hide themselves under manifold subtleties, but lurk securely under indefinite and variable terms. All this, together with "the force of his amazing genius," had given Edwards the mastery. The theory of the mind's efficiency, seemed to have been *strangled* by the mass of alleged absurdities which he had heaped upon it. His doctrine of the will, though made of the materials, and cast in the mould prepared by Collins, who had been "most obnox-

ious to divines of all denominations" in England, but who attempted no reply to the arguments of Dr. Clarke refuting his scheme, was, by many divines in this country, relied upon as a "pillar and ground of the truth."

When Dr. Emmons was a student in theology the philosophy of Edwards was in full power. Its fundamental position, that "the affections of the soul are not properly distinguishable from the will," was less controverted than it is now. The fallacy of the Dictum Necessitatis, "*that a cause cannot act but by first acting to produce that act,*" had not been detected, as it has now been. It had not then been demonstrated, that, in the necessitarian philosophy, strict analysis can find no material distinction between *natural* and *moral* necessity. Metaphysicians of that day often argued from the divine foreknowledge, as if *certainly* and *necessity* were identical in their logical relations; and inferred that whatever *will* be, in the view of the Creator, *must* be, relatively to the creature. In short, none of the fallacies in the Essay on the Will had been exposed, as many believe they have now been. The doctrine of the will had not been "Determined by an Appeal to Consciousness," as, in the judgment of many, it has now been. What wonder, then, if Dr. Emmons, in his youth, assented to what he was heard expressly to affirm in his old age, "that no man in this country understood the subject of the will, till Jonathan Edwards understood it?" Why should he not have believed what was taught him by such a man, especially when, by the suffrage of the mighty in the land, and for aught any one had successfully shown to the contrary, the question of the will had been, by that man, "thoroughly looked into, and searched to the very bottom?" Why wish to search beyond the bottom? Let us not think it strange that he imbibed a philosophy which it was almost sacrilege to dispute, nor forget that "his metaphysical theology must be viewed in connexion with the principles of mental science which were early instilled into his mind."

Rejecting the doctrine of the mind's efficiency, as he must have done, or else have rejected the wisdom of his teachers, and assuming that God is the efficient cause of man's volition, Dr. Emmons perceived that it could not affect the question of responsibility, whether he supposed them produced directly, or through a complicated train of circumstances. Is he not to be commended for preferring the plain and direct, to the occult and labyrinthian necessity advocated by some of his contemporaries?

As the former view did not less accord with the dominant philosophy of the times, he adopted it, and gave it the stamp of his own positive and executive mind. Unlike many divines, he determined, in his bold uprightness, that his philosophy should speak plainly in his theology and in his preaching. Having what seemed to him a true light, he was not afraid to let it shine. That God "worketh all in all," as the efficient cause of all, being the substance of what the great masters had taught him, why should he not inculcate the "awful and amiable doctrine"? Be it what it might, supposing it true, why should it be any longer as a thing secretly brought to the ear, or as an image at which men trembled, but "could not discern the form thereof"? Why need the truth retire into palliating shades, or wish to be seen only in the dim and hazy distance? Why should he not let men look at it, with its open front and its own true lineaments, unmasked and undisguised?

What that theory is, which is now proposed as the subject of inquiry, may be ascertained from Dr. Emmons's own words. "Since men are the creatures of God, they are necessarily his dependent creatures, who can act only as they are acted upon by a divine controlling influence," vol. IV., p. 397. "None of these creatures and objects are capable of guiding their own motions, or directing their own actions to promote the purposes for which they were made," vol. IV., p. 383. "Many imagine that their free agency consists in a power to cause or originate their own voluntary exercises; but this would imply that they are independent of God, in whom they live and move and have their being," vol. IV., p. 384. "It is his agency, and nothing but his agency, that makes men act and prevents them from acting," vol. IV., p. 272. "He exerts his agency in producing all the free and voluntary exercises of every moral agent, as constantly and fully as in preserving and supporting his existence, vol. IV., p. 383. "He wrought as effectually in the minds of Joseph's brethren when they sold him, as when they repented and besought his mercy. He not only prepared those persons to act, but made them act. He not only exhibited motives of action before their minds, but disposed their minds to comply with the motives exhibited. But there was no possible way in which he could dispose them to act, right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts," vol. IV., p. 371. "It is often thought and said, that nothing more was necessary on God's part, in order to fit Pharaoh for

destruction, than barely to leave him to himself. But God knew that no external means and motives would be sufficient of themselves to form his moral character. He determined, therefore, to operate on his heart itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in the view of certain external motives. When Moses called upon him to let the people go, God stood by him, and moved him to refuse. When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions, he did at all times," vol. IV., p. 327. "We cannot conceive that his acting is any thing but his willing or choosing to produce an effect. His willing or choosing a thing to exist, is all that he does in causing it to exist," vol. IV., p. 379.

The theory comprised in the foregoing propositions—and many more of the same import might be given—may be stated as in substance the following: *The agency of God consists merely in volition. He, by willing, is the efficient cause of every event, not only in the natural, but in the moral world. All human volitions, the good and bad alike, are produced by his irresistible and creative energy.* This is the theory of divine efficiency. We shall endeavor now to examine it.

I. *What are the alleged proofs of this theory?*

Dr. Emmons nowhere advocates it by a very strict or elaborate demonstration, but often quotes in its defence from the Bible, and still oftener propounds it in a brief enthymematical form.

1. Let us hear *the arguments from Scripture.* It is granted that we may appeal to the Bible in proof of some things respecting the divine agency. Of the fact, for example, that God has an agency in some way connected with human actions, the Bible yields proof which none but an infidel can impugn. But when one forms a theory metaphysically defining the *exact mode* of that agency, and appeals to Scripture for proof, the established principles of science reject the appeal; because the writers of the Bible do not pretend to reveal the agency of God scientifically, nor to give us facts from which its mode can be defined, as a matter of science. And even if they claimed to have done this, no argument from Scripture, for a philosophical theory, can be valid, unless the passages on which it depends be not only interpreted correctly, but such as when so interpreted, shall teach that theory. Are these conditions fulfilled

in Dr. Emmons's biblical arguments for the theory of divine efficiency? This question may be answered by referring to some examples.

Assuming that *mind* in moral agents, cannot be the efficient cause of its own acts, Dr. Emmons says, "all their motions, exercises, or actions, must originate from a divine efficiency," vol. IV., p. 366. By this he means, that God is the efficient or producing cause of all human actions. And what Scriptural proofs does he offer? One is, that "in Him we live and move and have our being." This language was used by Paul, in declaring to a heathen audience the existence of the one true God, as the source and sustenance of man's life and powers. But that he meant to teach the theory before us, or any other metaphysical theory, no commentator, so far as we know, has ever even conjectured. It was the language of poetry; and the laws of speech forbid that we should receive it as the language of science. "Even the sacred writers frequently borrow the figurative diction of poetry to convey ideas, which must be interpreted, not according to the letter, but the spirit of the passage. It is thus that thunder is called the voice of God; the wind, his breath; and the tempest, the blast of his nostrils. Not attending to this circumstance, or rather not choosing to direct to it the attention of his readers, Spinoza has laid hold of the well-known expression of St. Paul, that 'in God we live and move and have our being,' as a proof that the ideas of the Apostle concerning the divine nature, were pretty much the same with his own."\*

Again, to prove his theory, Dr. Emmons quotes the following: "We are not sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God." We find no evidence that he subjected this passage to any philological examination. It was a question indispensable to his argument, whether our *insufficiency* here spoken of, implies that we cannot determine our own acts, or that, as sinners, we need an atoning sacrifice;—whether our *sufficiency*, which is of God, consists in his creating all our moral actions, or in the merciful provisions of the gospel. The true meaning of the passage, respecting which expositors are agreed, is substantially this: we are not able to originate a plan of salvation for ourselves,

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\* Works of Dugald Stewart, vol. VI., p. 279.

but God has done it for us. Yet Dr. Emmons cites this passage as if it were a strict demonstration that the divine will is the efficient cause of all human actions.

Take one example more. Men "cannot originate a single thought, affection, or volition, independently of a divine influence upon their minds. They are always under a moral necessity of acting just as they do act," vol. IV., p. 397. That is, their moral actions are caused to be just what they are by divine efficiency. And what is the proof from Scripture? "The way of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh, to direct his steps." What is this but applying the metaphorical language of ecstatic devotion, as if it were a scientific axiom? What but wresting an impassioned ejaculation to the purposes of logic? This is transgressing the plainest laws both of interpretation and of reasoning. "Nothing is more usual for fervent devotion," says Sir James Mackintosh, "than to dwell so long and so warmly on the meanness and worthlessness of created things, and on the all-sufficiency of the Supreme Being, that it slides insensibly from comparative to absolute language, and in the eagerness of its zeal to magnify the Deity, seems to annihilate every thing else." The truth is, Dr. Emmons, finding that the Scriptures do, in some sense, ascribe human actions to God, supposes that this can be done only on the ground that he is their efficient producer; and then summons numerous passages to attest the truth of this hypothesis. We have endeavored to give a fair specimen of his biblical argumentation for the theory in question. In every part of it, he has certainly violated a principle now generally admitted, that the Bible, not being a manual of philosophy, is not to be used as such. And if it were, in what instance has he shown, by the exposition of any text, that it communicates the notion of his theory? What more is it possible to show, than that the Bible ascribes the actions of men to God, as the Being under whose moral government and sustaining power they take place? We cannot but ask, also, in this connexion, What if an avowed *pantheist* should argue from the Bible as Dr. Emmons has done? Let him found his doctrine on such texts as these: "In him we live and move and have our being." "We are not sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God." "It is not in man that walketh, to direct his steps." "There is no power but of God." "There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in

all." If these passages should be adduced as valid arguments for pantheism, what reply could be made, but that which we make to the arguments of Dr. Emmons, viz., that the Bible was not designed, and does not claim, to instruct men in any department of philosophy. And if it did, any metaphysical systems framed upon its unexamined declarations, however symmetrical or well compacted their parts, are liable, unless they can stand upon their own grounds, as matters of pure science, to crumble at the slightest touch of the philologist's wand.

2. Let us examine *the main arguments from reason*, in support of the theory. One of them is the following: "Since mind cannot act, any more than matter can move, without a divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will, to act, or not to act, independently of a divine influence. There must be, therefore, the exercise of divine agency in every human action, without which, it is impossible to conceive that God should govern moral agents, and make mankind act in perfect conformity to his designs," vol. IV., p. 372. This may be properly called the argument from *moral government*; though it has an antecedent premise, viz., that no principle of efficiency is to be predicated of mind, which cannot be of matter. This is the preliminary axiom or postulatum of all Dr. Emmons's philosophy of agency. The necessary consequences of this position will be stated in their proper place. It may be sufficient here to remark respecting it, that it is a naked hypothesis, a mere dictum without a single word of proof; that it is almost universally not granted; that it assumes analogies between matter and mind which have never been discovered, and leaves out of view capital points of difference which are universally admitted; and that by allowing no principle of causation in mind, which it denies in matter, it renders inadmissible the idea of any principle of *freedom* in mind, which there is not in matter. This was clearly seen by Dr. Emmons himself; nay, his own inference was, that it is even "absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will."

The remainder of the argument contains this enthymeme: God governs moral agents. But this he cannot do without being the efficient producer of all their moral actions. The premise is not denied. But the conclusion supposes that a creature's power to cause his own acts, must be an ungovernable power; as if there were no medium between such power as would make

him omnipotent, and no power at all; whereas the idea of power, as asserted for him by those who deny that he is under a necessity of acting just as he does act, is, that although he is the efficient cause of his own moral actions, yet his causative power is limited both in degree and in the sphere of its operation, and of course never uncontrollable by infinite power. The fallacy of the reasoning, then, as it respects man, lies in the assumption, that efficient power must be absolutely unmanageable power, though derived from God, sustained by him, and subject to him, because circumscribed in every sense that is compatible with free agency. The fallacy of the argument, as it respects God, lies in assuming what he has nowhere revealed, viz., the *precise mode* of his moral government. It lies in the postulate, that there is no possible way in which he can govern moral agents, without producing their volitions by his own creative will. Why not as well assume the exact mode of his existence, and of all his attributes?

The reasoning is also objectionable, because, though it was intended to illustrate the divine glory, it virtually derogates from it, by limiting the divine operations. For if God can govern mind only by the law of necessity, as he governs matter, he must not create minds above the level of matter, with respect to efficiency. If he can govern moral agents only as he does physical agents, which uniformly operate *just as he would have them*, he must not give moral agents power to operate as he would *not* have them. He must not create *efficient* beings, that is, beings in his own image; for he cannot control them. Every one should regard the *fact* of the divine government, with true faith and deep reverence, and be content, without knowing all the secrets of its *mode*. No one should presume that God cannot maintain it but by dint of irresistible efficiency. Let us not limit the Almighty to the creation of *inefficient* beings, lest he should not be able to govern any other. Let us not narrow the bounds of the Infinite One; but rather cherish the sentiment of the prophet in that rebuking question, "Is the Spirit of the Lord straitened?" May not the Omnipotent Spirit be competent to control the spirits he has created, in some way not by us metaphysically definable? Need we tremble, lest his government should not be strong enough, unless conceived of under some type of mechanical force? Why should we be afraid to trust God in the dark, or be shy of the movements of his providence, unless we can quite unravel all its complexity, and



unfold all its mystery, so as to tell the world exactly *in what manner* he touches the springs ?

Analogous to the argument already noticed, is that which may be called the argument from *divine purposes*, and *fore-knowledge of their accomplishment*. "Though God knows that mankind have natural power to act contrary to his designs, yet he knows that he is able to make them willing to fulfil his purposes, and that he has determined to make them willing ; and hence he knows that they always will fulfil his purposes," vol. IV., p. 305. We remind the reader, that by men's natural power, Dr. Emmons means power to do a thing, when there is created in them a volition to do it ; and that by making them willing, he means "producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts." "He is now exercising his powerful and irresistible agency upon the heart of every one of the human race, and producing either holy or unholy exercises in it," vol. IV., p. 388. "Nor has he ever failed to make his creatures do what he saw necessary for them to do, in order to fulfil his purposes, vol. IV., p. 387. The argument implied in these passages, is this : God knows of a certainty, that all his purposes will be accomplished ; but this he could not know without producing all human volitions by an "irresistible agency upon the heart." The premise involves two propositions, viz., God's purposes will be accomplished ; and he certainly knows they will. They are both admitted. But does either of them justify Dr. Emmons's conclusion ?

One part of the argument is : the purposes of God will be fulfilled ; but cannot be, unless he fulfils them by creating in the hearts of men all their volitions. Does not this take for granted the very point to be proved, viz., that it is not one of the purposes of God, that moral agents shall efficiently cause their own acts ? If, as most men believe, this *is* one of his purposes, then, surely, the execution of his purposes does not require, but forbids, that *he* should be the efficient cause of their acts. To assume without proof, that this is *not* one of his purposes, is no better for the argument than a *petitio principii*.

The other part of the argument is : God certainly knows that his purposes will be effected ; but could not know this, without efficiently producing all the creature's volitions. And why not know it ? Because, says the philosophy of Dr. Emmons's time, the creature's acts would be contingent in such a sense as not to be foreknowable, for want of connection with cause.

But this is the proper consequence of his own dictum, that "mind cannot act, any more than matter can move, without a divine agency;" and is by no means chargeable upon those who assert that the mind is itself the efficient cause of its own acts. Instead of implying that moral acts are without a cause, they expressly affirm that the moral agent himself is their cause. Their idea of contingency respecting moral acts, is in no sense opposed to the idea of cause, but implies it, and is opposed only to the idea of necessity. They believe that while the falling of a stone, or the decay of vegetation, is the effect of a *necessitated* cause, every human volition is the effect of a *free* cause, that is, the free mind. By a *necessitated* cause, they mean such an one, that, when the conditions of its acting are fulfilled, it would be a contradiction to suppose it not to act, or to act otherwise than it does act. By a *free* cause, they mean such an one, that, though the conditions of its acting be supplied, yet, whether it acts, in *any given case*, or in what way it acts, is determined by itself alone. Such a cause, they believe, is the mind of every moral agent. Thus they assign a cause and a well-known cause for every moral act; and their theory never implies that such an act is contingent in the sense that it may or may not take place, as it may or may not have a cause, but that it may or may not take place, simply in respect to its being produced by a *free* cause.

Suppose moral actions contingent in the sense now explained, and where is the ground for saying that they cannot be foreknown for want of connection with cause? The very opposite is demonstrable. For the *existence* of their cause, that is, of the moral agent, may be as well foreknown to God as that of any other cause, or as his own act in creating their cause. The *nature* of their cause, too, and its relation to its effects, may be as well foreknown as those of any other cause, for it is constituted by the same omniscient mind. If, then, future events in the physical world, are certain to God through their connection with cause, who shall say that human volitions are not certain to him through a medium of the same kind? Why should we imagine that things equally conceivable by us, are not equally intelligible to God? Whoever desires to see that human actions, on the supposition that man and not God is their efficient producer, have a manifest connection with cause, and thus to see that there is *evidence* by which God may foreknow such actions, may see it in abundance.

But it is an assumption, and a strange one, that God needs *evidence*, in order to be certain of the accomplishment of his purposes. To us, it is true, many things are known only through the medium of proof; yet some things are known intuitively even by us. And if our faculty of intelligence were not limited, we do not know that any part of our knowledge would depend on evidence. How, then, can the Infinite Intelligence be thus dependent? What is evidence, what can it be, to a mind that can be conceived of only as knowing all things *without* evidence? What is omniscience, but knowing all things intuitively? Unless we can precisely ascertain the modes and limits of this attribute, it must always be an error to infer *necessity* from *certainly*. It assumes that the Omniscient Jehovah holds much the same relation to future events as we, and obtains his knowledge of them by tracing their logical connections, which he himself has established! We might as well agree with Leibnitz, in supposing that all events and all truths being mathematically linked together, the Deity, in order to know them, is eternally working out the geometrical problem, to wit: the state of one particle being given, to determine the past, present, and future state of the whole universe! This is as good logic as is compatible with a philosophy, which confounds one idea of *certainly*, as implying the divine perception of events, with another, as predicating the absolute futurity of events; which postulates that there can be no causal efficiency of the creature without *uncertainty* to the Creator, and thus involves the conclusion that there can be no *certainly* to the Creator, any further than there is *necessity* to the creature.

3. There remains to be examined the argument from the *creature's dependence*. "Many imagine that their free agency consists in a power to cause or originate their own voluntary exercises; but this would imply that they are independent of God," vol. IV., p. 384. "Since men are the creatures of God, they are necessarily his dependent creatures, who can act only as they are acted upon by a divine controlling influence," vol. IV., p. 397. Since all men are dependent agents, all their motions, exercises, or actions, must originate from a divine efficiency," vol. IV., p. 366. In order to try this argument, it is only necessary to ascertain whether it implies a true definition of the word *dependent*. By man's dependence, is commonly understood his condition, as being sustained with all his susceptibilities and faculties by divine power. In this sense, doubtless,

he is constantly and entirely dependent. But according to Dr. Emmons's axiom, that mind has no higher principle of causality than matter, man's dependence implies not only that all his faculties, but that "all his motions, exercises or actions" are to be referred to God, as their immediate cause; that God "exerts his agency in producing" man's moral actions, "as constantly and fully as in preserving and supporting his existence;" and therefore that man is dependent for his volitions in the same sense as for the pulsations of his heart. Power to originate his moral actions, would make him absolutely independent, and take him out of the hands of his Maker. With such a construction of dependence, Dr. Emmons's theory is made out without even the form of an argument. His premise is, "men are dependent agents." We admit his language, in its common acceptation, but dispute his definition of it. It is true, we are dependent for all the gifts of God; but the question is, What are his gifts? It is true, we have nothing but what we have received; but the question is, What have we received? It is a question of facts, to be answered by an appeal to facts, not by hypothesis. Have we received the power of originating our own volitions? Dr. Emmons says, no; but that *without* such power, we are dependent for the creation of them by divine power. Thus, in his premise or definition of dependence, he assumes the very doctrine to be verified. His reasoning begs the question; and this of itself proves its invalidity.

Moreover, by assuming that a dependent moral agent cannot be the cause of his own acts, does he not annihilate the very idea of moral agency? Is a moral act conceivable on the supposition, that not the agent whose act it is, but another agent is the efficient cause of it? Could Dr. Emmons reconcile his view of dependence with responsibility? He attempted to do it by saying that dependence and activity "fall under the notice of distinct faculties of the mind. Dependence falls under the cognizance of reason; but activity falls under the cognizance of common sense," vol. IV., p. 348. But how does this reconcile them? What matters it, if the *two* ideas do "fall under the notice of distinct faculties of the mind"? The question of their consistency, is but *one* idea. Is the mind divided so as to give contrary verdicts respecting a single point? If, in the judgment of "common sense," man's activity implies any thing contradistinct from passivity, it implies that he has efficient power to act, or to cause his own acts; and if, as Dr. Emmons

supposes, it be the decision of "reason," that "dependent agents" have no such power, then, from "distinct faculties of the mind," we have contradictory affirmations. Either the common idea of activity and responsibility, or else his peculiar philosophy of dependence, must be set aside. It is nothing strange that the incompatibility between these doctrines, should have been regarded by many as the Gordian knot in theology. Dependence, if defined so as to exclude an essential element of personal agency, cannot possibly be consistent with accountability. To the question, *for what* is man morally dependent, Dr. Emmons could only reply, for all his moral actions. By supposing man dependent for the causation of his acts by a power not his own, he asserts dependence in a sense which most divines deny. By denying that man has causative power, he, of course, as we cannot be dependent for what we do not possess, denies dependence in one important sphere where most divines affirm it. By his very attempt to conceive of it as unlimited, he necessarily limits it even more than those whom he charges with making man independent.

We know not that Dr. Emmons has anywhere defined the moral agent's activity, or how he could define it. For if he should say it consists in moral exercises produced in us by a power foreign to ourselves, then, as we are dependent for these, he would make dependence and activity occupy an identical sphere, in the sense that we are dependent in that very particular in which we are active, and active in that very particular in which we are dependent. If he should take the only other possible view, and say our activity consists in producing moral acts by the exercise of our own efficient power, this would subvert his theory of divine efficiency. The truth is, his philosophy of dependence is utterly repugnant to any idea of a moral activity. For such an activity cannot be conceived of, but as implying the exercise of the moral agent's power to determine his own acts. If, however, we suppose that dependence and activity do not exactly occupy the same sphere—that in the sphere of dependence, is the existence and continual support of the moral agent's power to act, and that in the sphere of activity is the *exertion* of power, does the least inconsistency between dependence and activity any longer appear? In suggesting this view, the consideration of motives and the influence of the Holy Spirit is regarded as irrelevant to the question. The question is, whether we are dependent for the exertion of power, viewed

strictly as such. If, as Dr. Emmons thinks, we are as fully dependent for this as for the support of our existence, then whose is the exertion? If man's, whose is the power exerted? Abraham, at the divine command, "stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slay his son." If, in doing this, he exerted a power of determining his choice, whose power? If he did not exert such a power, and that his own, whose was the choice? What was his activity more than a muscular activity? Any philosophy of dependence which teacheth us falsely what is the agency of man, cannot teach us truly what is the agency of God.

We have now examined, as far as our limits permit, the main arguments for the theory in question. Whether it is vindicated by such arguments, is for the reader to decide. The remaining inquiry is:

## II. *What are the unavoidable consequences of the theory?*

1. If the theory be true, *the will of God is opposed to his will, or his agency to his law.* "It always was, and is, and will be, his secret will, that all things shall take place, which he sees will best promote his own glory and the highest good of the universe, whether they are good or evil, right or wrong, in their own nature," vol. IV., p. 287. Dr. Emmons, anticipating the objection, that upon his theory God's executive will or agency violates his promulgated laws, attempted to obviate it by saying: "God's secret will respects one thing, but his revealed will respects another. His secret will respects nothing but the existence or taking place of things; but his revealed will respects the nature or moral quality of the things that take place." "Holiness is one thing, and the taking place of holiness is another; and sin is one thing, and the taking place of sin is another," vol. IV., p. 292. This is the only defence which is attempted; and unless this analysis be true in the sense intended by Dr. Emmons, and in the only sense which is pertinent to the objection, that is, unless "sin" and "the taking place of sin" are things which have different relations to a moral agent or to a moral standard, the objection is valid by Dr. Emmons's own admission; for he says, "if the secret and revealed will of God respected the same objects, it is granted they would be inconsistent," vol. IV., p. 292.

We do indeed conceive of a material substance, as not being identical with its properties; but we do not and cannot conceive of it as a different object in relation to its Creator. So we con-

ceive of a moral act and its quality as in some sense distinct, that is, we mentally discriminate between the *fact* of an act and its *nature*. But we cannot conceive of them as different things in such a sense that one may exist without the other, or that God may be the efficient producer of the one and not of the other. They are not separable objects, nor can they have different relations to their cause. If the nature of a moral act is wanting, the act is wanting, and *vice versa*. A malicious blow of the hand is a moral act. But a blow of the same hand under the influence of a galvanic battery, is simply a physical phenomenon. Nothing is plainer than that a moral act and its quality are inseparably existent. Now the question before us, is, Can God openly forbid the one and secretly will the other, and yet his will not oppose his will; or can he prohibit the one and efficiently cause the other, and yet his agency not counteract his law? Dr. Emmons says, yes; because "sin is one thing, and the taking place of sin is another." Is this a true answer? If "sin is one thing and the taking place of sin is another," in such a sense that God may interdict the former, while, as the theory affirms, he secretly wills and efficiently produces the latter, and yet his will not oppose his will, or his agency counteract his law, then it is certain that there may be "the existence" or "taking place of sin" without sin; that *an act of sin may exist, and the sin of the act not exist*; or that there may be *sinning* without *sin*. But this contradicts not only Dr. Emmons's own definition of sin, as consisting in "sinning," but reason itself. The truth is, the sinful quality of an act is an inherent quality, and can be conceived of only as inseparable from the act; nay, as being that in which the act truly consists. Yet the theory supposes that God creates the act, while he prohibits the sinful quality of it; that by his "irresistible agency upon the heart," he produces, for example, a man's volition to poison his neighbor, and thus necessitates "the existence" or "taking place" of a sin, while his law is thundering against that "sin." If this is true, and yet God's agency does not violate his law, it must be that an evil moral act may come to pass without its evil nature; or that a sinful act is one thing and that in which the act consists another thing. "Sin is one thing;" and it is a thing against which "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven." But it is a thing either taking place or not. If the latter, it is nothing. If the former, it is sin taking place, or "the taking place of sin." "Sin," therefore, and "the taking

place of sin," are one and the same thing with respect to the actor or to any moral criterion. They cannot have different relations to man, as a moral agent, to law, as his rule of action, or to God, as his judge. And if God be the efficient cause of "the existence" or "taking place of sin," he is the efficient cause of "sin." His agency contravenes his statutes and commands.

2. If the theory be true, then, supposing a moral system, *utility, in opposition to right, predominates in that system.* Excluding the idea of man's efficiency, and asserting that all his volitions are the effects of an immediate divine efficiency, Dr. Emmons could not but view sin as the necessary product of infinite wisdom and goodness. Having assumed that God creates all sin, he could not justify the divine character without taking the ground, as he boldly does, that whatever sin exists, is an indispensable coefficient in effecting the highest good; and is better than holiness would be in its place. "He must form light and create darkness, make peace and *create evil*, when and where, and to what degree the good of the universe requires," vol. IV., p. 383. The theory fully coincides with the scheme of optimism proposed by Leibnitz, that God gives to men just those volitions which the Destinies require in the best of all possible worlds. It is a theory that compels us either to admit, that so far as sin exists, God prefers it to holiness even in *itself considered*, or else to believe that holiness, beyond a certain degree, is incompatible with the greatest good. For if God does not so prefer sin, it is because it is not right. Why, then, does he create it, except that, though it be wrong, holiness in its place would contravene the highest utility? Granting the theory, we cannot escape this dilemma. Right, beyond certain limits, is in its nature displeasing to God, or else it is opposed to the highest good. Dr. Emmons grasped the latter horn. He made right give way, that utility might have free course. And if, upon his theory, there can be a moral system, and any one solution of it less impeaches the divine character than another, it is the utilitarian solution; viz., that whatever sin there is, is the *sine qua non* of the best conceivable results,—the very thing without which, God would be divested of his glory and his counsels defeated; that he reserves all efficiency to himself, lest one right choice more, or one wrong choice less, than he sees to be beneficial, should mar the system and lessen the sum total of utility. Must we then receive a theory which is not only without valid



proof, but which implies that universal rectitude is incompatible with the largest enjoyment, and that God himself is under an invincible necessity of infringing the one or the other? A theory which tells us, the more sin the better as far as to the limit of all there is; that if all were right, all could not be for the best; and that obedience to God's commands, beyond a certain measure, must be an expense to his glory and rob the universe of its highest good? How can we hearken to a doctrine which forces us to believe with Bentham and Paley, that the principle of right cannot reign in the divine government; but that a nice calculation, by which the gain or loss of right and wrong may be found and accurately summed up into a net result, must form the basis of a perfect moral system!

3. Another consequence of the theory is *pantheism*.

In the first place, it is incompatible with the idea that the creature is a *personal agent*. Dr. Emmons doubtless had this idea, for every man has it; but he had it as a contraband article. His theory begins with the assumption, that mind has of itself no power to act more than matter has to move; that a dependent moral agent can no more form his own choices than a tree can evolve its buds, or determine the color of its blossoms. If this must be granted, and if the common idea of a personal agent, as having power to determine his own acts, be the true one, it follows that personal agency is not predicable of the human mind any more than of material masses. The theory implies that the mind is a mere series of exercises; and this Dr. Emmons did not deny, and could not, without violating the canons of his philosophy. He held it as his first axiom, that the human soul is not the determiner of its own moral acts; but that their proximate and efficient cause is God. Antecedent to the soul's moral acts, therefore, nothing can be found as a constituent of the soul. The immediate sequences of the soul's acts are physical phenomena, which, though signs of the soul's presence and agency, are no part of the soul. Thus we are shut up to the belief which Dr. Emmons did not disavow, that a mere series of exercises is all that constitutes the soul. The man is nothing but what we call his exercises, in creating which, God creates the man himself. This makes any rational conception of the soul, as a personal agent, logically impossible. It excludes a necessary element of personality, viz., the person's own power to determine his own acts. Man is not a *doer* of his moral acts any more than of his breathing. To call him an

agent, therefore, does not raise him to a level with what we call physical agents, if we suppose them to be the efficient causes of the phenomena which we refer to them. Much less does it raise him to the dignity of intentional and personal agency.

Besides, the soul being a mere series of exercises, as it must be if the idea of efficient power is excluded, we are chargeable with absurdity whenever, adhering to the theory, we use language intending to imply that the soul is a personal or moral agent. For, suppose we say the soul *acts freely* in view of motives. Is it an *agent* that thus acts? No, it is a mere series of exercises. Can we any better say the soul *has* moral exercises? What is the soul? A mere series of exercises. Let us say the soul *wills* or *chooses*. *Who* wills or chooses? A series of exercises. Shall we say the soul does just as it pleases? It is to say a series of exercises does as it pleases. We say the soul *acts voluntarily*. Do we mean that some *person* thus acts? No; but a series of exercises. Suppose we say the soul *ought* to do right. But who is it that is under such obligation? A succession of exercises. We may venture to say the soul *is conscious* of wrong moral exercises. Of whom is conscience thus predicated? Of a series of exercises. Shall we say the soul is responsible for its exercises? It is itself exercises. Therefore exercises are responsible for exercises. In short, if the theory be true, all the current phrases, man wills, chooses, is-free, acts voluntarily, is accountable, and the like, are altogether fallacious and must be discarded. Indeed, not only all forms of speech, but all forms of thought, which seem to imply that man is a personal agent, plunge us into manifest absurdity. The theory puts an end to the creature as a personal agent.

In the next place, it follows from one principle of the theory, that God is the universal and only agent, but, as will be shown from another principle of the same, not a *personal* agent. The theory admits no principle of efficiency but the might of the Creator's will. It affirms that cause or power is everywhere the same in kind, and is literally nothing else than a divine volition. This is the all-pervading energy which originates, causes, determines, and which, of course, effects or does every thing. All the phenomena in the universe, human choices not excepted, are produced by the immediate creative acts of God. All the actions of men are "God's conduct," as Dr. Emmons very consistently names them. Between God and the remotest events,

there is, by the theory, no conceivable place or room for an agent acting by his own efficiency. God, therefore, is the sole agent, the universal and all-efficient *doer* of all things. What we call the creature's agency, is but a portion or phenomenon of divine agency sent along in certain channels of operation, as heat and electricity are diffused in their courses to effect their destined results. Man's actions, so called, not less than the functions of animal life, or the motions of fluids, are the effects of instant divine volition, and are no less divine than any other agency. Thus, God is the sum total of all causality, or of all spirit that has efficient power. God is all this, and all this is God. And what is this but pantheism? It may be equally sublime with the doctrine of Heraclitus, that God is a most subtle, swift, and fiery substance, permeating and quickening the universe, and producing every thing by a fatal necessity. It may imply a system not less compact and energetic than that of the Stoics, who believed that God is the *anima mundi*. It may be even more scientific than the notion of the ancient Egyptians, who imagined God to be all that was and is and shall be, except the visible and outward, his *veil*. But it is as really pantheism, and much the same in form, as the theodicy of the old Greek pagans whom Plutarch condemns, because they "*resolved all into divine cause, as it were swallowing up all into God.*"

If it be asked, what is the characteristic of the pantheism now charged upon the theory, we answer, it is a pantheism incompatible with the idea of a *personal* Deity. This may be confirmed by principles commonly admitted, and by the premises of the theory itself. It is an established principle, that a distinct idea of personal agency is afforded us only by the operations of our own minds. The only true conception, therefore, which we can form of the Deity, as a personal agent, must be from a consciousness or conviction of what *we* are, as personal agents. This is corroborated by Dr. Emmons himself, affirming that man "bears the natural image of his Maker in the very frame and constitution of his nature," vol. II., p. 24.; that "we derive all our ideas of God from our ideas of ourselves;" and that it is even "absurd to say that God's agency is different in nature from our own," vol. IV., p. 381. But by the theory, it is no part of our agency, to cause, originate, or determine our own volitions. We can, consequently, have no true consciousness or conviction that we ever do this; and there-

fore we have no right to the idea that God ever causes, originates, or determines his volitions. As we have no power to such an effect, and as it is "absurd to say that God's agency is different in nature from our own," God has no power to such an effect. But who can conceive, that, without such power, he is a personal agent? By the theory, too, as has been proved, the soul or the agent, man, is a mere series of exercises; and since God's agency is of the same nature as man's, it follows inevitably, that God, as an agent, is a mere series of exercises, that is, no personal agent whatever. Admitting the theory, we know of nothing that can be called a personal Creator or God, but an eternal process of operations without any assignable first cause.

We unavoidably come to the same conclusion, if we take as a premise, a single position of Dr. Emmons; viz., that mind cannot act, except as it is acted upon by an efficient cause without itself, any more than matter can move, except as it is moved by a force *ab extra*. From this it plainly follows, that as matter cannot of itself be a first mover, mind cannot of itself be a first cause or agent. For it is an unquestionable axiom, that matter cannot move itself, and therefore the series of its motions must be infinite or without a first mover, unless it be mind; so, *if* it be an indisputable axiom, that mind can act only as it is made to act by an efficient cause from without, then the series of its acts must be infinite, that is, without a first mover, or first cause. For the premise is not less applicable to the divine mind than to the human, made like the divine, says Dr. Emmons, "in the very frame and constitution of its nature." Thus it can be strictly demonstrated, that the idea of mind necessarily implies the idea of efficient cause; and that, to refer the acts of mind to an efficient cause foreign to itself, is, by certain consequence, to expel from the universe the idea of mind as a *first cause*. That the universe, consisting of substance and attributes, is God, was the doctrine of Spinoza. That the universe, made up of necessitated agency and its effects, is God, is a necessary consequence of the theory of Dr. Emmons. It is a theory which annihilates the idea of personality, and thus ends in theoretical atheism. It well exemplifies a saying of the celebrated Dr. Clarke, that "believing too much and too little, have commonly the luck to meet together, like two things moving contrary ways in the same circle." It disastrously defeats the pious design from which it sprung. And of its author, great and good as he was, may we not say, without any breach

of charity, what Cicero said of Epicurus : *verbis reliquit deum, re sustulit?*

4. A fourth consequence of the theory is *fatalism*. This consequence is, indeed, essentially involved in the preceding, but claims a distinct consideration. The theory denies that men have "a power to cause or originate their own voluntary exercises," vol. IV., p. 384. Upon Dr. Emmons's own construction, it denies the common idea of freedom. "Since mind cannot act, any more than matter can move, without a divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will," vol. IV., p. 372. He had too clear an eye not to see, that, if we admit no *efficiency* of mind, which we deny of matter, we must affirm no *freedom* of mind, which we cannot of matter. If any known analogy, or law of reason, requires us to deny of spirit every principle of causation which we deny of matter, then, if philosophy decides that the notions of matter are absolutely necessitated, she must decide that the actions of mind are absolutely necessitated. She must comprise both in the *same* mechanism of cause and effect, whatever it may be. If we concede to the fatalist, that mind and matter are on the same level with respect to efficiency, we meet him on the very ground where he will infallibly triumph. The question of freedom or fatalism, turns wholly upon the point, whether men have the power of a contrary choice,—a power, when they choose the wrong, to choose the right instead of the wrong. But the theory affirms that they are not "capable of guiding their own motions, or directing their own actions," vol. IV., p. 383, and that there is "no possible way in which God can dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts," vol. IV., p. 371. These propositions both plainly imply that men do not determine their own choices, and of course, that they have not the power of a contrary choice, and therefore that they have not power to act otherwise than they do act. Here we have an absolute negation of freedom relatively to man ; and this is fatalism.

Besides, since it is the first principle of the theory, that mind cannot originate its own acts any more than matter can its own motions, and since man is like God "in the very frame and constitution of his nature," so that it is "absurd to say that God's agency is different in nature from our own," therefore all the actions of mind, those of the Deity not excepted, are, not less than the motions of matter, under an absolute necessity and uni-

versal fatalism. There is no alternative, but to reject the theory or abide this conclusion.

But let us regard attentively what is alleged in the theory's defence. Dr. Emmons himself infers that, "if men always act under a divine operation, then they always act of *necessity*," vol. IV., p. 351. He pleads, however, in vindication of their freedom, that they act only under "a moral necessity of acting just as they do act." But we know not that he attempts to prove any material difference between this and *natural* necessity. It is demonstrable, that the two necessities do not differ in any sense applicable to the question of free agency. A human volition is said to take place by a *moral*, and the springing of a plant by a *natural*, necessity. Where is the ground of this distinction of names? Certainly not in the causes of the two phenomena. For it must be allowed that all causes are alike, in the essential respect, that they all necessitate their effects. Both causes do this in the cases before us; and this shows the connexion of cause and effect in the one case, to be identical with that in the other. Of that connexion, therefore, two different necessities cannot be predicated. But of the *effects* or terms connected, one only is of a moral nature; and here is found the whole reason of the epithet *moral*, as applied to necessity. The word *necessity*, characterizes only the connexion of cause and effect. The words *natural* and *moral*, characterize only the terms connected. Indeed, it is conceded by necessitarians themselves, that the two necessities agree as to the nature of that connexion. This completely identifies them in every respect in which the word necessity has any proper meaning. To say, then, that men are "under a moral necessity of acting just as they do act," is to say that *their moral actions are of necessity just as they are*. And this is to affirm the contrary of freedom. "The only two opinions," says Dugald Stewart, "which, in the actual state of metaphysical science, ought to be stated in contrast, are that of liberty on the one side, and that of necessity on the other." Matter moves, it is said, under a *natural*, and mind acts under a *moral*, necessity. But the rigor of the *necessity* is no more mitigated by the one epithet than by the other. For all their import, when so applied, merely characterizes and distinguishes the two classes of events referred to as necessitated, while the necessities are intrinsically of one and the same kind.

Another apology for the theory as consistent with freedom, is, that it allows that men act as they choose; as if freedom lay in

*the connection of a choice with its sequent.* The answer is, that this avails nothing, if the sequent is necessitated, in every case, by the choice. To suppose that it is not, is to suppose that men may freely act contrary to choice; which is an absurdity too gross to be named. If a man wills to strike, there is no possibility of his not striking, unless prevented by a counteracting force or some physical disability. No analysis or scrutiny, however severe, can detect any thing but absolute necessity in this connexion of volition with its consequent. Where, then, is man's freedom? He is not free in *willing*, for every volition is created in him by an act of God. He is not free in *doing* what is willed, because he cannot forbear to do it. In what, according to the theory, is he more free than if subject to immovable fate? It may be said, Dr. Emmons taught that men have *natural power* to do otherwise than they do. He did so; but we cannot much rejoice in this fact, since he could give no definition of that power, which helps us to the idea of freedom. He could not say it is a power to cause or originate our volitions, for this he expressly denies. Such a power, he affirms, would make us independent of God, able to thwart his purposes, and to overturn his government. We ask, what is this natural power? Is it the same that is called, in current phrase, *the power of choice*? What, then, is the power of choice? Not a power that produces choices; for they are all produced, says the theory, by an "irresistible agency upon the heart." It is not a power *antecedent* to acts of choice, for all power there, says the theory, is the power of God. Is it a power lying *in* the choice itself, a power of determining its consequent to be otherwise than it is? No; such an absurdity would be universally rejected. Is this power some susceptibility of the mind, by reason of which, at a certain crisis of inclination or motives, choices are produced by divine causation? If such a power would make us free, then is a fulminating mixture free, because susceptible of explosion at a certain temperature, or under a certain pressure. Is this natural power, which is all that Dr. Emmons claims as the basis of freedom, a power of *acting*, in any particular, otherwise than we do act? No; for, by the theory, there is nothing in the whole sphere of man's agency, but willing, and doing what he wills; and this *doing* is, by common consent, necessitated by the willing, and the *willing*, says the theory, is produced by God's immediate power. To the question, then, what is this natural power,

which is said to be all that is requisite to save us from fatalism, we find in the philosophy of Dr. Emmons only this answer, that it is a power *to do what we will*. To affirm this power, is merely to affirm that the appointed sequent of every volition, is necessitated by its connexion with the volition; or that, when an executive act of the mind takes place, the act, which it executes, of necessity takes place. In this infallible certainty, lies all the freedom which modern necessitarians suppose to be conceivable. Volitions, says the theory, are produced by an immediate act of God; and yet man is free, because their necessary sequences never fail! The idea of power to choose or will otherwise, the theory utterly denies; and yet the man is free, because he has power to do what he wills! But has he power *not* to do it? No more than the rock dislodged from a precipice, has power to ascend or remain at rest in the middle air. We ask again, what actual power of man does the theory allow? None which does not vanish in being defined. None that would avail to lift a feather, though the life of millions should depend upon the act, unless the volition to do it were created by divine efficiency. Admitting such a theory, we are unable to believe that human actions are not as rigorously fated as it is possible to imagine that any thing can be.

Dr. Emmons attempts to rebut the charge of fatalism, by reiterating that human actions are *voluntary*. But the argument is futile, unless, by his theory, the word has some import that allows the conception of freedom. What is a voluntary act, when interpreted by the theory? If it be replied, an act of the will, what then is the will? Dr. Emmons says, "It never properly means a principle, or power, or faculty of the mind; but only choice, action, or volition."\* According to this, a voluntary act is an act of choice or volition. This must mean either the volition itself, or its consequent. If the former, then a voluntary act is a volition produced by an "irresistible agency upon the heart;" and where or what is the idea of its voluntariness? But if by an act of volition be meant the *consequent* of volition, then a voluntary act is any physical phenomenon that is necessitated by its immediate connection with a volition; and we search in vain for any idea of voluntariness that does not extinguish all conception of freedom. To affix the word volun-

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\* Christian Magazine, vol. I., p. 148.



tary to human actions, and thence to infer that men act freely, is not to prove that freedom survives, but merely to ring changes on the counterfeit terms of it. No doubt our actions are *voluntary*, but give the word any meaning compatible with freedom, and you sever the roots of the theory at a single blow.

But, says Dr. Emmons, "God has made men capable of acting freely and voluntarily under his irresistible influence," vol. IV., p. 399. "His acting on their hearts, and producing all their free, voluntary, moral exercises, necessarily makes them moral agents," vol. IV., p. 385. It "lays them under an absolute necessity of acting freely," vol. IV., p. 351. Here we have the most compact of all Dr. Emmons's theological "*joints*." In these asseverations, is the concentrated proof and defence, yea, the very rampart of the theory. Let the reader observe, however, that the question is not, whether God's creating free agents, necessarily makes them free agents. This is never disputed, and is not what Dr. Emmons means. The question is, *whether God's creating the actions of men, necessitates those actions.* To aver the negative, is the chief exploit of the theory. The whole of it consists in the bold assumption, that our actions may be free, though literally created, as much as we ourselves are, by an act of God. The very daringness of this postulate may have prevented many from seeing the fallacy that lurks under the virtual contradiction in its terms. But upon close inspection, it is evident, that to suppose God creates volitions in which man is free, is to suppose that, relatively to man, they cannot but exist, and yet may not exist; that God necessitates that, which, by common consent, it is a contradiction to suppose necessitated. It is impossible to impart sufficient firmness to "*joints*" of this kind. Freedom and necessity cannot be predicated of one and the same act. Things utterly opposite and mutually repellent, can never be made to coalesce.

Some suppose that Dr. Emmons's definition of divine agency, as consisting *merely in volition*, redeems the theory from fatalism. Cannot man act freely, they ask, when all that God does, is merely to *choose* or *will* that he shall act just as he does act? As if this would not

"—— Touch with lightest moment of impulse  
His free will, to her own inclining left  
In even scale."

We reply, that, according to the philosophy of Dr. Emmons,

the only creative energy is a divine *volition* ; that *that* is always creative ; and that, as God merely wills man's actions, so he merely wills his existence. If, therefore, by merely willing *him*, God necessitates his existence, by merely willing his *actions*, he necessitates their existence. And yet men act freely, it is said, because, in making them act just as they do act, God merely wills that they so act ! What more has he done in causing any thing to be as it is ? When he said, " Let there be light, and there was light," it was a mere volition that light should be. Are human actions free, because, in creating them, God merely wills them to be as they are ? He does no more in creating any thing that is *not* free. If, adhering to the theory, according to which the divine volition is in all cases alike creative, we say God wills that men shall act just as they do act, and yet *freely*, it is clear, that we use the word in no other sense than when we say matter *moves freely*. By the theory, the stone's fall and the assassin's blow are alike efficiently caused by a divine volition. The inevitable conclusion is, that, as there is only one sense in which the stone falls freely, that is, without external impediment, in this sense only the assassin strikes freely ; and no human act is free, except in the sense in which all things else are free.

5. It follows from the theory, that *there is no such thing as moral accountability or blameworthiness*. This consequence is fully implied in fatalism ; but its importance demands a separate exposition. By Dr. Emmons's own concession, all moral action consists in what he calls volitions. But the very marrow of the theory is, that God produces these same volitions by " his irresistible agency upon the heart." Therefore, as has been shown, it is essentially a theory of fatalism, and annihilates moral distinctions. Suppose, for illustration, that you intentionally thrust a dagger into your neighbor's breast. By common consent, not the visible act, but the volition by which it is necessitated, is the moral act. But whence this volition ? God creates it in you, says the theory. It is no more determined by you than any thing else which God creates. If it be in any sense *your* volition, it is in no sense blameworthy. But it is in no sense yours, except that it is a phenomenon produced in you by a divine energy. It is only by a convenient *usus loquendi*, that it is called yours ; just as respiration in you, is called yours. If, while in the presence of your neighbor, God should make your breath poisonous, and its efflux should kill him, it would be said

that your breath killed him, but you would no more be blamed, than if the lightning had killed him. So when you cause his death by a malicious blow, the volition to strike may be called yours; but God in creating that deadly volition, necessitates it as absolutely as he does the circulation of your blood. The only true verdict, therefore, must be, "*death by the visitation of God.*" There can be no greater solecism, than to suppose that any being acts under accountability in the same respect in which he acts under an absolute necessity. But the theory cannot escape the imputation of this absurdity. For it asserts that all moral action consists in *choosing* or *willing*; and yet grants no freedom but in *doing* what we choose or will. It admits that we are not directly accountable in that only particular in which it claims that we are free, namely, the *sequent* of volition. It affirms that we are directly accountable in that very particular in which it denies that we are free, namely, *volition*. How can this possibly accord with reason? Who but a pious fatalist\* can believe that we are *moral* agents in the identical particular in which he himself allows that we are not *free* agents?

No appeal to the *voluntariness* of human actions can be of any weight, since the theory utterly *vacates* the term in respect of all its meaning. He who smites you with malign intent, will be arraigned for trial. But his advocate shall plead that his assault upon you was necessitated by volition, and that the volition was necessitated by a creative act of God. Which of the links in this chain will you break by pronouncing over it the word *voluntary*? To say that the man accused was free in the visible act, is to say that he might have acted contrary to his volition; which is abhorrent to common sense. The only idea that lets in freedom anywhere into the series, is, that he had power, in the circumstances, to refrain from *willing* as he did. But this your theory denies. Whatever crimes, therefore, men may commit, you must nevertheless say of them what Dr. Emmons said of the great crime of Joseph's brethren, that "God not only prepared those persons" to commit it, "but made them" commit it; or, what he said of Pharaoh's troubling the Israelites, that "God stood by him and moved him" to do it. If you plead that men are *conscious* of freedom, and therefore responsible, and if you mean by freedom any thing more than the

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\* "Malgré ces opinions qui touchent au Matérialisme et au Fatalisme, Bonnet fut très religieux." *Cuvier*.

absence of external constraint, then you cannot wisely listen to the verdict of consciousness; for it gives the lie to your philosophy. If the theory claims responsibility on the ground that man *exercises free choice*, we ask for a definition of free choice. If you reply, it is a choice whose consequent is unobstructed, then you shift the plea, and predicate freedom, not of the choice, but of the act following, which you do not suppose to be a moral act, nor more free than any other physical phenomenon. If you say man is responsible because he chooses or wills freely, and mean to imply personal power or agency any more than when it is said,

“The river windeth at his own sweet will,”

then, though we are surprised at the concession, yet we gladly welcome you as coming out from the dismal shades of fatalism, where the glazed eye of necessity has ever been fixed upon you, into the sweet air and sunshine of liberty. Do you frankly avow the belief that *man chooses*,—that *the man himself wills*? Wonderful! We entreat you to tell us what is the thing affirmed, in saying that man wills. If you answer, he causes or originates his volitions, you will contradict the theory. If you say he does not cause or originate his volitions, what conceivable agency has he in willing? On what ground is he accountable for his volitions? What more than a figure of speech is it to say, man chooses, man wills? If now, waiving the consideration of choice and the imputation of blame where your philosophy allows no freedom, you turn to the sequent of choice and assert freedom where you impute no blame, saying the man can do what he chooses, he can do right if he will, you may thus puzzle the artless mind. Your meaning is, that the man can do right if he has a volition to do so. But this can never make him blamable, so long as no volition is, or can be, produced but by an “irresistible agency upon the heart.”

6. It follows, *that our notion of moral evil and sense of personal demerit, must be fallacious*. The theory is, that all human volitions are produced by the irresistible and immediate agency of God. To suppose, therefore, that any of them are wrong or morally evil, is a direct impeachment of Jehovah, as the author of them. For though we cling to the truth so fully revealed, so accordant with the divine perfections, and so consoling to us, that God overrules the creature’s sinful acts for good, yet the supposition, that he is the efficient agent in producing them, foils every attempt to conceive of him, as perfect in goodness

and holiness. The very idea of an act as sinful, is annihilated by the belief that God is the producer of it. To tell us, that, though God creates sin, yet he creates it for the best conceivable purpose, only doubles the absurdity. For it supposes not only that a thing essentially and utterly evil, is produced by a Being intrinsically and infinitely holy, but that the violation of pure and eternal right, is indispensable to the greatest utility; or that God must do evil, that good may come!

If it be said that *conscience* and *remorse* argue either freedom or responsibility, the answer is, that all evil volitions of which we are conscious, are produced by God's "irresistible agency upon the heart." "With such a system not the wit of man nor all the theodices ever framed by human ingenuity, before or since the attempt of the celebrated Leibnitz, can reconcile the sense of responsibility or the fact of the difference *in kind* between *regret* and *remorse*." For what should a man blame himself? Not for any *evil intention* in his volitions; for if there be any such, it is inherent in them and necessarily created with them. If ever he *means* evil, God stands by him and moves him to mean it. Call his volitions what you may, upbraid him as you may, he is not culpable for them, since God produces them and makes them what they are. The man is merely an organic body in which the Deity operates. You may pronounce sentence against him as criminal, yet he is no more so than the herb in which, it may be, poisonous juices flow. "But he is *conscious* of wrong volitions," you say. So much the more is he deceived, if your philosophy be true; and so much the harder his fate, since he has not the power of originating right volitions. He condemns himself for choosing wrong, without the power of choosing right in the place of wrong! Is this all you read in the record of man's consciousness? He is stricken by remorse for willing wrong; and the only reason he can give, is his conviction that in the same circumstances, he could have willed right. But now your philosophy comes to his relief, asseverating that he could not have willed otherwise, motives and the agency of God remaining the same. Prove to his Maker that this is true, and his Maker will absolve him from all accountability and all blame. Convince the man himself that this is true, and he will be irreprovable in his own eyes. He will know that his heart is deceitful, but not wicked; that his inborn convictions mislead him; that his conscience is fallacious; and he will no longer writhe under its retributive lash.

You will have quenched in his soul the consuming fire of remorse. You will have persuaded him that he has nothing to suffer or to fear but the allotment of inexorable Destiny.

7. Another inevitable consequence of the theory is, *that the divine commands are contrary to reason and justice.* This is so clear from what has gone before, that it hardly needs additional confirmation. The divine commands are generally regarded as in exact accordance with perfect justice and rectitude. If, indeed, they are so, and the creature is bound to obey them, it is on the ground that he is fully able to obey them. They cannot be right, relatively to him, on any other basis. No principle can be plainer, than that obligation is founded upon power to fulfil what is required, and can in no wise transcend that power. Now, no man will question that the precepts of the divine law, in their true spirit and force, are obligatory upon men with respect to their *choices* or *volitions*. In these alone, by common consent, moral action essentially consists. Any statutes or precepts, therefore, which oblige men to do right, virtually oblige them to *choose* or *will* right. But the theory is, that men have power to do right, if they will right, but not power to will otherwise than they do. And yet God never commands men to do right, *if* they will right, but always to *will* right. The theory denies that men have *moral* power to do always right. And yet no moral precept requires directly the exertion of any other power; nor by any other power is obedience possible. The theory gives us very positive assurance, that all human volitions, good and bad, are produced and made what they are by the creative agency of God. If you advocate such a theory, we inquire on what grounds you justify God's mandates to us, or his disapprobation of our actions. You will doubtless reply that we possess all the powers and faculties requisite for complete moral agency. We ask, What are these powers and faculties? You answer, reason, conscience, and *natural ability* to do our duty. But we find that you mean by this only an ability to do it, provided we will to do it. We are able to refrain from theft, if we choose to refrain; but if God creates in us the opposite choice, we are in no sense able to refrain. Yesterday, some one chose to steal, and you confidently affirm that he had not power to choose otherwise; for such a power would endanger the divine government and the happiness of the universe. His power to forbear stealing, if he had willed to forbear, renders him, you think, a fit

subject of the prohibition, "thou shalt not steal." Does God anywhere require the exercise of such a power? No. The spirit of the command is, thou shalt not *will* to steal. But you are very sure that God, by his "irresistible agency," produced in him the wicked volition to disobey. Unless, then, he had power to act contrary to choice, he had *no kind* of power to obey. And here is our reason for affirming that, upon your theory, the divine commands cannot be justified. No man has even *natural* ability to obey, when God creates in him the volition to disobey; and therefore no man can be justly condemned for disobedience. The reasoning is summarily this: no law is justifiable which the subject of it has not power to obey. The law of God requires us always to do right. But by the theory, we have not power to do right; no, not even *natural* power, in any of those cases in which God produces in us a volition to do wrong. It is therefore an unjust law. To vary the argument: God commands us always to *will* right, or to have *right volitions*. But by the theory, right volitions are beyond our reach; at least they are so, when God creates in us wrong ones. It is therefore an unrighteous command. It is harder than the tyrant's edict, that required bricks without straw. For under it, the man is to suffer the "vengeance of eternal fire" for disobeying, when to obey was absolutely out of his power.

8. If the theory be true, *all the reproofs and exhortations, which are addressed to men, are unwarrantable and absurd.* If any man deserves reprehension, it must be for his wrong volitions. But by the theory, all his volitions with all their qualities are brought into existence by the resistless and proximate efficiency of another Being. They are what they are by the sternest necessity. If you espouse such a theory, you are to be pleased with his good actions as with beautiful trees; and you are not to blame him for what you term his evil actions, any more than for a fever or a spasm. You have no right to assume the office of reprove, nor like the mild archangel to say, "the Lord rebuke thee," to any man, whatever he may have done. By every word of censure you do him a grievous wrong, if wrong be possible. If, however, he believes your philosophy, it will be for him an impenetrable shield against all "the arrows of conviction." You may chide him for pilfering; but he can plead like Zeno's slave, "it was fated that I should steal;" and you can only retort the same heathenish sentiment, "it was also fated that you should be reproached."

Moreover, with what authority or propriety can you exhort a man to any duty? If you do so, you assume, however unwittingly, yet very absurdly, that he has the identical power which you deny, viz., power to have *good* volitions, when God produces in him *evil* ones. Besides, if he had any such power, you would act altogether in the dark, and at the hazard of urging him to will contrary to the Omnipotent will and the good of the universe. For the executive will of God, you say, has "no respect to what is right or wrong, but only to what it is wisest and best should take place;" and as you are bound to exhort him to will only that which is right, what a disaster it would be, should you incite him to will not only against the divine purposes and agency, but in opposition to "what is wisest and best should take place"!

Not least among the absurdities would it be, to persuade him *to repent*. Repentance implies sincere contrition for sin. But the theory being true, there is no sin. Nothing is wrong, or can be. The volitions of men, which include all their sins, so called, are produced by an "irresistible agency upon the heart." They are not only fated, but fated for the "wisest and best." The incendiary may have fired your buildings, but why should he repent? Not because he could have done otherwise; for God produced the volition that moved his hand to set the fire. Not because his volition was evil; for all its evil was its inherent quality, and necessarily created with it. Not because he did harm; for if he did any, it was not only done of necessity, but was the wisest and best that could take place. Not because he transgressed the divine law; for if he did so, it was in the volition divinely created. Not because he is conscious that he did wrong; for if the theory be true, his conscience is false. Dr. Emmons very consistently says, that sinners "have no reason to be sorry that any evil action or event has taken place," and that they cannot be so, "without being sorry for God's conduct," vol. IV., p. 374. By this, however, he does not mean to admit the absurdity of repentance here charged upon his theory. On what ground, then, would he exhort men to repent? We have discovered none, and can conceive of none, unless it be, that "sin is one thing, and the taking place of sin is another;" as if *an act of sin* and *the sin of the act* could have different relations to the agent, or to a moral standard. The absurdity of this assumption has already been exposed. If God causes the *entity* of an evil act, he



causes its *evil nature*. If man is not to repent of the *taking place* of his sin, he is not to repent of his *sin*. If God produces man's volitions, he produces all that is wrong in them. If man cannot be sorry that his evil actions have taken place, "without being sorry for God's conduct," and this Dr. Emmons affirms, then he cannot repent of the *sin* of those actions without repenting of an inherent property of "God's conduct." If by eating unripe fruit, your health should be injured, and you should say, "I repent of eating the noxious quality of the fruit, but not the fruit itself," you would talk absurdly enough; but not more so than the theologian who exhorts men to repent of *the sin of their acts, but not of their acts of sin*, that is, of their *sin*, but not of their *sinning*. The truth is, Dr. Emmons's theory of agency involves us in inextricable difficulties. It is not, as some have imagined, a system of surprising and beautiful paradoxes, but of actual and absolute, though ingeniously palliated, contradictions. It is a theory by which the moral problem is insolvable, nay, by which the very conception of such a problem is utterly exterminated. Nothing, we believe, but the genius and moral excellence of its author, has hitherto saved it from universal rejection.

The theory which we have now very briefly examined, has important relations to which we cannot here allude. If any one would convict us of having misconceived the theory, he must either show that we have not understood Dr. Emmons as he wrote, or that he did not write as he meant. If there be errors in the reasoning by which we have endeavored to verify our allegations, they will be easily detected. It will doubtless be said, that Dr. Emmons would not admit these consequences. No one supposes that he would, unless he would disavow his own cherished philosophy. "*He would not admit these consequences!*" Is he therefore wronged by an endeavor to prove that they are legitimate consequences? Where is the proper tribunal? Is he the arbiter before whom we are to try his own speculations? If these consequences can be set aside, then we are so much in the dark, that we need, for their refutation, something far more luminous than a mere *ipsum non dixisse*.

Though a necessity has been laid upon us of animadverting on the philosophy of a very eminent and excellent divine, we have nevertheless a deep reverence for his character, as one both so great and "so good, that we shall seldom find his equal." With respect to various important merits in his writings, we do

not know that we estimate them a whit less highly than his warmest admirers. We could, on many accounts, wish his volumes a wide circulation ; and his fourth volume we do heartily commend to the most careful and studious perusal of all who are disposed to look with favor upon his peculiar theory of divine agency. While we cannot but record our regret, that much of his intellectual might was so exerted that it may be available on the side of the fatalist, still the elements of his character challenge our confidence and admiration. We confide in his estimate of theology, as the most important and exalted of all sciences. We confide in him, as a man of extraordinary wisdom and uprightness ; a man in whom there was nothing time-serving, no concealment, no dark windings, no want of transparency. We admire his wit, his originality and independence of mind. We both confide in him and admire him, for his magnanimity, his amplitude of views, his noble freedom of investigation, and his rare courage in declaring his opinions. We confide in him and revere him, because he had a generous faith in the future progress of the mind—a faith inspired by “the growing capacities of men,” as well as by the history of science ; because, in theory and in practice, he condemned the groundless and disheartening sentiment, which he represents as “often flung out, that all the subjects of human inquiry are nearly exhausted,” and that no great advance in knowledge is to be expected or attempted ; because he believed there is “room left in divinity and metaphysics, as well as in other sciences, to make large improvements ;” because he was an advocate “for pushing researches further and further ;” because he disliked what he called “a caveat given to men, not to pry into things above their measure ;” because he never frowned upon the spirit of *inquiry*, as if it were the spirit of *skepticism*, nor regarded men as sinning by being inquisitive, unless they transgressed the limits of attainable knowledge ; and because any disposition to say to the earnest inquirer, “thus far shalt thou come and no farther,” would have met his severe reprehension.

In conclusion, we cannot but hope that the debatable ground between necessitarians and their opponents, is not always to be a land of shades and of conflict. It seems to us, that already “we scent the morning air of the coming day” that is to shine upon sacred philosophy. It may be a long time before that day will reach its full effulgence ; for mind has its inertia as well as matter. We cannot expect so strange a thing as

that men should readily and at once abandon their hereditary household deities. It is nothing new, that men having a philosophy which requires them to marshal, in its defence, a host of subtleties, should withstand a philosophy whose strength lies only in simple facts and intuitive convictions. So it was in the days of Galileo. We are told that Lizzi, a Florentine astronomer, in order to disprove the existence of planets which many had actually seen, clung to his *logic*. As there are but seven metals, he argued, seven days in the week, and seven apertures in the human head, *therefore*, there cannot be more than seven planets! Another astronomer of the Platonic school refused to look at the heavens through the telescope, because, as he said, if he should see the moons of Jupiter with his own eyes, he must yield in the controversy and renounce his former opinions. As science advances, there will always be a class of philosophers afraid to look at Jupiter's moons. To this class, however, we do not refer Dr. Emmons, for we think that he had the temper and faith of a genuine philosopher; but that in his youth he had been enmeshed in the mighty sophisms of a necessitarian philosophy. To the influence of that philosophy, we must, doubtless, attribute the fatalism of his theology. Still he was right in maintaining that mental and moral science are not to be sundered from each other. But if our theology shall have formed an unnatural and portentous alliance with an *untenable* philosophy, that connection must be severed, or else they must both sink together. If great ingenuity be requisite in "*making joints*" between our metaphysics and our faith, we may suspect that one of them is false. There can be no repulsion between them so long as both are true. We shall greatly err, if we imagine a philosophy indubitable because associated with great and sacred names. Let us hallow the names, but scrutinize the philosophy. As defenders of truth, we need to look well to its philosophical safeguards. If its alert and resolute enemies discover that we are trusting in the shield of a *false* philosophy, a blow may be aimed at the very vitals of our theology by some feeble arm, which even the strongest will not be able to parry. Let us see to it, lest the bulwarks of our faith, being ready to fall away, invite to the assault, whilst we are reposing in a fatal security. For truth's defence, let us never rely upon a philosophy, however canonical, that is at war with the strongest utterances of common sense, with the plain facts of consciousness, and the first truths of universal intuition.

## ARTICLE VI.

## RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY—ITS NATURE, ENDS, AND VALIDITY.\*

PSYCHOLOGY is the science of mind in general; and divides itself into two distinct branches—*Empirical* and *Rational*.

Empirical Psychology finds the *facts* of mind, and gives to these facts a *systematic arrangement*. The mental states and exercises, which appear in experience, constitute all its elements; and the testimony of consciousness is assured, as the valid criterion for any facts, which may be doubtful or disputed. If, in any case, a contradictory consciousness between two minds be alleged, the umpire lies in the general consciousness of humanity, and the appeal is made through some of the many methods by which the concurring testimony of the human race, on that disputed point, may be gathered. This ultimate test is, what is commonly and properly called an appeal to COMMON SENSE.

Rational Psychology passes on beyond the facts of mind as given in experience, and seeks some necessary and universal *principle* by which the fact is controlled, and through which alone it can be intelligently expounded. This principle is seen to be a *priori* to the fact, independent of it, and conditional for it. It is the *rationale* of the fact, or the *law* by which that mental exercise, given in experience, is altogether and necessarily determined. The Elements of Rational Psychology are not, therefore, the states and exercises of the mind as given in consciousness, and appearing in experience, but those conditional principles through which experience itself is possible, and the facts of our mental being alone intelligible. It affirms, not as through experience in consciousness, *this is*; but from the peremptory law of the conditional principle, *this must be*. The human intellect is itself cognized in the *a priori* laws, which determine necessarily its entire agency.

This distinction may be more fully illustrated by a reference to other cases than the facts of mind. Whatever is capable of

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\* We withhold the author's name in this case, because the article is introductory to a contemplated publication, in which it is designed to evolve more fully the principles herein foreshadowed.—ED.

being represented under the double form of a fact in experience, and a necessary principle in science, may be used as an example.

By a long period of patient and careful observation, I may have discovered the great facts of astronomy—the revolutions of the planets, the relations of the primary bodies to their satellites, their apparent changes of form, the occasional transits or occultations of some; and, moreover, from long experience, I may have learned to combine these isolated facts into a system, and put the sun in the centre, and all the planets in their places, with their orbits, and periodic revolutions, and thus be able to plot a complete diagram of the solar system in pure space—and in this way, I should gain the whole science of *formal* astronomy. By experience I should cognize the facts of the heavenly phenomena, as they *are*. But if now, by any means, I can attain the conditional principle of gravitation, that all bodies are attracted towards each other, directly as their quantity of matter, and inversely as the squares of their distance, I at once possess the law for all these facts, and can say, not only from observation, such things *are*, but from principles *a priori* to the facts, such things *must be*.

I take any body of a triangular form, and from a measurement in experience, I find that any two of its sides are together greater than the third side. I come to another triangular body of different size and proportions, and I find myself unable to conclude from the mensuration of the former, any thing certain in reference to the latter. But I apply the measure by another experiment, and find the fact the same as before; and thus onward in my experience, so far as it extends, I affirm the facts *are* thus. But when I construct for myself a triangle in pure space, and contemplate it in its intuitive principles, as universal and necessary laws for all triangles, I cognize not only that the two sides of this triangle are together greater than a third side, but that this *must be* so for all possible triangles. *A priori* to all experiment, I know from the principle, what the fact must be.

So also with any construction of human art or skill. The materials of stone, brick, and mortar, thrown together in a mass, do not constitute a house. They must be combined and arranged according to some definite rule, or the house is not. Now the Empiric may have some other house as his copy, and by the repeated processes of mensurations, applying parts to parts, and fitting and trying through successive experiments, he may succeed in combining his materials in imitation of his model. But

the scientific architect will project his whole plan upon well-known conditional principles, and possess an *a priori* cognition of the whole structure, in the pure law of its combination.

The fabricator of plaster-busts sees the features of the human countenance as they are, and fitting his moulds to some face as the hand of nature has in fact formed it, he casts therein his yielding material, and there comes out its counterpart. But the eye of genius looks through nature to the *absolute ideal*, and chipping off the useless refuse from his block of marble, he finds at length the perfect form, of which his own bright creation was the archetype—a Venus, or an Apollo.

Such is everywhere the distinction between Empirical and Rational Science. One knows facts as they appear, the other knows the laws which determine their appearance. Mind, considered as the grand source of human intelligence and freedom, admits of being cognized in both these aspects. The facts of mind, as given in experience, and put together in a system according to the observed relations and dependences as they appear in consciousness, constitute the important science of Psychology in that division which I have denominated *Empirical*—and the conditional principles, which give necessary and universal laws to all intelligence, constitute the elements of Psychological Science, in that higher department which, in distinction, I have termed *Rational*. Through this latter process we come to know the human mind, not merely in its phenomena, as the facts and attributes which appear as its mode of being, but, in a far more comprehensive and adequate manner, according to the law of its being, as intelligent and free. In the necessary laws for all intelligence, we gain the position from which we may look over the field of all possible human science, and decide upon the whole of human experience—determining that which is possible, and the validity of that which is actual.

Here is, therefore, truly, the science of all sciences, inasmuch as it includes the source of all cognition, in the *rationale* or law for intelligence itself. It is also *Transcendental Philosophy*, inasmuch as it goes up to the conditional and *a priori* principles of all science, and thus *transcends* experience, that it may determine the validity of experience. Not *transcendental*, as has been too lamentably the fact with many who have assumed and dishonored the name, in the sense of transcending all meaning, and light, and evidence, and going forth into a region of mere shadows and empty chimeras. It draws a strong and clear line

of demarcation between Empiricism and Philosophy—assumption and science—facts which *are*, and laws which *must be*. It excludes hypothesis, and would rest only in absolute demonstrations.

Pure mathematics, and over a more limited field pure physics also, proceed in the sure and firm steps of valid science, because they derive their elements from a region beyond all experience, and deal only with those necessary and universal truths which are conditional for all possible experience. Nothing assumed as philosophy,—and above all, metaphysics,—proceeding in any assigned direction, can ever take the road to a sure and valid science, except as it strikes out its course, under the stern authority and rigid rule of necessary and universal principles. To be rational science, the law which determines, combines, and explains the whole system, must be cognized; and for this cognition, we must be able to stand without the system and look in upon it, and thus determine that the law which controls and combines all its real elements, accords with those *a priori* principles which are conditional for the system, and which are both necessary and universal. Thus, by the telescope we attain the perception of distant objects, and gain facts not otherwise within our reach, and by this means greatly enlarge the field of empirical science. We may proceed in this way without hesitation or misgiving, until we meet with some skeptic, who calls in question the reality of all assumed facts attained through the telescope. Now, surely, I shall prevail nothing in attempting to remove his doubts, while I confine myself to the mere facts and elements of my empirical system, as obtained through the telescope. I can demolish his skepticism in no other way than by going out of the system, and back of the facts obtained, and giving a rational demonstration that the laws of telescopic vision are valid. But, farther, this telescope is but an instrument for the eye, which perceives objects even without the telescope, and thus is competent to perceive the telescope itself as a fact in its experience. Now, on the assumption that the eye attains facts correctly, we have no difficulty in our empirical science. But if I meet a skeptic who questions the validity of the facts gained by the eye, I must go out beyond the objects given in vision, and in the conditional principles of optics, as the laws of vision, establish the accuracy of the organ, and thus the validity of its perceptions, before I can do any thing to silence his skeptical objections. Still farther, the eye is but the instrument for the mind. Through this organ, as in various other

ways, the mind attains the facts of experience. But I would fain know the laws of the intellect, and examine cognition in its primitive conditional principles. It is the only way in which I can meet the skeptic, who questions the testimony of the senses, and doubts whether even consciousness is not contradicted by reason ; and thus throws down all the foundations of a valid, and not a mere seeming, experience. A transcendental investigation, which goes through consciousness and experience, out to the *a priori* and necessary laws of all conscious experience, and thus expounds the fact of intelligence from the conditional principles of all human intelligence, is the only course by which this skepticism can be annihilated, and science established. The human mind, as a knower, must be cognized in the conditional laws of intelligence, before we have any true and valid rational science of mind ; and for this purpose it is necessary that we go entirely out of, and beyond, the whole field of Empirical Psychology.

All the past history of Philosophy teaches us, that no prevailing interest in thinking minds, and no permanent influence over them, have at any time been secured, except as the investigation has gone upward to the original sources of science, and the attempt, at least, has been made to settle the validity of the system, upon its immutable principles and necessary laws. This is the very spirit of the long-famous Socratic method of philosophizing. By a series of well-put interrogatories, Socrates effectually forced the disciple back to the first truths and elementary principles of the subject under investigation. While he thus secured a careful and docile spirit in the scholar, he, in this way, also, unsparingly laid bare the empty pretensions and shallow conclusions of the sophist. Plato, the most eminent of Socrates's disciples, and the world's great teacher in philosophy, still more thoroughly and extensively pursued science to its primitive source. The DIVINE IDEA was the counterpart to that intelligible law, by which nature was informed and manifested to human perception, and through which, all the phenomena of nature were to be interpreted and expounded. And his fellow-disciple, Aristotle, though studying nature in her manifested forms, rather than in the universal ideas which intellectually control her development, no less rigidly confined all science to that which can be reduced to its logical elements and conditional laws of being. Their voices have already penetrated more than twenty centuries, and are still speaking distinctly, to



all "who have ears to hear," the great foundation-truths of all philosophical science.

After the long perpetuated and empty dialectical conflicts of the schoolmen had exhausted all the resources of the mere syllogistic forms of logic, Descartes led the human mind back again to attempt the science of valid being in its first principles. The prolific germ of his wide-spread system lies in the following formula, as the original demonstration of his own existence. "It is absurd to suppose, that that which thinks does not exist, at the same time in which it thinks. Hence, this cognition—*I think, therefore I am*—is the first and most certain of all truths, which occurs, in course, to any one philosophizing."\* *Thought*, as the essence of the soul, and *extension*, as the essence of body, are necessarily opposed to each other; and their connection and co-operation in nature can be accounted for, only on the theory of immediate divine impulses. The soul is *simple*, and thus immortal; and the sublimation of matter into indivisible atoms, gave, also, simplicity to the primordial elements of body. This system branched off on one side into Spinozism, by identifying the attributes of infinite thought and extension in one absolute essence, and all finite beings as the mere *modes* of the manifestation of the absolute—and, on the other side, into the Leibnitz-wolfian theory, in which God, as the primordial monade, is distinct from all finite monades, or simple elements of being; and these finite monades exist, also, in the distinctions of a real *dualism*, or that of an essential difference between body and spirit.

Bacon, moreover, as the father of the Inductive Philosophy, would have us study nature, not in its mere facts, but in the laws by which the facts are connected. These laws, which give their mode of being to the facts of nature as phenomena, are what Bacon calls "*the forms*," in distinction from the matter, of things. They are the same, in their objective being, as the *ideas* of Plato, in the subjective or mere intellectual apprehension. The distinction of the *form*, as intellectual, from the *matter*, as merely phenomenal, is, with him, essential to all true philosophy. The following aphorism is his method of express-

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\* "Repugnat enim ut putemus id quod cogitat, eo ipso tempore quo cogitat, non existere. Ac proinde haec cognitio: *Ego cogito, ergo sum*, est omnium prima et certissima, quae cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat."

ing this essential truth : "The solution and separation of nature is to be thoroughly made, not indeed by fire, but by mind, as a divine fire."

Locke, also, pushed his inquiry to the original sources and extent of all knowledge. He unhappily passed over one entire division of the field of human cognition, and limited the intellect exclusively to that which comes into it through sensation, and thus opened the way to all that wide skepticism ultimately attained by the sensuous school in philosophy. But it has been altogether on account of the primitive and conditional principles of all knowledge, assumed in his system, that it has so effectually, for more than a century and a half, swayed almost the entire philosophic mind of England and America. Out of this has also grown the idealism of Berkeley, the materialism of Diderot and Helvetius, the universal skepticism of Hume, and in answer to the latter more especially, the counter assumptions of Reid, on the ground of common sense. So also, for the last fifty years, has the deep current of the thinking mind of Germany been impelled onward, in the direction which was given by the profound critical speculations of Kant, relatively to the origin and validity of all cognition. "Up to this time," says he, "it has been received, that all our cognition must regulate itself according to the objects; yet all attempts to make out something *a priori* by means of conceptions respecting such, whereby our cognitions would be extended, have proved, under this supposition, abortive. Let it be once, therefore, tried, whether we do not succeed better in the problems of metaphysics, when we admit that the objects must regulate themselves according to our cognition." The great peculiarity of the Königsberg Philosopher is found, in this reversed direction to the course of all former investigations, as really as the placing of the sun in the centre of the system, instead of the earth, constitutes the grand distinctive feature of modern astronomical science.

The disciples, or the opposers, of the critical philosophy in Germany—Cousin in France—Coleridge and Whewell in England—and all others, who have perseveringly and intelligently attempted to carry their speculations upward, to the conditional laws and primitive sources of knowledge, may be added to the foregoing, as the manifestation of how much controlling interest these original investigations possess, for thinking and philosophic minds. The reigning systems of metaphysics have

always taken a strong hold of all other departments of philosophy, and whether physical or moral science has been the subject, it has ever been moulded by the prevailing metaphysical theory. The only point in any erroneous system, against which the assault of truth can be effectual, is in the ultimate principle where the delusion or perversion originates. Assumptions and counter-assumptions, may both stand forever, one over against the other, with no power in either to demolish the opposite. The true system must have the validity of demonstration, from universal and necessary principles, and when thus strong in its own right, it can force off from its whole enclosure every intruding skeptic. In this way only, do we attain the ground for sure science. Empiricism can, at the best, only lay the ground for opinion or faith, while a rational demonstration from necessary truths compels the convictions which belong to knowledge. The former may have the name of science, until its ultimate principles are denied or doubted; but it must then have recourse to the latter, or it can never exclude the most incorrigible and inveterate skepticism. This may be sufficient relatively to the *nature* of rational psychology.

*The ends to be attained.*—There are many important questions of the highest speculative and practical interest to mankind, which stand precisely in this condition, that they receive a ready assent by the universal conduct and reception among men, and yet, when the general conviction is examined, it is found to rest upon mere assumption. An attempt to explain the correctness and settle the validity of this universal assent soon determines, that no conclusive answer is possible, except as gained through the transcendental demonstrations of a rational, in opposition to an empirical philosophy. Opposite parties may else maintain an endless but profitless contest, because it is, in fact, wholly a conflict of counter-assumptions. On his own premises, each may maintain his own conclusions; but the premises of each are assumptions, and no experience will enable either to go back and demolish the assumption of the other, and thus attain the triumph of final victory. Some such questions are directly embraced in the design of the present investigations, and a partial reference to them in this place, will secure the double purpose of a more full illustration of the nature of a transcendental philosophy, and of a better preparative to our future progress, by overlooking in some measure the field before us.

1. The object, known through sense, is deemed to be out of, and often at a great distance from, the subject knowing. This is especially true of the objects of smell, hearing, and sight. For present illustration, we shall fix attention upon the objects of vision. The thing seen is apprehended to be at a less or greater distance from the person seeing. And now the problem, which philosophy felt herself called upon to solve, was this—*How can the mind have cognizance of that which is at a distance from it?* The almost unanimous conclusion was, that by some means the object must affect the organ by impulse. The process was thought to be something as follows: An affection or impression must in some way be made upon the nervous susceptibility of the eye, and this must be continued up through the brain to the point of its communication with the spirit, and there, in the secret *penetralium* of the soul's temple, a junction must be effected of the impulse of the object and the action of the spirit, and the phenomenon of perception be thus completed.

But it was deemed to be an *a priori* principle—*nothing can act, except when it is, and where it is.\** As therefore the object is not where the point of the mind's perception is, there must be present at that point some *representative* of the distant object. This representative of the distant object was that which was, therefore, directly perceived by the mind, and through it the distant object was cognized. This general theory, modified in minor particulars by different philosophers, was nearly universal; and the general conclusion of course was, that all our knowledge of the external world was *mediate*—through some representation of it—and never direct and immediate, as if we perceived the object itself. The result of this was a twofold skepticism, differing according to the opposite directions, in which this theory was pushed out to its remoter consequences.

Many perplexing queries arose, in the course of the investigations to which this theory of representative perception was subjected, and which each was obliged to answer as he best could. What was this representative of the distant object? Was it some image, as an excerpt and detached form from the object? Was it material or spiritual? Was its origin from the object? or in the mind? or generated from some media between the object and the mind? Did it exist when the mind was unconscious

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\* *Nihil agit, nisi cum, et ubi, est.*

of the perception? Might it not be infused into the mind by direct supernatural agency? Yea, may not these representatives be identical with the Divine substance? and thus, as in the theory of Malebranche, "we see all things in God." But in whatever way these questions were resolved, it still remained true in their philosophy, that not the object, but the representative of the object, was immediately perceived.

When, therefore, *on one side*, the inquiry, relatively to the validity of the knowledge of an outer world by this theory, was perseveringly carried forward, there was soon found abundant ground for skepticism in relation to the reality of our perceptions. If the object is known only through its representative, how can it be settled that the object is *like* its representative? There can be no comparison between them, inasmuch as the object is never cognized except through its image—or if there is any way of direct comparison and ascertained resemblance, then is the real object itself given, and its representative is superfluous. How then can we be sure that we know the object truly? Yea, the representative is all that the mind really perceives, how can it then cognize any thing but representations? What possible way of proving that the objects exist at all? Even still more stringently may we conclude with Bishop Berkeley, that all we can know of an external world is through the mediate representations of sense; and all of which we can be conscious is the sensation itself; and this is wholly mental, and can never be a part of, or a resemblance to, any thing material. To deny this will be to identify mind and matter. And thus the conclusion in his own language—"the existence of a body out of a mind perceiving it, is not only impossible, and a contradiction in terms, but were it possible and even real, it were impossible that the mind should ever know it."

This conclusion was not at all the offspring of any religious skepticism. By giving up all cognition of an outer world of matter, and holding on to an inner world of spirit, Berkeley supposed himself to have avoided the skepticism in religion, which, on the ground of representative perception in sensation, was else so natural, perhaps so necessary. In his view, the belief in an external world, upon the common notion that abstract sensations could be any representatives of external realities, was the chief source, both of all error in philosophy, and of all heresy in religion. By renouncing all cognition of the world of matter without, he thought to save the world of spirit to human

knowledge, and the doctrines and duties of religion to human obligation. On this side of the representative theory, therefore, skepticism took on the form of *Idealism*—the rejection of all knowledge of the world of matter, save in the sensations of the mind itself.

This theory of representative perception, carried out on *the opposite side*, led the way to a skepticism of a still more startling character. The representative is from the object, and its action is upon the nicely-modified and arranged organization of the senses. This puts in motion the animal spirits, or the fibres of the brain, and this motion is propagated onward through all the organization to the sensorium, or point where perception is consummated. Now, no motion, extending back through any material organization, can propagate itself beyond the material sphere of that organization. It can never project itself into some supposed spiritual receptacle, which is wholly without parts, and utterly incompetent for the reception or transmission of motion. No representation can thus be carried out of the sphere of the material organization, and the perception must therefore be completed somewhere within the organ. The source of all knowledge is the subtile, sublimated, material modification of the organs of sense, acted upon by the representatives of outward material objects. Perception is the product of one form of matter impinging upon another; thought is the mere motion of peculiar organic particles. Consciousness itself becomes, in the language of Hobbes, “the agitation of our internal organism, determined by the unknown motions of a supposed outer world.” Or, to take the doctrine as given by Diderot, for the school of the French Encyclopediasts, every cognition, when carried to its ultimate analysis, must resolve itself into some sensible representation; and as this must have come into the intellect through the senses, all which proceeds from the intellect, that is not a mere chimera, must be able to attach itself again to its original archetype. Hence philosophy must reject every thing, which cannot find its archetype in some sensible object. On this side, we have, therefore, *Materialism*, as the form of skepticism to which the theory of a representative perception arrives—the rejection of the knowledge of all being, but the dead forms of an outer world.

But again, when this theory is taken in all its comprehensive conclusions, and carried out intrepidly to its legitimate results,

a broader and far more incorrigible skepticism ensues, than in either of the foregoing examples.

Universal consciousness testifies to the direct and immediate perception of an outer world. The knowledge of something out of and beside myself, is as direct and imperative as the knowledge of myself. Yea, in every cognition of an object, it is the object itself that must determine the peculiarity of the subjective act. I cannot be conscious that I have a perception, i. e., I cannot know that an act of perception is—that it is not some other act, except as I know the object perceived. All minds, the philosopher's and the peasant's, are absolutely shut up to this conviction, that objects external to themselves exist. It is a universal belief from which there is no escape. The skeptic himself admits this, yea, insists upon this, that he may make the conclusions of his skepticism the more invincible.

But when an investigation of this whole matter is made, on the ground of a representative perception of objects, the demonstration of reason comes out clear and irresistible, that no direct cognition of an outer world is possible. The very sensation, by which all knowledge is given, is itself but a mental phenomenon, and can furnish no ground for the conviction of the existence of any thing farther than that of the mind itself. An irresistible conviction of our nature, on one side, is flatly contradicted by an irrefragable demonstration, on the other. Consciousness belies reason; reason subverts consciousness. Man's intellectual nature is thus placed in irreconcilable conflict with itself. The very "light which is in us, is darkness"—the sources of irresistible conviction, by contradicting, annihilate each other; and all escape from universal skepticism is impossible. Our ultimate and independent grounds of knowledge prove each other to be false, and of each we must say—"falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus"—the truth of our nature is a lie, and in nothing can aught else remain, but to doubt. Here is the dreadful, but still rigid conclusion of David Hume, inevitable and unanswerable, on the ground of the representative theory of the old philosophy.

Reid, with intentional reference to Hume, but with equal effect in reference to both Idealism and Materialism, met this whole ground of skepticism, so far as self-defence is concerned, by rejecting the representative theory, and assuming the fact of an immediate and intuitive knowledge of objects themselves.

The object itself is perceived, and not its mere representative ; and on this position he could avoid all attacks from both the Idealist and the Materialist, as well as the absolute skepticism of Hume.

But this position was still but an arbitrary assumption. The whole ground taken was without any attempt to justify the title to it, but simply by an appeal to common sense. Direct and immediate perception of outward objects was an ultimate fact, neither requiring nor admitting proof, but itself the ground of proof for other things. It was a law of the human mind to perceive outward objects themselves by the senses. The universal decisions of common sense, wiser than all philosophy, forced this conviction upon every mind. The conflict was closed, not by a victory, but because each party had taken such positions, that neither could dislodge the other. Their entrenchments were two counter-assumptions, and so long as each kept within his own lines, he was secure from defeat, but also, at the same time, precluded from a triumph. The skeptic could affirm : " Nothing acts, but when and where it is ;" and from this starting point he might go out unchecked in either direction to Idealism, Materialism, or Universal Skepticism. The dogmatist could affirm : " It is an ultimate law of the human mind, to cognize outward objects directly," and thus insist upon the conclusions of Dualism, that the being of both matter and mind is cognized. And here each may remain forever, untouched by all the logical or metaphysical artillery of his antagonist.

And now, one of the ends of Rational Psychology, is to give the power of terminating this drawn-battle, in a final victory on the side of Science and Philosophy. In no other manner can the triumph be achieved, than by a transcendental process, to find the necessary law for perception, in the universal conditional principles of all cognition by sense. Neither the idealism of Berkeley, nor the materialism of French infidelity, nor the universal skepticism of Hume, can, if at all, be otherwise met by philosophical demonstration, than by cognizing the human mind in its conditional and primitive laws, under which all its possible perceptions of objects can be effected. The whole field, on which those counter-assumptions stand, is utterly inaccessible through any other pathway.

2. Rational Psychology has another more remote, and still more important end to attain, and which can be reached through



no other process. What this is, will be developed in the following train of remark.

The conditional Law of Perception understood and applied, will give to us a valid cognition of the objects of perception. An outer and inner world will be cognized, and the reality of their objects can be demonstrated. But those objects are only qualities and attributes, not the things qualified. We are conscious of the exercises which take place within us, but we have no perception of the mind itself as the agent. We are conscious of the qualities which appear without us, but we have no perception of the subject of these qualities. The senses give us the accidents but not the substance. Our knowledge is therefore confined to an exceedingly narrow field, where we have only found the law of perception, and demonstrated a valid reality to the objects which the perceptions give us. We have real qualities—as colors, sounds, tastes, etc., and we have real exercises—as thoughts, feelings, volitions, etc.; but we have no perceptions of the things which stand under these qualities, or which put forth these exercises. So far as the perceptions of sense can go, they are all but so many separate and isolated appearances; real as phenomena, but not connected in any permanent *substrata*.

Now this connection is wholly the work of the intellect, and the result of the process is what we term, judgments. The qualities are taken, as predicates, and joined in the same substratum, as their subject. We thus say, not merely that there is a *redness*, an *odor*, etc.; but that there is some *thing*—a *rose*, which is both red, fragrant, etc. There is not merely a *thinking*, a *feeling*, etc., but some *thing*—the mind, which thinks, feels, etc. In the judgment, we join the various attributes to the same subject, and this process of forming judgments is what the senses never execute. Conditional for judging, there must be reflection, or thinking; but the sense does not think, it only gives the materials for thinking, and thus for forming judgments. In addition to what sense gives, there is, therefore, in every judgment, something which the intellect gives, as the ground of connection for the phenomena of the senses. The qualities are connected in a *substance*, which is entirely without the sphere of the senses; and the acts, or changes, are connected to a *cause*, which is also wholly beyond the province of sense. The notions of substance and cause are thus conditional for all thinking in judgments, by which the qualities, as isolated

in sense, become connected in things through reflection. We assume the existence of substances and causes, which no perceptions of the sense can give, in order to connect in judgments those phenomena, which in sense we do perceive.

Now, having assumed these intellectual notions of substance and cause, as the permanently connecting existences of the qualities and changes which we perceive, we advance, in the same intellectual process, to far wider and more extended judgments.

The notion of a substance, as the ground in which qualities inhere, gives the conception of *body*. And of this, as a mere mental conception, I can by a process of analysis alone in simple thinking, without the perceptions of sense, form independent judgments. Thus I can predicate of body, *extension*, *form*, *divisibility*, *impenetrability*, etc., as *primary* qualities, and thereby gain a more distinct cognition of what body is; though instead of adding any thing to my knowledge, I have been only analyzing the cognition already possessed in my conception of body itself.

I can proceed much farther, through a process of observation and experiment by sense, and add many *secondary* qualities as the predicates of some particular body, thereby augmenting my knowledge by multiplying the predicates in the same subject. Thus, of a particular body—gold, for example—I may not only predicate the primary qualities as above, but also *yellowness*, *malleability*, *fusibility*, *solubility in aqua regia*, etc.; and thus on, to as many secondary qualities as sense by any experiment can perceive.

But again, far beyond all experiment and observation, I assume to go out in my cognition to unlimited propositions and universal judgments. By the *inductive process*, or the so-called Baconian philosophy, I not only subject the field of *actual* experience to science, but the whole of all *possible* experience, in the direction of the particular induction. I take my assumed notion of cause, as the ground for the connection of particular facts, and bind up the facts of the experiment in this law of causation. I apply, for example, heat in succession to several bodies, and I find that the fact of expansion appears in them all. I assume that heat is the cause of the phenomenon. I farther assume, that like causes will always produce like effects; and, having pursued the experiment until I have satisfied myself that the cause and its law of operation have been found, I then at once form the universal judgment—"heat expands all bodies."

On this assumption, that nature proceeds onward through all her changes in a uniform law of order, rests the entire superstructure of all inductive science. With the assumption that there is everywhere a causal law in operation, the inductive philosopher, in various ways, comes to his universal judgment. He may form, in the process of his own reflection, some hypothesis beforehand, and for the present use this, as if it were *the law of nature*, in the direction to which he would turn his investigation. With this, he goes forth to question and examine nature through all her chambers. If her answers contradict his hypothesis, he casts it aside as worthless; if they confirm, he holds it as hypothesis no longer, but henceforth as a discovered and established law, which will control all experience in that direction. Or, he may be observing the facts of nature in their complexity, with the silent conviction that there is some system, but with no conception what that system is; when at once, from some conspiring incidents, there shall flash out to his inspiration the great truth, by which the whole complexity is, in a moment, seen in its comprehensive unity.

So Harvey, amid his casual dissections, notices the valves within the arteries and veins, and as he sees the concurring facts, that in the former they open *from*, and in the latter *to* the heart, at once, the fact and the law of the circulation of the blood in the animal system are clear. Every contraction of the heart sends out, and every dilatation receives the blood anew; and the law of its circuit must be through the valves, which open before its own impulse. So the falling apple might, as it is sometimes said did, suggest to the great Philosopher the law of universal gravity. The attraction which brought that to the earth reaches evidently far higher. Why not then to the height of the atmosphere, and hold that to the earth? Why not to the moon, and control its motion? Yea, why not through the whole solar system, and hold each planet in its proper sphere? A few careful observations establish the fact, and the law of its working, and at once we extend this law over the universe. The revolution of the farthest planet, and the wandering of the most eccentric comet, are put unhesitatingly under its control.

Now the great inquiry here, essential to the validity of all inductive science, is not, whether a sufficiently broad induction of facts warrants the conclusion, that the law of nature has been found; for this has reference only to the *modus operandi*,

and determines merely the correctness of the process; but, whether the conditional principle, as the very foundation of all induction, is sure. The difficulty lies in this deeper and much more vital point. *By what right is it assumed that nature has laws?* How do we attain the principle of causation as the source of all change? and more especially, where is our warrant for making the uniformity of its operation universal? By what authority do we say, "that every event must have its cause"?—and, "that like causes, universally, produce like effects"? Such a principle of necessary and universal operation assumed, and then, of course, our induction may go, under its guidance, over the entire field of all possible experience; but by what right do we assume it? Can we attain a valid title to our use of this principle, and thus give, to all concluded by it, a legitimate possession for *science*? or, at the most, is it only probability, and affording ground for nothing more than *belief*? An assumption, merely, of this point, leaves the whole field open to skepticism.

Locke teaches, that we attain the principle of causation, by reflecting upon the perceptions of sense. But, surely, no reflection upon the objects of sense can get out of them that which by sense is not in them; and all that sense can give is, the qualities of things, and their changes. The mistake here is, that, inasmuch as the notion of cause is connected, in experience, *with* the objects of sense, it is therefore taken as if it had been given *in* the objects—and after assuming that it is thus given in the objects of experience, it is afterwards most inconclusively used, as a valid principle to carry out our cognition, beyond that experience in which it was given, even to necessary and universal judgments. Now all that sense can give, are simply phenomena, as facts; and never principles, as laws. And no reflection upon facts can get out of them any other judgments, than, that something *is*; not, that something *must be*. From the system of Locke, or any philosophy of experience, it is utterly incompetent to prove any right to our use of a universal law of nature, as a basis for *science*.

Hume, on the grounds of the sensuous philosophy, saw this incompetency very clearly, and drew out his conclusions of an impregnable skepticism, accordingly. All that experience can give is a series of phenomena, as antecedents and consequents. No reflection, upon these antecedents and consequents, can legitimately think into them the efficiency of the principle of

causation, by which they are necessarily and universally connected. No matter how intimate and invariable the sequences, no experience is competent to penetrate the secret nature of the antecedent, and cognize a causal *nexus* therein, which necessitates the consequent. All that experience can affirm is—so far as observed, such phenomena *have been* connected together; not at all that they *must be* thus connected; neither, *must have been* as past, nor, still *must be* in future, but simply, *so* experience finds them.

This most acute of all skeptics well knew the fact, that the human mind deems the connection of these sequences to be necessary; and while philosophy can never substantiate it as science, he very ingeniously explains how this persuasion of necessity is attained. His theory, though unsatisfactory and empty for all purposes of science, and confessedly terminating only in "belief," is still as plausible, and as philosophical, as the whole doctrine of experience can ever furnish. The mind, by the habit of observing these sequences in an invariable order of succession, comes at length to the persuasion of its necessity. At first, the "imagination" is "faint," but through the frequent repetition, custom excites "a more vivid and lively idea," which is a "belief" in the necessary connection and order of these sequences; and that thus, when the antecedent is given in experience, the mind ultimately comes to expect the consequent as a necessary attendant. And this is, in fact, the whole conception of causation, which can possibly, by any thinking in reflection, be gotten from the entire philosophy of sensation. The foundation-principle of all inductive science is a mere assumption, and so soon as carefully examined, the whole ground falls away, and leaves all, beyond the sphere of actual observation and experiment, to a factitious belief, which the skeptic may question and reject as he pleases.

Now, manifestly, the qualities given in sense can never be thought in judgments, as the connected predicates of one subject, except through the notion of a *permanent substance*, of which these qualities are but its *mode* of being; nor can the changes which occur in experience be connected in judgments, except through the notion of a *cause*, which determines the order of the sequences. Without these bonds of connection to the objects of sense, we can have only a rhapsody of isolated qualities and changes, where no law combines all in one *nature*, nor enspheres all possible experience, under that law, into a *uni-*

*verse*. It is in reflection that we connect the objects of sense in judgments, and conditional for all thinking in judgments is a law of order. As conditional for all experience, it is therefore preposterous to attempt to cognize this law from experience. Our only possible course is, to find the law of the intellect which regulates its *reflection*, as before, the law of the intellect which regulates its *organic perceptions*; and by carrying this out to the examination of the objects of sense, determine thus the valid being of those laws of nature, which, from their accordance with the laws of thought, make our experience of nature possible. In this way we do not assume, but we demonstrate, that nature has necessary and universal laws; on the basis of which, our induction becomes *science*, including and expounding all possible experience.

3. A greater, and more serious difficulty than any which has yet been encountered, remains still behind. The following order of thought will show what it is, as well as the impossibility of removing it, by any other than a transcendental process of investigation.

In the philosophy of sense, the necessary and universal connection of cause and effect is a mere assumption. Hume, and after him Brown, by a slight modification of the same philosophy, are unquestionably consistent with their foundation principles, in denying to human knowledge, any thing beyond the fact of mere antecedent and consequent, in the succession of changing phenomena. No *science* can, therefore, be raised upon the assumption of the necessary laws of nature. But both Hume and Brown recognize the fact, that the human mind attains the conviction of a necessary and invariable connection in the order of sequences. Hume originates this conviction, in the frequent repetition of the experience; and Brown accounts for it, by resolving the whole, solely, into the formation of the human mind. With neither, is there any knowledge of such necessary connection; but, with the first, through habit, and with the second, through an arbitrary conformation of nature, we are made to rest necessarily in such a conviction.

Now, with this "necessary belief" of the invariable connection and order in the sequence of events, from whatever source derived, there comes the occasion for a skepticism, which the philosophy of experience can never exclude, relatively to the fact, or the possibility, of any interference in the order of nature. All evidence of the alleged past interruptions in the order of

nature, must rest upon testimony; and no testimony is competent to give a conviction so deep of the violation, as is the unavoidable conclusion of the human mind in reference to the constancy and perpetuity of the laws of nature. All alleged miracles are thus beyond the possibility of rational belief. There may be very strange and unaccountable occurrences, but the human mind must conclude, that in all such cases there was really no violation of the laws of nature, but some unseen law was present which secured the strange event. At least, this necessary conviction of the uniformity of nature is sufficient ground for the philosopher to say—I doubt—in the face of any testimony for a miracle.

Nor is this all sophistry. It rests upon the very laws of human experience. If the real point of the difficulty be not turned aside, it is safe to say, that, from no philosophy of sense, has there as yet been found a conclusive answer.

Mere skepticism, however, on this point, is by no means the full strength of the difficulty. By a transcendental process, we arrive at the conclusion, not as a necessary belief from custom or from an arbitrary constitution of mind, but through a rational and rigid demonstration, that nature has fixed and constant laws. The very laws by which intelligence must proceed in reflection, as we shall subsequently show, demand this fixed order in the successive phenomena of nature. We thus shut ourselves up within the necessary bonds of cause and effect, and if our philosophy can go no farther, it will not be mere *doubt* whether there can be any interference with the order of nature, it becomes a demonstrated *science*, that nature's laws are the highest of all principles, and absolutely inviolable. Having bound ourselves fast within nature, unless our philosophy give us some principle by the help of which, *per saltum mortale*, we can project ourselves out beyond nature, then must we be content to abide the destiny of nature; and ourselves, soul and body, with all about us, are but the several links, each in our places, which constitute the progressive series of a fixed succession that is both endless and changeless. Not merely can we know nothing beyond, there is nothing beyond.

There are long-standing and far-famed theories of metaphysics, which inevitably involve these conclusions. Although they give qualifying appellations to the uses of necessity, as applied to the different phenomena of mind and matter in their connections; but yet include all the changes in each, under the

same category of an efficient causation ; when pushed intrepidly to their final issue, they utterly shut out all possibility of the knowledge of any God above nature. There is nothing within but necessitated causation, and it is thus impossible for the human mind to go out beyond the links of necessitated successions.

Aside, however, from these theories, sustained by good and great men, but who assuredly never followed them out to their ultimate results, there are more modern examples of a spurious transcendentalism, resting apparently satisfied in the full conclusion, that the cognition of the unchanging laws of nature constitutes the *ultima thule*, in the progress of the human intellect. They have followed the demonstrations of philosophy up to the cognition of nature, as ensphered in universal laws, and have thence shut off all light from beyond, which might guide them to the apprehension of any being above nature. Without any direct intimation by himself of his position, we sometimes learn infallibly from the views of a writer, that this was the only standpoint from which they could be taken ; and we know hence how to interpret him over those multiplied pages, in which, with English words and a foreign idiom, he tells his time-message, fulfils his life-task, and goes onward to the goal appointed. Others more distinctly define their position ; some in an intelligible diction, and some beyond all hope of comprehension, but there are gleams of truth, so bright and pure amid the mist and darkness, that we are forced to ask, whether the prevailing insanity may not sometimes have its flashes of inspiration.

Doubtless these views are spreading in the community, under the influence, which imposing forms, and an appearance of philosophy, and a seeming hearty sincerity, are giving to them. Especially do they captivate the minds of the youth in our colleges, who are just beginning to think and speculate. They are thus borne away from the sure footing of a sound philosophy, before the intellect is sufficiently mature to comprehend the hazard of assent, until it can see clear, and see far. With all the reverence which is here felt for nature, and all the deference paid to reason, and the earnest desire to elevate the human mind, and bring it off from the service of dead forms, to the worship of living truth, still this entire philosophy terminates in the acknowledgment of a Universe, a Soul, and a God, all completely circumscribed within the iron law of a necessitated order of operation. The whole chain is a unit, and every being and event are the component links, each conditioned by its



antecedent and necessitating its consequent. From the first link, if any first there be, no one is independent of its fellows, but one exists for all, and all for each; and the whole, including its hypothetical first link, is altogether a *thing*, possessing no proper personality. The Deity is the mere abstract force and law of the whole combination, working in and through it; and by an intestine necessity working orderly, incessantly, and irresistibly, but at the same time, also, working with simple spontaneity, alike destitute of feeling, or foresight, or freedom. This spontaneous energizing it is which evolves the universe; and the Deity can no more be without the universe, than the universe can be without the Deity. Hence the glowing, and often most sublime and beautiful representations, of the deep, ever mysterious, silent, and eternal workings of this power within and around us. All things together working on, and working out their own destiny; and the changeless law of the whole, which pervades the whole, is the God of the whole; and all is thus conclusively ensphered in a transcendental Pantheism.

And now, verily, it will but little subserve the good cause, to meet this highest form of infidelity by ridicule, or by hard names, or by reproachful epithets. It is a real, existing form of thought, and has much of high truth combined within it; and it will never be laughed out of countenance, nor beaten down by denunciation. Nature *has* fixed, and universal laws, which are working out for her a progressive and orderly development. What we need is, a philosophy which does not stop here, and worship only amid the laws and principles of nature. We must gain a steadfast position within nature, from which we can clearly look beyond nature, and cognize a LIBERTY, which while as absolute cause it can give birth to nature, is competent to originate its creations, in the full possession of an alternative election. We must discipline the mind and purify the vision, until we can discriminate liberty from instinct, or spontaneity, or unhindered causation in one direction; and come to the cognition of it, as a capacity to originate from *within* its own being, and put its creations forth to be *distinct from* its own being, while it is itself unconditioned by any prior causation. Unless we can do this, we can have no idea of a personal, independent Deity; and until we cognize the actual existence of the grand archetype of that idea, we have but an "unknown God."

Except this be accomplished, philosophy leaves her mission unfulfilled. Then, and only then, have we cognized truly a

Creator, when we have found that Being who originates the universe from himself, without himself existing at all as a component and included element within it. A living, rational, personal, free Being—who, though originating nature, still stands forth beyond nature, and can operate upon and within it, at his pleasure—can alone be the only true God. And, surely, this cannot otherwise be done, than by carrying our investigations beyond the field of actual experience, and attaining the ground of a transcendental science. The Being whom we seek is himself a transcendental object; working, himself, within and all through our experience, but never becoming a phenomenal fact for experience. The primitive conditional law of the intellect, for all rational cognition, is as essential to be cognized, in order to demonstrate the validity of the object of reason, as, before, we have shown the necessity for cognizing the laws of the intellect in both its acts of reflection and perception, for establishing the validity of substances and causes in reflection, and of phenomena in perception.

On this high ground is it, that there are now in the process of erection some of the most elaborate systems of infidelity. It were a shame to philosophy and to the church, not to make a full and final conquest of all that region, which, from the days of Plato, have been by right of discovery—and even from the days of Moses, by right of divine authority—the domain of truth, of freedom, and of science; and which has only seemed to pass into the hands of “the aliens,” by a most arrogant usurpation. Every mind which has worked its way upward to these heights of thought, well knows that there is in this pure region a broad and fair inheritance for philosophy to explore, possess, and cultivate. If some who have been there, dizzy with height and dazzled with excessive brightness, have taken up wrong positions and run false lines, their errors are not to be redressed by ridicule nor railing from below; but, assuredly, in no other method than by “girding up the loins,” and ascending to the same heights, and, by a more accurate survey, subverting their false positions and abolishing their wrong landmarks. Error, when brought anywhere within the grasp of omnipotent truth, is easily crushed; but never can we lay the hand of truth upon these errors in high places, except as some shall go up, and fix their firm stand, upon this last and highest point, where science and skepticism can grapple in conflict.

These three important inquiries, now concisely stated, respect-

ing the valid being of the phenomena of sense ; the connection of these into a nature, by valid laws ; and the true being of a God, out of and beyond nature, as its Creator and Governor ; constitute the proper field for the science of *ontology*—or the doctrine of being—and the several answers to which, include the ends we have proposed to ourselves in the subsequent investigation. These answers can no otherwise be attained, than through a cognition of the laws of our entire intellectual action—the law of perception, which verifies phenomena—the law of reflection, which verifies the connection and order of nature—the law of reason, which verifies the being of God—and this cognition of the conditional laws of the intellect, is what we have termed *rational psychology*. The science of ontology can be approached through no other possible medium than that of rational psychology. The course leads upward, to some of the highest points of speculation to which the human mind can elevate itself. So far forth, as the answers to these inquiries shall compel conviction in thinking minds, will there be laid the sure foundations of science, and only to such an extent can skepticism be excluded. This is not the place to assert, that an affirmative answer to all these questions can be put in the clear sun-light of demonstration ; but we are about to attempt, in all humility, and with some sense of the magnitude of the undertaking, how far and how firm we can find ground, on which may stand secure the whole completed structure of human science. Relatively to the above questions, the issue lies between mere assumption and complete demonstration. The first may have probabilities, commending the answer to our *faith* ; the last, only, can enforce the convictions of *science*. Is then the human mind, physically, “shut up to faith?” or, is there that which it may know? So far as the present attempt avails, the sequel will show which is the alternative that must be adopted.

*Validity of this Science.*—As a preliminary to all intelligent progress towards the attainment of the foregoing ends, we need a distinct apprehension of that which will give validity to all our conclusions. Without this, every step must be taken wholly at random in the darkness, and if perchance we should stumble upon our object, we should be utterly incompetent to realize our good fortune. The question is not, properly, “What is truth?”—for an answer to this would embrace *all* that is true, both that which is known, and that which is unknown. Our inquiry

respects the *knowledge* of truth, rather than the abstract *being* of truth. *What is true or valid science?*

The answer is, of course, exclusive of all that depends upon testimony. The highest degree to which confidence rises from testimony is to be termed *faith*, not *science*.

Of consciousness, however, in the facts of our own experience, we are wont to say, we *know*—not merely that we *believe* them to be. But of the validity of consciousness for proper science, we need to make accurate discriminations. What consciousness is, we shall hereafter more fully examine; but, for our present purpose, the common conception of consciousness is sufficiently explicit. Where empirical philosophy is alone concerned, consciousness is, and must be, the ultimate criterion of the facts. An appeal from consciousness would carry the case wholly out of experience. The man doubts the reality of the facts, as given in consciousness; but this very doubting is a fact given in consciousness, and thus his skepticism destroys the possibility of its own valid affirmation. If his consciousness is valid for the fact of his doubting, it is equally valid for all other facts which come within it.

So also, if there be an alleged contradictory consciousness respecting the same thing, by any two minds, the appeal at once lies to the common consciousness of mankind, or, what is properly meant by *common sense*. If, from the universal language, or laws, or customs, or any other facts applicable to the race, it can be determined what the general consciousness of mankind is, relatively to the point at issue, this must at once detect, which is the mendacious consciousness. The alleged consciousness, belied by the universal consciousness of the race, must be renounced; or the man must admit himself to be *alterum genus*, and thus excluded from all participation in the common nature of humanity. To go farther, in either of the above cases, is to carry the matter wholly off from the ground of experience. This, for empiricism, is therefore the ultimate criterion for the establishment of its facts.

But suppose the skepticism does go farther, and thus cut deeper than this. Berkeley admitted a *real appearance* in consciousness, but denied all validity of an *outward being* to the objects of sense. Hume admitted the decisions of universal consciousness relatively to an outer world, and founded upon that admission, the so much more incorrigible and helpless skepticism, of a necessary conviction of universal consciousness

flatly contradicted by the plain demonstrations of reason. The skeptic may, then, affirm of his doubts, and of all other facts of consciousness, that they *seem* to be thus : but that it may only be a seeming in appearance, with no validity of real being :—and may also affirm, that the universal convictions of men, his own included, are necessitated by the conscious perceptions of sense ; but that still philosophy proves this universal conviction to be false ;—and then what can empirical philosophy further do ? The case is carried beyond the last tribunals, unsettled ; because the judge applies an assumption, to which the skeptic, with equal right, opposes a counter-assumption. Must then the case lie forever undecided ? We answer, so far as consciousness, in simple experience, is concerned, there is no possible help for it. Here, then, we discriminate, and admit, that the unexamined decisions of consciousness, in relation to the validity of our experience, may be questioned. Simple consciousness is sufficient for the fact of *appearance* ; we know that there is a seeming perception ; but without an examination and knowledge of the law of consciousness itself, we do not *know* that the seeming perception has an-objectively valid being. This may be assumed, with Reid ; but while it is merely assumed, it can never prevent the counter-assumptions of skepticism.

What, then, is a valid criterion of true science ? The answer we will propound, as concisely and clearly as practicable.

To *know*, involves the *knowing* and the *known*. There must be the subjective act, and the objective reality. The subjective part of the process, considered as distinct by itself, is wholly intellectual, and involves *thinking* as an exercise, and *the thought* as a product. The objective part, separately considered, is an existence independent of the intellect, and includes the *matter* as the being, and the *form* as determination of the mode of being. We may, in our farther explication, pass over wholly the thinking in the subjective, and the matter in the objective, as the merely phenomenal content of sense ; and apply the investigation solely to the thought and the form. Let it be permitted to designate the thought, by the precise and exclusive term—*IDEA*—and the form by a term equally precise and exclusive—*LAW*. And now that will be valid science, or the cognition of real being, when the subjective *Idea* accords with the objective *Law*.

Particular illustrations will here more completely develop our meaning, on this necessarily abstruse subject, than any mere

statement, however carefully the language may be chosen to avoid ambiguity, and render the thought perspicuous.

The mind which first invented a watch, must have had an end in view, as the noting of time ; and then, by a process of thinking, have joined its conceptions in a certain order, by which the whole combined result was made to stand forth in its unity, as one thought. This was wholly in the intellect, and as such was the *idea*. As a process of thought, and a result attained, there was truth ; but as there was no corresponding reality existing as yet, there could of course be no cognition of a watch. There was the subjective truth, but not the objective being. Another mind perceives a watch, as a phenomenon of sense, and distinguishes all its component materials. Its whole variety of metals, shapes, relative positions, and perfection of workmanship and polish in the different parts, are all noticed and appreciated. But in all this, there is no more the cognition of the watch, as a *chronometer*, than would be gained from an inspection of an equal variety of pebbles. The *law*, which combines the whole into one system, is not apprehended ; and though it be there as object, it is not known.

Now the *idea* in the one case, and the *law* in the other case, are complete correlates ; and except as the idea in the subject and the law in the object come, in the light of consciousness, into complete accordance, there can be no *science*. It is wholly immaterial which is the order of apprehension—the thinking may have given the idea, and that may have induced the artist to put it into outward being, as the law of the combination ; or the perception of the parts, as already arranged under the law, may have induced the idea ; the difference is only that one mind is the inventor, and the other a learner—but, in one order or the other, the consciousness of their accordance must be, or there is no cognition of an objective reality.

This holds true, not merely in works of human art, but everywhere throughout nature. Every object has its law of combination and being. Animals, plants, minerals, earths, may all appear as phenomena, but they are not known in their distinctive, valid being, except as cognized in their peculiar formative principles, or specific laws of organization. And all these again have their more comprehensive law, which combines them into the round world on which we dwell ; and higher laws combine worlds into systems ; and still higher, systems into a universe. Our science reaches no farther than where our clearly evolved

intellectual idea corresponds to the apprehended law, which combines and informs the object.

Equally manifest is this in all those pure intuitions, which the mind constructs for itself in void space and time. The idea, and the according law in their construction, determine their valid cognition. In my idea, a line is a point produced; a circle is that produced line returning again into itself, with every point in it equidistant from a central point; a cylinder is the revolution of a parallelogram about one of its sides; a cone is the revolution of a right-angled triangle about one of its sides containing the right-angle, etc. And when I would construct such pure intuitions in space, the law, for the motion of my constructive act, accords completely and universally with my intellectual ideas. Thus, also, with any combination of numbers, as intuitions of pure successions in time. The rule is the expression of the intellectual idea, and the arithmetical computation ever contains within its combination the law in accordance with it. The whole *science* of pure mathematics rests entirely upon the apprehension of this correlation of the idea and the law.

Thus, in all cases, science demands the law, which, as it is the determining or formative principle of the phenomenon as given by sense, is that which can alone expound and verify it as a real object. But this outward law in the object can never be a perception of the senses. It can be cognized only as a correlative to the idea in the intellect. The phenomenon, without the law, is mere appearance; the intellectual idea, without the object, is mere void thought. The idea in the intellect, and the law in the object, must both be given in their correlation, or there can be no cognition.

And this directly unfolds the necessity for cognizing the intellect in its laws of operation, in order to any valid science of outward objects. The object, as known, must be in its existence conformable to the laws of thought, or it can be nothing for the human intellect. Had the phenomena of sense no connecting laws, they might appear as mere qualities and changes; but they could not be known as other than isolated, fleeting phantoms: and were these connecting laws any other than in full accordance with the laws of thought, the human mind could have no cognition of them, for it could not bring its own ideas in correlation with them. In order to verify our cognitions, we must, therefore, cognize the intellect itself; and the same thing is conditional for cognizing the intellect as for any thing

else, viz., that we cognize it in its conditional laws. This is a peculiarity of mind, that it can make itself its own object; and in its original thinking attain the idea, and through its consciousness of operation give the law, which, in their accordance, legitimates the cognition.

This is, then, conclusive for valid science, if the laws of intelligence can themselves be made the exponent and criterion of the cognitions of the intellect. We then know the knower in his laws of operation, and can apply science itself to the correction or confirmation of our entire intellectual action; just as the astronomer corrects, confirms, and adjusts his telescope. The law of intelligence itself becomes the valid test of our science, and in this law we discriminate true being from all illusive appearance, or mental hallucination, or credulous *clairvoyance*. We thus also legitimate and necessitate a *transcendental philosophy*; and albeit that it has been pressed in its blindness into the service of the uncircumcised, yet is it none the less, but all the more important, that it should be brought forth in its strength, and placed where it may feel the pillars of that profane temple in which it has been exposed to mockery.

So far as this science of sciences can be fairly extended, it legalizes the whole possession to philosophy; and by this, even mathematical demonstration itself alone sustains its claims. The whole domain of science may in this manner be cleared from all the intrusions of skepticism; but except these title-deeds be in our hands, we can never sue out a summary process of ejectment against any determined trespasser.

It is proper also to mention a consequent benefit, of no trifling moment, which the success of this undertaking secures. By cognizing the intelligence itself in its laws, we make a complete circumscription of the human mind, and determine the limits of its entire capacity. And though we are competent to say nothing beforehand of the *items* of future science, yet shall we be able to draw the lines upon the map before us, and determine the only *regions* which human science can ever explore. A *complete classification* of all science is thus practicable, and the only scientific classification which can be, viz., that indicated by the laws of all science.

The human mind will doubtless be ever progressive; but in eternity it must progress according to the law of its own action. Unless, then, new laws are to be given to our intelligence, by direct Omnipotence, we may now be able to embrace in our com-



prehension the entire sphere of our future action. When rolling cycles shall have passed in pure and holy employment, we must even yet be acting within the laws which define our mental capacities; and although then but just opening, perhaps, some broad scene of life, and being, and reality, still stretching ever onward; yet, from these unchanged laws, may we even now determine the outlines of that field, within which our free, intelligent agency must somewhere be—

“While life, and thought, and being last,  
Or immortality endures.”

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## ARTICLE VII.

### PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH.

By J. W. Nevin, D. D. President of Marshall College, Mercersburg, Pa.

FAVORABLE notice has been taken in the *Biblical Repository* of a small work, by Dr. Murdock of New-Haven, entitled *Sketches of Modern Philosophy, especially among the Germans*. It is only lately that the writer has had an opportunity of seeing and reading this little volume, though it has been about a year before the public.

It is not intended to enter into any particular consideration of the merits of the work, as a whole. In the nature of the case, considering its diminutive form, the vast dimensions of its subject, and the circumstances of its preparation, it could not be either full or profound. It was announced in the form of Newspaper Essays, “at the request of several gentlemen, chiefly clergymen, who said they could obtain no definite ideas of the modern German Philosophy.” After some progress had been made with the “piecemeal composition,” it was judged best to throw it into the form of a volume, that it might serve still more extensively to literary clergymen and others in the dark, as a lantern and clew to guide them through the intricacies and mysteries of this foreign labyrinth. The author modestly declines all personal responsibility as a “teacher of philosophical science.” He brings forward no system of his own, and offers

no "*critique* upon the writings and speculations of others." He is not a philosopher, he tells us, but comes forward as a mere *historian*, narrating the progress of speculative philosophy in modern times." This is to be sure a great undertaking. The German philosophers would tell us, as with one mouth, that to trace the history of philosophy, even for a short period, a man *must* be himself a philosopher, and a philosopher too of no mean size. To know much about any science or art, in their view, a man must first penetrate the art or science to some extent for himself. But especially necessary is this held to be, in the case of philosophy, which may be said to involve all other kinds of knowledge. That a man should pretend to understand a single system of philosophy, that of Hegel for instance, by observations taken from without merely, they would regard as not less extravagant, than it would be for him to think of measuring the sea and estimating its contents from some quiet position on the shore. With Hegel himself, philosophy and the history of philosophy are in the end one and the same thing. To be understood, it must be made to live in our own minds. All this, however, might be considered hard doctrine, and clearly *transcendental* withal, on this side of the Atlantic. We may well admire, therefore, the courage of Dr. Murdock, who in the face of such German authority, has undertaken to give us in these sketches a picture in full of Modern Philosophy, through all its varying phases, without the least thought of being a philosopher himself, from the beginning to the end of the process. And then that he should dare to do all this, in the compass of a small 18mo volume of two hundred pages, medium print and leaded, is perhaps more admirable still. Tennemann's *Grundriss*, or Rixner's *Handbuch*, as they are facetiously styled, might seem a folio to a primer in comparison. Hegel has left behind him a history of philosophy, in popular form, which fills three volumes, to the amount altogether of about 1700 full octavo pages; and yet this was considered to be so meagre on the period between Kant and himself, that his editor, Michelet, has deemed it necessary to cover the ground, from that point onward, with upwards of 1300 pages more, in a separate work. But here verily we have the world in a nut-shell. "After a brief statement of the two principal modes of philosophizing, the author endeavors to describe summarily but distinctly, all the more noted systems proposed by the metaphysical philosophers from the times of Des Cartes to the present day."

And all this in a small 18mo of 200 pages, with medium print and leads, and no more matter than might be presented in a single number of the New-York Observer. Of a truth may it be said, that we live in an age of steam; and also that America is emphatically the land of steam. Could any work well be conceived more accommodating and obliging, in all respects, to the condition of the "several gentlemen," that could obtain no definite ideas of the modern German philosophy, for whose special benefit it was undertaken, or more likely to be welcome to many "others in like circumstances?" But in the nature of the case, as now explained, we should not expect to find this history remarkably profound. To answer its vocation at all, it was necessary that it should only skim the surface of the "vastly deep" it was sent forth to explore, and fetch back so much as it could pick up in its flight, and might have strength besides to carry. And this is all it can be considered to have accomplished in fact.

It is, however, for the sake of the last chapter more particularly, that the work is now noticed. Not satisfied with exhibiting, in the narrow limits that have been mentioned, the metaphysical systems of Europe from Des Cartes to Hegel and Cousin, Dr. Murdock finds room for a very liberal share of attention to what he denominates German philosophy in America. Nearly one fourth part of the whole volume is devoted to this subject, under the titles of Coleridgeism, the Unitarian Transcendentalism of New England, and the philosophy of the late Dr. Frederick A. Rauch, as contained in his *Psychology*. The entire concluding chapter is occupied with this last; and a representation is given of the views of the deceased president of Marshall College, which can hardly fail to seem to his friends generally in no small degree injurious to his memory. This to be sure would furnish no just ground for complaint, if the representation could be shown to be fair and correct. Where a man's views are published to the world in the form of a book, it can never be wrong to make them the subject of criticism; and if they should be found to involve false and hurtful principles, it is not only right, but may be said to be a solemn duty, to make this appear as extensively as possible, without regard to the author's reputation or the feelings of his friends. But in the present instance, it is believed that the representation which has been made is neither fair nor correct. At the same time, it is likely to be widely respected, as proceeding from a man

so eminent as Dr. Murdock, and so much at home as he must naturally be considered to be in the mysteries of German philosophy. However loosely and blindly the terms *pantheism* and *transcendentalism* may be used by others, they will be supposed to mean something from the lips of the accomplished translator of Mosheim, formally employed in dissecting the various systems of modern metaphysics from Des Cartes and Leibnitz downwards. In these circumstances, it seems a debt of justice, no less than of friendship, to the character of Dr. Rauch, to rescue his work, if it can be done, from the unfavorable light, in which it is here made to stand.

"Dr. Rauch," we are told by the author of these sketches, "was one of that class of German philosophers who, embracing fully the transcendental speculations of Schelling and Hegel, have labored to reconcile them with the religion of the Bible." Of his psychology he says, "There is a philosophy underlying it, which it is not difficult to discover, and that philosophy is manifestly *transcendental*, and derived from the school of *Hegel*." "As a philosopher, Dr. Rauch was a *Transcendentalist*; for he maintains that our reason gives us *objective knowledge* of things, and not merely *subjective knowledge*."—"Being a *Transcendentalist*, Dr. Rauch was diametrically opposed to the views of Kant, whose critical philosophy has for its chief aim to overthrow all Transcendentalism, or as Kant would rather call it, *Transcendentalism*." "As a Transcendental philosopher, Dr. Rauch belonged to the school of *Hegel*, and not to that of Schelling."—"Whether his philosophy is favorable to sound views of religion, deserves more examination than comports with the design of these sketches. If I have not entirely misunderstood him, he is a *Transcendentalist* and a *Pantheist* of the school of *Hegel*. It is also noticeable that his book makes no allusion to any *special revelation* from God, or to an *apostacy* of man, the intervention of a *Saviour*, the *forgiveness of sin* in consequence of an *atonement*, a future *judgment*, and eternal *retributions* after the present life. At the same time, his pantheistic, transcendental principles serve to leave little or no room for these cardinal doctrines of the Bible."

These are grave charges, and not the less so that the principal terms employed in the case are, for most persons, of such vague and uncertain signification. It is very doubtful, whether with the benefit even of Dr. Murdock's historical analysis one out of ten among his readers, not previously enlight-

ened from other sources, will be found to have any "definite idea," when all is done, of what is to be understood either by pantheism or transcendentalism, as here so liberally applied to the views of Dr. Rauch—only it must be clear to all, that they are intended to mean something very bad, and full scope is left to the imagination, stimulated by darkness, to fill them with the worst sense it may be able to command.

There are various kinds of pantheism. In one sense, we may speak of a pantheism that is found in the Bible itself, and that furnishes the only correct view that can be taken of the relation of God to his works. "Of Him, through Him, and to Him, are all things." He is the ground of the universe and its life. "In Him we live and move, and have our being." The world springs from God, and is comprehended in God, continually. This is the doctrine of the Bible. There is reason to apprehend, however, that this truth is not held for the most part in a form fully adequate to its demands. The world is so separated from God, in the general view, as to be considered in fact an independent existence. While the theory of an *eternal matter*, out of which the present system of nature might be supposed to have been constructed is rejected, such a view is still entertained of the system of nature actually existing, as may be said to involve practically with regard to God the very same error. Nor is this to be counted a light heresy. Dualism, with all its insidious plausibility, is, to say the least, no less inimical to all right conceptions of religion, than pantheism itself. It is to be taken for granted, that Dr. Murdock is orthodox at this point; and yet it might really seem that there was room occasionally to doubt it, from the way in which he exemplifies his idea of pantheism in the case of Dr. Rauch. Thus, for instance, he is dissatisfied with a passage in the *Psychology*, page 43, in which it is said that it is an error, to consider nature, and its manifold powers as a *mechanical whole*, whose parts have been brought together by some mechanic, and whose *powers exist side by side*, without having any affinity to, or connection with each other; that it is on the contrary a *system*, alive and active in all its elements and atoms, and filled with powers, which flow invisibly into each other, actuated by eternal laws. So he finds the same sort of error in the following propositions: "All life, wherever it exists, is *formed* and *organized*." Form is not and cannot be the result of matter which is chaotic and shapeless. *Form* in man, and

throughout the universe, is the result of *thought*. Hence *life*, being formed, does not proceed from *matter*; but is a *thought of God, accompanied by the divine will*, to be realized in nature, and to appear externally by an organized body." "The *soul of man* is likewise a *divine thought*, a creation of God, *filled with power to live an existence of its own*." "Reason has not its origin in itself; its author is God, whose will lives in it as its law." "That which truly is in nature, are the *divine thoughts*, the *divine laws*; and all the rest is but matter." If language like this involve pantheism, it would be easy to charge the heresy upon the excellent Olshausen in full, and to some extent on every evangelical writer in Germany of the present age. Leighton, Howe, and the most spiritual English divines of the 17th century generally, could hardly escape condemnation. It might be difficult even to vindicate the Bible itself from reproach. Seriously we might ask, can Dr. Murdock mean to exhibit the opposite of this theory of the creation, as his own? Does he hold that nature is *not* a system, but a mechanism only, made up of parts outwardly brought together and fitted side by side? Does he hold that *life can* proceed from matter? Or will he venture to say, that any existence can hold in nature, or in the world of mind, that is not rooted continually in the thought and volition of God? The propositions from Dr. Rauch are, I know, quoted as involving *more* than this. But can this be considered fair? And does it not perhaps betray a wrong habit of mind, leaning towards the other extreme, when such statements are thus felt to be the fruit of a philosophy essentially pantheistic.

But Dr. Murdock is sufficiently explicit as to the measure of odium he wishes to be included, in this case, in the imputation of pantheism. It is not the pantheism of Malebranche, or Spinoza, or Schelling, which, according to him, is intertwined with the psychology of Dr. Rauch, but specifically the pantheism of *Hegel*. How much is comprehended in this charge, may appear from what the author says of Hegel's philosophy, when he has it under consideration. "Hegel's was a system of absolute *idealism*, while Schelling's was rather a system of *realism*; for Schelling, like Spinoza, considered the original All-One as a real substance, which evolved itself into the existing universe: but Hegel considered mere ideas or conceptions as the only real existences; he believed that there is nothing in the universe more substantial or more real than what he calls *concrete ideas*

and conceptions." "They reduce all things to one primal substance, the All-One, or God, which develops itself according to certain laws inherent in its very nature, and thereby presents to us all the variety, and beauty, and harmony of this great universe. And the latest and most renowned of these philosophers makes this primal All-One to be himself nothing but an idea or conception of the human mind." Such is the general view of Hegel's philosophy, accepted by Dr. Murdock in the midst of the acknowledged darkness in which it is shrouded to his mind. Some of his followers have denied, it is true, that he taught any such system. But so he has been understood by at least a large section of his school; and this, at all events, is what is taken for Hegelian pantheism by Dr. Murdock. And so we need be at no loss to see how much is meant, when he allows himself to say of Dr. Rauch, "If I have not entirely misunderstood him, he is a *Transcendentalist* and a *Pantheist* of the school of *Hegel*." He might well speak of his book, in this view, as of *questionable* soundness, with regard to religion. Hegelian pantheism leaves no room for the idea of a personal God, or for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. It is admitted, at the same time, that Dr. Rauch "everywhere manifests profound reverence for God, and a deep sense of the importance of religion." But it seems to be insinuated, immediately afterwards, that this could hardly be honest, since his views are such as tend virtually to subvert the very foundations of piety.

Now, if it be a fact that Dr. Rauch is in his *Psychology* a "pantheist of the school of Hegel," he must have been so in his own consciousness to the end of his life. "Being a man of genius, and familiar with the numerous and learned works of the Germans on psychology," as Dr. M. informs us, he could not construct his system in this form without being aware of what he was about. He must have *known* that he was weaving Hegelian pantheism, with its rejection of the soul's immortality and a personal God, into his whole course of instruction on the subject of the human mind; and it must have been his *intention* to infuse this false philosophy along with what he thus taught. More than this, he must have taken pains to deceive the world with regard to his views in this respect, in order the more effectually to insinuate the poison of his errors. For his book is any thing but a bold and open avowal of pantheism: and to the end of his life he disclaimed it with abhorrence. Those who knew

him intimately will not easily be induced to believe, either that he was ignorant of his own position relatively to the pantheism of Hegel's school, or that he made it his business hypocritically to keep it out of sight. They will give full credit to his own testimony concerning himself in this case, and are likely to have as much confidence in his judgment with regard to the nature of the philosophy that is embodied in his *Psychology*, as in the judgment of his distinguished critic on the same point. Dr. Murdock pronounces him a pantheist of the school of Hegel. He himself, in the class-room and in private communication with his friends, to say nothing of his profession and preaching as a regular minister of the gospel, always reprobated pantheism, and professed in opposition to it the simple faith of the Bible. Most certainly he never intended his book to be pantheistic, and never considered it to be so in fact. The second edition of it was prepared, we may say, upon his death-bed; during his last sickness, at least, and in the midst of much solemn meditation on his condition and prospects. It is not to be imagined for a moment that he was not honest in these circumstances in what he professed with regard to this point.

It is rather strange again, if the work be so clearly pantheistic in its character as here represented, that the fact should entirely have escaped the notice of the reviewers generally on its first appearance; and especially that this should have been the case with the *Biblical Repertory*, of Princeton, which is commonly so keen of scent in the direction of every thing that is in the least tainted with German rationalism, and in the view of which Hegel might seem to stand as the very incarnation of Satan himself. Soon after the appearance of the first edition, it was made the subject of a full and able review in this periodical, where it is spoken of in terms of the highest praise. In that article, no discovery is made that Dr. Rauch is "a pantheist of the school of Hegel." On the contrary, we find the subject referred to in the following style: "If we could clearly discern in his elaborate work a tendency towards this hideous system, no considerations even of personal friendship should withhold us from denouncing it in the strongest terms. Let others, if they see cause, sneer at these fears of pantheistic speculation, as idle, prejudiced, and proceeding from shallowness of mind. We see such a gulf between the idea of a God—eternal, unchangeable, all-wise, all-good, simple, immense, and *personal*—and that of an eternal, impersonal chaos, ever striving after self-consciousness, that we conceive of



no two systems more destructive of one another; the difference between Deism and Christianity being trifling in the comparison. Of this godless philosophy, we see no traces in the work. If, in a few instances, modes of expression have strayed into the system, which seem to have come from the enemy's camp, we hope it is from mere neglect, and that these forms will be exchanged for others more becoming a Christian, a supernaturalist, and a believer in Jesus. We rejoice to see for once a work on philosophy, in which we find the name of Christ, and in which are recognized the fallen state of man, the need of regeneration, and the influence of the Holy Spirit." Thus the Biblical Repertory in 1840. But we are now assured by Dr. Murdock, that the cardinal doctrines of the Bible are *not* recognized in the book at all, and that the author of it was clearly a Transcendentalist and a Pantheist of the school of Hegel. Strange that the Argus of the Princeton Review should have been so utterly mystified and bamboozled in so clear a case. The only part of the work which causes the Review to pause with painful misgiving, is the passage on the subject of *personality*, in which some expressions occur that do certainly carry along with them a pantheistic sound; though even here a general confidence is declared in the author, as not intending himself to appear, even for a moment, in the interest of pantheism. When Dr. Rauch read this stricture, it may be here remarked, he seemed both surprised and hurt that there should appear to be any thing so equivocal in his language at this point as the reviewer supposed; while at the same time he spoke of it in the most prompt and free way, as an utter misapprehension of his meaning. In the second edition, accordingly, we find, instead of the expression, "God, who is *the* person," which was noted with anxiety, as confounding human personality with the divine, the clearer statement, "God, who is the *ground* of all personality," which, however, Dr. Murdock still quotes as a specimen of the very error it was intended to escape. And to prevent all misunderstanding still further, there is *added* to the statement, in this edition, a clear, categorical, and formal declaration, on the part of the author, as had been suggested by the Repertory, that he did not mean to mix the personality of man, in any sense, with the personality of God. "In saying that God is the ground of all personality," he says, "we mean that he freely created man; that there was no *emanation*, by virtue of which the Deity flowed forth into man, and could not return to himself again. If

that were the case, our highest wisdom would become an Ego-logy, and the Bible and theology would become superfluous. So the personality of God differs widely from that of man. Its elements are omniscience and omnipotence, and all the other infinite attributes. Those of human personality are a limited reason and will, attached to nerves and muscles."

Still there is the book to speak for itself. It involves a system of philosophy, and this we are told is transcendental and pantheistic, the opinion of the author to the contrary notwithstanding. It must be confessed, however, that the proofs of any such pantheism in the work as is attributed to Hegel, are hard to be found or felt. Dr. Murdock, indeed, quotes what he deems sufficient evidence to establish the point. But after all he reaches it, in his own way, only by implication from premises which are by no means clear, and a sense put upon various statements which it is by no means necessary that they should bear.

The representation on pages 196 and 197 is so framed as to imply, that with Dr. Rauch the universe resolves itself into four leading forms of existence, and that these in the end have no reality except as immanent acts of the Divine mind. "Four divine thoughts, combined with divine volitions, constitute the entire created universe; and *God* and his *thoughts* are all that exists or has any being." Now we do not find, in the first place, precisely this four-fold classification of existences in the book; the system it presents might be said rather to comprehend five different orders, the *Inorganic*, the *Vegetable-organic*, the *Animal-organic*, the *Human*, and the *Spiritual*. Then it is not said anywhere, that matter is a mere activity, without any essence of its own. We are told that "nature is a system, not a conglomeration. Alive and active in all its elements and atoms, it is *filled with* powers, from the mechanical up to the organic, all of which flow invisibly into each other, affect and determine each other. Thus we have a constant life—powers flow up and down, to and fro." All this, however, does not affirm that matter is nothing *but* the powers with which it is filled; and much less does it teach that these powers, thus constituting all that the world is, have no existence separate from the proper personal existence of God, as a man's sensations and exercises of thinking, are a part of himself. For it does not follow, that in resolving the idea of matter even into that of mere invisible forces, constantly at work, we overthrow the

notion of its separate substantial existence. When men speak of the *essence* of matter, they speak of something of which confessedly they can have no conception. What right, then, can Dr. Murdock have to *assume* that it must hold in the form of passive expansion in space, and not in a simply dynamic form? Can he possibly dream, that such a conception of the essence of the material world serves to make its existence more *real*, or more external to God, than if it were supposed to stand in the power of such an all-pervading force as is made to constitute its essential nature in the other view? If so, it is hard to see how *his* scheme can be rescued from the charge of dualism. When we enter the sphere of organic nature, we are *compelled* to take different ground. Who that reflects, can allow the essence of a plant to be something holding in space? It can be only monadic, indivisible, dynamic. But is it the less real on this account? The most shallow view that can possibly be taken of the *essence* of things, is that which is borrowed from the senses, making it to stand in something answerable to their phenomenal character, as the Jews of old fashioned their conception of *sheol*, or the place of departed spirits, after the pattern of their sepulchres.

But we are told, that the forces which thus enter into the constitution of the universe, are exhibited as simple actings of the divine mind, so that in the end, "God and his thoughts are all that exists, or have any being." Here, however, the argument turns upon the sound of things, more than upon their proper sense. In a deep and most important sense it is true, that the forces which fill the universe, and make it what it is, are simply and continually volitions of God. Not only are they the result of his will, as concerned in their production, but they spring forth from it afresh every moment, and stand in it perpetually as their constitution and ground. Is it possible to conceive rationally of the state of the world relatively to God, under any *other* view we may be pleased to take of its essential nature? Be its essence what it may, can it be in this respect any thing more than a perpetual *Werden*, in which existence, at the same moment, *is* and *is not* at every point of its progress? We may say, then, with the fullest reason, that the different orders of existence have their ground ultimately and essentially in *ideas*, or thoughts and volitions of God. But in saying this, it is by no means necessary that we should mean to confound God with his thoughts, as

though they could have in no sense an existence separate from his own, as a man's thoughts, subjectively considered, are a part of himself. The thoughts of God, in this case, are entities of the highest order, holding directly in the divine mind, and yet capable of entering into innumerable forms of individual existence, separate and distinct. If this seem unintelligible, it might be well to consider whether the case is made a whit more easy of comprehension, by supposing individual existences to have their ground in any other sort of entity, which, after all, to be in any true sense whatever, must have its being in God.

The quotations, then, which Dr. Murdock has drawn from Rauch's *Psychology* in connection with this point, have no such import in their legitimate sense as they are made to carry. The charge of pantheism is not sustained. We find here no pantheism in the bad sense of the term; least of all such a pantheism as is attributed to Hegel, with whom, we are told, "the primal All-One is himself nothing but an idea or conception of the human mind." There is no reason, accordingly, why we should not give credit to Dr. Rauch himself, when he tells us in his book that his theory of the world "upholds the idea of a *creation*, and not *emanation*; God remaining what he is, the unchangeable Jehovah, after the universe is created." Page 186. And we may confide in his honesty, when he tells us again, that his view of human personality "by no means teaches any form of pantheism," page 191; and that by declaring God to be "the ground of all personality," he means that "he freely created man; that there was no *emanation*, by virtue of which the Deity flowed forth into man, and could not return to himself again." Page 191.

That Dr. Rauch respected Hegel, and followed him to some extent in his philosophy, is not to be questioned; just as he respected and made great account also of the authority of Kant. But this by no means implies, that he felt himself slavishly bound by Hegel's system as a whole, or that he fell blindly into its errors. The system is acknowledged to be dark and difficult to understand. His school in Germany has included men of widely different views, ranging from an extreme *right* to an extreme *left*, on the most fundamental points in religion; and many who are not considered as belonging to his school at all, have felt sensibly at various points the influence of his general scheme. How unfair, in such circumstances, to hold every measure of conformity with him obnoxious to the charge of

the worst heresies that have been found in his philosophy? If Dr. Rauch was disposed to call any man master in this sphere, it was not Hegel, but Daub. The system unfolded in his Psychology is substantially the same that is presented in the *anthropology* and lectures generally of the latter. Daub himself, it may be said, followed Hegel. But only to a certain extent. He was as free and profound as Hegel himself. To the end, he considered himself as much under the banner of Kant, as that of any of his successors, though appropriating from all of them at pleasure. To read Hegel, Dr. Rauch himself used to speak of as a sort of pastime, in comparison with sounding the depths of Daub. With all his professed respect for the Gospel, the theologian of Heidelberg, it must be acknowledged, is no safe guide in the sphere of religion. The Christian salvation may be said to perish in his hands. But his philosophy cannot be charged, in any proper sense, with the pantheism usually attributed to Hegel.

It may be admitted that the great cardinal doctrines of the Gospel, are not made to stand forth as prominently as they might, in Dr. Rauch's work on Psychology. It is to be regretted, perhaps, that this was not done, if it had been only to save appearances, where the *principle* of the omission might not generally be understood. But nothing can be inferred fairly from this circumstance, against the religious character either of the author himself, or of his book. According to the methodology he follows, generally embraced in Germany, anthropology or psychology have nothing to do directly with theology or ethics. Any formal reference therefore to the Christian doctrines, as such, must have been felt to be in this connection unscientific and out of place. The object of the treatise is to unfold the progressive development of the human soul, as reason on the one hand and will on the other, till both are fairly evolved in their proper freedom from the *involucra* of sense and nature, under which their existence is commenced. This process, as such, is something quite distinct from religion. Only when the idea of the soul under this form has been reached, may we be said to be in the element of religion, which is the consciousness of God and our relation to Him, in which our personality becomes complete. Here, however, Psychology as a science ends, or rather passes over into the science of religion. Under the general name of Theology, this becomes on the one hand dogmatic divinity, and on the other, ethics; the

last having for its object the law for the will, or the idea of *freedom*, as distinguished from that of truth.

We see, then, in what sense "the *freedom of the will* in the natural man," is denied by Dr. Rauch. By a *free will*, he understands something wholly different from what the words mean for Dr. Murdock, or for metaphysicians in this country generally. In the one case the *contents* of the will are contemplated, in the other its *form*. The will is free, in a proper sense, only when it is fairly disentangled from the control of desires, inclinations, etc., which are mere natural affections, without moral character of any sort in themselves, so as to follow simply the law of its own nature; or when, in other words, it is animated and actuated by the divine will as its soul. And yet this last representation, strangely enough, is what Dr. Murdock finds fault with, as "giving to the divine will an absolute control over the human, in the regenerate!" As though it were not the very ideal of the New Testament holiness—*Thy will be done!* Any other view of a good will must be considered sufficiently rationalistic, to say the least. And must we not be surprised again, to hear a like disapprobation expressed, in view of the statement, that man, in his natural state, is wholly *incapable of holiness?*

This article, however, is not intended to be a defence, at all points, of the views presented in Dr. Rauch's work. It may be admitted, that the *conclusion*, especially, contains some representations on the subject of religion, which are not as clear and satisfactory as might be desired; though it is believed that this difficulty would be materially relieved, if the reader were enabled to occupy precisely the point of observation, from which the views, scientifically considered, are taken. My object has been simply to vindicate the memory of a much respected friend from the general imputation of pantheism, in the worst sense, with which he has been publicly stigmatized in Dr. Murdock's Sketches; but which, I am very sure, he would himself repel, were he now alive, with sensitive and earnest abhorrence.

## ARTICLE VIII.

## ENGLISH PHONOLOGY.

By Rev. Henry N. Day, Prof. of Sacred Rhetoric, Western Reserve College, Hudson, Ohio.

It must be admitted, however disparaging it may seem to the character of English orthoëpists, that the great facts in the phonology of our language are still far from being accurately ascertained. The very foundation upon which the whole structure of our language, as a spoken language, rests;—the source from which must be derived the regulating principles both of pronunciation, and, to a considerable extent, even of etymological philology, is, even at this day, but very imperfectly defined.

In proof of this, we have only to advert to the loose and discordant, not to say often absurd, observations and dogmas published by our orthoëpists and philologists of highest reputation and of most recent date. It is a question yet to be settled, if we are to regard the authority of some late writers, whether the sounds of speech are not in part formed in the chest, or even in the abdomen, while others have their seat in the head—whether our alphabetical elements, thus, ought not to be distinguished into those of the “*voce de (di) petto*” and those of the “*voce de testa*.”

The distinction between vowels and consonants lies yet, it would seem, in mystery:—some insisting that there is no such difference as authorizes a distinct arrangement into classes; others still pertinaciously adhering to the old definitions that a vowel is a sound which can be perfectly uttered by itself, while a consonant is one which cannot be uttered without the aid of a vowel; and a third class rejecting these definitions, yet maintaining that there is a generic distinction founded in the mode of forming the sounds. Even the number of vocal elements in the language is undetermined. Scarcely any two authors can be found to agree; and the enumerations vary from twenty-four to double that number.

Passing to the respective powers of different letters, we find all confusion and dissension. It would be tedious to exemplify this in full. A few instances only, taken almost at random, will

suffice. One phonologist of eminence maintains, that the vowel sound heard in *robe* is the same as that heard in *but* ; and that the only difference between the *a* in *art*, *father*, and the *e* in *herd*, *terrible*, is one of quantity,—the vowel in the former words being long, in the latter short, so that if we only protract the *e* in *terrible*, we shall have the sound of *a* in *tar*. Another teaches us that the *y* in *duty* is long *e* in *mere*, and pronounces *yarn* as if spelled *e a r n*. The sound represented by *ng*, and heard in *sing*, is by some considered as only a combination of the *n* and *g* ; by others as consisting of a peculiar nasal like the French, and the element *g* ; by others still, as a simple element of itself, as much so as *n* or *g*.

In regard to the vocal sounds of speech as affected by accent and quantity, we discover the same unsettled state of opinion. It is yet to be defined what accent is, and how it is expressed. The seat of the accent, whether upon the vowel or consonant, or upon the entire syllable, is yet in dispute ; and it is equally questioned whether two accents are admissible in the same word. One distinguished writer has laid down the broad rule, that in an unaccented syllable, the vowel has universally a short sound. Authors differ also in regard to the effect of quantity upon the vocal elements.

That there are peculiar difficulties attending investigations in this branch of knowledge, must be admitted. The rapidity with which the elemental sounds are uttered in speech, renders it extremely difficult for the heavy organs of man to seize them, and to retain them long enough to investigate and ascertain their precise power. This is especially true of the vowel sounds when not under the accent. Hence has arisen the diversity of opinion among orthoëpists as to the power of the *a e* and *o* in words like *altar*, *river*, *honor*.

Again, the influence which the combination of one element with another has upon the sound, it is difficult to estimate with exactness. In fact, this influence has not generally been taken into the account at all in determining the nature of the individual sounds, and hence there has arisen much disagreement and error. Whether the vowel sound in *fair* is the same as that in *fat*, or in *fame*, has been a matter of much contention.

A still greater difficulty arises from the fact that the standard of pronunciation in the English language is perpetually changing. The two leading causes of these changes are to be found in the natural propensity to facilitate as much as possible the



utterance of words, and in the ready communication which our language suffers with foreign dialects. For the sake of ease in utterance, for instance, the vowels in unaccented syllables, which once were fully and distinctly articulated, are now, in many words, but very imperfectly enounced. Thus the *a* in *village*, *steerage*, and the *u* in *minute*, are commonly sounded very much like short *i* in *griffin*;—this sound being altogether more easily formed, in those connections, than that of the full *a* as in *fate*; while *scutage*, *nonage*, not having been so much exposed to this corrupting influence, in consequence of their being less used, retain the original sound of the *a*. It will be found, on examination, that many of the elemental sounds in our language have been seriously affected in this way.

Again, the familiarity of intercourse which the English language suffers with foreign languages, has opened the way for material changes in our phonology. Ears accustomed to the peculiar articulations of foreign tongues, will demand the same articulations for the same representations or letters, and for kindred sounds in their own language. Thus the gallicised Englishman will be apt to give our broad *a* as in *all*, and the Italian *a*, as it is called, in *father*, the intermediate sound which is heard in France. The *b* and the *v*, by those who have been more conversant with the German, will be modified from the pure English sounds belonging to those elements. Not only this, our language receives, with singular readiness, the words of other tongues; and, unlike most other languages, receives them in their foreign dress, with little if any alteration. The foreign pronunciation naturally follows the foreign orthography; and hence our phonology has been greatly corrupted. This cause, there is reason to believe, will continue to operate; as it is not likely, notwithstanding the efforts that are repeated, in one or another quarter, every year, to reform our orthography, that it will ever be made to conform to our orthoëpy. The French may convert the English *roast beef* into *rosbif*, when they feel the want of the foreign word; but it is not to be expected, if it is to be desired, that we shall ever write *beau*, *bo*, or *cheval de frise*, *shevo de freez*. In truth, the English language, to a far greater extent than, perhaps, any other language, is constructed for the reader rather than the hearer; for the eye rather than the ear: so that, the reverse of what is usually true, instead of selecting written characters to represent the sounds of speech, our task is rather to find sounds for our written

characters. This peculiarity strikes far deeper into our language than the oral or written dress; it penetrates the whole structure;—as well our etymology and syntax, as our orthoëpy and orthography. The language must, therefore, undergo a radical transformation—must become a different language in essential features, before these influences on our phonology, by the admission of foreign words, can be arrested.

Now it is obvious that, when such causes are operating to unsettle and vary the powers of our alphabetic characters, it must be impossible accurately to determine the facts of our phonology; unless, indeed, we adopt the absurd supposition of some writers, that the sounds in all languages are essentially the same. The general laws of these changes may and should be investigated and defined; but the effects of their imperceptible operation must escape the most acute and patient investigation.

Closely connected with this source of difficulty, is that of the actual diversity of pronunciation prevailing in the different provinces and regions in which the language is spoken. Provincialisms must, almost unavoidably, mislead the most cautious and the most candid phonologist. He can hardly, by any precautions, preserve himself from confounding the dialect of a section with the use of the nation. Especially when it is considered that the distinctive character of an element may be retained, while the position of the articulating organs is considerably changed, will the magnitude of this difficulty be acknowledged. A nice observer will remark a difference between the cockney pronunciation of the word *Thames*, and that prevailing in the nation generally. Still the *t* in neither case would be confounded with any other element. In regard to many of the elements, although there is not this wide and sensible distinction, there is still a difference, which, if the attention of a practised ear is particularly drawn to it, may be detected. While it devolves on the phonologist to define precisely the limits within which these variations may be made, and still the characteristic power of the element be preserved, yet the particular sounds within these limits adopted in different provinces will be likely to escape his notice. And if they do not, there is danger that, sitting down in his study to investigate the actual sounds of the language, he will mistake what is provincial for what is national. In like manner, the individual investigator himself, prone, as he is, to regard his own usage as that of the nation, or rather necessitated, as he is, to do this in a great degree in researches of this

kind, may have his own dialect, in which he may, unconsciously to himself, differ from all the rest of the nation.

I say nothing here of the liabilities to error which grow out of the imperfect correspondence between our sounds in speech and their signs in writing—the fruitful source of so many mistakes in our phonologists.

After this glance at the peculiar difficulties that attend phonological investigations in the English language, it will not appear so strange that so little has been accomplished.

The first great question to be settled in every attempt at analyzing and describing the sounds of a language, respects the *principle* by which the investigation is to be conducted. There are three different ways of pursuing such an investigation. The first is that of following mainly the eye; and of determining the sounds from the signs. However exceptionable this might appear, even at the most cursory glance, yet, in point of fact, this mode has been adopted very generally in phonological investigations heretofore. Assuming that the consonants, so called, were such evanescent things, requiring the aid of the substantial vowel, even to render them in any case susceptible of examination, that they could not be defined nor their combinations analyzed, the attention has been chiefly directed to the vowels. With the sign or written representative almost exclusively in view, it has hardly occurred in investigation that different signs could represent the same sound; and hence the strangest absurdities have been received and promulgated with the air of authority. Of all the alphabetic elements the vowels are the most indeterminate in regard to their actual powers. They are the most slippery, the most changeable, the most difficult to be distinguished, by far, of the sounds of speech. That this is so, is confirmed by the single fact that the three Arabic vowels have no determinate and invariable sound, but their respective powers are determined by the consonants with which they stand in connection, so that often one represents the same sound in one connection which another represents in another. It is not surprising, therefore, that in words derived from the same original root, the vowel elements should be exchanged in different languages one for another, and not only be represented by different signs, but, also, have different powers. Yet we are gravely told, it is one of the great results of more recent labors in comparative philology to have established “the affinity, and, in a certain sense, the identity of the short vowels, *ä, ë, ö*, in the classical

languages!"\* It has not been sufficiently borne in mind that the signs in actual use are incapable of representing the exact sounds, particularly in our language. Were any proof needed of this fact, it would be found in the discordant efforts of different phonologists to represent by means of written characters the different elements.†

It is justly considered by Mr. Duponceau, in his able Essay on English Phonology,‡ as the great reason of the failure to ascertain the elementary sounds of our language, "that the investigation has always been carried on through the medium of the alphabetical signs."

Another mode of investigation is to follow exclusively the guidance of the ear. This is the mode pursued by Mr. Duponceau. This method, however, is liable to its objections. In the first place, the ear is often a delusive sense as well as the eye. Few are aware of the great liability to deception from this organ. Even practised ears have, sometimes, been so imposed upon, after fatiguing attention to sounds, as to mistake the chord of an octave for a unison; and we are told dogmatically by a certain author, that after any vowel has been prolonged in utterance for some time, it is impossible to distinguish which it is. Thus, it is said, an *a* protracted for some time cannot be distinguished from an *o* by any ear. Now, whether this be true or not, still the remark, made as it is by practised observers, evinces the delusiveness of this sense. But, again, the combinations of the elements with one another so much influence the effect upon the ear, that where the sign and the sound of the element have been identical, different orthoëpists have represented the power very differently. Thus, in the instance before noticed, short *æ* followed by the liquid *r*, as in *fare*, is considered by some the same as that represented by the same letter in *fame*, by others as that in *hat*. And Mr. Duponceau maintains that Sheridan's pronunciation of *merchant* (martshant) differs from Walker's (mertshant) only in quantity.

\* Bopp's *Vocalismus* in *Blackwood's Mag.* for Feb., 1841.

† How unsafe it must be to rely on the signs of the elements, is strikingly shown from the fact that the modern Greeks represent the vocal *th* in *then* by  $\delta$ ; the *v* by  $\beta$ ; and sometimes the *d* by  $\nu$ , and the *b* by  $\mu$ ; thus Νεαμβίδ, *Damville*; Μάρτζαρης, *Bozzaris*. Vide Schinas' *Grammaire du Grec Moderne*.

‡ Amer. Phil. Trans., new series, vol. I., p. 228.

A third mode of investigation is by observing the position of the organs of speech in the enunciation of the elements. That this method, if it could be perfectly adopted and applied, and its results be accurately and intelligibly recorded, would give a true knowledge of the sounds of a language, is clear; since every sound has its own peculiar position of the articulating organs by which its character is determined. It has this superiority over the other methods, that it directs us at once to the producing cause of the phenomena to be investigated; and in applying it, we may employ the united aid of the muscular sense, the touch, and the sight, and may retain the object of investigation longer under observation. The peculiar liabilities to error from the other methods may thus be avoided.

Observations thus made, tested and corrected by the ear, it is believed, will guide to the surest results to be attained in investigations of this nature. There is an important incidental advantage to be derived from adopting this as the principle of investigation, that it will throw light on many of the peculiar modifications of sound in our language. It will explain many apparent anomalies, and solve many seeming mysteries. Accepting this method of investigation, we shall be led, at once, to found the distinctions between the different elemental sounds directly in the organic positions which they respectively require. This principle of analysis and of enumeration will conduct us to a more certain knowledge of the nature and the number of the elements in the language. Each element having its definite organic formation, there must be so many different elements as there are different positions assumed by the organs in speech. If, in the same element, there is no change of position in the organs, we know it to be simple or monophthongal. If in uttering it, the organs change, we conclude that it is diphthongal. If in the case of a diphthongal letter, the positions at the beginning and termination of the sound are the same as those of simple elements, we know what are its constituents; we are enabled, also, at once, to determine, in like manner, in a given combination of elements, what are the particular elements combined, and thus to settle beyond dispute many vexed questions in phonology of which the ear is an incompetent arbiter. This principle, moreover, furnishes us with the means of a more exact and useful classification of the elements of speech than can otherwise be attained.

This method of investigation discovers, at once, a phenomenon

which has entirely escaped the notice of observers pursuing a different course, and thus shuns some erroneous conclusions into which they have fallen. It is the peculiar sound which is given by the organs while passing from one element to another in the same syllable. As there is no interruption in the voice, a sound must be given out while the organs are in transition, which, of course, must vary in all the different combinations. The syllable *form*, thus, is made up of something more than the elements represented by *f*, *o*, *r*, *m*. These four elemental sounds are cemented together, as it were, by those peculiar sounds which are produced while the organs are passing from one to the other. These transition sounds, although obviously they cannot be enumerated as elements, necessarily enter into speech, and are, it will be seen, of essential importance in determining the laws of phonology.

A close examination of the position of the organs in enunciation will, also, discover to us some most important laws which regulate the combination of elements. We observe, in fact, that the English language adopts readily certain forms of combination, while others it shuns; and if, by chance, etymology imposes them upon it, it seeks to change and modify them. Thus it is with all languages; and nearly all the so-called laws of euphony are merely the requisitions made by the organs of speech for their own ease of movement. In this way, we discover the reasons of certain pronunciations which seem unaccountable, when only the literal representatives of the elements are regarded. For a single example of a single class of combinations, the terminal syllables, *cion*, *sion*, *tion*, are pronounced alike, yet all of them very differently from what we should expect, by analogy, from the known powers of those letters. But on noticing the position of the organs while these terminations are pronounced, it will be found that these similar pronunciations are given by the organs being very nearly in the same position in which the elements themselves should respectively be pronounced. Thus, in pronouncing the words *pension* and *mention*, if we divide the syllables so as that *ion* shall compose the last in each, we shall have *pens-yon* and *ment-yon*; the *i* at the beginning of a syllable being represented by *y*. The only difference between these sounds, leaving out of view the initials *p* and *m*, is, that the first syllable of the one terminates in a mute sibilant, while the other ends in a simple mute. The element *i* or *g* is formed, as are also the *s* and the *t*, in nearly the same part

of the mouth as the *sh*. Hence, in rapid pronunciation, the sounds *pens-yon*, and *ment-yon*, are easily exchanged for *pen-shon* and *men-shon*; while the pronunciation pointed out by the elements differs by a scarcely perceptible difference from the one in actual use, at the same time that it is more difficult.

Applying ourselves now, with this method of investigation, to an analysis of the elements themselves, we perceive, at once, that they divide themselves into two distinct classes, according as they do or do not involve any action of the vocal organs, properly so called. The class denominated *mutes*, and by Dr. Rush *atonics*, from their being destitute of all vocality, includes nine of the elements in the English language. These may be subdivided into those which have some sound, although not properly vocal, and those which have no sound whatever, and serve merely to modify the sound of other elements with which they happen to be combined. This class of elements, the *mutes*, allow also, as we shall see, of a similar arrangement and classification to that of the vocal elements, and bear striking analogies to them.

Another great distinction, and one that has ever been recognized, is that into *vowels* and *consonants*.\* A distinction so long and so universally made in all languages, we should at once suppose, must have some ground to rest upon. What that ground is—in what the precise difference consists, is a question to which different, and, perhaps, sometimes absurd answers have been given. It is not strange that some have been led to doubt whether there is any distinction at all that can be defined, from seeing the unsatisfactory attempts to explain wherein it lies. Yet it is irrational to suppose that this general opinion of a distinction should be utterly unfounded in fact. We may reject the definitions, so long current, that a vowel is an element which can be perfectly sounded by itself, and that a consonant requires the aid of a vowel in order to be distinctly uttered; we may question the correctness of the theory which finds the distinc-

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\* There are serious objections to these denominations; and the only reason for retaining them is, that they have been consecrated by long use. Dr. Rush's nomenclature of *tonics*, *subtonics*, and *atonics*, is likewise exceptionable in some respects. Mr. Duponceau calls the two classes *organic* and *in-organic*; which, although less significant, is more reconcilable with facts.

tion in the supposed rest of the organs when vowels are enunciated, while consonants demand motion in the organs of speech, although it is firmly believed that, with proper modifications and limitations, it would be difficult to overthrow this theory; we may refuse adhesion to any theory whatever that may be formed to account for the difference, and yet have a firm faith in the reality of the distinction. The fact of such a fundamental distinction, however difficult it may be to describe it, receives a striking confirmation from a foreign and independent source in the experiments of Kratzenstein, Kempelen, Willis, and others. From these experiments, and especially those of Mr. Willis,\* it appears that the vowel sounds can be distinctly produced by means of a reed vibrating in open tubes; while no consonant could be attained from any similar contrivance.

But it is believed that we are not compelled to content ourselves simply with the fact of a distinction. It has already been intimated that the true distinction may be pointed out; and that it consists in this,—that the enunciation of the vowels is independent of any changes in the articulating organs, strictly so called;† while the consonants derive their distinctive character from the action of those organs. In proof of this, let the vowel sounds be enunciated in the following manner: let the short *u*, as heard in *but*, be first sounded. Then, with no change in the position of the articulating organs, let the other vowels be sounded in succession. It will be found, on trial, that all may be formed while the articulating organs remain in precisely the same position. On the other hand, it will be found impossible to enounce any one of the consonants without bringing some one or other of the articulating organs in contact with some part of the mouth.‡

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\* Cambridge Phil. Trans., vol. III., part I., p. 231.

† By these are meant, here, only the lips, the tongue, and the uvula.

‡ While the above distinction is regarded as the true and exact distinction between the vowels and the consonants, still it may be better for practical purposes to take the safer ground, that a consonant involves a contact of an articulating organ with some part of the mouth, while a vowel may be perfectly enounced without such contact. This is, substantially, Dr. Webster's view. It will be observed that it is by no



If the above experiments on the vowel sounds be repeated, it may be perceived, on close attention, that apparently, by some organism about the larynx, a sensation is produced in the mouth, which seems to indicate that the breath, put into vibration by the *chordæ vocales*, strikes, in different vowels, upon different parts of the cavity of the mouth. Thus, in the element *oo*, in *pool*, the breath seems to strike far back in the mouth, or even in the throat; and a vibration may be felt on applying the fingers to the outside of the throat, just above the larynx. In the element *e*, in *mete*, the breath seems to strike quite in the fore part of the mouth, and no vibration can be perceived in the throat. We are thus led to form a scale of vowel sounds according to the position at which the vibrating breath strikes the cavity of the mouth; or, to use the language commonly employed to express this fact, according to the place in which the element is formed in the mouth.\* Beginning with short *u*, as heard in *but*, which is formed farthest back,† we shall have the following order in which the simple vowel sounds used in the English language succeed each other.

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|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. <i>u</i> as heard in <i>but</i> . | 7. <i>i</i> in <i>pin</i> .   |
| 2. <i>oo</i> in <i>pool</i> .        | 8. <i>a</i> in <i>fat</i> .   |
| 3. <i>o</i> in <i>bone</i> .         | 9. <i>a</i> in <i>take</i> .  |
| 4. <i>a</i> in <i>all</i> .          | 10. <i>e</i> in <i>pet</i> .  |
| 5. <i>i</i> in <i>pine</i> .         | 11. <i>e</i> in <i>mete</i> . |
| 6. <i>a</i> in <i>father</i> .       |                               |

means maintained that a vowel cannot be sounded when there is a contact between some parts of the mouth. It is only maintained that a vowel is independent of this, while a consonant cannot possibly be formed without it. Even the consonant *r*, the *experimentum crucis* with those who deny the distinction, cannot be formed without bringing the sides of the back part of the tongue into contact with the teeth, or upper gums. Much less can the other semi-vowel, *l*, be formed without such contact.

\* The opinion, not uncommon, that the sound itself, the *vocality*, is originated in the mouth—that the breath issuing from the larynx is first vocalized in the mouth, is too palpably erroneous to need any refutation. Yet the language used in the text seems to sanction it; and it seems not wholly superfluous to add this caution against such a misconception.

† Although we may, on some grounds, justify ourselves in thus ranking the short *u* as formed farthest back in the mouth,

These results are, in the main, confirmed by the experiments of Mr. Willis. He discovered that, on causing a metallic reed set in a plate lined with leather to vibrate in an open glass tube, a perfect vowel-sound was produced, which was always the same with the same length of tube; and varied with the length of the tube. On applying a tube which, in respect to the distance from the reed to the end, could be lengthened or shortened at pleasure, the vowel sounds, denoted in the combinations expressed in the following table, required respectively the length of tube indicated by the figures, which denote inches and decimals of an inch, written against them.

See	0.38	Paw	3.05
Pet	0.6	Nought	3.8
Pay	1.	No	4.7
Paa	1.8	But	} indefinite.*
Part	2.2	Boot	

Mr. Willis found that a particular vowel was uniformly connected with a given length of tube, whatever might be its diameter, and that the sounds recurred invariably in the same order.

We cannot resist the temptation to break in here and interpose the following queries :

1. Do not these experiments give some sanction to the vague popular notion that the vowel elements are, in some way, associated with pitch ?

2. Do they not furnish another argument entirely independent of that before advanced, derived from the openness of the tube, in proof of the reality of the distinction between vowels and consonants ?—the tube never giving a consonant, but only vowel sounds.

3. Do they not show that the vowel sounds, in this respect also totally unlike the consonants, run into one another and

yet several distinct considerations lead us to the opinion that it should, in a strict arrangement, be placed by itself. Certainly it seems distinguished from all the other vowels by this peculiarity, that no movement can be detected in the throat similar to that which attends the formation of the others. The voice appears to come forth directly from the larynx, and not to be afterwards in the least modified. With some propriety it may thus be regarded as the primitive element, and the others as mere modifications of it.

\* *Cam. Phil. Trans.*, Vol. III., p. 243.

are, therefore, extremely liable to be confounded? The sliding tube, as it is gradually lengthened, gives successively, at determinate distances, the different vowels. Why did the experimenter stop just here, and not there? What was the character of the sound produced at the intermediate distances? Were they vowels? If so, What?

4. Do they not show also that, while the vowel sounds actually in use in different languages, in different provinces, by different individuals, may greatly vary,—the Italian *a*, for instance, as heard in *father*, vibrating between the broad *a* in *all* and the short *a* in *fat*, in the speech of different nations, in different dialects,—the number of vowel elements possible in a given language is indefinite? the only limitations to the multiplication of them being the distance between the extremes, say the short *u* in *but*, and the long *e* in *mete*, and the indistinctness arising from a too near approximation of one to another. Certainly, if we suppose this first limitation of distance to be represented by a straight line, the two extremes of which shall be short *u* and long *e*, the points which may be taken in that line at which a vowel shall be formed, are, strictly speaking, unlimited. In fact, we find different languages, different dialects, different individuals even speaking the same dialect, stopping at different points in this line; and producing, thus, so many different vowels.

5. Do not these considerations join with comparative philology, in proving beyond all doubt, the absurdity of the opinion by some strenuously maintained, that the vowels are the essence of a word—constitute its frame, while the consonants are only its flesh—its form and accidental dress.

We return to the arrangement of the vowels. Confirmed as we are by the experiments of Mr. Willis, we think we are warranted in assuming the order in which we have placed them to be correct. The importance of a knowledge of this order may be seen in its bearings, not only on orthoëpy, but still more on etymology and comparative philology. It seems to us that some most absurd conclusions in philological investigations have originated from an ignorance of these phonological truths.\* In in-

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\* So broad an assertion as this might seem to require the adduction of some facts in substantiation. But it is deemed sufficient to refer to the simple fact that, by some philologists of note, the relation of the vowel elements or *sounds* to one another, seems to have been disregarded altogether. What

vestigating the correctness of these conclusions by attending to the positions of the organs while enouncing the vowel elements, some may experience a little difficulty from failing to regard two important facts, which here deserve notice. First, in the English language, in particular, some of the simple sounds receive a modification in some instances from the action of the lips and tongue. This is true of the element *oo*, when distinctly and fully uttered. In undertaking to form it, the lips will be protruded and the breath will be forced through them in a circular form. The English *oo*, when accented and not followed by a mute, receives from this conjoint action of the lips a peculiar roundness and distinctness. This, however, is not essential to the element. It may be perfectly formed without any action of the lips, and is actually so formed in unaccented syllables and when followed by a mute, as in *bistoury*, *root*. The same is true of the short *i*, as heard in *pin*. The sides of the tongue are drawn up, sometimes, against the teeth, giving the element something of a consonantal quality. Both the *i* and *oo*, when commencing a syllable, have this peculiarity, as in *one*, *wo*, *your*, *al-ien*. Indeed, there is a strong propensity in the formation of all or nearly all the vowel elements, when they are to be made prominent, as in pure and accented syllables, to imitate the action of the articulating organs. But this, it should be remarked, is not essential.

Again, some of the English vowels are diphthongal. Of these, one is always so; others only occasionally. The long *i* in *pine* is always so;—the organs in the larynx evidently moving, in forming it, from a position near that in which the *a* in *father* is formed to that in which short *i* is produced. The elements occasionally diphthongal are *a* in *fame*, which commences with a sound peculiar to itself, and terminates with that of *e* in *mete*; and *o* in *bone*, which commences with the sound of *o* in *colt*, and ends with that of *oo*.

We are now prepared to solve a problem which has exceedingly puzzled English orthoëpists. It respects the power of the vowels in unaccented syllables. Concerning these, Mr. Dupon-

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confidence can be placed in the derivations of words from one language to another, when this relation of the sounds is entirely overlooked, and the signs are regarded exclusively? If languages were transmitted by writing, and not by speech, this would be safe; but not otherwise.

ceau\* has well remarked: "There is nothing so difficult for the ear to take hold of and correctly to discriminate, as the short sounds of the English unaccented vowels. The principal characteristics of our language are strength and rapidity. The voice does not act by pressure on accented syllables, as it does in the Italian and Spanish, resting upon them awhile so as to fall gently on those that are unaccented and give them their correct articulation, but strikes with sudden force on the accented vowel, and, impelled by the momentum which it gives to itself, rolls on rapidly through the unaccented syllables to where it is obliged to renew its stroke. Hence our accented vowels are in general short, and those unaccented are passed over with so much quickness that the vocal organ does not dwell upon them long enough to enable a common ear to catch their precise sound; and it perceives only an indistinct vibration, a small vacant space, as it were, between the consonants, like the *sheva* of the Hebrews and the French *e* feminine." "This *sheva* the English phonologists have almost uniformly represented by *u* short." "Thus *altar*, *cancer*, *honor*, *martyr*, when their pronunciation is to be explained, will be spelled, for demonstration's sake, *altur*, *cansur*, *honur*, *martur*, as if the vowel sound of the last syllable in all of them were the same. But the similarity is nothing, in my opinion, but a deception produced in the ear by the rapidity of the voice passing over the unaccented vowel." These observations, although perhaps somewhat vague, are in the main, and so far as they have meaning, correct, and attest the accuracy of the author's ear. It is, certainly, a decided mark of vulgarity to confound the vowel sounds in such cases. Yet, it is true, that these sounds in unaccented syllables, are not as fully and distinctly articulated, as they are when under the accent. The following observations, it is believed, will explain the manner in which the pronunciation should be given.

In the first place, as has been seen, some of our vowel sounds are occasionally diphthongal. These, in the quick enunciation of unaccented syllables, lose one of their constituents and become simple or monophthongal. Again, although the vowel sounds are, as has been observed, in a sense independent of the articulating organs, properly so called, yet, in the English lan-

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\* Amer. Phil. Trans. ubi sup.

guage, to help out the sounds and make them more distinct, those organs are sometimes called into action. This is always the case when the vowels are in pure and accented syllables, as in *aw-ful*, *no-tion*. In *aw*, for instance, the mouth is opened wide, and its cavity very much arched. In the same element in the word *inauspicious*, however, the cavity is not enlarged more than it is in uttering the other elements of the word. Similar remarks are applicable to, perhaps, all of the other vowel sounds. Thus we have the general law, that each of these elements has both a *simple* and unarticulated, and also an imperfectly *articulated* power; the former occurring in rapid enunciation, the latter in pure and accented syllables, and, also, in impure, unaccented syllables, when the enunciation is slow and distinct. The peculiar distinctive force of the element, however, remains the same in both cases. And correct speakers will never, therefore, confound the vowel sounds in the last syllables of such words as *altar*, *cancer*, *honor*, *murmur*, *petal*, *level*, *carol*.

These remarks will apply to most cases of this description. There is, however, one other class of syllables where the peculiarity of the pronunciation is to be explained on another principle. Few speakers, who regard at all correctness of pronunciation, for instance, would give the *e* in the final syllable in *government* its proper sound as heard in *met*. It is not, however, entirely silent, as is the case in such words as *listen*, *heaven*. There is a sound distinctly perceptible between the *m* and the *n*. What it is, may easily be explained on referring to the fact before mentioned, that, in passing from one element to another in the same syllable, the voice continues to flow out uninterruptedly. In this particular case, it is evident that between the *m* and the *n*, the organs separate; the voice is unimpeded in its passage out of the mouth, and consequently the sound must possess a vowel character. Yet it cannot be any proper element of the language; it is at most only an approximation to one. It certainly is the furthest possible from the element *u* in *but*. The same is true in every syllable where, in the transition from one letter to another, the articulating organs separate from all contact with any part of the mouth. If the voice continue to issue, it is evident it must bear the character of a vowel sound. Such is the case in the final syllables of words like *tremble*, *terrible*. In the last syllable of *tendon*, the movement of the or-

gans, in dropping the tip of the tongue after the *d* is formed, to give the vowel sound, and then raising it again to form the *n*, is easily perceived. It is plain, also, that this vowel sound is neither short *o* nor *u*, nor any other of the proper vowel elements.

One other fact in relation to the vowel elements deserves to be noticed. It is that some of them are affected by quantity; and that when protracted, the sound is somewhat more open than when short. Thus the broad *a* sound in *inaugurate* is longer and somewhat more open than in *inauspicious*; in *nor* than in *not*. While in *mock*, *cross*, *lost*, and the like, it is of a medium quantity, being neither so long as in *mawkish*, nor so short as in *rock*. The element *oo*, likewise, is longer and more open in *pool* than it is in *took*.

In the English language, as in many others, the vowel elements are often found in combination in the same syllable. The *oo* and the short *i* thus, as has been before intimated, frequently precede other vowels. But for some of these vowel compounds, sometimes, but improperly, called diphthongs, we have peculiar characters appropriated; as the *u* long in *tube*, which is composed of short *i* and *oo* as heard in *took*; *ou*, as in *route*, compounded of *a* in *father* and *oo*; and *oi* in *toil*, compounded of *a* in *all* and short *i* in *pin*. The slide in passing from one organic position to the other in the formation of these compound sounds, it should be observed, gives them an effect upon the ear somewhat different from what would be produced by the two constituents alone. Being thus compounded of two other elements, they are not regarded as elements themselves, as is *i* in *pine*; since this is supposed to have for its first constituent a sound different from that of any other element.

To this class of elements belong, as another species, the mutes represented by *h* and *wh*. Although there may appear to be some impropriety in the name, if the etymology be regarded, yet both the principle of classification which we have adopted, and, also, considerations of convenience, sustain us in denominating these *vowel-mutes*. They consist of mere aspiration, and are formed, like the vowels proper, without any contact between the articulating organs and other parts of the mouth. They are, in fact, the vowels *u* and *oo* with the vocality suppressed; and cannot in whispering be distinguished from these vowels, except that, perhaps, the breath is sometimes more forcibly ex-

pelled in them, probably from habit, than in the corresponding vowels.\* It is obvious that nothing forbids the indefinite multiplication of the vowel mutes in a language, but the difficulty of distinguishing them, which is greater here than in the case of the vocals. It will not appear strange, either, that different languages should select different vowel mutes from those which are found in our own language.

We have before remarked, that within certain limitations which were mentioned, the number of possible vowel elements may vary *ad libitum*. The vowel sounds attained in the way described may each be doubled, by causing the vocalized breath to pass through the nostrils instead of the lips. We may have thus a set of pure vowels, and a corresponding set of nasal vowels. The French language has, in fact, four of these nasal vowels, expressed by *an*, *in*, *on*, and *un*. That they are but the common vowels nasalized, is evident from the fact that they are formed from the others simply by causing the breath to pass through the nostrils, in a manner precisely similar to that in which the *m*, the *n*, and the *ng* are formed from the *b*, the *d*, and the hard *g* respectively.†

The other class of alphabetical elements, denominated consonants, are susceptible of a subdivision into two species. The first consists of those, in forming which the articulating organs, by being brought into contact with various parts of the mouth, but partially obstruct the passage of the breath through the lips; the other of those which entirely occlude it. The first may hence be denominated the *partial*, the last, *perfect* consonants.

Of the partial consonants, the English language has none but those which are formed by the action of the two articulating organs, the tongue and the lips. Palatal partial consonants are, however, found as mutes in various languages, as the

\* We are aware that the *wh*, as heard in *when*, is by some regarded as compounded of the aspirate *h* and the vowel *oo*. But a diversity of independent considerations, all leading to the same result, force us to the view presented in the text. We think this will be admitted by those who will carefully observe the position of the organs and the sound when pronouncing *when*, both audibly and in a whisper, and also when uttering the supposed combination *h-wen*.

† Have we not the vowel *e* in *pen*, nasalized in the colloquial *eh*?



Spanish *j* or *x* in *viejo*, *Mexico*; the German *ch* in *noch*, and others; and both as mutes and vocals in the Arabic and kindred tongues. The English partial consonants are ten in number, six of which are vocal and the rest mutes. Of the vocals, five are formed by the tongue and one by the lips. The linguals are *r*, *l*, *z* posterior as heard in *azure*, *z* anterior as in *zone*, *th* vocal as in *then*, and *v*. They are formed in the order named.

The *r* is formed farthest back in the mouth, by bringing the sides of the posterior portion of the tongue into contact with the upper teeth or gums. This position is essential: different persons combine with this other and different motions of the part of the mouth; but these do not affect the essential character of the elements. They at most but modify the effect on the ear. By some, thus, and particularly is this true of the Irish, the anterior part of the tongue is sometimes rolled or vibrated against the roof of the mouth, which, especially if it is combined with a sudden abrupt separation of the tongue from the teeth or gums, gives the element a very peculiar character; it is then called the *rolling* or *vibrant r*.

The *l* is formed next in order, by raising the tip of the tongue against the upper part of the mouth.

The *l* and *r* alone of all the vocal consonants, have in our language no corresponding mutes. The reason seems to be that such mutes could not so readily be distinguished from the vowel mutes *h* and *wh*.\*

These two elements possess another peculiarity in that they, unlike all the other linguals of this species, do not receive any vibration of the vocalized breath directly on the articulating organ. They only prevent the breath from flowing out unobstructed, as is the case in the vowel elements. They are hence denominated semi-vowels. They are, moreover, from being formed so near together, and from this last named peculiarity, very easily interchanged in the transmission of words from one language to another, and are liable to be confounded with one another. Children generally distinguish them but with difficulty. The *l*, moreover, being formed in the same

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\* In the Welsh language, however, we find the mute *l* represented by *ll*. No language now occurs which has the mute *r*, unless in some provincial dialects of the German, the palatal *ch* in *noch* is modified into the lingual. Was the Greek *ρ* when initial, as in *ῥίττωρ*, only an aspirate?

part of the mouth as the short *i* in *pit*, is often substituted for it in the derivation of words. Thus the Italian *chiamare* from the latin *clamare*, *piano* from *planus*, and the like.

The *l* and the *r* are the only consonants, except the *m* and *n*, which form syllables by themselves, as *acre*, *never*, *swivel*, pronounced *ak-r*, *nev-r*, *swiv-l*.

The next element in order is *z* posterior, as heard in *azure*, *leisure*. The organs are brought into closer, firmer contact than is the case with the *r*, and the breath is vibrated against them. This fact distinguishes this and the other vocal consonants of this species, more than any thing else, from the *l* and the *r*; as the *l* particularly allows a considerable range in the part of the roof of the mouth with which it is brought in contact. The *z* posterior is liable to be confounded with the *r*, as might be expected from their being formed so near each other, although their respective sounds differ so much. Children often, thus, substitute the *r* for this element. It is probable, although no instances now suggest themselves, that comparative philology would furnish illustrations of this remark.

The mute corresponding to the *z* posterior is that represented by the characters *sh*. It is formed in the same way. The vocality is suppressed, and there is no distinct vibration against the parts brought into contact. This last feature enables us to distinguish the *sh* from the *z* posterior, in whispering. A like remark is applicable to the distinction between all the other vocals and their cognate mutes.

These elements are formed nearly in the same part of the mouth with the short *i*. Hence the substitution of the *sh* for the *i* in certain syllables of which *i* is the initial; as in *act-ion*, *pass-ion*. So likewise, as *u* is equivalent to short *i* and *oo*, the corruption of *natshure* from *nat-yur* becomes easy.

By slightly raising the tip of the tongue and almost closing the passage of the voice, we obtain, instead of *zh*, the element *z* in *zone*; and by suppressing the vocality and suffering the breath to pass without vibrating against the tongue, we have the cognate mute *s* as in *son*.

Passing the tip of the tongue forward against the teeth, we get the vocal *th* in *then*, with its mute *th* in *thin*.

*v* is the only labial of this species. It is formed by bringing the under lip in contact with the upper teeth. Its mute is *f*.

It is worthy of remark here, that all these last vocal elements, with their mutes, are greatly modified in their character by the

heavier or lighter pressure of the organs against one another. The English is distinguished from most of the continental languages by its bringing the parts of the mouth into firmer contact, and by its vibrating the breath more violently against the occluding parts. The French *j*, corresponding to what we have denominated the *z posterior* as heard in *azure*, is thus much softer than the English element. The German *w*, as heard in *wald*, differs from our *v* only in this respect: as, in its formation, it suffers the breath to pass out without being vibrated against the teeth and lips, it resembles the *l* and the *r*, and deserves the like appellation of a semi-vowel.

The other species of the consonant, or organic elements, are characterized by their wholly obstructing the outward passage of the vocalized breath. As the breath can be stopped thus only by the palate, the tongue, or the lips, we have three, and but three, varieties under this species. As, further, the voice may be wholly suppressed, or be admitted only into the cavity of the mouth back of the obstructing organs, or be allowed a passage through the nostrils, we have, in each variety, also, three individual elements. It is evident, also, that there can be but three in each.

Obstructing the breath by the palate, we have the mute *k*, the pure vocal *g*, and the nasal *ng*;<sup>\*</sup> by the tongue, the mute *t*, the vocal *d*, and the nasal *n*; by the lips, the mute *p*, the vocal *b*, and the nasal *m*.

It is to be remarked concerning these elements, that the nasals may be protracted indefinitely; the mutes have no time whatever; and the vocals are susceptible of only a limited prolongation, viz., only while the portion of the cavity of the mouth back of the obstructing organs is filling with breath. In *g*, the cavity back of the palate being quite small, it can be sounded only while the breath is passing to fill it; as the passage of the breath outwards being stopped, the vibration in the glottis necessarily ceases. In *d*, the cavity back of the tongue being larger, more quantity can be given; in *b*, of course, more still.

It is to be observed, further, respecting this variety of the alphabetic elements, that it is the obstruction of the breath by

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\* That *ng* is a simple element, is determined at once by the fact, that it is perfectly formed by a single position of the organs.

the respective organ that gives the element its peculiar character. In the linguals of this variety, particularly, as the tongue may be applied to any part, almost, of the roof of the mouth, and so stop the passage of the breath, the *t*, *d*, and *n*, may be considerably modified in their character. We obtain a *t* of a different cast altogether, for instance, when we place the tongue against the upper teeth, from what is produced by placing it across the highest part of the mouth. In different dialects, however, different modifications of these elements prevail.\*

The mutes, moreover, of this variety, have no sound whatever. Their only office in speech is to modify the sound of other elements with which they are connected. Thus in *top*, the tongue is first brought firmly against the upper part of the mouth, the parts separate, and at once a sound is emitted of a non-descript character, till the organs are in a position to give the *o*; when this is formed by another process, analogous to the first, the *o* sound is stopped by the organs taking the position of the *p*.

Besides the characters which represent simple elements, we have, in our language, some that represent sounds composed of different elements. The *g*, as in *George*, is one. It is evidently compounded of *d* and *z* posterior as in *azure*. Its corresponding mute is represented by *ch* as in *church*, which is compounded of the cognate mutes of the constituents of the *g* just named, viz., *t* and *sh*. *X* is another character representing a compound consonant. It is composed of *g* and *z*, or of their corresponding mutes, *k* and *s*. It is worthy of note, that *x* never represents a sound composed of a vocal and a mute, as is erroneously stated by some writers. It always consists either of *k* and *s*, or of hard *g* and *z*. The two sounds are exemplified in *box* and *example*.

From this analysis and enumeration, it appears that we have, in the English language, in all, thirty-two different elemental sounds, of which nine are mutes, and twenty-three vocal. Eleven of the vocal elements are vowels, two of which have their corresponding mutes; six are partially occluded elements, four of which have their cognate mutes; and of the remaining six vocals, three are pure and three are their nasal cognates, which have their three corresponding mutes.

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\* In the Shemitish languages two *t* elements are distinguished;—the Teth and the Tau.

The following table is subjoined to exhibit more readily to the eye the organic classification of the elements. The consonants are placed opposite to the vowels which are formed in the same or adjoining part of the mouth. The interchange of certain vowels and consonants will be at once explained by this representation of their juxtaposition. The mutes are placed opposite their cognate vocals.

VOWELS.		PARTIAL CONSONANTS.		PERFECT CONSONANTS.		
VOCALS.	MUTES.	VOCALS.	MUTES.	VOCALS.	MUTES.	NASALS.
1 u in but	h in hat			g in go	k in key	ng in sing
2 oo in pool	wh in why					
3 o in colt						
4 a in all						
5 i in pine						
6 a in far		r in ran				
7 i in pin		l in limb*				
8 a in fat						
9 a in ray		z in azure	sh in shun			
		z in zone	s in son			
10 e in pet		th in then	th in thin	d in dint	t in top	n in nor
11 e in mete		v in vile	f in fin	b in by	p in pin	m in me

\* Comp. Spanish *ll*, as in *caballo*, pronounced *cabal-yo* (= *io*.)

## ARTICLE IX.

### EXPOSITION OF LUKE 16 : 1—14.

By Pastor Brauns, in Oesselse, near Hanover. Translated from the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*. By the Editor.

Few passages of the New Testament have given as much trouble to interpreters, as the one before us ; few have remained so dark and dubious, notwithstanding every effort on its several parts, as the Parable of the Householder. Already from of old exposition pressed on exposition ; and if we but compare the interpretations of Glassius (Phil. Sacr. 492,) Driessen (Dia-

trib. de princip. et legibus theol. emblem.), Henke (Magazin für Religionsphilosophie, Exegese und Kirchengeschichte, p. 336), Schreiter (historico-critic. explicationum parab. de improbo œconomio descr. Lipsiæ 1806), Löffler (bei Anzeige dieser Monographie in seinem Magazine f. Prediger 1806, Band III. 1. Stück), Möller (in Augusti's theol. Blättern, Jahrgang I. Quart. 2. p. 353 ff.), Olshausen, Schleiermacher and the latest commentators,—what a multitude of meanings about the entire passage and the several parts of the parable! Whilst Glassius interprets thus: Use your earthly possessions in well-doing, to secure for yourselves everlasting habitations; Schleiermacher says: The discourse has not the remotest relation to such a sentiment! With one expositor the *ἄνθρωπος πλούσιος* is = *ὁ θεός*, with another emperor Romanus, with a third Romani, and a fourth—the *Devil*. To this one, *ὁ οἰκονόμος* is homo improbus; to that one, a calumniated, a compassionate publican, an energetic servant of God, who foils the plans of Satan, a fit companion for a Paul. One finds in the words, Make to yourselves friends, etc., an earnest *injunction*, another a bitter *re-proof*; and so a Sunday lesson can scarcely be given, which shall make the preacher more of an enigma, than this pregnant history of the householder. What diverse sermons, therefore, may the church happen to hear on the 9, post trinitatis!

The writer hitherto has understood the parable thus: Ye children of light, evince, in your *spiritual* calling, an activity as circumspect and energetic after the *everlasting* habitations in heaven, as the children of the world do to secure the *earthly* shelter; in short, be ye as active in *spiritual* things, as they are in the *worldly*. But a certain uncomfortable feeling, which remains after every reading of the parable as a distinct impression, and seems also to abide in the church after the most careful exposition, has rendered the writer of this article distrustful of such an apprehension of the passage. And seeing so many bold views advanced, he also ventures to propose to the friends of the divine word, in all modesty, a new interpretation, before which, should it be fully justified by better hands and established as the only true one, (which the author hopes,) every difficulty would at once vanish away. Will the respected reader now hear, *without prejudice*, and then judge?

Yet, let me first premise the following brief remark. *A parable can never be intended to indicate its counterpart.* This affirmation probably needs no further proof. The aim of the

parable, as its office, especially in the mouth of the Lord, renders the contrary inadmissible. Christ has consequently, in Luke 16th, not intended to recommend to his disciples a course *opposite* to the management of the steward, but a *similar* one. The symbolic in the parable must remain within the *conceivable* and *possible* ; the case need not be *real*, but it *must be possible*. The application is properly but the parable carried out, and we must consequently be able, out of the clear sense to infer the more enigmatical. But to the subject itself.

A certain rich man had a steward ; and the same was accused unto him as one διασκορπίζων τὰ υπάρχοντα. The owner at once takes the necessary measures, and the scene described in vs. 2—8 manifestly occurs in the presence of the rich man : at least no one can prove the contrary. Φωνήσας αὐτὸν, he called him before him, and having explained the cause of his citation, demanded, *on the spot*, an account of his stewardship and a surrender of it. Verse 3 by no means intimates that the steward *went away* ; he says not κατ' ἰδίαν, but ἐν ἐαντιῷ. Καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος, to wit, *immediately*, without the owner permitting him to leave his presence, the farmers or purchasers, his lord's debtors, come together. The οἰκονόμος inquires : How much owest thou ? Take thy bill, write *thou* 50 instead of 100 measures, *thou* 80 in lieu of 100 ; and this, to deceive his lord about it ? That is not *possible* ; his lord is present ! Would he allow this to be done, without making the least remonstrance ? Did not the οἰκονόμος appear in the commonly received sense, a *mente caput*, and yet could the discourse, throughout, be of a φρόνησις (φρονίμως ἐποίησεν) with respect to such an one ? But what, then, is the meaning ? In truth, the only exegesis which abides the test of all exegetical researches is this : The steward does, what Zaccheus, in Luke 19th, also does, and what all unrighteously enriched publicans, without exception, *should* do,—the 50, and the 20 measures subtracted before the eyes of the οἰκοδεσπότης, he counts out of *his own gains* ; he makes restitution and is liberal at the same time, and that is his φρόνησις.

Is not this exposition worthy of consideration ? It is necessary. This interpretation, in the first place, does not of necessity conflict with the σκάπτειν οὐκ ἰσχύω, ἐπαιτεῖν αἰσχύνομαι, since the mode of the διασκορπίζειν is by no means precisely indicated, and it is at least conceivable, that the steward would have laid up of the property of his lord, a considerable amount in *his own* coffers, although not so much (his master probably

being too wide awake for that) that he could, from his savings, have sustained himself above future beggary, without employment and reputation. *Besides, he must give out of his own stock, moreover, for the covering of the deficit, whatever it might be.* Whether the 50 and 20 measures here mentioned were of wheat, and how great or small, I leave to those better acquainted with Hebrew Archæology.

The necessity of the above exposition seems to me to follow directly from the entire situation of things as described in vs. 3—8. The usually received downright deceit is not at all possible, because the lord is present. This necessity results farther from the use of *φρονίμως*. He who has managed *φρονίμως* cannot have managed so meanly; *φρονίμως* excludes *mean-ness*; *φρονίμως* is no *πανούργως*. Nowhere in the New Testament does *φρονίμως* occur in a low sense; it is not *versutus*, but *prudens*. Compare Luke 12 : 42 : *τίς ἐστίν, κ.τ.λ.*; here it is manifestly used in its good sense, for Jesus says afterwards : *μακάριος, κ.τ.λ.* In Matt. 25 : 8, the five wise virgins are *αἱ φρόνιμοι*, who waited for the bridegroom, and were ready at the right time. The Lord recommends *φρόνησις* in Matt. 10 : 16 : *γίνεσθε οὖν φρόνιμοι ὡς οἱ ὄφεις καὶ* (not *ἀλλά*, for the *φρόνησις* is not the antithesis of *ἀκεραιότης*, any more than prudence and integritas) *ἀκέραιοι ὡς αἱ περιστεραί*. In Rom. 11 : 25, and 12 : 16, it is true, *φρόνιμοι* stands in the signification of *self-conceited*, but there the bad sense is expressed by means of the subjoined *παρ' ἑαυτοῖς*. When, therefore, the *οἰκοδεσπότης* says, *φρονίμως ἐποίησεν*, this can never be translated by, callide, versute egit, but by, prudenter et integre egit.

This exposition is further confirmed by the *subject itself*. In the usual acception there is not a grain of wisdom exhibited, (granting, that *φρόνησις* could signify astutia, prudence without rectitude,) rather a silliness, bordering on the inconceivable. It were indeed almost ludicrous to represent so superficial an intrigue as a master-stroke of prudence, especially as the whole trick must be, according to v. 8, even already revealed. According to our view, however, a *true φρόνησις* is manifested: the steward effects two objects at one stroke—he makes to the lord, whom he openly confesses to have been injured, a *restitution* in some sort, since the debtors, perhaps, *were not able* to pay; protects his lord against loss, and, at the same time, exercises compassion towards men in the utmost embarrassment; moves the feelings of both creditor and debtors, who, should it



come to an extremity, were in danger, according to Matt. 18 : 25, of being sold with wives and children into slavery. In short, he secured the hearts as well of his lord as of his debtors, and laid them under obligations to himself. Supposing he had wished to play a deceitful part, he could by no means know whether these debtors would unite with him in it ; and still less, were the trick successful, could he with so much certainty say : *ἐγὼν, τί ποιήσω, ἵνα δεξωταί με εἰς τοὺς οἴκους αὐτῶν*. How could he be so sure, that his accomplices would not yet desert him in his misery, and repeat to him the well-known *ὦ ὄψει !* (Matt. 27 : 5.)

Whoever considers v. 8, will remark, that it is so intimately connected with what precedes, that no one can, for a moment, suppose that the owner had expressed this *subsequent* to his being made acquainted with the transaction : it is no *after reflection*, but the immediate expression of joyful surprise. *Ὅτι οἰκονόμος ἐποίησεν* must not, with Luther and Fr. v. Meyer, be translated, “that he *had* managed wisely,” but, “that he *did* wisely,” quod ad meliorem frugem redibat, that he returned to this wise course ; by which, without being obliged to resort to a new act of unrighteousness, he so securely delivered himself, by means of the wisdom of *μετάνοια*!

The correctness of this exposition is further established by the whole epilogue, which undeniably sounds as if the preceding representation of conduct were in the highest degree commendable. No one who reads on from v. 9, without looking back, certainly can deny this impression. The *καὶ* (Luther and Fr. v. Meyer transfer this *καὶ*, as it seems to me incorrectly, at least insignificantly, to the end, “and I say unto you *also*”) must be understood : *I also* say unto you, and this “*I also*” refers back to the rich owner and his *ἐπαινεῖν*, and must signify : As the owner found the conduct of the *οἰκονόμος* praiseworthy, and consequently in his heart desired the exhibition of such conduct in every one in like circumstances, so do *I also* here express this wish, and give this counsel : Ye publican-disciples, make to yourselves friends with the unrighteous mammon, as in the sacrifice of the *ἄλλοτρίον καὶ ἐλαχίστον* reference is had to the *σκηναὶ αἰωνιοί*. The *ἐκ* is thereby significant : it is a material *out of*, and there is embraced in it the thought, let go the mammon and make to yourselves *out of* the same,—i. e. *ἐν τῷ ἀφιέναι καὶ παραδίδόναι αὐτόν*,—friends.

This interpretation is also recommended by the *character* of

the particular *hearers* of Jesus, by the circumstances and habits of thought peculiar to publicans. In Luke 3: 13, advice is given to them, which opens to us a view of their inner man. In Matt. 9: 10, we have, πολλοὶ τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοί; in 11: 19, it is said of Christ, that he is τελωνῶν φίλος καὶ ἁμαρτωλῶν; 18: 17, the Lord says to the brother often reproved and yet continuing obstinate, ἔστω σοι ὥσπερ ἔθνικὸς καὶ ὁ τελωνῆς; 21: 31, ὅτι καὶ οἱ τελῶναι καὶ αἱ πόρναι προάγουσι, κ.τ.λ. In brief, publicans were held to be the refuse of mankind, the bloodsuckers of the people; and no class could more deeply feel than they, the fleeting nature of every thing temporal, and the duty of restitution, or, where this was no longer possible, the benevolent *expenditure* of present means. For this the Lord rejoiced over Zaccheus; and as he, Luke 19: 8, so joyfully recognized this first chief duty as his own, so Christ replied, This day is salvation come to this house! If we *rightly* apprehend the publicans of that time, we think the parable of the Saviour addressed to *publicans* who would become *Christians*, *must* have taken such a course as that indicated; it seems to us we are bound to take this view of it; otherwise we should certainly be alarmed at the result which must follow, according to the usual interpretation.

This interpretation is farther recommended by its *facility and comprehensibility*. On the usual sense assigned to the parable, it is truly wonderful that the disciples did not say, Master, explain to us this parable? We must probably look upon those who followed the Lord *at that time*, as not more capable than the most intelligent members of our own churches; and, verily, the best instructed of them have hitherto been perplexed, and after a statement of the ordinary interpretation, have thought that the whole could be very easily and dangerously misunderstood, and already, many a base man may have had recourse to this parable. Moreover, were it not to be expected that the Pharisees, ever lying in wait to catch every syllable of our Lord's words,—as would certainly be the case with such a discourse, understood as it has usually been to this time in numberless assemblies,—would have stepped up and said, Verily, thou preachest strange morals! Shall we not still say that thou art a Samaritan, a corrupter of the people, and hast a devil? Instead of this, they content themselves with an ἐκμυκτηρίζειν; i. e. magistrum deridebant. If the householder were intended to be exhibited to the publicans as somewhat not merely *figura-*

*tive*, but also *typical*, then must there *appear* in him also a *καλόν τι*, and a Pharisee would probably have done rightly, if he had cast up to the Saviour such cunning as mere prudent forethought about the future; this would indeed be too glaring, and for a publican rather dangerous than edifying doctrine, and after so frivolous an introduction must probably excite in the new disciples not a warfare with sin, but the greatest freedom of living.

Thus far all is clear, and no one, I hope, will be able to say, that there exists nothing in the text of a restitution by the steward. Yet this all seems to be overthrown again by the remark of Christ in verse 8: *ὅτι οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος, κ.τ.λ.*, according to which the steward is yet again reckoned among the children of this world, and the above signification of *φρονίμως* fails in the *φρονιμώτεροι*. Let us examine the verse closely.

If we translate, The children of this world are wiser than the children of light, the proposition, as Henke and others have remarked, is in no wise *true*. One will remedy this by restricting the *εἰς τὴν γενεὰν ἐαυτῶν* to the first member of the sentence: they are wiser *in their worldly sphere*; but *that* thought is so very much a matter of course, that from its triviality, it seems altogether unsuitable in the mouth of the Lord. We would not enter the pulpit with *this* lesson of instruction, that an old practised thief understands pilfering better than the honest man! Moreover, the reference of the *εἰς τὴν γενεὰν, κ.τ.λ.*, to the first member alone is an obvious violence. Whoever would blame an interpreter for attaching this adjection to the *last* member of the sentence, from which would then proceed this sense: the children of this world are more prudent than the children of light in their (spiritual) sphere, Caiaphas wiser than Stephen, would then verily bestow very questionable praise on the *υἱοὶ τοῦ φωτός*.

The only correct exposition is probably that which applies the *εἰς τὴν γενεὰν* to *both* members; nor is it, indeed, so arbitrary as, by most expositors, *εἰς τὴν* for *ἐν τῇ*. How is this justified?

*Γενεὰ* is race, generation, *ἀπὸ Ἀβραάμ ἕως Δαυὶδ γενεαὶ δεκατέσσαρες*, Matt. 1: 17; then the *race of men now living*, *οὐ μὴ παρελθῇ ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη*, Matt. 24: 34; finally, above all, a species, i. e. a *class*, as Luther has translated Matt. 12: 39: *γενεὰ πονηρὰ καὶ μοιχαλὶς*, Mark 9: 19: *ὁ γενεὰ ἀπίστος*.

Who, now, are the *υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου* and the *υἱοὶ τοῦ*

φωτός? The statement of the Lord has throughout a concealed irony towards the Pharisees, who stood near, and against everything διεγόγγυζον, ὅτι οὗτος ἀμαρτωλὸς προσδέχεται καὶ συνεσθίει αὐτοῖς, 15: 2. These children of light are the Pharisees, whom Jesus, Luke 18: 9, sq., calls the πεποιθότας ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς, the δικαίους καὶ ἐξουθενούντας τοὺς λοιποὺς, those in respect to whom he says, John 9: 36: ἦλθον, ὅτι οἱ μὴ βλέποντες βλέπωσι (i. e., φρόνιμοι γίνονται) καὶ οἱ βλέποντες (νιοὶ τοῦ φωτός) τυφλοὶ γίνονται. In brief, the children of light are those who *conceive* themselves to be such and *so promulge*, to whom under the Old Testament economy a sufficiency of light had been offered, who daily had to do with this light in their instructions to the people, but yet were no children of light, σοφοὶ καὶ συνετοί, Matt. 11: 25.

Hence it follows, of course, that the children of this world are the publicans, and those like them, out of whose circle the disciples themselves were selected, those νήπιοι etc. the πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι, who took to heart the eternal wisdom of the Gospel, because they felt it necessary to their life. If we bring together the beautiful sense of this verse, which now begins to appear, the translation must be something like *this*: The children of this world (publicans and the like, grown up in the life of this world, *upbraided* as worldlings) are more prudent than the (self-conceited) children of light,—εἰς τὴν γενεὰν ἑαυτῶν (with exact rendering of the εἰς) *in respect to their estate*, i. e., *their religious and moral state, their sinful corruption, condemnation, and need of salvation*, and are consequently the more inclined and ready to come over to *Him* who is Light and Life, and imparts to every one who seeks in earnest.

This exposition, before which all former difficulties vanish, is not affected, as every one sees without being reminded, by the fact that the steward, v. 5, confesses himself guilty, nor by v. 8, in which he is called οἶκ. τῆς ἀδικίας, for he had been an ἄδικος. Interpreters have bothered themselves greatly to ascertain why μαμωνᾶς has the adjunct ἀδικία: Schreier more than all; yet has he, in this word, found only caducitas et fragilitas and adhered to them; certainly most arbitrarily. We might solve this problem briefly thus: *All riches, thought of and spoken of as μαμωνᾶς, is connected with an ἀδικία; else would it cease to be μαμωνᾶς, and would rather be πλοῦτος*. The possession itself, we would say in opposition to Olshausen, is no sin, but, as μαμωνᾶς, is in every case and always sin.

Were we to give the tenor of the parable, according to all

that has passed, we should take a special view of it, and perhaps superscribe it thus: *The necessity of restitution and respective benevolent expenditure of unrighteous gains, in order to entrance into the kingdom of Christ and the acquisition of its heavenly riches.*

It is the highest wish of the author of this attempt, as well as of many of his official brethren, that this essay be subjected to a rigid criticism, and that it be ascertained that his pen has been guided by no desire to say something new, but by a longing after truth and purity.

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## ARTICLE X.

### THE EDUCATION OF INDIGENT YOUNG MEN FOR THE MINISTRY.

By Prof. J. M. Sturtevant, of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Ill.

THIS is confessed by all to be a subject of great importance: and yet it is one upon which the public mind is at the present time greatly unsettled. It is one, therefore, upon which discussion is not only admissible, but in a high degree necessary. There are, if we mistake not, some indications that the principles of the subject have not hitherto been well understood, and that in the practical arrangements hitherto adopted all is not right. It is now twenty-seven years since the organization of the American Education Society. After having been in operation ten years, its machinery had become so far encumbered by excessive friction, that a thorough remodeling was deemed indispensable. Such a remodeling was projected, and carried into execution, with all the disinterested and fervent piety, and all the executive energy of the lamented Cornelius. After a lapse of about fifteen years more, during the earlier portion of which period it operated with a great degree of efficiency and power, we find that again a convention of its friends is called, to save the whole enterprise from utter extinction. The extent of this danger may be judged of by the following remarks of Prof. B. B. Edwards in his able article "on the necessity of education societies," (Bib. Rep. Oct. 1842, page 445.)

"Its annual resources since 1835 have been diminished more

than half. The number admitted to its patronage during the last year, was but a little more than one-fourth of the number so admitted in 1838. Such a falling off in the means and consequent usefulness of this institution is not accounted for by the commercial relations of the country. None of its sister charities has been so crippled. The business arrangements of the community are no worse now than they were three or four years ago. Yet the society has steadily declined in its means of fulfilling its engagements."

The convention above referred to appointed an able committee to revise the whole system of the society, and suggest such modifications as they might think called for. In the wisdom of that committee we repose great confidence: and yet we cannot but regard the present as a most auspicious occasion for the free and full exhibition of all the principles which the case involves. Past experience should surely teach us caution. The supply of the church with an intelligent and evangelical ministry is an object of too much importance to be trifled with; and the consequences of another failure in constructing our system may be very serious. We must endeavor now to discover all the causes which have produced past embarrassments, and if possible to avoid them. As Christian men we must listen to every suggestion from every quarter, we must endeavor to divest our minds of long cherished and perhaps popular prejudices, and to view a question confessedly of great and peculiar difficulty with true christian candor. We revere—American Christians ever will revere—the founders and early advocates of the American Education Society. Nor is that enough to say of them. Their record is on high, and the world is already reaping a rich harvest, as the fruits of their labors in this very department. It is well for millions that the question, What would have been the religious condition of our country at the present time, had the American Education Society never existed? is one of speculation, not of experience. Still it is no disparagement of those men to say, that they did not know without experience, what can only be learned by experience. Let us not fail to profit by all the lessons which their labors have taught us: and if there are any false principles incorporated in the superstructure which they reared, let not our reverence for them prevent our discerning and removing them.

What, then, are the causes which have hitherto impeded the

usefulness of the American Education Society, and involved it in repeated embarrassments ?

We shall at present insist only on two—partly because we believe these two to have been mainly at fault in producing the past reverses of the society, and partly because others have been so ably set forth by other writers on the subject, as to require no farther illustration.\*

The first of these is—that the American Education Society, in common with other kindred Associations, *has encouraged youth prematurely to make choice of the ministry as their profession, and to devote themselves to it by a solemn public religious pledge.* This practice we believe to be unwise in itself, prejudicial to the enterprise in which the education societies are engaged, and attended with no small danger to the church. We shall now endeavor to give our reasons for this opinion.

1. The practice is in obvious violation of those principles which experience has established, as applicable in all analogous cases. Who does not see the impropriety of selecting our future judges, governors, legislators, and other public officers while they are yet lads in the grammar-school ? Who does not feel that if for any reason we were to be induced to do so, we should commit errors for which no advantages of future appropriate training could ever compensate ? And can then the church without danger select those, who are to hold her highest office and sustain her highest responsibilities, both with reference to her internal welfare, and her aggressive action upon the world, from the lads of our academies and the members of the freshman classes in our colleges ? Will any advantages to be derived from educating them expressly for her service, justify her in violating so obvious a dictate of general expediency ?

It may be said that the fact of their being educated for the ministry, does not oblige the various ecclesiastical bodies to license and ordain them. True—but how rare the occurrence that one is rejected ! The ecclesiastical bodies regard such a candidate as having almost acquired a right to licensure, by his long, self-denying, and persevering pursuit of it. Besides, they were long ago examined and approved by wise and good men. They have all along been under the watch and instruction of good

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\* Bib. Rep. Oct. 1842, Prof. B. B. Edwards and New Englander, Jan. 1843.

men, and no reproach has ever come upon their character. They have been passed along from one stage of their education to another, much as travellers are transferred from one conveyance to another, by simply exhibiting their certificates of payment, and when found versed in the various branches of learning required, their licensure is practically treated as almost a matter of course, provided that in due time they make their application.

2. *This practice does actually and inevitably introduce into the ministry, many who are not called of God to that office, and from this source result some of the severest embarrassments which press the enterprise.* It is admitted that God has given to every man talents to serve the church in some capacity usefully and honorably; and that the talents of one individual, of whatever kind or degree, are as truly required to be devoted to the service of God as those of another. But it does not hence follow that every man is qualified for the Christian ministry, or can become so by any possible training; nor even that every man of sound judgment, common-sense, and respectable aptitude for acquiring scholastic learning, is of course called to that solemn and responsible office. He may still lack those certain qualities, which are indispensable to render him an edifying public teacher, or an efficient, influential, and successful pastor. Can it then be predicted with any degree of certainty of the youth in college or in the academy, whether he will be found to possess those qualities or not? Is it not rather a question which can only be decided when the character is mature, nor even then with any certainty, till it has been put to the test of experience among the realities of active life? Grant then that your examining committee is wise and faithful to any supposable extent; they must often recommend those who will not in the end prove useful in the ministry. To be secured against the frequent commission of such errors, they must be endowed with the gift of prophecy. Nor can this evil be obviated by any degree of strictness on their part. Suppose even that you adopt a standard so high, and adhere to it so rigidly, that half the applicants are rejected: the evil we apprehend would not be remedied. The evil seems to lie in an attempt to make up a judgment in a case, in which the materials of an intelligent decision do not exist; and we should still expect to find among the admitted many who would never become useful ministers, and many among the rejected whose ministrations might have proved a blessing to thousands.



What, then, must be the effect of this mode of selecting and educating young men for the ministry? What, upon the candidates themselves? What, ultimately, on the education society and on the church? A young man selected is pious and conscientious; he has acted all along as he should do under high religious considerations. He considers himself under the solemnity of a vow to God to devote his life to the ministry. He treats the question as forever settled, and refuses to listen for a moment to any suggestion leading in any other direction: he even regards it as a temptation of the devil. We think this is not over-stated: the experience of the greater portion of all those who have been educated specifically for the ministry by the aid of the church, will, we think, fully confirm it. Still it cannot be by any means certain that this man is after all called of God to the ministry. It is a matter of devout gratitude that a large portion of those who have been thus educated, have been found on trial to be in a good degree qualified for their work. Among them, however, it cannot be denied that there are not a very few, who, with a sound and thorough religious character, are still not such ministers as the church wants. And though neither the college instructor, the education society, nor the ecclesiastical body, could be expected to discover the error, the church and the community judge by experience and cannot long remain ignorant of it. Such men soon find their services not acceptable, and not in demand: they are unemployed. They still feel themselves pledged to the ministry, and their hearts are in it: they are forbidden by taste, by a sense of duty, and the sentiments of the community, to retire from the sacred office, and support themselves by secular pursuits. Their prospects for life, it must be admitted, are gloomy and disheartening. But they do not suffer alone. The community suffers deeply with them. The ministry goes begging, and suffers degradation in the popular esteem. The education society falls into disrepute. It is charged with educating incompetent men; or it is concluded that any such effort is unnecessary: as it begins to be believed, that we have already more ministers than we need.

What discerning man has failed to notice that every one of these effects is distinctly discernible at the present time, in all that portion of our country which has been the main field of the American Education Society's operations? Is not the number of candidates in readiness for any vacant place, and their zeal to obtain it, such as to make the impression that the ministry is

filled up with mere place-seekers—hanging on the church for a living? This inference is made with the more confidence, because it is said the West is in a state of deplorable destitution; and why do not those who are here wanting places go and supply those destitutions? To this question we should be disposed to make answer by asking another—Why does not the vacant parish in the New England or Middle States settle the first man who offers? or any one whom they have heard and rejected, and of whom they have said, Why does he not go to the West, instead of looking for a place here? It would probably be replied, that he is not *the man for them*. Then all parties may rest assured, that he is not *the man for the West nor for the foreign Mission*. The man who will not do for a settled regular parish, will not do for a Missionary. Is he then the man for the Christian ministry?

Now what must be the effect of multiplying in the most efficient churches of our country such an unemployed and place-seeking clergy? Must it not degrade the ministry in popular esteem, and greatly depreciate its influence? And must it not inevitably bring the object of the education society into disrepute? Will the churches continue to make efforts, and practise self-denial in raising up ministers, while a vacant parish is sure to be sought by scores of applicants? We are aware that the embarrassments of the Foreign and Home Missionary Societies have contributed something to swell the number of unemployed ministers. But this is by no means an adequate account of what is taking place. The vast fields of the West are white already to the harvest, and it has not yet been true that the truly faithful, devoted, and gifted minister of Christ, could not find here his food and raiment sure. While the resources of the Home Missionary Society have been curtailed, the number of Western churches able and willing to sustain a minister in some sort without missionary aid has greatly increased. If the unemployed minister had the same spirit of enterprise in his work, which we witness in the lawyer, the physician, the merchant, or the mechanic, he would not sit down all the day idle, concluding that no man hath hired him, till he had first thrown himself upon the wave of emigration, to see whether God had not a work for him to do in the vast opening fields of the west.

Nor are we unaware that the fact, that a minister is unemployed, is not of itself proof, either that he is not qualified for his

work, or that he is not willing to go wherever his Master calls him. We admit that, to any general conclusions of this sort, circumstances must make many honorable exceptions. And it would be matter of the deepest regret with us, that our language on this point should wound the feelings of any such brother in the ministry. Still we maintain that our principle is in general a correct one. The existence of a large number of unemployed ministers in any of our churches, does degrade the ministry, by reducing it to the vulgar level of the mere place-seeking, and it does destroy all energy in the effort to increase the supply of ministers to meet the wants of the world.

In reply to all this, it is said the evil lies in the education of incompetent men, and in their introduction into the ministry. This is readily conceded. But again we contend that the mode of effort which the church has been pursuing in reference to this object, *tends directly and inevitably to such a result*. The church has been selecting her ministers, not from men of mature years and ripe attainments, and after some experience of their ability to edify, but from the freshman classes in our colleges—nay, worse than this, from the preparatory classes in our grammar schools. We take it upon ourselves to say, that among materials so crude, untried, and undeveloped, no committee—no human sagacity, can select the candidates for such an office as the Christian ministry, without liability, nay, *certainly*, of numerous and great blunders. We said the church has been selecting her ministers, *her* ministers in this way—we mistake, she has in this way selected and trained up ministers, but when trained she is vexed and disgusted that she often finds them such as she will not employ.

And yet here they are, in the ministry—the vows of God—the solemn obligations of their ordination, which they can never forget—are on them, and yet the church rejects their services. They feel that they are supernumerary, perhaps that they are a burden and a clog. Is not a system which tends to such results erroneous? Does it not require reformation? Does not the requiring of the untrained youth of sixteen, in the very first stage of his studies, to pledge his life to the ministry, tend inevitably to this result? Let wise men judge.

But this is not always the worst form of the evil. It is to be feared that cases are not entirely wanting, (though it is hoped they are rare,) of those who on completing their prepar-

atory studies under a pledge of the Christian ministry, have found that they had really no heart for the work. Still their word is pledged in circumstances of great solemnity: the expectations of many pious friends are excited; if they draw back, if they forsake the ministry, and devote themselves to any other profession, they will be regarded as traitors to religion—as having disappointed cherished hopes, and wasted the resources of the church, bestowed for the sacred purpose of raising up a learned and pious ministry. In such a position they cannot bear to place themselves, or to violate such assumed obligations. While, therefore, they are conscious that they have no heart for the ministry, they suppress all their reluctance under the pressure of their hastily assumed pledges, and the church is burdened, in these cases, with a worldly and heartless ministry—and surely there is no greater burden she can be made to bear.

3. *The popularity of the Education Society suffers greatly from the fact, that those who have assumed this pledge not unfrequently turn aside to other professions.* Suppose that the class of persons last described decide differently, as not unfrequently they do—suppose they yield to their aversion to the ministry, and their longing for some profession offering a better prospect of wealth and fame—who has not witnessed the painful revulsion of feeling which exhibits itself as far as the facts are known? Pious friends and supporters of the Education Society are grieved, disheartened, and discouraged, and lose at once a large portion of their attachment to the cause: they distrust the management of the society, and their confidence is often shaken in every benevolent enterprise. The cause of religion itself suffers oftentimes a deep wound, ungodly men exult in the fall of promising youthful piety, and taunt the church with the hasty inference, that these young men whom they are educating for the ministry, are only in search of an easy way to get a living. We have long been intimately acquainted with those who have received and are receiving charitable aid in preparing for the ministry, and we assert without any fear of successful contradiction, that no inference could be, as a general rule, more false and slanderous. But it is equally undeniable, that whenever any youth educated for the ministry has turned aside to a secular profession, an impression has been made on the irreligious portion of the community, deeply prejudicial to religion itself: while its influence on the whole community has tended to paralyze every benevolent and religious enterprise.

Still we say let all this be endured, rather than the church be burdened with a cold, worldly, self-seeking, heartless, reluctant ministry. Let no man enter the ministry against all the wishes and feelings of his heart, simply because he has been educated for that purpose, and has pledged himself to that profession. It were far better to test all aspirants to the sacred office, as Gideon did the army of Israel, even till but three hundred of all the host were left to go up against the enemies of the Lord. So we believe all would say. Why then place a youth in circumstances of such extreme difficulty and trial?—or to speak more correctly, of extreme temptation? If you intend to rely on nothing, after all, but his love to Jesus and the souls of men as your security for his entering the sacred office—if you desire, after all, none to enter the ministry who are not drawn to it by these holy attractions, why then seek another and a far more earthly bond? Why make a pledge to enter the ministry, assumed in one's boyhood, while his character is yet undeveloped, his views but narrow and limited, and his judgment unformed, the condition of the aid you give him? If you are satisfied to rely on his sense of obligation to God, why seek to constitute an obligation additional to that, by a pledge to you and to the church?

4. We object again to the practice of requiring a pledge to the ministry, *because it invests the youth so pledged with responsibilities which he cannot reasonably be expected to be prepared to sustain.* The lad at school or in college, who has been selected for the sacred office by his own solemn publicly expressed conviction of duty, and the judgment of wise, good, and probably venerable men, and who is deriving his support from the sacred contributions of Christian benevolence, occupies a most delicate and unenviable position. On the one hand he is already invested, in the estimation of his acquaintances and associates, with no small portion of the sanctity of the sacred office itself. He is in a sense set apart to a holy use. On him the church is expending resources designed only to be employed in qualifying men to minister at her altar. From a youth thus situated is expected little less of gravity in conversation and propriety in deportment, than from those who are actually invested with the responsibilities of the ministry; while of ready and cheerful self-denial and uniform humility, much more is demanded, than even from the pastor himself.

On the other hand he is but a youth in age, and often but a

very child in experience and knowledge of the world : and will seldom be found capable of avoiding entirely the follies and indiscretions which belong to his years. Pious and sincere he may be—but piety does not make the boy a man—nor supply the place of those lessons of practical wisdom, which experience alone can teach. What wonder then if, in his intercourse with society, we find unceasing irritation and dissatisfaction ? What wonder if one is offended with his dress, another with his levity, another with his pride, another with his want of the accomplishments of the more elegant and refined circles ? And what wonder if all agree together in expressing their amazement, that the education society should think of making a minister of the gospel of such a youth as he ? The truth is, he is placed in a false position in reference to all these points and a multitude of others, which might be mentioned. He is judged by a standard wholly unfair, because it is wholly unsuited to his years, his previous opportunities, and his present circumstances.

The difficulty is greatly aggravated by the fact, that in the course of the same year he is often brought into intimate contact with the very extremes of society. The interest which is felt in one who is devoting his life to the service of the church, will often obtain for him the notice of the wealthy and introduce him to the circles of fastidious refinement, and here he must endeavor to be at home. But his own kindred and all his early friends are perhaps found, though in the most truly respectable, yet in the plainest and obscurest walks of life. To these scenes he delights to retire and feel at home. And yet, in all this variety of circumstances, he must act his part with a propriety and consistency such as would naturally be expected of one, who in a few years is to be clothed in all the dignity and responsibility of an ambassador of Christ. And is it wonderful if he often fails ? Is it not much more wonderful that he so often in a good degree succeeds ?

We put it then to the candor of our readers, is it not to be expected, that a benevolent enterprise which is yearly calling on the humblest and obscurest Christian to contribute his mite to its aid, and is yet presenting causes of irritation like these in almost every parish within the territory upon which it operates, will rapidly lose the affections and the confidence of the people ? And can we give a complete account of the difficulties and embarrassments of our education societies, till we have allowed that these causes have had a large share in producing them ?

Does not every observing friend of the enterprise himself know many individuals, who have been by these very influences entirely estranged, and even rendered hostile ?

Nor are the evils of this false standard of judgment confined to the community—they are very disastrous to the young men themselves. Early notoriety is always dangerous even in the most favorable circumstances—but such a notoriety as this is pre-eminently so. Such a youth is not only an object of marked attention—but he is so while in a false and unnatural position. The effect is quite different in different individuals, but always, we fear, more or less injurious. One soon learns to despair of pleasing all, and resolves to please himself. He becomes rash and headstrong, ungrateful for favors, and reckless of the public consequences of his own conduct. Another becomes crushed in spirit in view of censures heaped upon him unjustly, and broken-hearted at the injury which the cause of Christ sustains on his account, and is either quite discouraged, or, in his efforts to please all, loses his own mental independence and individuality. Others there are again, we rejoice to admit, who have either had the good sense to conform their conduct to these circumstances, difficult as they were, or who have been so far assisted by the grace of God, as to pass through the trial without material injury. We could wish, however, that these were much more numerous than they are.

Nor are these evils in any way separable from the existing constitution of our education societies. They result directly from selecting our candidates for the sacred office, and holding them up to the world as such, and expending upon them individually, funds which have been consecrated to the service of the church in the ministerial office, while as yet they are not qualified, either by age, experience, or attainment, to abide that standard, by which, in such circumstances, their conduct is sure to be estimated. It is not because their characters are peculiarly faulty, or even because they are not peculiarly excellent, but because more is demanded than can be reasonably expected of an inexperienced youth.

5. We object again to the pledge to the ministry, *because it operates injuriously on the relations of students to one another, and is on that account prejudicial to the cause of morality and religion in our colleges.* No person can have been conversant for four years with a body of students, a portion of whom are pledged to the ministry, and on that condition receiving the

aid of the education society, without observing that there is another class of students, equally needy, equally talented, and many of whom are equally pious, and do ultimately enter the ministry, whom yet no persuasion can induce to apply for the aid of the education society. They shrink from it: it is assuming responsibilities for which they feel that they are not prepared. They perceive the disadvantages and embarrassments of that false position which we have been describing, and they will not incur them. They will submit to almost any inconveniences and hardships, in order to complete their education without assuming any such burden. The relations of these two classes of students to one another, are productive of unpleasant and injurious consequences. To those who are not aided, the pressure of poverty becomes unnaturally oppressive, because they see those whom they cannot regard as more worthy than themselves, aided and relieved by the liberality of the benevolent and the pious, while they are left, without fault of their own, to bear their burdens alone. They do not feel that their unwillingness to engage to become ministers of the gospel, is a fault: on the contrary, they regard the engagements into which their companions have entered, as rash, hasty, and unwise. Hence, this class of students are very apt to feel themselves deprived of that kind and sympathizing regard, which it would be natural that they should receive from the friends and patrons of learning.

On the other hand, those who do receive the aid of the education society, are brought into comparison with those who rely exclusively on their own resources, and honor is done to the latter, to the disparagement of the former. Receiving the aid of the education society, he becomes to a certain extent, a degradation in the estimation of the great body of the students. Those who do receive it are watched suspiciously, and their influence is diminished. We do not consider any contempt incurred in the course of unflinching adhesion to Christian principle, as an evil to him who is called to bear it: but a degradation of standing, incurred in the way we have described, by so important a body of young men as the indigent pious students of our colleges, is an evil—it is prejudicial to the religious and moral interests of these institutions. The influence of such young men in college is precious, and let us place them in circumstances in the highest degree favorable to their exerting it to the utmost extent pos-



sible. The existing system of the American Education Society does not, we are persuaded, place them in such circumstances; but deprives our colleges of no small portion of that benign influence which they would otherwise exert upon them.

But perhaps in reply to all these arguments, it will be denied, *that the obligation assumed by those who receive aid, is of the nature of a pledge.* This point, then, will require a little examination.

The appropriations of the American Education Society, are made quarterly: as a condition of receiving each appropriation, the beneficiary must sign a declaration in the following words, or an equivalent, viz:

*"I hereby declare, that it is my serious purpose to devote my life to the Christian ministry."* A. B.

What then is the true import and impression of this transaction, repeated every three months during the whole course of his education? It will be readily conceded, that it does not amount to an *absolute pledge*. It is not to be supposed, that it was the intention of the society to bind a man to the ministry, in case of his becoming physically incapacitated for its duties, or that they intended to force into that sacred office, a man who should prove to be morally unfit for it. But while there are certain respects in which this transaction differs from an absolute pledge, there are several other points of precise agreement; and those are the very points from which all our arguments have been drawn.

1. The declaration as given above implies, that the person signing it has deliberately and solemnly examined the whole subject, and formed a solemn judgment and purpose in the premises: and he is aided only, on condition, that both he and his friends and advisers consider this question as settled. Against this we protest. It is a question which neither he nor his advisers are able as yet, intelligently to settle. The settlement of it depends on facts, and traits of character, yet undeveloped, and which therefore cannot be known: and to treat such a question as settled—to act on such unknown facts *as known*, is surely unsafe;—it is preparing the way for just such disappointments and reverses, as we have so often witnessed in the course of these efforts. So far, therefore, as our previous reasonings have proceeded upon the impracticability of making a judicious selection of candidates for the sacred office, while the mind is

yet immature, and the character unformed, they are just as applicable to the case as they would be if the pledge were absolute.

2. The expectation of friends and of the church generally, that the individuals aided are to become ministers of the gospel, and the feeling that they are under a solemn religious obligation to do so, unless physically incapacitated, have about the same strength as though an absolute pledge were given. Friends and the church generally, contribute to the object for this end only—the young man knows that he is aided for this object alone. True, if he is physically unable to preach the gospel, he will be considered as absolved from his obligation. But if the disqualification be moral, the public will hold him scarcely, if at all, less bound, than they would have done under any conceivable pledge. If he forsakes the ministry from a dislike of its duties, or from a consciousness of moral unfitness for them, the Christian public will be none the less dissatisfied, because his pledge is informally expressed. Hence all which we have said of disappointed hopes, of loss of character to the individual, if he fails to enter the ministry,—of injury to the general enterprise of providing for the education of the indigent,—to all benevolent enterprises, and to the cause of religion generally, applies with nearly the same force as though the pledge were of the most absolute character.

3. Nor, again, does the individual himself feel the pressure of obligation resulting from such a declaration, to differ much from that incurred by a more formal pledge. He has virtually told his friends and patrons, and the church at large, once in three months, solemnly and in writing, that he did clearly see it to be his duty to preach the gospel of Christ. And during all that time, he has been receiving aid from the sacred funds of the church, only on condition that such was his conviction, and such his purpose. Will a young man, tolerably conscientious, or having even an ordinary sense of honor, consider himself perfectly free to reverse such a decision, after having been thus fed and clothed for several years? Will he not feel that he is pledged, and that too with great solemnity?

These are the only points essential to our argument, and our reasonings are therefore precisely as applicable to the case, as though the form of words in which the pledge is expressed, had been a little more imperative. The moral effect is essen-

tially the same, both upon the individuals aided by the society, and the community at large.

Some of these evils, the lamented Cornelius and those who acted with him, clearly saw, and deeply felt; and they hoped in some good degree to remedy them, by requiring the beneficiary to refund the money received after his education was completed. The wisdom and expediency of this arrangement, we do not propose now to discuss. The public have just been presented with an able discussion of that question, in the *New-Englander* of January last, to which we have already referred. But it concerns our present purpose to inquire how far that modification in the plan of the society has obviated the evils of which we have complained in the foregoing remarks. The hope of its advocates was, that it would free the young men under patronage from their crushing dependence. What they received, it was said, would no longer be a gratuity, but a "parental loan." It was hoped that this would place them on a better footing with the community: that the young men would no longer be regarded as pensioners and dependents, living on the charities of the church, but as doing business on a borrowed capital, and therefore only responsible for returning what was borrowed, and not for the use they made of it: that, in short, they would no longer be mere "beneficiaries."

However well the system of refunding may have operated in other respects, it is to us very obvious that it has accomplished little in this. The reasons are manifest. The loan was without interest, and therefore in part still a gratuity. It was from the first found impracticable to enforce refunding with any degree of strictness. The domestic or the foreign missionary could not pay a debt of several hundred dollars to the Education Society from the scanty pittance which he could hope to receive from those self-denying fields of labor. And when a minister of Christ, educated in part at the expense of the church, for the very purpose of serving her in this very work, is called to such a field, and is willing to go, all feel the impropriety of detaining him, for the purpose of refunding the money which the church has expended in his education. In all these cases, therefore, and they are numerous, the aid bestowed is an entire gratuity. Besides these cases, there are many others where to exact payment is impolitic and impracticable. To a very great extent therefore the aid afforded is still a gratuity, except as it

is repaid by services done to the church and to the world, the value of which can never be estimated in money. Hence the appropriations made by the Education Society still continue to be considered charities, and those who receive them, beneficiaries. The churches are still solicited as before, from year to year, to contribute to its funds, and so far as popular impression is concerned, the relation of the church to those who are aided is unchanged.

But even if this were not the fact—if the aid received were a loan with interest, and prompt payment were rigidly enforced, the case would still, in reference to the points we have been insisting on, be nearly the same as now. It would still be true, that those aided by the society had been selected from the companions of their youth to bear the vessels of the Lord, and while yet in their youth invested with a portion of the sanctity of the sacred office, which they are ill prepared to sustain. It would still be true, that the Christian public would be called on to make sacrifices for the purpose of providing the means employed in their education. For however rigidly payment might be enforced, there would still be many who could never pay; from loss of health, premature death, or other providential visitations, and hence the resources derived from refunding could never sustain the society; to say nothing of the necessity of constantly enlarging its operations, to meet the growing wants of the church and the world. If, therefore, a system of refunding which should rigidly enforce prompt payment without discrimination were wise and practicable, we think it would still leave those who receive the aid of the society substantially in the same condition as at present, so far as respects the moral influences of the system. We shall never reach the root of the evil by any such change in the mere pecuniary relations of the society to those whom it patronizes. The real mischief is found where we have been seeking it; in the premature selection of candidates for the Christian ministry; in holding up to the world, as almost ministers of Christ, those who have yet only learned those first lessons of wisdom and propriety, which young men in college, or lads in the academy, may be expected to know. Do we then run any risk in predicting that, whatever changes may now be made, if this fundamental principle be left unchanged, the society will be likely ere long, again to lose the confidence of the church, and to sink into embarrassment and inefficiency?

We cannot leave this part of our subject without earnestly entreating all who love this enterprise to consider it attentively, solemnly, and prayerfully. To ourselves the case has long seemed a plain one. The opinions we have thus far expressed, have not been formed hastily and without thought. They are the result of many years of intimate acquaintance with the subject, first as a college student and a beneficiary, then as a college officer and a member of an examining committee of the American Education Society, and of a careful observation of the operation of the system upon the church, upon the ministry, upon our colleges, and upon the beneficiaries. They are not the result of lukewarmness, or of hostility towards the general object, but of a warm and fervent attachment to it—an attachment which was imbibed in our youth, and has never for one moment abated. We beg therefore we may not be heard as an enemy with suspicion, but as a friend with kindness and candor.

We are, however, aware that such a change as that proposed in the constitution of the American Education Society cannot be made without essentially changing the whole system. To aid as now indigent youth in acquiring an education, without requiring from them any pledge as to their future profession, will evidently alter fundamentally the relations of the society to the Christian community. Perhaps it will be thought by some, perhaps by those from whose opinion we would not willingly differ, that this change would be fatal to the enterprise, that it would so destroy the religious character of the Institution, that Christians would no longer cherish and support it. We have ourselves heard this objection to our views, from fathers and from brethren for whose opinion we entertain great respect. And if the other parts of the system were to remain unchanged, we should readily concede its validity. We do not believe it would be possible to secure for the society, as it would then be constituted, the affections and the efficient co-operation of the Christian public. In losing its religious character, it would also have lost the most efficient and the holiest motives by which its appeal has been hitherto sustained.

*What further changes then in our mode of conducting this enterprise are needful, in order to give it a warm and permanent place in the affections of the church?* We feel that this question is one of immense importance: it is vital to the whole enterprise. For if we are right in our previous positions, so long as the existing system is persevered in, any permanent

success is impossible: the society bears in its own constitution the causes of its certain destruction, and judging from the past those causes are very rapid in their action. Ten years have been quite sufficient to develope their destructive efficiency. If therefore a satisfactory answer cannot be given to the question just proposed, the whole enterprise must be given up as hopeless. To that question it is therefore necessary to give our earnest attention.

This question cannot in our opinion be satisfactorily answered without referring to the fact, that a great, and as we believe, a very sad change has taken place in the public opinion of this country, on the whole subject of collegiate education. Colleges have lost that high place which they once occupied in the holiest religious affections of the pious portion of the community. The founding of Yale College was as truly and as deeply a religious enterprise, as the establishment of any mission of the A. B. C. F. M. or as the organization of the American Education Society. The same was true of Cambridge. In the very words of the records of the colony of New Haven, they considered that the work is "a service to Christ to bring up young plants to his service."\* In a petition presented to the colonial Assembly, signed by a large number of ministers and laymen, praying for a charter for what afterwards became Yale College, the following language occurs—"That from a sincere regard to and zeal for upholding the Protestant religion by a succession of learned and orthodox men, they had proposed that a collegiate school should be erected in this colony, wherein youth should be instructed in all parts of learning to qualify them for public employments in Church and civil State."† The same language is incorporated in the preamble to the charter itself.‡

In October 1753 we find the General Assembly of Connecticut resolving, "That one principal end proposed in erecting the College, was to supply the churches in this colony with a learned, pious, and orthodox ministry; to which end, it was requisite that the students of the college should have the best instructions in divinity, and the best patterns of preaching set before them."§

The light in which our puritan fathers regarded their colleges, was much the same as that in which we regard a seminary of learning in connexion with a foreign mission as an institution

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\* *Annals of Yale College*, page 6.

† *Annals of Yale College*, p. 12. ‡ *Do.*, p. 13. § *Do.*, p. 67.

in which the choicest youths of the country may be trained, under learned and pious teachers, with a hope that they will become wise unto eternal life, and very many of them able ministers of the New Testament. The colleges were regarded as the main reliance of the church for a learned and pious ministry. And hence the inhabitants of New England were in the habit of contributing individually a peck of wheat, or its value, "for the relief of poor scholars at Cambridge." In this way provision was annually made for sustaining at college those young men whose parents were unable to sustain them.

Various causes, however, have probably conspired in later years to secularize these and all other colleges in this country. It would be foreign to our purpose to inquire at large what these causes are, although the question is one of surpassing interest, both to the church and the state. One of them, and in our opinion the principal one, we will specify. The colleges themselves have changed. They are far less directly religious. Their teachers are religious men for the most part, but they exert very little direct personal religious influence over the students. The religious teaching of the college, as such, comes very little in contact with the religious principles or affections of the pupil. This is probably caused by a reaction of the public mind, and not less of teachers themselves, against rendering colleges sectarian in their character. While the people of New England were mostly of one sect, nothing hindered the religious views of that sect being fully and unreservedly taught in her colleges. But when, as at present, sects are numerous and jealous of each other, it is necessary and right that sectarian peculiarities should as far as possible be excluded. But in excluding them we are in danger of excluding all religion. It is indeed undeniable that *sectarism* is in this way tending with fearful power to exclude all religious influences from our entire system of education, from the highest to the lowest department.

We have no desire to see our colleges rendered more *sectarian* in their character, but we believe they must be made more *religious*, or they can never either accomplish their proper work upon society, or retain their hold on the pious affections of the Christian community. Nor is there any real difficulty in rendering them religious, without rendering them sectarian. The great principles of the Bible are not obscure or unintelligible: they can be understood and taught as distinct from those minor

peculiarities, which distinguish such sects as have any solid claim to be called Christian. What reasonable consideration forbids the Christian teacher to hold communion with his pupil over the Bible, any more than over Virgil, or Demosthenes, or Newton? And yet how rarely does it occur, and when it does, with what restraint and timidity and fear of giving offence is it too often conducted. We believe the Puritans were right in this matter, only they should have used the Bible instead of the catechism.

Out of this secularizing of our colleges we believe has grown that peculiar feature of the American Education Society, against which our previous remarks have been directed. The secular character of our colleges was new: they are, for the most part, devoted to *mere* human learning. In this they furnish advantages, of which in this age, the minister of Christ must not be destitute. The candidate for the holy office must therefore be sent to college. But for his religious character we must rely, under God, on other instrumentalities. We must seek out our future ministers among the pious youth of our churches, administer to them a pledge to devote their lives to the ministry, and then send them to college to acquire human learning, only hoping that their religious character will not there be spoiled. How did our Puritan fathers view this same question? They were as anxious to raise up a pious and learned ministry as we—they felt the necessity of educating the indigent for this purpose. But their system of effort differed materially from ours. They filled their colleges with religious influence, and sent their youth to them, and made provision for the support of their indigent, and expected that, with the blessing of God, they would there acquire both human and divine wisdom, and become qualified for public employments both in Church and civil State. And when means were scanty, and the burden of the enterprise pressed heavily on their resources, they taxed themselves by the head, a peck of wheat, or its value, “for the relief of poor scholars at Cambridge.” Verily, all the wisdom of the world is not with the present generation!

It seems to us therefore that the remedy is plain. Let us go back to the good old paths of the fathers of New-England. Let our effort be like theirs, two-fold—first, to fill our colleges with sound and efficient religious influences—and second, in them to provide for the education of the indigent, both in human



and divine knowledge.\* Let our colleges at home sustain the same relations to the church which Missionary Seminaries in heathen lands sustain to the Missions with which they are connected. Let them be patronized from the same high religious motives, and prayed for with the same religious fervor. Let our men of wisdom and experience study the best modes of increasing the amount of religious teaching in them, without diminishing their broad, true Christian liberality.

Nor does it seem to us in the least doubtful that this system is vastly better than that which we have been pursuing, even taking our colleges just as they are. Though they are less religious than is desirable, many of them are far from being irreligious. Judging from facts, there are few conditions in which a young man can be placed, in which there will be greater probability of his becoming a Christian, and an efficient one, than in college. It is obvious also that the very fact of the church becoming again accustomed to rely on her colleges for her ministry, would powerfully tend to improve their religious character. The heart's blood of the church would again flow through them: prayer would ascend for them: the importance of piety in instructors would be felt: the whole subject would be carefully and earnestly examined, with a view to improve their religious condition in every possible way; and, more than all, there is reason to believe the Holy Spirit would be imparted.

We have probably now laid before our readers the two ideas which are fundamental to a true solution of our main question—colleges the handmaids of religion, and provisions for the support of the indigent in college. It remains to inquire in what manner these ideas are to be embodied in a practical system? To this we shall answer briefly, that we think the American Education Society should be released entirely from all responsibility of selecting and watching over its beneficiaries: and that its operations should be limited to the raising of funds. The funds raised should be, semi-annually or quarterly, placed at the disposal of such colleges as might be regarded as suitable for the purpose; and be disbursed according to fixed rules, in pay-

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\* We must not be understood here to speak of that religious training which is properly professional. This we believe must be acquired as now in an entirely separate course of instruction.

ing the expenses of indigent students. The amount bestowed on each college should be graduated by the number of such indigent pupils connected with it, as may come within the rules of the society. No funds should be expended at any college whose course of instruction is not thorough, or whose religious character is not sound and evangelical. There might be some difficulty in making these selections, but there could be none which would be peculiar to this plan. Such selections and discriminations the American Education Society as now constituted is obliged to make, as truly as on the plan proposed. Of this sketch of a plan we do not propose to attempt a defence: we simply throw it out as a hint, hoping that it may be pondered with candor, and adopted so far as it may be regarded as sound and practicable.

The inquiry still remains, on what principles are we to select those who are to receive aid from the funds raised? If the principles already laid down are correct, the object aimed at should be to render the advantages of a liberal education to the greatest possible extent available to promising talent in every condition in society. Good moral character should therefore be indispensable; for without it no talent affords any reasonable prospect of usefulness, and the influence of the vicious youth is corrupting and pestilential in college. But no pledge should be required to any particular profession: in this respect the youth should be left free to obey the dictates of his conscience, and the decisions of his judgment after his education is completed. He is to be understood to have discharged the obligation conferred upon him by aiding him in defraying the expenses of his education, if he shall have made the best of his talents in any way which his own taste and conscience may dictate. He is to be required to pledge his honor that he will do his utmost to acquire a thorough liberal education.

There is still one more point to which particular attention must be paid, or we apprehend the whole system will fail. Those who are to be aided must possess talents which promise future usefulness. We said in the outset that we should speak of two causes of the past and present embarrassments of the American Education Society. Of one we have spoken. *The other is, that in respect to talents its patronage has been too indiscriminately bestowed.* We admit that its intentions have on this point always been correct, and that its machinery has been worked with all the fidelity and integrity which can be required

or expected. The evil lies in the system itself—which contains no provision for such a discrimination of talent as is indispensable to its success. Its appropriations are made on the mere general recommendation of the heads of the various institutions where the young men are receiving their education. Accurate discrimination of talent by means of such a system is not to be expected. For this reason we honestly believe that the resources of the American Education Society, though they have conferred great and lasting blessings on our country, have failed to communicate that salutary impulse to indigent intellect which might have been reasonably anticipated. Perhaps experience has proved that the indigent youth can receive aid in acquiring an education, with safety to himself and advantage to the public, in no other way than as the reward of diligent and successful study, on an arena of open and fair competition. When he receives it thus, he is regarded as having fairly won the prize, and therefore as having a right to enjoy it. He is not any longer a pensioner on public charity, but is receiving the rewards of his own talents and industry. This then is probably the only way of avoiding what has ever been justly regarded as the great evil in the system of modern education societies. They bestow their benefactions in a way which applies no stimulus to intellectual effort, and affords no ground of discrimination between the aided and the unaided, the propriety of which all can see and feel. The applicant for their bounty regards himself, and is regarded by others, as a beggar, and the receiver of it as a public pauper.

It is then indispensable that on this point the system should be radically changed. We are assured that unless it is so, all other amendments will prove ineffectual and vain. The aid offered must be thrown into the field of open and fair competition, and conferred as the reward of merit. Does any one say that this will be wasting the resources of the church to educate the ungodly? We reply by asking—is it no object worthy of the highest efforts of the church, to open the doors of Protestant evangelical colleges to indigent talent in every sect and grade of society, and to provide for its thorough education under enlightened and Christian teachers? Cannot Protestants understand the importance of this subject as well as Catholics? From their operations we might learn wisdom. They do not forbear to expend money on colleges, and on the education of the *Protestant* poor, for fear their pupils will not turn out Cath-

olics. They educate them without discrimination of sect or opinion, and trust their system to make them subservient to their interests. And need Protestants hesitate? Will not their system as readily commend itself to the educated and cultivated mind, as the dark superstition of the Papacy? And can they not rely on the blessing of God with as much confidence as the advocates of spiritual despotism? If the church engages in a work so great, so noble, so liberal, and so truly Christian, will not her God hear her prayers, and pour out his Spirit abundantly? Will it not be to her according to her faith? We think so: the church may safely trust God's truth and faithfulness in such an enterprise as this: or if not in this, then not in any other—not surely in her missions and seminaries in heathen lands, where the obstacles in the way of saving results are vastly more numerous and formidable.

But how, it will be asked, is such discrimination of talent to be carried out in practice? Of this question we shall briefly give our views, without argument in their defence. Every college ought to keep a scale of merit; at least, so we think; and to make up at stated intervals the aggregate standing of each pupil, formed upon the teacher's daily judgment of his recitation as recorded at the time. Such a scale of merit transmitted to the parent of the pupil, probably applies to his mind the most salutary stimulus, which the nature of the case admits. Let the Education Society require of every college upon which any portion of its funds is expended, to keep such a scale of merit, and let none in any case be aided, whose scholarship does not reach a given grade, which grade is to be determined by the Education Society. In our opinion, that grade should be much above mediocrity, and no discretion should be lodged anywhere to grant aid to any one falling below it. The conditions of receiving aid would then be four:—*Good moral character—indigence—a promise to prosecute to the utmost of their ability a liberal education—and, a certain grade of scholarship.* We would suggest, then, that the President of each college, assisted by a committee appointed by the Trustees of the same, should distribute the funds placed at their disposal equally among all those, who should, in their judgment, come within the four conditions above named. Perhaps some would prefer—perhaps we ourselves should be of the number—that a definite annual sum should be distributed to each, and that when the resources of the society were insufficient to pay that sum to all who should

be embraced within the above-named conditions, preference should always be given to superior scholarship. We are aware, however, that public opinion does not at present much favor an appeal to the principle of emulation, as an incentive to intellectual effort.

We ask for this plan, of which we have now sketched the outline, the candid and prayerful consideration of the wise, the pious, and the liberal—of the friend of learning, and the friend of religion. In principle it contains little which is new or untried. Indeed, it is nothing more than an attempt to supply the want of scholarship in our colleges, by the annual operations of one of the great benevolent associations of the day. It proposes through that association to make the yearly liberality of the friends of learning and religion, supply the place of permanent funds. The question is—is this practicable? Or at least, is it not worth the experiment? We ask that the plan may be examined particularly with reference to the following points of inquiry:

1. Can the American Education Society be sustained without a change of its fundamental principles, as indicated in the foregoing remarks?

2. Would not the plan proposed operate most beneficially upon the intellectual character of our colleges?

3. Would not the plan proposed afford a reasonable prospect of a great improvement in the moral and religious condition of our colleges?

4. Would not the plan proposed greatly improve both the intellectual, and the moral and religious character of the other professions?

5. Would not the sum of \$50,000 per annum, expended on this plan, furnish the church annually with a greater number of *efficient ministers*, and fewer *inefficient and worthless ones*, than if expended according to the existing plan of the American Education Society?

We regret that it has not been in our power to offer these suggestions to the public at an earlier stage in this all-important discussion; as well as the imperfect and hasty manner in which we have been obliged now to present them. But we have done what we could. In reference to most which we have said, we can at least say,

—“*quæque ipse miserrima vidi,  
Et quorum pars magna fui.*”

## ARTICLE XI.

## CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*Ecclesiastical Republicanism, or the Republicanism, Liberality and Catholicity of Presbytery, in Contrast with Prelacy and Popery.* By Thomas Smyth, author of *Lectures on Apostolical Succession, etc.* Boston, Crocker & Brewster; New York, Robert Carter, J. Leavitt, Wiley & Putnam; Philadelphia, Whetham & Son, W. S. Martein, Perkins & Purves, etc., 1843, pp. 323, 12mo.

MR. SMYTH is already well known and duly appreciated as the author of several volumes on ecclesiastical polity, Apostolical succession, Presbytery and not Prelacy Scriptural, Ecclesiastical catechism, etc. The present volume is designed to show that Presbytery is preëminently republican, that it is liberal and catholic, and admirably adapted, in its principles, both dogmatical and ecclesiastical, to our system of civil polity. It may be well here to remark, that the author employs the term Presbytery generally, as alike applicable to all non-episcopal churches; and intends to be understood as contending, not for the republicanism of Presbyterianism exclusively, but for all those systems which recognize the parity of the ministry and rights of the people, such as the Lutheran church—the Reformed—the Reformed Dutch—the Protestant Methodist—the Baptist—the whole body of New England Puritans, generally denominated Congregationalists.

We have always wondered, how those who hold to episcopacy could contend for its republicanism and adaptedness to our system of representative government. It seems to us too manifest to be denied, without a blush, that the principles of presbytery, in its extended sense, are precisely those which lie at the basis of our political structure, that they are essentially liberal and republican, and equalled by no others in their accordance with the free spirit of our popular government.

The author has done his part well, and his work merits the commendation of all non-episcopal, and the attention of all episcopal communions. At the present crisis, it is especially demanded, when so lofty claims are set up by those who deem

themselves the only conservators of the rights and privileges of God's house. May the writer be rewarded for his work of faith!

2.—*Presbytery and not Prelacy, the Scriptural and Primitive Polity, proved from the testimonies of Scripture; the Fathers, the Schoolmen, the Reformers, and the English and Oriental Churches. Also, the Antiquity of Presbytery; including an account of the ancient Culdees, and of St. Patrick.* By Thomas Smyth. Published as above. 1843. pp. 568, 8vo.

It is not in our power now, to devote as much space to a notice of this work, as its merits certainly would justify. It is well worthy of an extended review, and we should be pleased to have one offered for our pages, as we fear our own pressing and multiplied engagements will not allow us the time necessary for its preparation.

Mr. Smyth has taken hold of a great subject, with great zeal, and stands up manfully in defence of non-episcopal polity. The day seems to have come, when we must again buckle on the armor for a conflict with the papacy and sub-papacy, or Newmania! We must show the people that we stand on solid ground, when we maintain the parity of the ministry, and undertake to substantiate our claims to as high and holy a succession, and as rightful and regular an administration of the ordinances of Christ's house, as ever belonged to Pope or Prelate.

But to the volume. Mr. Smyth has here furnished an armory, where the presbyter can be readily supplied with a panoply, all-sufficient for his defence against the hottest onsets of his antagonists, and indeed, one in which he can go forth with confidence of victory. The matter is embraced in three books—I. Presbytery the Scriptural and Apostolical order of the Church of Christ. II. The claims of Presbytery to the Apostolical or ministerial succession, sustained by an appeal to the fathers, the schoolmen, the reformers, and to the Romish, Anglican and other churches. III. The Antiquity of Presbytery, with an Exhibition of the Presbyterianism of the ancient Culdees of Ireland and Scotland, and also of St. Patrick. The first book contains 14 ch.; the second 7 ch.; the third 3 ch., presenting a full, free, satisfactory view of the whole subject in a lucid style. The chapter on the Culdees of Ireland, is especially worthy of attention.

3.—*Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. John Williams, Missionary to Polynesia. By Ebenezer Prout, of Halstead. First American edition. New York, M. W. Dodd; Andover, Allen, Morrill, & Wardwell. 1843. pp. 416, 12mo.*

Most of our readers have, we presume, read more or less of the "Martyr of Erromanga," the devoted Williams, whose memoirs we have before us. The "Missionary enterprises" gave us some insight into his lovely character, and consecrated energies; but enough of interesting incident remained untold, to lay the foundation of the present volume.

John Williams was the son of a pious mother, often borne up by her on the arms of faith, and given to God, in hope. Yet eighteen years of his life were spent in impenitency, until one memorable night, whilst waiting at the door of an inn, for some wicked companions, with whom he had engaged to spend the night in dissipation, and who were not punctual to their agreement, he was seen by the woman with whom he boarded, and persuaded very reluctantly, to accompany her to the Tabernacle, the house of worship. He went with a vexed spirit, and with no predisposition to give heed to the word of God. But there the arrow of the Almighty penetrated his heart until it bled with sorrow for sin, and drove him, like the hunted and stricken deer, into solitude, there to shed the penitential tear. He yielded to Christ, devoted his life to the cause of God, and in due time became a missionary to the South Sea Islands. His labors there were unwontedly successful, and his plans of operation large. It was in the execution of one of them, that of conveying the gospel to other islands than those on which he had so long and so successfully labored, that he fell before the clubs of the cannibal savages, a martyr. "How does the wave of Erromanga henceforth seem to redden with his blood, and to murmur with his name; and its corals to pile up their monument to the enterprise of his mission and the oblation of his death?"

Thus, one after another of the holy company, who have gone forth to gird the earth with a band of light and love, is summoned away from his toils on earth, to his crown in heaven. Well! though these dispensations are often mysterious to us, what we know not now, we shall know hereafter; and the wisdom and love of God will probably shine forth most gloriously, just where we could see least of it in this world of dim vision, so clouded over with sin. This and the subsequent volume from Mr. Dodd's press, will be acceptable to the Christian community, and, we presume, have an extensive sale.



- 4.—*The Wrongs of Woman. By Charlotte Elizabeth. Milliners and Dress Makers.* New-York: M. W. Dodd, 1843, pp. 108, 18mo.

Lest any should be alarmed at the title, and presume that she was becoming the advocate of what are now popularly called Woman's Rights, Charlotte Elizabeth thus introduces her work: "When we name the infliction of a wrong, we imply the existence of a right. Therefore, if we undertake to discuss the wrongs of women, we may be expected to set out by plainly defining what are the rights of women. This is soon done. We repudiate all pretensions to equality with man, save on the ground specified by the Apostles, that in Christ Jesus, there is neither male nor female!" "Complaints are usually heard from aspiring individuals of the female sex, as to a supposed depression in the scale of intellectual power and mental capability, below the mark at which they consider themselves entitled to be rated; some conceiving that the spiritual equalization is no less applicable here. It is due to our readers and to ourselves, however, to announce that we have no intention of advancing any such claims; and further to guarantee that assurance, we frankly confess our entire dissent from the views of those who hold them." "Let us, then, contentedly bear our impressive designation as the 'weaker vessel,' and on it found the rights, that we may the more effectually show forth the wrongs, of woman."

In this small volume, the writer's design is to call the attention of benevolent women to a class of poor girls, whose health and morals are both injured and often destroyed by the undue pressure made on them by their heartless, selfish employers: and to accomplish it, she tells the tale of two sisters, sent from the country to the city, in consequence of the poverty of their parents. The book will be read with interest and profit.

- 5.—*Papal Rome as it is, by a Roman; with an Introduction by the Rev. W. C. Brownlee, D. D.* By Rev. L. Giustiniani, D. D., formerly a Roman Priest, now minister of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Baltimore: Publication Rooms. 1843. pp. 262.

The author of this volume has been familiar with the Papal system from his infancy, having been nurtured on its lap. He has been behind the scenes, and initiated into its arcana: and after having spent a great portion of his life in becom-

ing practically acquainted with it in all its varied forms, he comes out prepared to disclose to the public its essential principles and ordinary practices. Mr. Giustiniani has certainly a right to speak of popery, and tell us what it is at Rome, the fountain-head. If impure there, the streams which issue from it must be also muddy.

He was a devoted Romanist, until "Father Clement" fell into his hands. He purchased it at a bookstand, presuming it to be the story of some saint: but on reading it, had his eyes opened to new revelations. He sought a Bible, to controvert the declarations of that book: having, with difficulty, obtained one, he found, with surprise, the quotations of "Protestant" to be correct. His faith was shaken: yet he endeavored to bolster himself up in his old belief, until by the truth and Spirit of God, he was brought to bow, a penitent sinner, at the feet of a crucified Jesus. He, of course, feels deeply for his brethren, who are burdened with a heavy weight of unmeaning ceremonies, and in this volume speaks to them in love, hoping that some of them, at least, may be induced to read, and to inquire for themselves after the truth as it is in Jesus.

Those who wish to acquire correct information of the practices of Rome, will obtain it in this volume: and we heartily recommend it to the attention of the Protestant and Roman world. We regret to find so many errors in the printing.

- 6.—*Lessons on the Book of Proverbs, topically arranged, forming a system of Practical Ethics, for the use of Sabbath Schools and Bible Classes.* Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1843. pp. 107.

The design of the author in this little book is, "first, to present in a distinct form the series of moral lessons so admirably conveyed in the book of Proverbs, elucidating and enforcing each by appropriate illustrations and examples: secondly, to produce an increased acquaintance with the Scriptures." The intention of the writer is accomplished by dividing the whole into twenty-five chapters, embracing such topics as the following: Diligence and Slothfulness—Self-conceit—Honor due to Parents—Right use of the Tongue—Choice of Companions—Temperance, etc. etc. These and other points are abundantly illustrated by references to the Scriptures themselves; and a variety of questions is proposed, adapted to incite intellect and improve the soul. We are much pleased with the plan, and hope the book will be extensively used in Sabbath Schools and Bible Classes. We know

of no book of practical wisdom equal to the Proverbs, nor of any little manual so well suited, as this, to impress them on the youthful mind. Scotch Presbyterians were wont early to imbue the minds of their children with the lessons of this portion of God's word, and the good results were apparent in their elevated character. Mrs. Louisa Payson Hopkins has, in this work, elucidated one of the best systems of ethics ever penned: and we trust her reward will be found in the happy influence exerted by it over the rising generation.

7.—*Prayers for the Use of Families; or the Domestic Minister's Assistant.* By William Jay. From the last London Edition. With an Appendix, containing a number of select and original Prayers for particular occasions. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1843. pp. 311. 12mo.

The author of these prayers is a deservedly popular religious writer, diffusing through all his works much of the benign spirit of the Author of Christianity. His morning and evening Exercises have refreshed and strengthened many a weary pilgrim on both sides of the Atlantic. We love his spirit, and as we expected, we find it breathing itself out through his 'Prayers.' These forms will, doubtless, be helpful to many who, from various causes, feel themselves unable to conduct family prayer extemporaneously; and those who prefer forms of prayer will find them abounding in evangelical sentiment, expressed very frequently and appropriately in scriptural language. For ourselves, whilst we have no bigotry which would denounce all use of a written prayer as inconsistent with heartfelt expressions of piety, we have a preference for the simple, original, extemporaneous expressions of a soul imbued with a sense of its wants. The author himself says: "I cannot but earnestly recommend the use of free extemporaneous prayer, where it is practicable. There is in it a freshness, a particularity, an appropriateness, an immediate adoption and use of circumstances and events, which cannot be found in the best composed forms."

From the Preface we extract the following true and beautiful thoughts: "Men are often led out of their own proper sphere of action in order to be useful; but it is ignorance, if not discontent and pride, that tempts them astray."

"As the stream of a river is most lovely and beneficial when it patiently steals along its own channel, though it makes not so much noise, and excites not so much notice, as when it breaks over its banks and roars and rolls as a flood: so good

men are most acceptable and useful in their appointed course. Wisdom will estimate every man by what he is, not out of his place or calling, but in them. *There* we naturally look after him; there we unavoidably compare him with his obligations; there we see him habitually, and there he gains a character or goes without one."

Here are thoughts well meriting the consideration of young men and maidens too. The world will unquestionably be better when all shall learn the true wisdom of laboring patiently and quietly in their respective spheres.

8.—*Guide for writing Latin: consisting of Rules and Examples for Practice.* By John Philip Krebs, Doctor of Philosophy, and Principal School Director in the Dutchy of Nassau. From the German: by Samuel H. Taylor, of Phillips' Academy. Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. New-York: M. H. Newman. 1843. pp. 479. 12mo.

We are glad to see, at last, a book in our own language which we think far better fitted to make good Latin scholars, if judiciously used, than any previously published. It comes, indeed, from Germany, whither we naturally look for our best and most original works on philology. The author is celebrated at home for his pure Latinity and his skill in the preparation of books for learners. In these respects he is probably not surpassed.—The translator has not only had the ordinary task of converting German into good English, but was, of course, under the necessity of substituting English for German Idioms, in the comparative illustrations of the Latin by our own tongue. He has executed his work well, quite as well as could be expected in a first edition. The use of the book will suggest trifling emendations for future editions, should they be demanded, as we can not but hope and believe they will be.

With such a book as this, early put into the hands of students, and used as intended, we may confidently expect an advanced grade of scholarship among our graduates, better disciplined minds, and a higher appreciation of the spirit and beauty of the Latin tongue. A boy that should study this 'Guide' thoroughly, in connexion with the careful, elaborate reading and translation of select passages from the purest Latin authors, would know more of the principles, idioms and beauties of the language, than is ordinarily known by those who have received their diplomas and are ready to become *teachers*.

We do love *thoroughness* in teaching and learning and hence we welcome the work before us, and heartily commend

it to the attention of trustees and conductors of classical schools. We could and would write more on this topic, but must desist.

- 9.—*Bible Majesty: or Christ's Dominion over the Nations: with an examination of the Civil Institutions of the United States.* By Rev. James Wilson, A. M. Philadelphia: Missionary Society of Reformed Presbyterian Church. 1842. pp. 122.

The author of this volume takes high ground on the subject of Christ's dominion; contending that as he is Lord of all, and the kingdoms of this world are given to him for a possession, all nations are bound to recognize his authority, and to form their constitutions and laws according to the principles of the gospel, and with a direct recognition of Christ's Headship. Consequently it is wrong to elevate to office any but Christians. "If government is entrusted to Christ's enemies, it is in violation of his institution" of government. Of course, God's people can rightfully vote for no candidate for office, who does not practically confess Jesus to be his Lord.

After an examination of the constitution of these United States, it is concluded to be entirely atheistical, making no direct recognition of God, or his providence: and the practical operation of it decidedly so. These thoughts are worthy the consideration of all Christian people: and, although we might not go the whole length of the author, in some of his positions, we do believe that good men ought to be far more cautious than they are in the exercise of the elective franchise. They ought not to aid in elevating those to office, who have no regard for God or his law; and whose example will tend powerfully to the corruption of the body politic.

- 10.—*Elements of Algebra, being an Abridgment of Day's Algebra, adapted to the Capacities of the Young, and the Method of Instruction in Schools and Academies.* By James B. Thompson, A. M. New Haven: Durrie & Peck. Philadelphia: Smith & Peck. New-York: Robinson, Pratt & Co. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1843. pp. 252. 12mo.

Day's Algebra has long been popular and useful as a text book in colleges: and is too well known to need commendation at this late day. The present abridgment by Mr. Thompson, is designed "to divest the study of Algebra of all its intricacy and repulsiveness; to illustrate its elementary principles so clearly, that any school-boy of ordinary capacity may

understand and apply them ; and thus to render this interesting and useful science more attractive to the young." Many of those divisions of the science, which belong to the higher department of Algebra, are here omitted : the whole is reduced within a suitable compass for academic and common school instruction, and the principles so clearly stated and illustrated, that we cannot but think it well adapted to the end for which it has been prepared.

- 11.—*Brande's Encyclopædia of Science, Literature and Art. Alison's History of Europe.* New-York: Harper & Brothers.

The former of these valuable works is now complete in 12 parts, and will make two large 8vo. volumes, containing a mass of important matter in a compendious form, and suitable as a book of reference on the different branches of human knowledge.

The latter will soon be completed in 16 numbers, and make four 8vo. vols., thus offering to the public one of the most interesting and valuable histories ever prepared. We doubt not the publishers will be abundantly compensated for their laudable enterprise.

- 12.—*Jessy Allan, the Lame Girl : a Story, founded on facts.* By Grace Kennedy, Author of "*The Decision*," "*Father Clement*," etc. From the ninth Edinburgh Edition. New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 107. 18mo.

The Authoress of "*Decision*," and of "*Father Clement*," is capable of writing an interesting and useful book : and although "*Jessy Allan*" is not equal to either of the others, it is yet admirably well written, and ought to find a place, at least, in every Sunday School Library. It is a tale of sorrow, and yet of joy. It tells the story of a poor girl, cursed with wicked parents, who yet, by the grace of God, was brought an humbled child to the feet of Jesus. She was lamed by a wound from a lump of stone coal, and after many days and nights of suffering, was obliged, at last, to submit to the amputation of one of her legs. Under the operation, she exhibited Christian patience and submission : and although she recovered and lived in health for many months, she afterwards was attacked with disease, which brought her to the grave. Through all her sufferings, she confided in Jesus, was calm and composed, and finally departed in peace to be with Christ.

- 13.—*The Saints' Everlasting Rest. By the Rev. Richard Baxter. Abridged by Benjamin Fawcett, A. M. New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 540. 12mo.*

Of Baxter's 'Saints' Everlasting Rest' it were almost a work of supererogation to say any thing to commend it. It is every where known and admired, and he must be an ignorant man indeed who has never heard of it. Such a legacy has seldom been left as the Saints' Rest. How many has it directed to a better portion than they were seeking on earth! How many has it comforted in the hour of affliction! How often has it opened the gates of the upper temple to the Christian, and led him to pant after its pure and sublime worship! One thing we must notice in respect to the execution of the work. It is printed on large, clear type, so as to be suited to the failing vision of the aged, who must soon expect to cross over Jordan.

- 14.—*The Cottage Fireside; or the Parish Schoolmaster. By Henry Duncan, D. D. Ruthwell. Author of the Sacred Philosophy of the Seasons, etc. etc. From the fifth Edinburgh edition. New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 251. 12mo.*

"The chief object of THE COTTAGE FIRESIDE is to point out and remedy the common abuses which take place in the education of children, particularly among the Scottish peasantry"—"to convey, in an agreeable form, instruction to parents in the art of education, an impressive lesson to children in the duty of obedience and the happiness of good conduct, and to all, a striking illustration of the importance of regulating the heart and affections."

We think the author has accomplished his purpose, and in the happiest manner. Seldom have we read a book with deeper interest. It is full of touching incidents, narrated with so much simplicity and naturalness, that they tenderly affect the heart, and at the same time inculcate the most important lessons on the subject of education. "A family Picture," in the first chapter, is a graphic representation of scenes which too often occur, from the mistaken tenderness or thoughtless severity of parents, in the management of children. The drowning on the Sabbath, in the third chapter, will bring tears to many eyes; and the angry mother and the murder, in the fourth, will awaken deep emotion and fixed attention.

- 15.—*Lectures on the Epistle of Paul, the Apostle, to the Romans.*  
By Thomas Chalmers, D. D., LL. D. Second Edition.  
New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter.  
1843. pp. 521. 8vo.

Mr. Carter has completed his reprint of Chalmers's Lectures in numbers, and now offers them to readers in one large volume. We have so recently noticed the work in another form, and the author is so popular, that further remark is unnecessary. Many will differ with the Doctor on some points. Among others, where he concedes that baptism is primarily immersion, and that this was the prevalent mode in apostolic times. Yet, even granting this, we cannot see that immersion is obligatory, as a necessary mode of baptism.

- 16.—*An Ecclesiastical Catechism of the Presbyterian Church, for the use of Families, Bible Classes, and Private Members.*  
By Thomas Smyth. New York, Leavitt & Trow, 1843,  
pp. 124, 18mo.

This little work has been formerly noticed in the Repository, and we need only add, that the demand for a third edition is evidence of the favor of the public, and their appreciation of Mr. Smyth's labors. The catechism is simple and lucid in style, adapted to the end in view, and likely to be extensively and usefully studied.

- 17.—*Antioch: or Increase of Moral Power in the Church of Christ.*  
By Rev. Pharcellus Church. With an Introductory Essay,  
by Rev. Baron Stow. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln.  
Rochester: Sage & Brother. 1843. pp. 258.

There are, in this book, some admirable lessons, which we should be gratified to see deeply impressed on the minds of our Baptist brethren, as well as on our own: e. g. tenacity of misproved dogmas—sectarianism not moral power, etc.

- 18.—*An Inquiry concerning the Lawfulness of Marriage between parties previously related by Consanguinity or Affinity. Also a Short History of Opinions in different Ages and Countries, and of the action of Ecclesiastical Bodies on that subject, by Rev. William Marshall.* New-York: Mark H. Newman.  
1843. pp. 212.

We can only say that Mr. Marshall has gone extensively into the subject, and reasoned well.



- 19.—*Bickersteth's Treatise on the Lord's Supper : adapted to the Services of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States. With an Introduction, Notes and an Essay, by G. T. Bedell, D. D. Fifth Edition.* New York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter.

This work has already passed through so many editions, and met with so much favor from those for whom it is intended, as to need no commendation from us. The author is known to be an evangelical clergyman in the Episcopal church; and although some of the instructions in this volume are especially adapted to members of his own denomination, the most of them are equally suited to all of every name, who call on the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity and truth, and love his ordinances.

- 20.—*Second Causes ; or Up and Be Doing.* By Charlotte Elizabeth. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1843. pp. 230. 18mo.

This is one of Charlotte Elizabeth's best books. It is written in a forcible style, abounds in scriptural language and illustration, and is evidently adapted to stir up the deep emotions, and give vision to the faith, of the Christian. She would urge God's people to look away from second causes to the Great First Cause, to rely with confidence on his promises of aid, and to go forth, in his strength, to urge the warfare with the powers of darkness. These powers, she thinks, are now mustering themselves for the great battle; a crisis is at hand, yea even now is, which will demand of the followers of Christ an apostolical and a martyr's spirit. She sees Popery advancing, with rapid stride, to the height of temporal and spiritual power in England itself, and fears the day is not far distant, when the "Man of Sin" shall have wended his way into the affections of those in the high places of power. Read and admire.

- 21.—*Remains of the Rev. Richard Cecil, M. A. To which is prefixed a View of his Character.* By Josiah Pratt, B.D. F. A. S. From the Eleventh London Edition. New-York: R. Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 283. 12mo.

Cecil's 'Remains' will be welcomed by many to a place among the books which they love to peruse. Cecil was a striking subject of divine grace, led back from the dark waters of sin to the pure fountain of holiness, through the instrumentality of a pious mother's prayers and admonitions; and he has left behind him in his 'Remains' and 'Sermons' abundant evidence of the loveliness of his spirit, and the strength of his faith.

## ARTICLE XII.

## LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

## Russia.

To the University of Dorpat, the Emperor has assigned an annual contribution of 23,370 silver rubles, for the purpose of multiplying the professors and the means of instruction,—three new professors in the medical faculty, one in the judicial, and fourteen in the philosophical, making in the last twenty-eight.—Under the title *Historica Russiæ monumenta ex exterarum gentium archivis atque bibliothecis deprompta ab A. C. Turgenewio*, there has been published, in Petersburg, a collection of documents, illustrating the early history of Russia, down to 1580. They are principally excerpts from the archives of the Vatican, and accounts of the Venetian ambassadors.

## Germany.

Rauch, the Sculptor, has finished his model for the equestrian statue of Frederick the Great. It is to be cast in bronze, and erected in Berlin.—In Kiel, there has been formed, a society for aiding oppressed Protestants, resident in countries where an opposite faith prevails. It has now ninety-nine members, and has collected a considerable sum of money.—Number of students at Breslau, in the winter-semester, 676; of Professors, 40 ordinary, 10 extraordinary, 26 private docents, 4 lecturers, and 7 other teachers:—at Giessen, 445 students; Göttingen, 691; Heidelberg, 633; Jena, 423; Leipzig, 867; Marburg, 271—a great reduction; Tübingen, 847; Würzburg, 512.—Hupfeld, of Marburg, is successor of Gesenius, at Halle. Bekkar has published a new edition of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; Böckh, a metrical translation of the *Antigone* of Sophocles; Hengstenberg, the 2d vol. of his *Com. on the Psalms*; Tholuck, one on the *Psalms* also; Hävernich, on *Ezekiel*; Dr. M. Baumgarten, a private docent in the University of Kiel, has published a portion of the first part of a theological commentary on the Old Testament. The whole work is to be embraced in four parts; 1, A general introduction and the Pentateuch; 2, Historical Books; 3, Poetic and Didactic Books; 4, Prophets. It is intended to be in respect to the Old Testament, what Olshausen's is for the New, and its completion is looked for with interest.—The state of ecclesiastical matters is yet unsettled in Prussia. Whether Presbytery or Episcopacy will prevail, is uncertain. The tendency is rather towards the latter, and that High Churchism, of course. Tholuck commends the translation of Gladstone's work with a preface.—Julius Müller, of Halle, is increasingly popular. Doubtful whether Hävernich will succeed at Königsberg, and will probably go to Berlin. Uhland is in Leipsic, preparing an important historical work.

## France.

De Sacy's library, recently sold at auction, contained 364 Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Syrian manuscripts, of peculiar interest.—M. Siebold, the Dutch traveller, has presented to the Paris Academy of Science some beautiful maps of Japan, copied from those executed by Japanese geographers. The person who allowed the *European barbarian* to copy them, the chief astronomer of Japan, was imprisoned for it.—Louis-Philippe is engaged at his "Mémoires," which, it is said, commence with the emigration of the Duke of Orleans to Switzerland.

## Great Britain.

Puseyism has received a shock, but we shall not be surprised to see it recover with renewed energy and success.—The Free Church of Scotland has taken a noble stand, and, with the spirit manifested by its leaders and the people, will undoubtedly prosper.—Of course many books are issued from the press, illustrating the times of the Reformation. Among others, the *Life and Times of Reuchlin*, the Father of the German Reformation. We have received a copy of this work. It embodies the principal matter of the work by Mayerhoff, is written in a fine style, exhibits a view of the state of religion and literature in Germany prior to the reformation, and represents Reuchlin in an interesting light. It is well worthy to be read by all, in connection with D'Aubigné's *History of the Reformation*, to which it forms a fit introduction. It will soon be issued from the press in this city.—Kühner's *Greek Grammar*, announced in our April No., as to be published at Andover, has been translated and issued in London.

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